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NO.  93-81408- 


MICROFILMED  1993 
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A  UTHOR: 


STIRLING,  JAMES 
HUTCHISON 


TITLE: 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DATE: 


1882 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


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TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT 


THE  CKITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON : 


^ESTHETIC,  CATEGORIES,  SCHEMAITSM. 


TRANSLATION,  EEPBODUCTION,  COMMENTARY.  INDEX. 


WITH 


BIOGEAPHICAL  SKETCH. 


JAMES  HUTCHISON   STIRLING,   LL.D., 

FOREJON   MEMBER   OP  THE    PHILOSOPHICAL  SOCIETY   OF    BERLIN. 


NEW    YORK: 

G.    P.    PUTNAM'S    SONS, 

27  AND  29  WEST  23iiD  STREET. 
1882. 


CONTENTS. 


■nr 


Q5B 


vi*; 


\ 


/ 


J 


jrIv£'F.t\.C£)     ••••••••tf 

Biographical  Sketch, 

Beprodüction, 

Introduction, 

Book  I.  Apprehension — 

1.  Relation  of  Sense  to  Apprehension, 

2.  Relation  of  the  Understanding  to  Apprehension,    . 

Book  II.  Judgment,       ....... 

Translation  and  Commentary  : 
Introduction — 

I.  Difference  between  Pure  and  Empirical  Cognition, 
II.  We  do  possess  certain  a  priori  Cognitions,    . 

III.  Philosophy  stands  in  need  of  a  Science,  etc., 

IV.  Analytic  and  Synthetic  Judgments,    . 
V.  A  priori  Synthetics  are,  etc., 

VI.  General  Proposition  of  Pure  Reason,    . 
VII.  Idea  and  Divisions, 


PAGE 

ix 

XV 

I 
3 

34 
44 

78 


T.  C. 

115  345 

117  348 

119  351 

122  .355 

125  357 

129  359 

133  360 


Transcendental  ^Esthetic- 


0 

-I 


Vfcq> 


§1 

§  2.  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Space, 

§  3.  Transcendental  Exposition, 

Inferences,        .... 
§  4.  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Time, 
§  5.  Transcendental  Exposition, 
§  6.  Inferences,       .... 


138  362 

140  ?% 

143  372 

144  373 
147  377 

149  377 

150  377 


411397 


VI 


CONTENTS. 


Tkanslation  .ind  Commentary — continnsd : 
Transcendental  iEsthetic — ccmtinmd — 

§  7.  Further  Explanations,      .... 
§  8.  General  Kemarks,     ..... 

Transcendental  Logic — 
Of  Logic  in  General,  etc.,  etc.,     .... 

Book  I.    The  Analytic  of  Notions, 

§  9.  The  Logical  Function  of  Understanding, 
§  10.  The  Categories  or  Pure  Notions,     . 

^XX.  •  .  .  .  •  a  .  « 

§12 

§  13.  Principles  of  a  Transcendental  Deduction, 

§  14.  Transition  to  Deduction, 

^  15.  The  Possibility  of  Conjunction, 

§  16.  Synthetic  Unity  of  Apperception,  . 

§  17.  The  Axiom  of  it  Ultimate  Principle, 

§  18.  Meaning  of  Objective  Unity, . 

§  19.  Logical  Form  of  all  Judgments, 

§  20.  All  Perceptions  under  the  Categories,     . 

§  21.  Eeniark,         ...... 

§  22.  No  other  Function  of  Categories,    . 

§23 

§  24.  Application  of  Categories, 

§25 

§  26.  Deduction  of  Use  of  Categories, 

§  27.  Result  of  Deduction,      .... 

The  Deduction  in  its  First  Form,  .... 

Book  II.  The  Analytic  of  Judgments, 
Transcendentiil  Judgment,    . 
Chap.    I.  The  Schematism,     .... 
Chap.  II.  System  of  Primary  Propositions, 
Sec.      I.  Ultimate  Analytic  Principle, 
Sec.    II.  Ultimate  Synthetic  Principle, 
Sec.  III.  System  of  Synthetic  Primaries,    . 

1.  Axioms  of  Perception, .... 

2.  Anticipations  of  Sense, 

3.  Analogies  of  Experience, 

A.  Substance, 

B,  Causality, 

e.  Reciprocity, 


rAOK 

y^ 

C. 

153 

378 

157 

378 

16d 

383 

181 

383 

185 

386 

190 

387 

196 

391 

199 

393 

201 

394 

207 

404 

212 

406 

213 

408 

217 

409 

219 

409 

221 

412 

222 

413 

223 

413 

224 

413 

226 

413 

227 

414 

234 

420 

236 

420 

240 

443 

• 

44« 

243 

452 

245 

452 

248 

454 

256 

464 

258 

464 

261 

464 

265 

471 

268 

482 

273 

484 

282 

486 

288 

490 

294 

490 

316 

507 

CONTENTS. 

Translation  and  Co^mm^Am^cmtinued ; 

System  of  Synthetic  Primaries— con<tni«rf- 

4.  Postulates, 

General  Remark, ,        .        .        , 


Vll 

rAOE 

T.        C. 


323    509 
336    615 


Appendix:        .        .        ,  . 

I.  Pen-in-Hand  Analysis,  . 

II.  From  the  Prolegomena,  . 
III.  From  the  Logic,      . 

Index 


517 
518 
531 
540 

643 


• 


\ 


J 


11 


I 


PREFACE. 


It  may  be  desirable  to  premise  a  word  in  regard  to 
the  contents  of  this  book,  or  even  perhaps  its  name— 
*^  Text-book." 

We  all  feel  that  an  effect  inust  have  a  cause :  that 
is,  there  is  assumed  to  be  a  necessary  connexion  between 
them.  Still,  we  take  it  for  granted,  as  well,  that 
7naiters  of  fact  (which  any  case  of  causality  seems 
really  to  be)  are  always  contingent  and  never  neces- 
sary: their  contraries,  implying  no  contradiction, 
are  to  be  acknowledged  possible ;  as,  for  example,  the 
sun  rises  and  sets,  but  it  might  do  neither.  Hume, 
now,  pointed  out  the  discrepancy  here,  and  asked,— 
The  relation  of  cause  and  effect  being  matter  of  fact, 
why  do  we,  inconsistently,  assume  it  to  be  necessary? 
Kant,  again,  who  took  the  question  to  himself,  an- 
swered, — It  is  to  understate  the  question,  to  confine 
it  to  causality;  substance  and  accident,  action  and 
re-action,  are  as  necessarily  connected  as  a  cause  and 
its  effect ;  and  the  entire  interest,  rather,  relates  to  a 
general  system -a  general  system  of  necessary  con- 
nexion, necessary  synthesis,  or  say  synthetic  necessity, 
even  in  matters  of  fact. 

This  system,  now,— while  it  is  all  that,  properly 


tai!!ip!ii!piiiiipiiiiipr"w 


f 


X  PREFACK, 

and  peculiarly,  is  constitutive  either  of  or  with  Kant 
(anything  else,  unless  the  categorical  imperative^  being 
either  only  negative  and  regulative^  or  simply  a  corol- 
lary),— is  what  is  here  exhibited,  with  the  fullest 
details,  and  in  no  less  than  a  threefold  form.  For 
such  reason  (indicated)  it  is,  then,  that  this  book  is 
named.  Text-book  to  Kant. 

The  Translation  has  been  executed  with  every  care; 
and  notes  have  been  added  in  explanation  or  correc- 
tion of  the  text.  Existing  translations  have  neither 
been  now  referred  to,  nor  at  any  time,  indeed,  either 
used  or  read  (those  principally  in  vogue,  however, 
having  years  ago  been  sufficiently  consulted,  legiti- 
mately to  warrant  a  general  judgment). 

It  has  been  the  aim  of  the  Commentary  to  leave  as 
few  obstacles  as  possible  between  the  reader  and  a 
full  understanding  of  the  transcendental  system  of  Kant. 
Perhaps  the  very  word  transcendental  may  henceforth 
carry,  in  general,  a  somewhat  saner  sense  than  seems 
currently  in  use  at  present. 

In  supplement  both  of  translation  and  commentary 
(which,  reasonably,  are  based  on  the  second  edition'), 
pertinent  extracts  will  be  found  to  have  been  made 
from  the  first  edition  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason^ 
as  also  from  the  Prolegomena^  early  pen-in-hand  sum- 
maries, etc. 

In  the  Index  there  has  been  a  very  special  endea- 

»  The  special  text  that  underlies  this  volume  is  (what  is  most  gener- 
ally found  here)  that  of  Kant's  collected  works  at  the  hands  of  Rosen- 
kranz and  Schubert :  the  other  edition,  Hartenstein's,  I  do  not  happen  to 
have  seen.  I  had  a  little  old  Graetz  reprint  (1795)  of  the  second 
edition  of  the  K.  of  P.  R.  beside  me  as  well. 


PREIACE. 


XI 


vour  to  provide  the  reader  with  a  complete  referential 
guide. 

The  Reproduction^  that,  by  way  of  introduction, 
precedes  the  translation,  will  be  found  to  cover  the 
whole  ground  occupied  by  the  rest  of  the  book. 
Executed  in  1862,  it  is  all  that  exists  of  the  "  Exposi- 
tion of  Kant "  which  is  several  times  mentioned  in 
the  Secret  of  Hegel  as  prior  to  that  work.  Perhaps 
some  of  my  friendly  correspondents  will — so  far  in 
response  to  their  wishes — be  pleased  to  see  this  ex- 
position at  last.  I  only  regret,  as  I  write  this,  that 
Mr  Lewes,  who  was  one  of  the  most  earnest  of  these, 
is  not  now  alive  to  honour  it  with  his  perusal.  It  is 
the  continued  interest  in  Kant,  as  well  as  my  recent, 
somewhat  intimate  occupation  with  the  subject,  that 
has  led  to  publication  at  length. 

In  the  Biographical  Sketchy  taking  a  day  as  usually 
spent  by  Kant,  and  filling  into  the  distribution  of  it 
salient,  characteristic  expressions  of  his  gathered  from 
his  whole  works,  some  little  has  been  attempted,  as 
well  in  indication  of  the  man,  as  of  the  peculiarity  of 
his  modes  and  subjects  of  thought  generally. 


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TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT: 

THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 


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BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


It  is  five  o'clock  of  a  winter's  morning  in  the  year  179-  and, 
prompt  to  the  minute,  a  stiff,  erect,  old-soldier  of  a  servant 
briskly  throws  up  the  door  of  a  small  sleeping-room, — where 
never  the  sun  shone,  nor  a  fire  entered, — with  the  words, 
" Herr  Professor,  die  Zeit  ist  angekommen!"  Nor  does  the 
Professor  addressed  neglect  the  call.  Sitting  up  at  once,  he 
considerately  divests  himself  of  the  carefully-calculated  appli- 
ances of  the  night.  The  Professor  is  Kant,  the  caller  his 
inexorable  old  servant  Lampe,  and  the  scene  the  philosopher's 
simple  bed-closet,  in  his  simple  dwelling-house,  in  the  remote 
and  winter-dismal  Koenigsberg. 

Once  dressed,  the  Professor  smokes  his  one  daily  pipe  of 
tobacco,  and  (without  eating)  drinks  his  two  daily  cups  of  tea. 
Were  it  a  matter  of  choice  with  him,  he  would  prefer  coffee ; 
but  he  finds  it  heating,  and  he  relinquishes  it.  Neither  is  it 
as  a  matter  of  sense  that  he  inhales  the  fragrance  of  the 
weed  at  this  so  early  morning-hour.  No ;  that  to  him  is  the 
pain  and  penalty  of  a  nauseous  and  confusing  duty.  He  is 
but  a  little  man,  the  Herr  Professor,  hardly  more  than  five 
feet  in  height,  small-boned,  fleshless,  meagre,  thin,  evanescent 
as  a  shadow  ;  and  these  awkwardly  gulped  tobacco-fumes  are 
but  the  medicinal  nauseant  with  which  philosophy  would 
clear  and  cleanse  the  mala  pituita  from  its  poor,  sunken, 
narrow,  little  chest.  Not,  however,  that,  in  this  case,  to  be 
always  frail  is  ever  to  be  actually  ill.  Against  that,  plainly, 
there  are  subtler  expedients  in  use  than  even  the  matutinal 
nauseant ;  for  there  is  a  cheerful  red  on  the  cheek,  there  is  an 
alert  eye  in  the  head  of  the  little  philosopher.  Blue,  loving, 
and  true,  those  eyes  of  his  at  once  touch  all  men  irresistibly 
into  affection  and  respect     Not  large,  the  head  is  handsome 


/ 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


II 


It  is  five  o'clock  of  a  winter*s  morning  in  the  year  179-,  and, 
prompt  to  the  minute,  a  stiff,  erect,  old-soldier  of  a  servant 
briskly  throws  up  the  door  of  a  small  sleeping-room, — where 
never  the  sun  shone,  nor  a  fire  entered, — with  the  words, 
" Herr  Professor,  die  Zeit  ist  angekommen!"  Nor  does  the 
Professor  addressed  neglect  the  call.  Sitting  up  at  once,  he 
considerately  divests  himself  of  the  carefully-calculated  appli- 
ances of  the  night.  The  Professor  is  Kant,  the  caller  his 
inexorable  old  servant  Lampe,  and  the  scene  the  philosopher's 
simple  bed-closet,  in  his  simple  dwelling-house,  in  the  remote 
and  winter-dismal  Koenigsberg. 

Once  dressed,  the  Professor  smokes  his  one  daily  pipe  of 
tobacco,  and  (without  eating)  drinks  his  two  daily  cups  of  tea. 
Were  it  a  matter  of  choice  with  him,  he  would  prefer  cofiee ; 
but  he  finds  it  heating,  and  he  relinquishes  it.     Neither  is  it 
as  a  matter  of  sense  that  he  inhales  the  fragrance  of  the 
weed  at  this  so  early  morning-hour.     No ;  that  to  him  is  the 
pain  and  penalty  of  a  nauseous  and  confusing  duty.     He  is 
but  a  little  man,  the  Herr  Professor,  hardly  more  than  five 
feet  in  height,  small-boned,  fleshless,  meagre,  thin,  evanescent 
as  a  shadow ;  and  these  awkwardly  gulped  tobacco-fumes  are 
but  the  medicinal  nauseant  with  which   philosophy  would 
clear  and  cleanse  the  mala  pituita  from  its  poor,  sunken, 
narrow,  little  chest.     Not,  however,  that,  in  this  case,  to  be 
always  frail  is  ever  to  be  actually  ill.     Against  that,  plainly, 
there  are  subtler  expedients  in  use  than  even  the  matutinal 
nauseant ;  for  there  is  a  cheerful  red  on  the  cheek,  there  is  an 
alert  eye  in  the  head  of  the  little  philosopher.     Blue,  loving, 
and  true,  those  eyes  of  his  at  once  touch  all  men  irresistibly 
into  affection  and  respect     Not  large,  the  head  is  handsome 


xvi 


BlOGBAPiUCAL   SKETCH. 


enough;  and  the  face  under  it  h«„  fi     i    ,   • 

.  His  pipe  ended  and  his  tea  swallowed T.T 
lumself  for  his  seven  o'clort  uj  '  ^^^°*  "°^  prepares 

murky  lights  of  0Ü  or  tdlot  ['f^-''^"'  «'«lock  under  the 
Kcenigsb^rg !  Ah  but  his«  '\''T^'  <"'«.  dark,  wintry 
know^in,"    Tbt  know  hi,  I"''.  ^T''  '"  ^^">'  f^^  'hey 

nature-an  absoluily  tL  ItuT.^"  :''''  '^'^"'"'^'^  '^^ 
itself.  With  all  his\^m.\Z  y  "  <=«°«cientiousness 
know  him  to  be  the  mo  tl^f  ^  ?  '^''^"»•■«'"«nte.  too,  they 
yet  the  man  whf  oX  dTdt  S  t'">"  "'  '"°^^*'  ^^ 
that  "did  any  man  propose  to  l^'  ^''  ''""'*  '^^  "^'^  ^'P«- 

a  good  actionjiim  ifewodd Ihank  "'"  "  '"  '"*  "''~^' 

tho^ä^re;mtterifhf  ""^"^^  ''"^''^'^  ^"'  ^^•«*<'». 

^itU  which  he  seems  to  Sktr  ?,  '''''^  "^^  ^°^^  ^«i«« 
this  morning,  in  that  honest  tmWe  of  Z  ^'  ^"^  '^'^^ 
faculties  by  which  lo4 1  3,    /  '^"affected  talk,  of  the 

wes  to'which  thX\r:^är  -^  *'^  ^-«^^  ^- 

which  they  derive  ™i^;;;-^^  unde.tanding)  from 
perceptions  and  notions  (ZL^  distinction  between 

brings  forward  the  rr:iStr~SarÄ^^^     '^"^^ 
understanding    disposes   it   Sri  ™  ,®™^  ^°'  thinking;  it  is 

notions;  fori;  ev  Co-^Lof  '^^^^'^  ''  ^'^^^  '"'^«  ^r 
matter mdforrn.   SdEZ??  "'"''  ^'  «^'«K-^nshed 
cognition  is  identical   wtTXt^^^^^^^ 
notion,  intuition  and  discourse     ^      ,,?'",  Perception   and 
opposed  to  intuitive  co'S„  .^'^^^''^^  ^»gnition  is  not 

nition  thro^h  i?e«nm  S  ?^  ^''""''^^  "«^"««n  (cog- 
taneity)  that"  rSl  B^^TgI  T  'f""^'  ''''  ^i- 
again.is  that  other  interJri:epSi'"*  «PPrehension. 

duplicity :  internal  sense  dflr»„^  ^'  ^^°  ^^^  »  certain 

complex ;  appercept  oT  ruSr  "°  '  ^*'*'*^*'  P«'««P«ve 
tion.  a  thought,  a  loS  S  ,  f ''°"'°'''' "  ''«*  *  'cflec- 
mtter  of  cfnt;nt^S  on  ° s  "t  frl  ^"-«^"-«y  "f  «" 

apprehension,  nor  th  s  that    Cn      °'^''''  ''^^''^'' ''  ""'^ 

tüat    The  one  is  pure,  the  other  em- 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


XVll 


f 


pirical,  etc.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  Ego 
itself  changes  and  differs  as  its  states  happen  to  change  and 
differ ;  for  it  is  only  by  reference  to  its  identity  that  their 
difference  is  recognised.  A  sound  understanding,  a  practised 
judgment,  a  comprehensive  reason,  constitute  the  entire  com- 
pass of  the  intellect.  The  servant,  under  formal  orders,  need 
only  understand ;  the  agent  of  a  special  duty,  with  merely 
general  directions  to  guide  him,  can  but  judge ;  but  the  chief, 
who  has  to  anticipate  cases  and  find  the  rule  for  them,  must 
reason.  He  who  is  deficient  in  wit  is  an  ohtusum  caput,  a 
stumpfe  Kopf,  a  blockhead.  Deficiency  of  judgment,  but  with 
wit,  is  stidtitia,  insiilsitas,  Albernheit,  silliness,  scatterbrained- 
ness ;  ivithout  wit,  it  is  stiipiditas,  Dummheit^  what  charac- 
terizes the  dolt.  He  who  is  incapable  of  learning,  or  into 
whom  nothing  can  be  got, — he,  like  an  untempered  blade,  is 
hehes,  dull,  einfältig,  a  dunce.  He  who  can  only  imitate  is  a 
Finsel,  a  shallowpate ;  while  he  who  can  originate  is  a  Kopf 
He  who  sacrifices  the  substantial  for  the  unsubstantial,  as 
home-comfort  for  glitter  abroad,  is  a  Thor,  a  fool ;  but  the 
Thor  that  is  offensive  is  a  Narr,  a  beast.^ 

His  lecture  over,  Kant  now  returns  to  his  abode,  and 
occupies  himself  with  his  studies  till  it  wants  a  quarter  of 
one.  Warned  by  his  housekeeper,  he  then  springs  up  with 
alacrity,  and  hastens  to  deposit  on  the  dining-table,  for  his 
own  consumption  at  a  prescribed  moment,  a  small  glass  of 
rum  carefully  covered  with  paper.  That  effected,  he  dresses 
for  dinner.  This,  in  the  twenty-four  hours,  is  his  only  meal ; 
and  he  eats  it  largely  (for  him),  and  with  enjoyment.  It 
usually  consists  of  three  dishes  with  dessert  and  two  bottles 
of  wine.  Kant,  now,  like  the  wise  man  he  is,  throws  off  the 
harness  of  the  intellect,  and  dons  the  lounging-coat  of  the 
body.  But  he  will  not,  like  a  mere  brute,  only  crunch  his 
bones  in  solitude ;  he  has  always  at  least  two,  and  sometimes 
five,  to  dine  with  him.  He  will  have  a  rational  zest  to  his 
meal  in  the  company  and  discourse  of  his  fellows. 

Once  at  table,  Kant  directly  sets  himself  to  put  his  guests 

at  their  ease :  he  even  salutes  or  rallies  them  in  the  homely 

provincial  of  the  district.     Kant  is  only  a  Professor ;  but  he 

has  lived  in  the  houses  of  the  distinguished :  he  feels  up  to  a 

*  Kant  fills  whole  pages,  in  work  after  work,  with  distinctions  like  these. 

h 


XVlll 


BIOGUAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


XIX 


tMng  or  two ;  he  will  be  quite  the  man  of  the  world,  and  not 
a  cuistre.     The  discourse  at  table  must  be  light,  then,  and 
such  as  gently  to  entertain  and  stimulate.     Kant  has  his  own 
expedients,  indeed,  for  keeping  the  ball  up ;  for  he  hates  the 
mortal  agony  of  a  pause.     Is  it  not  curious,  he  remarks,  that 
poUromi  should  be  only  a  contraction  consisting  of  the  first 
syllables  of  the  words  pollex  trumatits?    Or  he  resorts  to  a 
mild  conundrum  and  asks.  Why  a  woman  ought  to  be  at  once 
like  and  unlike  the  town-clock  or  a  snail  ?    Like,  to  be  sure, 
as  correct  to  the  minute;   but  unlike,  as  not  proclaiming 
everything  that  happens.     Like,  again,  as  keeping  to  a  house 
of  her  own ;  but  unlike,  as  never  carrying  her  all  on  her 
back !    The  French  feel  beauty,  he  points  out  again  ;  but  it 
is  the  English  who  are  open  to  the  sublime.     And  is  it  not 
strange  that,  whereas  the  French  commonly  like  the  English, 
the   English,   on  the   contrary,   as    commonly  despise   the 
French.     But  it  is  the  commercial  spirit  does  this,  and  not 
possibly  the  mere  rivalry  of  neighbours,  as  England  is  quite 
well  aware  of  its  own  indisputable  superiority. 

And  here  now  the  thought  of  other  nations  suggests  phy- 
sical geography  to  him.     He  cannot  help  referring  to  some  of 
the  most  interesting  facts  that  have  reached  him.    There  is 
such  a  thing  as  a  milk-white  sea,  he  says ;  you  have  that  at 
the  Moluccas.     The  English  and  Scotch  differ  from  the  High- 
landers, as  being  very  delicately  brought  up !    Negroes  are 
born  white,  all  to  a  ring  round  the  navel.    The  ibis  dies 
the  moment  it  quits  Egypt.     The  lion  is  so  noble,  he  wiU  not 
put  a  paw  upon  a  woman.     He  is  not  afraid  of  the  crowing  of 
a  cock,  but  he  runs  away  from  a  snake  or  a  fire.    The  marrow 
of  Ms  bones,  when  dried  in  the  sun,  is  so  hard  that  you  may 
strike  a  light  with  it.    The  water  at  the  Cape  is  so  pure  that 
it  remains  sweet  when  brought  to  Europe.    If  you  make  a 
cup  of  the  rhinoceros's  horn,  any  poison  will  splinter  it.     A 
tree  in  Congo  has  its  leaves  and  its  bark  both  poisonous,  but 
the  one  is  the  antidote  to  the  other,  take  which  you  wiU  first. 
In  the  Canary  Islands  there  is  the  tree  of  life  that  never  rots, 
whether  in  the  ground  or  in  water.     There  is  a  mussel  in 
Italy  that  gives  out  so  much  light,  you  can  see  to  read  by  it. 
In  Languedoc  there  is  a  hot  spring  that  hatches  eggs,  but  its 
water  on  the  fire  comes  much  slower  a-bsg  than  ordinary 


II 


water.  A  petrifying  spring  at  Clermont  has  actually  made 
an  ordinary  stone-bridge  over  a  river.  Wild  beasts  only  eat 
Negroes  in  Gambia,  and  leave  Europeans  alone.  The  Negroes 
in  America  are  immensely  fond  of  dog's  flesh,  and  all  the 
dogs  bark  at  them.^ 

By-and-by  Kant  takes  an  opportunity  to  tell  his  guests 
what  he  knows  about  Swedenborg.  In  the  end  of  the  year 
1761  Swedenborg  was  called  to  a  certain  Princess  whose  great 
good  sense  and  excellent  understanding  made  it  all  but  im- 
possible for  her  to  be  deceived.  She  had  heard  many  strange 
things  told  of  the  visions  of  the  man,  and  wanted  to  convince 
herself  of  the  truth  of  the  matter  by  a  trial  of  her  own. 
Swedenborg  came  to  her,  and,  after  they  had  conversed  to- 
gether for  some  time,  she  commissioned  him  to  deliver  a 
secret  message  to  the  spirit  of  one  of  her  departed  friends. 
In  a  few  days  Swedenborg  was  once  more  ushered  into  her 
presence.  The  lady  said.  Well  ?  and  Swedenborg,  stooping, 
whispered  into  her  ear  a  word  or  two  which  drove  the  blood 
from  her  face  and  chilled  her  to  the  marrow.  What  he  had 
whispered  was  true,  she  said,  and  it  could  have  been  com- 
municated to  him  only  by  the  dead. 

Madame  Hauteville,  widow  of  an  Envoy^  from  Holland  to 
the  Court  of  Stockholm,  was  summoned,  some  time  after  the 
death  of  her  husband,  to  pay  an  account  to  the  goldsmith 
Croon,  which  she  was  morally  convinced  a  man  of  her  late 
husband's  punctual  and  orderly  ways  must  already  long  ago 
have  settled.  The  sum  concerned  was  a  considerable  one, 
and  in  the  trouble  and  anxiety  of  the  circumstances  she  was 
induced  to  speak  to  Swedenborg,  who  happened  to  be  then 
at  homa  Swedenborg  cheerfully  undertook  to  carry  a  mes- 
sage to  her  dead  husband,  and  bring  her  his  answer  on  the 
point  Accordingly,  three  days  afterwards,  he  presented 
himself  at  Madame  Hauteville's,  when  it  chanced  that  she 
was  entertaining  company.  In  his  cold  way  he  announced 
to  the  lady  that  he  had  seen  and  spoken  with  her  departed 
husband,  who  assured  him  that  the  money  had  been  paid, 
and  that  the  receipt  was  then  lying  in  a  certain  desk.  Here- 
upon the  lady  exclaimed  that  that  very  desk  had  been  com- 

*  Almost  an  infinite  number  of  such  stories  are  to  loe  found  in  Kant, 
and  all  gravely  propounded  ! 


iH 


XX 


BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH. 


pletely  cleared  out  and  its  contents  thoroughly  overhauled 
and  carefuDy  examined,  but  that  not  a  vestige  of  any  such 
paper  had  been  discovered.  Yes,  said  Swedenborg,  but  your 
husband  intimates  that,  if  you  take  out  a  certain  drawer  on 
the  left  side,  you  will  see  a  board,  which  you  must  push  away, 
and  then  you  will  find  a  concealed  shelf  with  the  Secret  De- 
spatches of  the  Government  on  it,  and  beside  them  the  receipt 
of  Croon  for  payment  of  the  plate.  At  these  words  of  Sweden- 
borg's  the  widow  ascended  to  the  room  where  the  desk  in  ques- 
tion lay,  followed  by  her  whole  company,  in  whose  presence 
all  proved  itself  to  be  exactly  as  Swedenborg  had  described. 

There  is  the  story,  too,  of  how  Swedenborg,  when  at  Gothen- 
burg, saw  the  conflagration  that  was  then  raging  at  Stock- 
holm (some  two  hundred  and  fifty  mües  off,  and  with  the 
whole  breadth  of  Sweden  between  them),  and  threatening  his ' 
own  dwelling-house  there,  and  of  how,  after  watching  it  for 
some  hours,  he  became  composed  at  last,  and  said  the  fire  had 
stopped  at  such  and  such  a  buüding :  all  which,  too,  proved 
itself  true.  In  fact,  the  friend  from  whom  the  last  state- 
ment directly  came  knew  intimately  all  the  best  people 
in  Gothenburg,  and  he  spent  two  months  there  directly 
investigating  a  matter  that  was  then  recent.  While,  as  for  the 
first  statement,  it  was  communicated  by  a  personal  friend, 
who  had  been  directly  present  to  the  whole  transaction.* 

Turning  to  science  now,  Kant  tells  his  guests  of  his  fancies 
about  the  construction  of  the  universe.  He  shows  them,  too, 
how,  in  process  of  time,  the  resistance  of  the  tides  must  bring 
the  rotation  of  the  Earth  to  a  stop,  with  consequent  de*^ 
struction  of  the  planet.  Many  evolutions  and  revolutions, 
he  continues,— petrifactions,  crystallizations,  organizations,— 
must  have  preceded  the  advent  of  man.  The  thought  of  an 
affinity  in  things  such  that,  in  consequence  of  it,  they  must  have 
originated  either,  genus  after  genus,  from  a  single  primitive 
one,  or,  as  it  were,  from  a  single  generative  mother^s  lap,  leads 
to  ideas  so  monstrous  that  reason  shudders  back  from  them.* 
There  is  a  wonderful  power  in  the  mind  to  master  the  body, 

«  Kant  actually  heaps  a  number  of  circumstantial  particulars  together 
which  almost  seem  to  authenticate  these  wonderful  stories. 

•  The  anticipations,  as  above,  of  Herschel  and  Lapkce,  of  Thomson 
and  1  ait,  are  known  to  eveiybody ;  but  not  so  that  assonance,  let  it  be 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


XXI 


is  the  next  remark,  and  Kant  expatiates  on  all  his  thousand 
and  one  little  theories  about  health  and  disease.  The  plan, 
on  the  whole,  is,  he  says,  not  to  disturb  nature;  for  the 
shortest-lived  are  just  those  who  are  for  ever  striving  to  set 
death  at  defiance. 

Health  and  the  duty  to  one's  self  suggesting  to  Kant  the 
question  of  temperance,  he  cannot  help  exclaiming  that  a 
man  in  a  state  of  drunkenness  is  only  a  beast :  the  false  hap- 
piness and  spurious  freedom  from  care  which  result  from 
artificial  stimulants  can  only  end  in  that  manner.  And  yet, 
something  is  to  be  said  on  the  other  side ;  for  how  wine,  short 
of  intoxication,  promotes  good  fellowship  and  open-hearted 
free  communication  between  man  and  man — nay,  how  it  has 
even  the  merit  to  foster  virtue  itself!  Did  not  old  Cato 
himself,  according  to  Cicero  and  Horace,  feed  the  flame  of  his 
integrity  with  wine  ?  Hume,  too,  liked  his  bottle  of  port 
with  his  rubber  of  whist ;  and  he  actually  execrates  the  guest 
who  cannot  forget  in  the  morning  the  events  of  the  night. 
It  is  remarked  of  women,  priests,  and  Jews,  that  they  do  not 
get  drunk ;  for  people  believe  in  them  from  the  outside.  Ah, 
one  might  marry  were  it  not  for  that  wart  on  the  nose  or  that 
gap  in  the  teeth  ! 

But  now  the  sitting  has  almost  reached  the  very  extremest 
limit  that  Kant  endures,  and,  to  the  satisfaction  of  all,  the 
company  breaks  up  and  departs.  Kant,  too,  sallies  out  for 
his  walk.  Day  after  day  it  is  over  the  same  ground,  and  at 
a  certain  part  of  it  he  must  pay  toll  to  certain  beggars,  whom 
his  own  benevolence  has  gathered  for  him.  Past  the  beggars, 
Kant  ^n  resign  himself  to  the  course  of  his  own  thoughts. 
The  sight  of  his  legs,  as  he  walks,  suggests  to  him  his  own 
oft-repeated  original  observation  that  white  stockings  do  more 
justice  to  one's  calves  than  black  ones.  And,  so,  what  a  thing 
is  seeming !  How  often  does  not  studied  obscurity  that  plays 
the  part  of  depth  obtain  the  credit  it  seeks !    But  to  save 

of  what  force  it  may,  to  Darwin.  Here,  too,  is  a  curious  anticipation 
of  Bulwer.  Did  we  take  up  at  nights  the  threads  of  our  dreams  where 
we  left  them  off  when  we  awoke,  it  is  possible  that  we  should  come  to 
think  we  lived  in  two  different  worlds.  And  this  concerning  one  novel, 
we  may  refer  to  another  such.  Kant's  milk-white  sea,  as  lately  men- 
tioned, reappears  in  The  Green  Hand. 

52 


XXll 


BIÜGKAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


the  ship  we  must  give  the  whale  a  barrel  to  play  with.     It 
does  not  do  to  be  bashful,  or  put  a  great  weight  on  what  folks 
think  of  us.     Just  to  fancy  now  that  Hume — the  fine  and 
gentle  Hume — was  a  great  four-square  man,  and  yet  was 
bashful,  or,  in  his  own  language,  Uaet  (our  Uöde)  \  he  speaks 
very  meaningly  of  the  horror  that  attends  the  break-down  of 
the  first  attempt  to  speak  with  the  due  assurance.^   The  season 
suggests  now  that  the  South  Pole  is  colder  than  the  North 
Pole :  there  is  more  land  north,  and  the  sun  remains  there  in 
summer  eight  days  longer.    Strange,  how,  in  northern  lati- 
tudes, though  no  wood  grows,  there  is  plenty  drifted.     In 
Siberia  they  consider  the  devil  only ;  in  Heaven,  they  say, 
God  is  too  far  off;  but  it  is  the  devil  rules  here.     The  vul- 
garest  smut  or  the  stupidest  practical  joke  will  be  hailed 
by  the  common  man  with  quite  as  much  joy  as  Kepler 
may  have  felt  over  some  discovery  his  share  in  which  he 
would  not  have  exchanged  for  an  entire  principality.    The 
smallest  insect  that  springs  pushes  the  earth  back.    A  dog 
is  old  when  a  man  is  scarcely  out  of  his  boyhood ;  and  the 
cedars  of  Lebanon  are  but  middle-aged  when  its  firs  have 
long  since  perished.    Perhaps  five  or  six  thousand  years  are 
but  a  day  in  the  life  of  the  earth.     Possibly,  therefore,  the 
earth  was  several  thousand  years  in  existence  before  any  life 
appeared  on  it.     No  chance,  however,  or  mere  physical  cause 
can  produce  an  organism :  give  me  all  the  matter  in  the  world, 
and  I  could  not  make  a  caterpillar.    There  are  certainly  pro- 
visions, at  the  same  time,  in  view  of  new  conditions :  birds 
get  additional  feathers  when  transferred  to  colder  climates. 
But  qucelihet  nattcra  est  conservatrix  sui.    America,  at  its 
hottest,  cannot  grow  a  Negro,  or  even  a  Hindoo,  of  its  own. 
What  should  show  the  origin  of  plants  and  animals  would  be 
a  science  for  the  gods  who  were  there  at  the  time.     How  it 
darkens !   Ah,  day  is  beautiful,  but  night  is  sublime.    Yes,  the 
English — that  is  what  newspapers  do ;  it  is  scarcely  possible 
that  there  can  be  any  nation  where  understanding  is  so  universal, 
even  among  the  lowest  classes,  as  is  the  case  with  England.^ 
Keturning  from  his  walk,  Kant  now  seats  himself  for  the 

•  Of  course  Kant  is  not  responsible  for  the  etymology  here. 

*  These  propos  are  rather  miscellaneous,  perhaps,  but  there  are  thou- 
sands of  others  the  like,  in  which  Kant  was  pleased  to  indulge  himself. 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


XXlll 


evening  by  the  stove  in  his  room;  and,  fixing  his  eye  on 
the  point  of  a  church-spire  which  he  sees  out  of  window,  he 
runs  over  in  mind — what  was  his  work — his  System. 

I  am  so  far  from  considering  metaphysic  worthless  or 
unnecessary,  he  thinks,  that,  on  the  contrary,  ever  since  I 
have  seen  into  its  nature  and  the  place  proper  to  it  in  the 
circle  of  our  knowledge,  I  am  convinced  that  even  the  true 
and  eternal  weal  of  the  human  race  depends  upon  it — an 
estimate  that  may  appear  to  everybody  else  extravagant  and 
wild.  But  it  comes  to  this,  one  ought  to  ask :  1.  Am  I  right 
in  my  distinction  between  analytic  and  synthetic  judgments, 
as  well  as  in  my  statement  of  the  nature  and  value  of  the 
latter  when  a  priori — that  they  constitute,  namely,  the  founda- 
tion of  metaphysic?  2.  If  it  be  true  that  we  cannot  syn- 
thetically decide  upon  anything  a  priori,  unless  in  reference 
to  such  formal  conditions,  whether  with  regard  to  perceptions 
of  sense  or  notions  of  the  understanding,  as  i^recede  experience, 
and  render  it  possible — such  experience  as  this  of  ours,  that 
is  ?  3.  Whether,  therefore,  finally,  all  speculative  cognition 
a  priori  possible  for  us,  though  granting  necessary  existence 
to  unknown  things  in  themselves  {noumeiia),  avails  to  reach 
only  pheno7nena,  mere  appearance  to  sense,  and  in  this  way 
leaves  room  for  a  natural  dialectic,  which,  being  understood 
and  seen  into,  we  are  immediately  at  home  as  regards  the 
true  nature  and  limits  at  once  of  our  knowledge  and  hopes  ?  * 

For,  any  cognition,  to  deserve  the  name  metaphysical,  can- 
not be  a  posteriori  (matter  of  fact,  then,  and,  consequently,  con^ 
tingent),  but  must  be  a  priori.  Now,  there  is  only  sense  and 
understanding ;  and  the  former  being  the  special  seat  of  the 
a  posteriori,  it  must  be  the  faculties  of  the  understanding 
alone  that  can  concern  the  a  priori.  That  is,  our  faculties 
themselves  will  contribute  to  experience,  even  as  we  receive  it 
through  sense,  certain  elements  of  their  own.  But  a  notion 
alone  never  gives  an  actual  or  real  cognition.  We  may  con- 
ceive centaurs,  harpies,  gorgons,  chimaeras,  and  fancy  all 
manner  of  new  principles  or  new  senses ;  still  these  are  but 
notions  and  empty — they  give  no  knowledge.  Suppose  we 
have  at  any  time  a  notion  only,  what  is  it  we  usually  do  to 

>  Only  the  above  paragraph  has  actual  words  of  Kant  in  regard ;  what 
loUows  is  et^ually  true  to  Kant,  but  only  to  be  named  reproduction. 


XXIV 


BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH. 


realize  it  ?    We  turn  to  experience,  we  turn  to  the  object  of 
it,  we  try  this  object,  to  which  the  notion  itself  is  due ;  and, 
in  this  way,  learning  fact  after  fact,  we  fill  the  notion  and 
convert  it  into  a  reality.     But,  this  being,  it  would  appear 
that,  in  the  case  of  a  pnHori  notions,  it  must,  once  for  all,  be 
quite  impossible  to  attain  to  any  a  priori  knowledge  that 
shall  be  worthy  of  the  name.    A  prm^i,  there  is  no  turning 
to  experience,  to  special  sense,  possible.     Let  us,  then,  have 
even  an  infinitude  of  a  priori  notions,  they  must,  as  mere 
notions,  and  without  filling,  prove  worthless — mere  possible 
fancies,  dreams,  not  positive  cognitions,  realities.    That  is 
what  the  want  of  the  special  senses  brings  about  for  us.     If 
we  have  a  prim^i  notions,  it  is  an  indispensable  necessity  that 
we  should  have  a  medium  of  sense  to  apply  to  for  such 
material  as  shall  impregnate  them  with  meaning — give  them 
sense,  as  we  say — render  them  objectively  real.    But  can  a 
medium  of  sense  be,  by  any  possibility,  a  priori  f    Wliy, 
sense  is  precisely  what  is  a  posteriori..    Sense  and  the  a  pos- 
teriori are,  in  fact,  convertible  terms:  they  are  identical. 
Each  is  the  other ;  the  latter  is  the  former,  and  the  former  the 
latter.     It  is  manifestly  impossible  and  absurd — an  actual 
contradiction  in  terms — to  speak  of  an  a  pHori  sense.    And 
without  it,  any  other  a  priori — even  if  true — must  be  and 
can  only  be  a  mere  meaningless  region  of  impalpable  ghosts 
— domos  vacitas  et  inania  regna. 

But  we  have  spoken  of  the  possibility  of  the  faculties  them- 
selves contributing  elements  to,  so  to  speak,  the  bolus  of  ex- 
perience ;  why,  then,  should  we  not  suppose  this  of  the  faculty 
of  sense  ?  It  is  true  that  each  of  the  five  special  senses  yields, 
in  odours,  savours,  colours,  etc.,  only  what  is  simply  the  a  pos- 
teriori proper.  Each  odour,  savour,  colour,  what  not,  is  a  mere 
sensation,  a  mere  feeling,  subjective  affection,  that  has  to  be 
waited  for — something,  consequently,  that  can  only  be  a  pos- 
teriori. Still,  are  there  no  general  forms  which  may  be  com- 
mon to  them  all,  and,  as  common  to  them  all,  only  possibly 
due  to  the  very  machinery  of  sense  itself  as  machinery  ?  Alay 
not  what  we  may  call  general  sense,  namely,  have  forms  of  its 
own,  actual  sensuous  forms, — even,  so  to  speak,  actual  material 
forms  ?  In  sense,  besides  the  mere  feelings  contributed  by  the 
sensations,  there  ii  audi  a  thing  as  perception.    We  do  not  only 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


XXV 


feel  in  sense,  but  we  also  perceive — that  is,  we  discern  a 
manifold,  a  complex  of  units,  which  units  we  set  together  into 
the  one  object,  and  can  even  count.  Now,  that  in  sense  that 
holds  of  perception,  let  sensation  be  as  it  will,  may  possess 
actual  a  prioii  forms,  actual  a  priori  objective  forms — forms, 
that  is,  which  add  themselves  objectively,  even  as  objective 
units,  namely,  to  the  other  units  of  the  manifold  or  complex 
that  is  to  be  the  object  perceived.  Any  such  forms  must  be 
absolutely  general,  and  alone  absolutely  general:  are  there 
any  such?  Why,  all  things  whatever — that  is,  all  special 
sensations  whatever — are  in  time  and  space.  If  we  want 
absolutely  general  forms,  surely  these  are  they.  They  are 
absolutely  universal,  absolutely  unexceptive,  absolutely  neces- 
sary, absolutely  infinite ;  and  there  are  no  others.  But  time 
and  space  are  themselves  perceptible  manifolds:  time  is  a 
series  of  perceptibly  succeeding  moments ;  space,  though  infi- 
nite, is  as  a  stereoscopic  whole  of  length,  breadth,  and  thickness 
— it  is  a  perfect  aggregate  of  discernible  units.  Here,  then, 
is  a  perceptive,  a  sensuous  matter,  with  which  we  may,  in  two 
different  wavs,  fill  notions.  As  a  piHori,  too,  it  is  in  a  position 
to  fill  a  priori  notioua.  After  all,  «Lan,  it  is  only  these  latter 
we  want  now — accepting,  as  we  do  at  once,  time  and  space  as  a 
perfectly  satisfactory  medium  of  a  ijriori  sense.  Well,  then, 
it  is  logic  shall  yield  us  the  a  priori  notions.  Logic  is  an 
established  pure  science,  complete  in  all  its  parts,  and  as  pure 
(in  that  it  relates  to  the  mind  only),  it  is  also  perfectly  a 
priori.  This  science,  in  its  classification  of  judgments,  now, 
under  quantity,  quality,  relation,  and  modality,  yields  us  at 
once  the  entire  a  priori  tree  of  the  pure  functions  of  judg- 
ment; and  judgment  is  identical  with  the  understanding, 
judgment  is  identical  with  apperception,  judgment  is  identical 
with  consciousness,  with  what  I  call  the  Ego,  my  self. 

Here,  now,  then,  are  all  our  difficulties  removed,  and  the 
way  completely  cleared  for  us.  A  notion  to  have  reality, 
meaning,  or,  as  we  say,  sense,  must  have  a  sensible  complex 
filled  into  it ;  but  then,  again,  a  sensible  complex,  if  to  have 
connexion,  unity,  objectivity,  must  have  a  notion  into  which  it 
may  collapse,  and  become  henceforth  a  one  perceived  or  experi- 
enced entity.  These  stones,  and  edges  of  lime,  and  all  the  angles 
and  colours  in  them,  are  but  a  disjunct,  unintelligible  chaos 


XXVI 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


« 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


XXVll 


until  I  have  fused  them  all  together  into  the  single  articulate 
entity  and  identity  I  call  wall.  Wall,  now,  is  a  perfectly 
general  notion,  though,  of  course,  empirical  or  a  posteriori  in 
origin.  Wall,  too,  though  a  notion,  has  become,  as  in  amal- 
gamation with  those  sensuous  materials,  actually  perceptive. 
The  manifold  of  sensation  not  more  than  the  unity  of  notion, 
mediates  ihQ  perceptioTi.  And  this  is  general.  There  never 
can  be  formed  perception,  finished  perception,  unless  a  notion 
has  added  itself  to  the  sensation ;  though,  of  course,  there  may 
be  conceived  consciousness  of  the  units  of  what  we  may  call 
crude  objectivity  (time  and  space)  without  the  help  of  a 
notion ;  but  that  we  should  name  crude  perception,  perception 
as  perception,  and,  in  that  sense,  perception  proper. 

Now,  with  such  considerations  before  us,  it  is  easy  to  see 
that,  possessing  a  priori  notions  and  a  piiori  matter  of  sense, 
we  possess,  also,  all  the  ingredients  necessary  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  priori  objects.  These  a  priori  objects  we  shall  call 
scliemata;  and  the  schemata,  as  resulting  from  the  a  priori 
action  of  a  priori  function  (notions,  the  categories)  on  a  priori 
affection  (general  sense,  time  and  space),  will  prove  so  many 
checkers  foi'  reception  in.t:  objectivity  and  necessity  of  the 
mere  subjective  contingency  of  our  special  senses  in  their 
various  sensations ;  which,  as  such,  are  always,  evidently,  our 
own  states,  our  own  mere  feelings. 

And  here  we  see  the  answer  to  Hume  as  regards  the  ques- 
tion of  causality.  What  is  the  reason,  he  asked,  of  the  neces- 
sary connexion  we  attribute  to  all  actual  examples  of  it? 
Now,  he,  for  his  part,  assured  that  he  had  only  matters  of 
fact  before  him,  could  fall  on  no  rationale  but  reference  to 
natural  instinct  on  custom.  We,  for  our  parts,  again,  assured 
of  the  presence  of  necessity  of  synthesis  between  elements 
that  are  absolutely  alien  the  one  to  the  other,  have  become 
awake  to  this,  that  the  rationale  desiderated  cannot,  as  Hume 
supposed,  lie  in  any  element  of  experience,  but  must  be  sought 
for  in  a  source  that  is  absolutely  (not  relatively)  a  piHori, 
The  answer,  in  fact,  is  this.  The  nexus  of  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent is  a  function  of  judgment,  a  function  of  apperception, 
an  a  priori  notion,  and  its  action  on  a  certain  modus  of  time 
is  such  as  to  determine  this  modus  into  a  schema,  a  species,  a 
simnlacmm  of  the  law  of  causality,  which,  reflected  into  all 


actual  cases  of  cause  and  effect,  insinuates  into  these  that 
apodictic  necessity  which  we  predicate  of  them. 

But  it  is  now  ten  o'clock,  and  the  inexorable  Lampe  appears 
to  put  his  master  to  bed.  Kant,  as  his  principles  are,  can  only 
obey.  In  the  little  sunless,  fireless  bed-closet  which  we  have 
already  seen,  he  lays  him  down  on  his  little  bed  accurately 
adjusted  to  a  prescribed  angle — he  lays  him  down  and  in  a 
carefully  calculated  position  which  he  stoically  preserves. 
Lampe  covers  him  up,  and  wraps  him  in,  on  those  strictly 
scientific  principles  which  have  been  laid  down  for  him.  The 
philosopher  is  then  left  to  his  well- won  repose.  This  he  pur- 
sues, like  everything  else,  steadily.  His  lips  are  firmly  closed, 
and  he  breathes  through  his  nostrils  only.*  Then  his  thoughts, 
they,  too,  must  only  wander  in  an  authorized  tract.  He  "  shuts 
his  eyes  "  (as  his  phrase  is)  to  any  too  importunate  thought,  so 
that  gradually  such  confusion  of  the  ideas  springs  as  is  akin  to 
dream.  With  realization  of  all  these  subtle  calculations  and 
appliances,  then,  it  is  not  wonderful  that — after  due  work, 
exercise,  relaxation,  and  with  his  single  meal  now,  perhaps, even 
perfectly  assimilated — the  wise  little  body,  that  allows  itself 
only  seven  hours  of  sleep,  should  fall  gently  into  the  most 
natural  and  healthiest  of  slumbers — slumbers  that  are  only 
disturbed  at  five  o'clock  of  the  following  morning  by  the 
inexorable  Lampe  in  the  way  we  have  seen.  Such  now  has 
been  for  years,  and  will  remain  for  years,  the  philosopher's 
daily  course  of  life. 


Immanuel  Kant  was  born  at  Koenigsberg,  April  22,  1724, 
and  died  there  February  12,  1804.  His  parents  were  pious, 
respectable  people  in  humble  life;  his  father  a  saddler  of 
the  name  of  Cant,  and  by  descent  Scotch.  It  was  Immanuel 
himself  made  the  name  Kant,  in  order  to  preclude  the  pro- 
nunciation Zant.  His  course  in  life  was,  on  the  whole,  the 
usual  one  of  a  German  student  who  would  provide  for  himself 
by  the  pursuit  of  letters.     He  had  the  usual  training  at  school 

*  Talk  of  the  anticipation  of  Laplace  or  of  Thomson,  why  here  is 
another,  even  more  curious  than  of  Bulwer  and  the  Green  Hand.  Mr 
Catlin  startled  the  whole  kingdom  the  other  day  by  the  recommendation 
to  keep  our  mouths  shut.  And  Kant  knew  it  all,  and  practised  it  all  a 
hundred  years  ago ! 


.'  ^- 


XXVlll 


BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 


and  college.  At  the  usual  years,  he  was  the  usual  house-tutor. 
It  was  only  later  than  usual,  however,  that  he  seems  to  have 
qualified  himself  as  the  usual  university  teacher ;  and  he  was  no 
less  than  forty-six  years  of  age  when  he  came  into  port  at  last  as 
a  Professor.  As  teacher  and  professor — and  he  was  eminently 
successful  as  either — he  wrote  many  works,  of  which  the 
principal  ones  are  these :  First  of  all,  the  works  which  are  his 
workj  the  Three  Great  Kritiken,  namely ;  to  which  his  Pro- 
legomena, his  works  on  Morals  and  Law,  his  Metaphysic  of 
Nature,  and  his  Strife  of  the  Faculties  may  be  regarded  as  only 
supplementary.  The  Anthropology  is  very  interesting,  and 
the  Logic  must  be  read.  His  Eeligion  within  the  Limits  of 
Pure  Eeason  has  been  widely  influential,  and  is  the  respective 
corollary  to  his  philosophy.  The  student  has  much  to  gain 
also  by  a  perusal  of  his  shorter  essays,  as  his  review  of  Herder, 
his  Progress  of  Metaphysic,  On  Philosophy,  etc.  In  fact,  no 
one  writing  of  Kant  that  appeared  after  1781  can  well  be 
neglected.  Before  that  date,  too,  there  are  many  interesting 
papers — but  they  are  all  to  be  found  named  in  their  order  in 
a  very  useful  chronological  table  at  page  211  of  the  eleventh 
volume  of  the  Works. 

It  is  now — 1881 — exactly  a  hundred  years  since  the  publi- 
cation of  the  first  great  Kritik ;  and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that,  at  this  moment,  the  place  of  Kant,  as  generally  esti- 
mated, is  that  of  greatest  German  philosopher,  greatest  modern 
philosopher,  greatest  philosopher  at  all  with  only  the  usual 
exceptions  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Nor  can  there  be  any  doubt 
that  a  like  estimate  will  continue  for  some  considerable  time 
yet.  Kant,  in  truth,  was  a  man  of  a  supremely  active,  tena- 
cious faculty.  One  might  almost  say  that  the  drawing  of 
distinctions  lay  in  his  very  blood.  But  it  must  be  said,  too, 
that,  in  the  sort  of  elephantine  simplicity  and  naiveU  of  his 
countrymen,  another  of  his  characteristics  is  superfetation. 
In  common  with  them,  namely,  he  has  the  distinct  drawback 
of  seeing  so  very  deeply  through  the  millstone  as  actually  to 
witness  the  gnomes  of  the  universe  at  work.  His  reading 
had,  evidently,  been  wide  and  general,  but  not,  perhaps,  pre- 
cisely deep.  His  character  as  a  man  has  been  already,  to 
some  extent,  depicted.  In  that  respect,  and  every  other  re- 
spect, he  was,  and  always  will  be — der  ehrliche  Kant 


The  Reproduction. 


THE  REPRODUCTION. 


Introduction. 

State  of  the  question:  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  Locke,  HiiniC.  The 
general  problem.  The  necessary  conditions  of  its  solution,  and 
consequent  distribution  of  the  whole  inquiry. 

Descartes,  as  Leibnitz  after  him,  held  by  innate 
ideas.  Locke  controverted  the  terra  innatey  and  as- 
sumed, as  well,  all  our  ideas  to  originate  in  the  sensa- 
tion or  reflection  of  experience.  For  even  reflection  was 
to  him  but  the  mind's  own  further  experience  in 
manipulating  the  experience  that  was  already  due  to 
sensation.  If  sensation  were  external  sense,  then,  said 
Locke,  reflection  "  might  properly  enough  be  called 
inteimal  sensed  "  When,"  from  these  sources,  "  the 
understanding  is  once  stored  with  simple  ideas,  it  has 
the  power  to  repeat,  compare,  and  unite  them,  even 
to  an  almost  infinite  variety,  and  so  can  make  at 
pleasure  new  complex  ideas;  but  it  is  not  in  the 
power  of  the  most  exalted  wit,  or  enlarged  under- 
standing, by  any  quickness  or  variety  of  thought,  to 
invent  or  frame  one  new  simple  idea  in  the  mind,  not 
taken  in  by  the  ways  aforementioned."  Hume  now, 
on  the  one  hand,  only  accentuated  these  positions; 
but,  on  the  other,  he  drew  from  them  their  natural 
consequences  —  consequences  which  Locke,  for  his 
part,  had  been  so  far  from  foreseeing  that  he  had 


4  TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 

even  reasoned,  in  excess  of  his  principles,  to  their 
very  opposites.  It  is  part  of  these  proceedings  of 
Hume  which  we  have  now,  in  the  first  place,  to  see. 

The  word  idea  with  Locke  is  the  Vorstellung  of  the 
Germans.     It  is  "  the  most  general  expression  for  all 
that  is  present  to  mental  consciousness;"  and  it  is 
quite  as  applicable  to  the  products  of  sensation  as  to 
those  of  reflection.    Hume  altered  this.    He  discrimi- 
nated between  these  products,— naming  the  former 
imjyressionsy  and  only  the  latter  ideas.      Impressions 
{Enquiry,  sec.  ii.)  are  "  all  our  more  lively  perceptions, 
when  we  hear,  or  see,  or  feel,  or  love,  or  hate,  or  desire, 
or  will:''   ideas    "are  the  less  lively  perceptions  of 
which  we  are  conscious  when  we  reflect  on  any  of  those 
sensations  or  movements."    It  is  important  to  observe 
that  what  we  generally  call  feelings  (love,  hate,  desire, 
etc.)  are  here  ranked  with  sensations  as  equally  impres- 
sions.    Hume  will  regard  sense  as  but  a  single  func- 
tion—from whatever  side,   whether   ah   intra  or   ah 
extra.     Or  there  is  to  Hume,  just  as  there  was  for 
Locke,  an  internal  as  well  as  an  external  sense;  the 
former,  moreover,  even  as  a  sense,  being  quite  on  a 
par  with  the  latter.    It  seems  to  be  his  belief,  namely, 
—and  a  belief,  as  seen,  apparently  shared  by  Locke,— 
that,  to  a  being  like  man,  an  internal  sense,  calculated 
to  take  note  of  the  successive  empirical  states  of  the 
inner  subject,  is  as  necessary  as  an  external  sense 
which  shall  bear  to  refer  to  an  outer  object.     In 
which  case,  too,  it  must  be  seen  that  inner  sense  is, 
as  a  sense,  to  be  strictly  distinguished  from  self-con- 
sciousness, or  the  apperception  of  the  ego.  The  contents 
of  the  former  are  all  the  transient  states  of  the  em- 
pirical subject  when  under  sensuous  feeling ;  whereas 
those  of  the  latter  are  but  the  simple  /,  a  mere  intel- 
lectual act,  the  bare  thought  /,  /,  /,  or  /  that  am  here 


THE    KEPRODUCTION. 


and  noiv  thinking  (das  ''ich  deriJce^'),  It  is  also  impor- 
tant to  observe  further  that,  by  the  term  impression, 
Hume  means  only  the  mental  state,  and  as  simply /^/^, 
without  reference  to  any  supposed  impressing  stimulus: 
it  means  simply — with  total  suppression  of  the  con- 
sideration of  an  agent  —  any  cognised  affection  of 
sense,  inward  or  outward,  as  such. 

We  may  state  the  chief  points  in  the  modified 
position  thus:  1,  Sensation  is  the  source  of  all  ele- 
ments of  knowledge;  2,  There  is  internal  as  well 
as  external  sensation ;  3,  Sensation  externally  is 
not  more  product  of  a  sense  than  sensation  internally; 
4,  What  to  us  are  the  ideas  of  our  thoughts,  are,  in 
reality,  only  copies  of  our  sensible  impressions.  To 
these  we  may  add,  5,  That,  for  knowledge,  we  are 
shut  in  to  our  own  subjective  states  of  affection  or 
impression:  "nothing  can  ever  be  present  to  the 
mind  but  an  image  or  perception — this  house  and  tliat 
tree  are  nothing  but  perceptions  in  the  mind  "  {Enquhy, 
sec.  xii.  part  i.) 

And  now  the  corisequences  of  the  general  theory 
become  all  too  manifest.  If  all  our  ideas  are  only 
copies  of  our  impressions,  then  we  know  nothing 
whatever  that,  substantially,  is  not  the  product  of 
sensible  experience.  But  we  have  no  sensible  ex- 
perience of  the  hidden  principles  of  things — we  have 
no  sensible  experience,  indeed,  of  the  actual  things 
themselves;  for,  by  the  very  terms  of  it,  sensible 
experience  is  but  a  consciousness  of  affection — 
affection  set  up  in  us  we  know  not  how:  it  is  but 
a  subjective  feeling  (light,  sound,  fragrance,  etc.), 
and  it  is  impossible  to  pass  beyond  it.  Further, 
we  have  no  sensible  experience  of  God,  or  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  or  (strictly)  of  the  freedom 
of  the  will.     That  is,  the  whole  business  of  meta- 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


even  reasoned,  in  excess  of  his  principles,  to  their 
very  opposites.  It  is  part  of  these  proceedings  of 
Hume  which  we  have  now,  in  the  first  place,  to  see. 

The  word  idea  with  Locke  is  the  Vorstellung  of  the 
Germans.     It  is  "  the  most  general  expression  for  all 
that  is  present  to  mental  consciousness;"  and  it  is 
quite  as  applicable  to  the  products  of  sensation  as  to 
those  of  reflection.     Hume  altered  this.     He  discrimi- 
nated between  these  products,— naming  the  former 
impressions,  and  only  the  latter  ideas.      Impressions 
(Enguiry,  sec.  ii.)  are  ''  all  our  more  lively  j^erceptions, 
when  we  liear,  or  see,  or  feel,  or  love,  or  hate,  or  desire, 
or  will:''   ideas    "are  the  less  lively  percejytions  of 
which  we  are  conscious  when  we  reflect  on  any  of  those 
sensations  or  movements."    It  is  important  to  observe 
that  what  we  generally  call  feelings  (love,  hate,^  desire, 
etc.)  are  here  ranked  with  seyisations  as  equally  impres- 
sions.    Hume  will  regard  se^ise  as  but  a  single  func- 
tion—from whatever  side,  whether  ab  intra  or  ab 
extra.     Or  there  is  to  Hume,  just  as  there  was  for 
Locke,  an  internal  as  well  as  an  external  sense;  the 
former,  moreover,  even  as  a  sense,  being  quite  on  a 
par  with  the  latter.    It  seems  to  be  his  belief,  namely, 
—and  a  belief,  as  seen,  apparently  shared  by  Locke,— 
that,  to  a  being  like  man,  an  internal  sense,  calculated 
to  take  note  of  the  successive  empirical  states  of  the 
inner  subject,  is  as  necessary  as  an  external  sense 
which  shall  bear  to  refer  to  an   outer  object.     In 
which  case,  too,  it  must  be  seen  that  inner  sense  is, 
as  a  sense,  to  be  strictly  distinguished  from  self-con- 
sciousness, or  the  apperception  of  the  ego.  The  contents 
of  the  former  are  all  the  transient  states  of  the  em- 
pirical subject  when  under  sensuous  feeling ;  whereas 
those  of  the  latter  are  but  the  simple  /,  a  mere  intel- 
lectual act,  the  bare  thought  /,  /,  /,  or  /  that  am  here 


THE    REPllODUCTlüN. 


and noiv  thinking  (das  ^' ich  denke'').  It  is  also  impor- 
tant to  observe  further  that,  by  the  term  impression, 
Hume  means  only  the  mental  state,  and  as  simply /^/^, 
without  reference  to  any  supposed  impressing  stimulus: 
it  means  simply — with  total  suppression  of  the  con- 
sideration of  an  agent  —  any  cognised  affection  of 
sense,  inward  or  outward,  as  such. 

We  may  state  the  chief  points  in  the  modified 
position  thus:  1,  Sensation  is  the  source  of  all  ele- 
ments of  knowledge;  2,  There  is  internal  as  well 
as  external  sensation ;  3,  Sensation  externally  is 
not  more  product  of  a  sense  than  sensation  internally; 
4,  What  to  us  are  the  ideas  of  our  thoughts,  are,  in 
reality,  only  copies  of  our  sensible  impressions.  To 
these  we  may  add,  5,  That,  for  knowledge,  we  are 
shut  in  to  our  own  subjective  states  of  affection  or 
impression:  "nothing  can  ever  be  present  to  the 
mind  but  an  image  or  perception — this  house  and  that 
tree  are  nothing  but  perceptions  in  the  mind  "  (Enquiiy, 
sec.  xii.  part  i.) 

And  now  the  consequences  of  the  general  theory 
become  all  too  manifest.  If  all  our  ideas  are  only 
copies  of  our  impressions,  then  we  know  nothing 
whatever  that,  substantially,  is  not  the  product  of 
sensible  experience.  But  we  have  no  sensible  ex- 
perience of  the  hidden  principles  of  things — we  have 
no  sensible  experience,  indeed,  of  the  actual  things 
themselves;  for,  by  the  very  terms  of  it,  sensible 
experience  is  but  a  consciousness  of  affection — 
affection  set  up  in  us  we  know  not  how:  it  is  but 
a  subjective  feelirig  (light,  sound,  fragrance,  etc.), 
and  it  is  impossible  to  pass  beyond  it.  Further, 
we  have  no  sensible  experience  of  God,  or  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  or  (strictly)  of  the  freedom 
of  the  will.     That  is,  the  whole  business  of  meta- 


b  TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 

physic— metaphysic  proper,  metaphysic  with  its  fore- 
court of  ontology — is  summarily  sisted. 

But  what,  in  that  case,  of  experience  itself?  And 
here  Hume  is  at  once  struck  by  the  extraordinary 
fact  that  the  authority  of  experience  depends  on 
causality,  while  that  of  causality,  again,  depends  on 
experience — a  circle  of  support  which,  of  course,  lies 
only  in  the  air.  These  findings  Hume  subjects,  as 
he  believes,  to  a  most  searching  scrutiny,  and  with 
no  other  result  than — instinct  apart,  and  so  far  as 
any  intelligible  principle  is  concerned  —  a  relega- 
tion of  the  whole  authority  of  both  causality  and 
experience  to  habit  or  custom.  Two  matters  of  fact 
that  we  have  been  in  the  habit  of  seeing  together 
mutually  suggest  each  other ;  and  thus  the  terms  in 
the  whole  series  of  experience,  which  we  implicitly 
believe  strung  on  a  necessary  and  universal  law,  are 
really  combined  and  held  together  —  accreted  or 
agglutinated,  as  it  were — by  nothing  whatever  but 
that  mere  customary  or  habitual  suggestion  which, 
in  all  cases,  follows  the  simple  frequency  of  asso- 
ciation. A  few  quotations  wuU  make  clear  the 
nature  and  process  of  Hume's  thought  here. 

(I  omit  the  quotations,  and  simply  extract  the 
following  passage  from  article,  *' Philosophy  of 
Causality  :  Hume  and  Kant,"  page  186)  :— 

"  Hume's  proceedings  are  these.  His  first  reference  is  to 
this,  that  neither  generally  nor  specially  is  causation  a 
quality.  It  is  impossible  to  point  to  any  '  one  quality  which 
universally  belongs  to  all  beings,  and  gives  them  a  title  to 
that  denomination  *  (cause).  Equally  impossible  is  it  to  find 
in  any  particular  cause  any  particular  quality  by  which  it  is 
the  cause  it  is.  *  No  object  ever  discovers,  by  the  qualities 
which  appear  to  the  senses,  either  the  causes  which  produced 
it,  or  the  effects  which  will  arise  from  it.'    But  if  causality 


THE    IIEPIIODUCTION. 


be  not  a  quality,  it  can  only  be  a  relation.     And  this  relation 
examined,  we  find  all  that  is  representative  of  it  to  be  only 
the  coiijimction  in  time  and  place  of  the  cause  with  the  effect. 
We  do  assume,  and  no  doubt  rightly,  this  conjunction  to  be  a 
necessary    connexion;    but    no    minutest    investigation    can 
demonstrate  to  the  understanding  the  ground  or  reason  of 
this  necessary  connexion.     Depending  on  a  matter  of  fact,  this 
reason  is  no  affair  of  either  intuition  or  demonstration ;  but, 
even  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  reason  is  not  capable  of  being 
seen  and  understood,  whether  before  production  of  the  effect, 
or  even  after  deliberate  observation  of  that  event.    Impression 
as  the  original  from  which  the  idea  of  necessary  connexion  is 
copied,  there  is  none  to  be  found,  unless  simply  custom  from 
repetition  of  the  association.     If  besides  custom  there  is  any- 
thing else  to  be  taken  into  account,  it  is  that  reflection  of 
vivacity  from  present  impression  to  idea  of  absent  object  which 
is  called  helief.    I  hear  a  voice  from  the  next  room.    That  voice 
has  always  been  conjoined  in  the  past  with  a  certain  person. 
The  custom  of  that  conjunction  suggests  this  person  as  the 
cause  of  this  voice.     The  actual  impression   of  this  voice 
reflects  its  own  vivacity  to  the  person  suggested.     This  person, 
suggested  with  all  this  reflected  vivacity,  is  believed  in ;  or 
belief  in  the  actual  existence  of  this  person,  suggested  by  the 
voice  through  customary  conjunction,  is  reflected  into  the 
mind  from  the  vivacity  of  the  actual  impression.     Nature,  it 
is  true,  attributes  to  causality  a  tie  of  necessity ;  but  philo- 
sophy,  for  its  part,  can  find  no  representative  for  that  tie  but 
the  mere  custom  of  repeated  mental  association.     The  tie 
ascribed  by  nature  to  causes  and  effects  themselves  cannot  be 
found,  so  far  as  philosophy  goes,  to  lie  in  them,  but  in  us.    It 
is  only  *  so  far  as  causation  is  a  natural  relation,  and  produces 
a  union  among  our  ideas,  that  we  are  able  to  reason  upon  it, 
or  draw  any  inference  from  it : '  ^  we  infer  a  cause  immediately 
from  its  effect ;  and  this  inference  is  not  only  a  true  species  of 
reasoning,  but  the  strongest  of  all  others.'    Nevertheless,  ^  as 
a  philosopliical  relation,'  causation  implies  only  *  contiguity, 
succession,  and  constant  conjunction.'     Hume's  whole  theory, 
point  by  point,  is  contained  in  what  has  just  been  said ;  and 
the  reader  will  have  no  difficulty  in  verifying  this,  whether 
from  the  Treatise  or  the  Enquiry. 


^  TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 

^  "It  is  Iliime's  own  object  to  refer  our  belief  in  causality  to 
instinct  A  principle  so  necessary  to  us  lie  openly  vindicates 
lor  intallible  nature  as  against  our  fallible  faculties.  But  this 
was  for  Beattie  and  others  precisely  their  own  conclusion. 
Causality  was  to  them,  too,  an  implanted  first  principle,  an 
mstmct;  and  when  they  advanced  as  much  as  against  Hume 
they  advanced  only  what  Hume  himself  similarly  advanced' 
Instinct  here,  in  fact,  was  rather  the  sceptic's  than  the  dog- 
matist s  affair."  |  ° 

But  now  is  there  no  reply  to  Hume  ?    The  word 
tmtinct,  as  we  see,  is  none  such.     But  again,  whether 
on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  to  announce  this  instinct 
as  the  conclusion,  is,  in  all  cases,  to  leave  the  ori-inal 
diöiculty  precisely  where  it  was.     Let  it  be  a  fact  that 
we  cannot  but  think  the  A  B  of  causality  as  necessary  • 
IS  It,  then,  to  explain  this  fact,  simply  to /zam^  it  J 
call  It  instinct?     Is  it  not  still  true  to  say  that  there 
IS  here  a  mental  inference  which  defies  philosophy  to 
account  for  it?  '^ 

This,  at  all  events,  we  assume,  for  our  part,  to  be 
the  state  of  the  question;  and  it  now  belongs  to  us 
to  ask,  Is  It  final  ?     Is  it  to  be  confessed  at  last  that 

tZlir^  'S  'T^'  ^V^^^^Ü-HÄ  in  human 
knowledge  ?    1  his  the  result  to  which  alone  he  seemed 
to  labour,  surely  it  is  to  be  said  that  Hume  himself 
hoped  against  it.  '^Metaphysics  and  morals,"  he  directly 
says   "  form  the  most  considerable  branches  of  science  • 
mathematics  and  natural  philosophy  are  not  half  so 
valuable.      It  is  he  himself,  too,  assures  us  that  -  the 
motive  of  blind  despair  can  never  reasonably  have 
place  m   the   sciences,   since,    however   unsuccessful 
former  attempts  may  have  proved,  there  is  still  room 
to  hope  that  the  industry,  good  fortune,  or  improved 
sagacity  of  succeeding  generations  may   reach   dis- 
coveries unknown  to  former  ages The  like  has 

been  performed  with  regard  to  other  parts  of  nature  • 


TUE    llEPRODUCTIüN. 


9 


and  there  is  no  room  to  despair  of  equal  success  in 
our  inquiries  concerning  the  mental  powers  and 
(economy,  if  prosecuted  with  equal  capacity  and 
caution."  These  last  words  are  suggested  by  reflec- 
tion on  the  science  of  astronomy  and  the  extraor- 
dinary perfection  to  which  it  has  been  brought  by 
the  genius  of  a  single  thinker,  Newton  alone.  And, 
certainly,  that  is  to  be  said,  that  such  inquiries  as  lie 
now  before  us  have  never  yet  been  guided  into  the 
highway  of  science.  In  that  there  is  no  bringing  of 
the  collaborators  to  agreement:  the  one  thinks  he 
has  hit  the  road  here,  the  other  there ;  and  follow^ 
which  we  will,  we  are  presently  at  a  loss.  It  is  not  so 
with  logic,  nor  mathematics,  nor,  since  Bacon,  Galilei, 
Torricelli,  and  Stahl,  with  natural  philosophy.  These, 
in  that  they  have  reached,  each  its  own  open  high- 
way, are  now  sciences,  and  need  only  move  onward. 
Nor  is  it  difficult  to  find  the  reason  of  this.  The  men 
we  have  named,  with  others  the  like,  "  comprehended 
at  last  that  reason  only  gets  to  understand  what  she 
herself  plan  fully  creates ;  that  she  must  precede, 
consequently,  with  principles  of  her  judgment  accord- 
ing to  constant  laws,  and  actually  compel  nature  to 
answer  her  inquiries."  Metaphysic,  as  said,  '^  has 
not  as  yet  had  the  same  good  fortune,  nor  hit  the 
highway  ;  not  but  that  she  is  older  than  all  the  other 
sciences,  and  would  remain  even  if  these  were  bodily 
swallowed  up  in  the  maw  of  an  all-devouring  bar- 
barism "  (Kant,  WW.,  ii.  669). 

This,  then,  if  we  would  raise  metaphysic  into  a 
science.  Is  what  we  have  to  do.  We  must  look  about 
us  for  principles^  and,  by  their  aid,  put  reason's  self 
to  the  question.  Now  what  if  these  should  be  found 
precisely  in  those  proceedings  by  which  David  Hume 
would  seem  to  have  broudit  the  whole  interest  to  a 


10 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT 


THE   REPRODUCTION. 


11 


TX 


O*" 


vj 


dead-lock?      Is   it   simply  credible   that   the   entire 
synthesis,,of^xperience   should   be   the   product   of 
"Habit  ?     The  causal  nexus,  then,  is  not  objective  but 
subjective ?     The  effect,  that  is,  is  attributeTtoTHe" 
cause,  not  because  of  an  objective  reason  that  will  be 
alike  for  everybody  and  perceivable  by  everybody, 
but  because  of  a  subjective  reason  in  consequence  of 
a  habit  that  has  force,  and  can  have  force,  only  for 
myself?     With  such  course  of  reflection  before  us, 
surely  we  cannot  help  asking,  Is  this  true?     When 
the  sun  shines  upon  it,  I  expect  a  stone  to  warm. 
But   is   this   expectation    only  a   matter   of  habit? 
W^hen  I  see  the  shining  of  the  sun  on  the  stone,   is  it 
only  by  habit  that  I  think  of  the  Avarmth  ?     When   I 
think  of  the  arrow,  I  think  of  the  bow ;  but  is  the 
arrow  the  cause  of  the  bow?     When  I  think  of  the 
moon,  I  think  of  the  sun ;  but  is  the  moon  the  cause 
of  the  sun  ?    When  I  think  the  letter  A  in  the  alpha- 
bet, I   think   also   B,    and   C,  and  D,  etc.;  and  in 
numbers,  when  I  think  1,   I  think  as  well  2.  and 
3,  and  4,  and  5,  etc.      In  these  cases,   it  is  quite 
certain  that  there  has  been  an  habitual  conjunction 
as  far  back  as  my  memory  carries  me.     But  I  have 
never  considered  the  one  the  cause  of  the  other.     I 
feel  that  the  nexus,  in  such  a  case,  is  one  of  custom,  is 
one  of  habitual  association,   and  that  the  reason  for 
the  conjunction  lies  in  me,  and  not  in   the  letters  or 
the  ciphers  themselves— that  it  is  subjective,  and  not 
objective.     "  Mrs  Shandy,"  says  Sterne,  "  could  never 
hear  the  house-clock  wound  up,  but  the  thoughts  of 
some  other  things  unavoidably  popped  into  herliead  ;" 
but  we  are  not  for  a  moment  led  to  suppose  that  Mrs 
Shandy  regarded  the  winding-up  of  the  house-clock  as 
the  cause  of  those  *'  other  things."      Habitual  associa- 
tion  is  a  nexus,  then ;  but  it  is  not  the  nexus   of 


^ 


causality.      But  take  the  principle  in  its  absolutely 
general  form — take  the  proposition  of  causality  itself, 
Every  change  must  have  a  cause.     What  is  the  nature 
of  the  evidence  here  ?    Merely  subjective— an  associa- 
tion that  I  feel  I  cannot  help  in  consequence  of  habit? 
Or  is  it  objective— bearing  on  a  truth  which  I  hold  to 
be  universal  and  necessary,  valid  for  everybody,  valid 
in  itself— a  truth  which  I  intellectually  perceive,  and 
which  I  know  everybody  else  will  similarly  perceive  ? 
Surely  the  nature  of  the  evidence,  the  truth,  here, 
must  be  called  apodictic.      The  universality  involved 
is    not    comparative    merely;    it    is   absolute.       A 
chano-e  must  have  a  cause.     This  is  not  only  true 
beca'^eTTir  true,  but  because  it  must  be  true,  and 
because  its  opposite   is   manifestly  impossible.     The 
necessity  is  rigorous;  the  universality  is  unexceptive. 
A  change  has  a  cause  ;  a  straight  line  is  the  shortest 
possible°:  compare  the  necessity  and  universality  of 
the  propositions.     A  change  may  be  without  cause ; 
a  straight  line  may   not   be   the   possible   shortest: 
compar'e    the    absurdity    and    impossibility   of    the 
two  contradictions.      Is    not    the    authority  of  the 
evidence  in  both  of  the  original  propositions  equally 
stringent  ?   The  law  of  causality,  then,  is  an  apodictic 

truth ! 

But  this  is  very  strange.  We  have  been  taught  to 
believe  that  apodictic  evidence  is  confined  to  relations 
of  ideas ;  and  here  seems  a  truth  of  an  apodictic  nature 
in  what  is,  even  glaringly,  a  matter  of  fact— a  mere 
affair  of  experience  I  But  how  can  that  be  possible? 
Experience  tells  us  that  something  is  so  and  so,  but 
never  that  something  7nust  be  so  and  so.  How,  then, 
'can  experiencelell  us  that  a  change  must  have  a  cause? 
If  we  be  rif^ht  as  regards  the  probable  evidence  of  ex- 
perieaue,  it  is  not  from  experiencejhat  we  can  possibly 


12 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT  : 


THE  REPRODUCTION. 


13 


> 


^^jy^  tlus^tni^    And  yet  it  is  easy  to  see  that,  with- 
out experience,  we  could  never  have  the  notion  of  a 
change.     Change  is  an  empirical  fact ;  it  is  derived 
wholly  a  posteriori:  how,  then,  can  it  possibly  be  con- 
nected with  evidence  apodictic,  necessary,  universal, 
such  as  attaches  to  the  a  jmori  alone  of  mathematical 
science  ?    Well  indeed  might  Hume  be  starthid  by  the 
fact ;  and  no  wonder  that  he  asked,  how  could  apo- 
dictic truth  attach  to  a  manifest  principle  of  experi- 
ence ?     His  answer,  habit,  custom,  from  frequency  of 
association,  is  now  manifestly  incompetent.     But  can 
we  find  a  better  ? 

^  What,  then,  if  it  should  turn  out  that  Humes  con- 
siderations are  only  there  to  bring  the  general  interest 
to  a  crisis  ? 

And,  first  of  all,  in  regard  of  the  answer  desiderated, 
is  causality  the  only  empirical  principle  that  is  so 
situated  ?     The  very  question  is  a  flash.     If  there  be 
other  such  principles,  it  is  only  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  they,  one  and  all  of  them,  will  have  a  common 
ground ;  which  ascertained,  there  will  be  a  consequent 
advance  at  once  to  something  equally  new  and  impor- 
tant,  something  that  will  surely  constitute  one  of  the 
main  pillars  of  human  reason,^  Here  at  last  we  gain  a 
glimpse  of  the  possibility  of  metaphysic,— here  at  last, 
that  is,  we  have  come  to  the-pakce^ate""  der  Könio-inn 
aller  Wissenschaften  "  (the  queen  of  all  the  sciences), 
and  the  royal  matron  wffl-nolonger  complain,  forsaken 
and  forlorn,  like  Hecuba,  "Modo  maxima  rerum,  tot 
generis  natisque  potens— nunc  trahor  exul,  inops!"i 

David  Hume,  then,  when  he  brought  us  to  the 
nexus  of  causality,  shall  have  brought  us  also  to  the 

1  Literal  allusion  to  a  sentence  in  the  first  preface  to  the  K  of  P   R 
Kant  appends  to  the  quotation,  with  all  the  touching  exactness  of  a 
German,  "  Ovid.  Metam,"  ! 


very  porch  of  the  sanctuary ;  and  it  is  for  us,  com- 
pleting the  roll  of  all  such  principles,  to  give  ourselves 
entrance  with  it  into  the  very  body  of  the  edifice, 
taking  it  at  long  and  last  into  an  easy  and  a  full  pos- 
session. 

The  question,  then,  is,  Are  there  any  other  such 
principles  as  this  of  causality — principles,  that  is,  at 
once  empirical  and  apodictic— what  we  shall  presume 
to  name  principlesirö2i.s££22£i^i2ia/.-^ 

Now,  where  is  it  that  this  principle  of  causality  is 
used — where  is  it  generally  to  be  found?    Perhaps  in 
the  same  neighbourhood  we  shall  find  others  the  like. 
But  causality  is  one  of  the  principles  of  general  physics. 
Let  us  turn  up  the  ordinary  treatises  on  such  subjects, 
and  examine  the  leading  propositions  laid  down  as 
principles  there.  What  is  this,  for  example :— Through- 
out all  its  changes  the  original  quantity  of  matter  is 
neither  lessened  nor  increased  ?     What  are  we  to  say 
to  a  proposition  of  that  nature?     Here,  again,  some- 
thing is  spoken  of  that  can  only  be  known  by  experi- 
ence, and  yet  an  assertion  is  made  respecting  it  of  a 
strictly  apodictic  nature.     We  perceive  the  univer- 
sality, the  necessity  of  the  proposition,  the  moment 
we  understand  it ;  or,  ^vhat  is  the  same  thing,  we  per- 
ceive then  the  impossibility  of  its  opposite  or  contra- 
dictory.    We  are  conscious,  too,  that  the  nexus  here 
is  not,   and  cannot  be,   an  aff^air  of  habit.     Again, 
In  all  physical  phenomena,  action  and  reaction  are 
equal.     We  have  in  this  also  apodictic  evidence  con- 
joined with  elements  of  an  empirical  nature.     Here 
then,  now,  we  have  at  least  three  propositions  that 
seem  to  rest  on  experience,  and  yet  imply  apodictic 

(JyTranscendent  is  an  object  beyond  experience.  Transcendental  applies 
to  an  object  that  is  in  experience,  but  yet  of  a  validity  that  isljetjona  ex-" 
perience^  Kant's  question  of  Quid  juris  is  addressed  wholly  to  that 
validityTof  which  the  causal  nexus  is  an  example. 


14 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT: 


THE    llEPRODUCTION. 


15 


certainty.     The  question,  consequently,  comes  natur- 
ally, How  is  this?      Above  all,   how  can  apodictic 
certainty  attach  to  elements  of  an  empirical  nature? 
Are  we  quite  certain  that  we  stated  the  truth  when 
we  affirmed  that  experience  declared  only  that  a  thing 
is,  not  that  it  must  be  ?     No,  in  that  we  cannot  be 
wrong ; .  expericnic^  brings  to  us  facts,  and  we  know 
thus  that  they  are,  but  never  tEat  they  must  be.   Sight 
tells  us  that  there  is  such  and  such  a  colour,  and  again 
such  and  such  a  colour,  as  hearing  that  there  are 
such  and  such  sounds,  or  smell  that  there  are  such 
and  such  odours,  or  taste  that  there  are  such  and  such 
flavours,  or  touch  that  there  are  such  and  such  feels. 
But  all  that  I  perceive  in  these  or  any  such  circum- 
stances is  that  the  facts  are  once  for  all  so,  without 
the  slightest  appearance  of  any  reason  being  present 
in  them  to  necessitate  the  so.     The  colour  that  is  here 
might  be  the  colour  that  is  there,  or  the  sound  that 
was  then  might  have  been  the  feel  that  is  now— and 
all  this  without  the  smallest  contradiction.     But  the 
facts  _that,.ßater_the  mind   through    any   sense    are 
all  constituted  in  a  similar  manner.     They  all  enter; 
the  fact,  then,  of  their  being  is  acknowle^ged^but  not 
the  reason  that  necessitates  their  being,  not  the  reason 
that  renders  it  impossible  for  them  not  to  be.     So  it 
is  with  the  inner  sense ;  we  recognise  all  the  miiuüs 
successive  empirical  states :  they  bring  with  them  the 
Tact  of  their  existence,  but  not  the  necessity  of  their 
existence.     The  apodictic  element  in  the  propositions 
in  question,  then,  cannot  be  referred  to  experience ; 
it  must  be  referred  to  some  other  source ;  and  the 
question  is.  To  what  other?     Nay,  is  it  not  simply 
impossible  that  there  can  be  such  other,  even  in  con- 
sequence of  the  conclusion  which  we  have  just  seen 
established  at  the  hands  of  both  philosophers,  Locke 


f 


d  Hume,  that  all  our  knowledge  is  due  to  experience „V 

me  ?     This  it  is,  without  doubt,  that  hasHBeen  the 


and 
saione 

obstruction  to  Hume,  and  the  occasion  of  his  resorting 
to  a  subjective  principle  of  explanation,  habit.  But 
we  have  sufficiently  seen  the  inadequacy  of  this  ex- 
planation, and  must  obtain  another. 

It  is  evident,  then,  either  that  all  our  ideas  do  not 
arise  from  experience,  or  that  we  possess  no  such 
thing  as  an  apodictic  truth.  But,  apart  from  all  con- 
sideration of  any  proposition  immediately  before  us, 
we  do  possess  apodictic  truths :  the  mathematics  and 
kindred  branches  found  on  such,  contain  such.  Nay, 
Hume  himself  admits  this.  Under  the  phrase,  rela- 
tions of  ideas,  he  alludes  to  a  vast  aggregate  of  ideas 
that  are  either  intuitively  or  demonstratively  cer- 
tain— that  are  "  discoverable  by  the  mere  operation 
of  thought" — that  "would  for  ever  retain  their  cer- 
tainty and  evidence,"  though  objects  corresponding 
to  them  never  existed  in  nature.  How,  then,  can  he 
have  possibly  reconciled  himself  to  this  duality  In" 
knowledge,  and  yet  have  believed  that  all  knowledge 
was  due  to  experience  ?  The  fact  that  these  others 
were  relations  of  ideas,  and  not  qualities  of  existent 
objects,  seems  to  have  been  latently  and  half-con- 
sciously  the  reason  of  his  acquiescence  without  special 
inquiry.  Perhaps,  also,  it  appeared  to  him  that 
mathematical  truth  was  of  an  analytic  nature,  and 
flowed  deductively,  by  expansion,  under  guidance  of 
the  principle  of  contradiction,  from  original  defini- 
tions in  which  it  lay  from  the  first  involved  and 
implied.  For  it  is  to  be  acknowledged  that  the  pro- 
ducts of  all  such  analytic  procedure  are  of  an  apo- 
dictic nature,  and  their  contraries  would  imply  a  con- 
tradiction. This,  then,  it  was  that  probably  occurred 
to  Hume,  though  obscurely,  in  explanation  of  the 


IG 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT 


TUE    REPKODUCTION. 


17 


vast  distinction  that  he  observed  and  asserted  to  sub- 
sist between  relations  of  ideas  and  matters  of  fact. 
But  that,  probably,  was  his  misfortune  as  well.  All, 
doubtless,  would  have  issued  very  differently  with 
him,  had  he  but  questioned  the  source  of  apodictic 
truth  in  the  mathematics.  So  questioning,  he  would 
have  been  led  to  the  consideration  of  such  truth 
generally.  ^ 

*  In  the  Treatise ]3,mBe  devotüH  a  whole  "part"  to  the  consideration 
of  mathematical  reasoning  ;  and  this,  as  usual,  is  not  unrepresented  in 
the  re-cast  of  the  Enquiry.  No  full  student  of  his,  then,  can  think  of 
Hume  as  neglecting  mathematics.  Still  a  reader  of  the  Enquiry  alone 
might  regard  the  mathematical  allusions  there  as  only  casual  ;  and  this 
might  have  been  the  case  with  Kant.  I  do  not  recollect  of  any  direct 
([notation  from  Hume  in  the  Kritik ;  but  at  page  6  of  the  Prolegomena  we 
have  in  a  note  what  bears  to  be  a  verbal  quotation  from  "  Versuche,  4ter 
Theil,  Seite  214,  deutsche  Uebers."  Now  the  Prolegomena  was  published 
only  once,  Rosenki-anz  says,  and  that  was  in  1783.  The  German  trans- 
lations of  Hume  mentioned  in  anv  book  beside  me  are  these : — Treatise. 
Jakob,  1790  ;  Essays,  'lennemann,  1793  ;  Enquiry ,  Tennemann,  1793  ; 
Dialogues  concerning  Natural  Religion,  Schreiter,  1781  ;  Enquiry,  Sulzer, 
1755.  It  thus  €ippears  that  the  translation  necessarily  used  by  Kant 
("Versuche,"  etc.,  as  above)  is,  so  far,  omitted  from  mention.  I  liave 
not  as  yet  been  able  to  verify  in  Hume  the  quotation  actually  made  by 
Kant  from  these  "  Versuche  ; "  but,  supposing  the  latter  to  liave  used 
translations  only,  it  is  evidently  fair  to  hold  it  proliable  that  he  was  not 
a  reader  of  the  Treatise,  and  that  he  might,  consequently,  veiy  well  talk 
of  Hume  neglecting  mathematics.     (Quotation  occurs  ^^  Essay  17.") 

It  was  no  failure,  then,  at  least  to  think  of  mathematics  that  led  to 
Hume^s  failure  to  reflect  on  the  contradiction,  which  lay  in  the  apodictic 
validity  of  relations  of  ideas,  to  the  conclusion  that  all  knowledge  was  due 
to  experience,  which,  for  its  part,  was  competent  to  no  more  than  proba- 
bility. Whether  he  thought  of  mathematical  truths  being  analytic  only 
is  another  question,  and  one  which  I  am  hardly  disposed  to  answer 
affirmatively.  Relations  of  ideas,  it  appears  to  me,  must  have  been 
thought  of  by  Hume  only  in  that  jumbling  sort  of  reference  to  complex 
ideas  as  inventions  of  the  mind,  which  we  find  in  Locke.  We  have  seen 
this  already  in  the  quotation  on  our  first  page  as  concerns  the  power  of 
the  understanding  to  "  make  at  pleasure  new  complex  ideas  even  to  an 
almost  infinite  variety;"  and  there  is  a  passage  in  Hume  {Enquiry,  sec. 
V.  part  ii.)  which,  almost  verbally  identical  with  the  entire  citation  from 
Locke,  similarly  ascribes  to  the  mind  a  power  of  compounding  ideas  **  to 
all  the  varieties  of  fiction  and  vision."  We  know,  too,  that  Locke,  in 
answer  to  the  Bishop  of  Worcester,  who  objected  that  the  idea  of  sub- 


i 


We  have  seen,  then,  that  there  are  propositions  of 
.^n  apodictic  nature,  and  yet  apparently  of  an  em- 
pirical origin  ;  while  there  are  others  no  less  apo- 
dictic, but  evidently  independent  of  experience.  How 
is  this  ?  How  is  it  that  truths  or  facts  occupying 
fields  so  entirely  different  should  yet  possess  evidence 
of  identical  stringency  ? 

But,  for  a  moment,  we  must  here  divert  attention 
to  this,  that  propositions  fairly  analytic  are  also  apo- 
dictic. The  reason  is  obvious.  We  have  no  occasion, 
in  such  cases,  to  resort  to  experience  for  the  know- 
ledge in  question :  that  knowledge  we  attain  by  a 
mental  operation,  without  any  trial  of  what  actual 
experience  will  teach.  That  is,  analytic  propositions 
are  of  an  a  priori  nature,  meaning  by  that  the  pro- 
cess of  ascertainment  by  simple  operation  of  the 
mind,    though  on   grounds,  it   may   be,    previously 

stance  can  be  derived  neither  from  sensation  nor  reflection,  averred  "  that 
general  ideas  enter  the  mind  neither  through  sensation  nor  through 
reflection,  but  are  creations  or  inventions  of  the  understanding."    Reid 
( Works,  p.  276)  descril)es  Locke's  process  in  formation  of  the  idea  gemis 
"  till  at  last  it  becomes  an  abstract  general  idea,"  with  powers,  evidently, 
all  its  own.     And  the  same  sort  of  unconscious  conviction  is  to  be  found 
in  Hume  again  and  again.     Abstract  ideas  are  to  him,  as  complex  ideas 
are,  mere  efitia  rationis,  and  their  lelations  may,  without  any  contradic- 
tion whatever  to  his  inferences  from  experience,  be  as  apodictic  as  they 
may.     Relations  of  ideas  refer,  he  says,  always  to  quantity  and  number, 
and  these  are  abstractions.     Consequently,  he  is  not  at  all  led  riglitly  to 
reflect  by  "  the  bold  detemiinations  of  the  abstract  sciences."    Even  in 
concrete  matters,    "  geometry   assists,"    he    says,   only  by   giving  us, 
through  abstraction,  "  just  dimensions."     It  is  a  great  advantage  to 
mathematical  science  that  it  can  show  its  objects.     "  An  oval  is  never 
mistaken  for  a  circle,"  etc. ;  *'  though  there  never  were  a  true  circle  or 
triangle  in  nature."     To  Hume  there  are  really  none  such  in  nature,  and 
so  neither  are  there  in  nature  those  apodictic  relations.     The  true  circle 
is  a  fiction  of  the  mind;  and  so  are  all  its  necessary  qualities.     He 
simply  forgets  the  ellipses  of  the  planets,  and  the  triangles  by  the  aid  of 
which   our  mathematicians  mete   the   heavens.     Hume,   in   fact,   like 
Locke,  had  very  obscure  ideas  of  the  powers  of  mental  abstraction;  and 
it  is  at  least  doubtful  whether  the  one  or  the  other  ever  thought,  in  that 
connexion,  either  of  analysis  or  of  synthesis. 


18 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


"iiA. 


established  by  experience,  without  any  a  posieriuri 
reference  whatever  to  actual  trial  then  and  there. 
In  this  there  is  no  difficulty.  The  truth  is  developed 
under  leading  of  the  principle  of  contradiction. 
That  is,  the  reason  that  we  give  for  any  affirmation 
in  this  situation,  is  that  it  must  be  so  and  so,  else  it 
would  contradict  itself ;  and  the  principle  in  ques- 
tion is  simply  that  an  idea,  proposition,  judgment, 
must  not  contradict  itself.  But  if  anything  is  true, 
and  must  be  true,  otherwise  it  would  contradict  itself, 
it  is  evident  that  we  have  in  hand  something  of  an 
apodictic  nature ;  and  this,  evidently,  must  be  the 
result  of  all  pure  operations  of  the  inind.alöne.  As 
such,  these  operations  are  a  priori,  and  the  principle 
of  their  process  is  that  they  must  not  contradict  them- 
selves ;  and  in  this  way  it  is  evident  that  they  must 
be  apodictic. 

Illustration  will  make  this  plain.  All  bodies  are 
extended.  This  proposition  is,  so  to  speak,  an  ana- 
lytic apodictic.  The  notion  of  exteyision,  that  is,  is 
already  contained  in  the  notion  body ;  and  the  pro- 
position itself,  consequently,  simply  must  be  true — 
true  universally — else,  as  is  evident,  the  notion  body 
would  be  self  contradictory ;  its  constituent  quality, 
namely,  being  at  once  affirmed  and  denied  of  it.  As 
much  as  this  results,  too,  entirely  by  operation  of  the 
mind ;  or  it  is  by  such  operation,  and  not  by  actual 
trial  of  some  actual  body  then  and  there,  that  insight 
into  the  truth  is  attained.  All  bodies  are  divisible,  is 
again  an  analytic  proposition  that  is  also  ajanfizi  and 
apodictic ;  resting  for  its  truth  on  process  of  mind,  and 
not  on  process  of  experiment;  for  the  divisibility,  under 
penalty  of  infringing  the  law  of  contradiction,  follows 
from  the  extension  which  is  necessarily  involved  in  the 
very  notion  of  bodies  or  a  body.     Indeed,  it  will  be 


THE    RErRODUCTION. 


19 


evident  now  that  any  complex  notion  whatever  may 
Be  similarly  expanded  with  consequent  possibility  to 
produce  an  even  infinite  number  of  propositions  which, 
as  analytic,  are,  however  ultimately,  at  least  proximately 
a  priori  and  consequently  apodictic ;  for  the  analysis 
that  extends  the  insight,  or  constitutes  the  fulcrum  of 
the  predication,  is,  not  a  trial  by  sense,  an  experiment, 
an  experience,  but  an  action  of  intellect  that,  without 
contradiction,  carries  its  own  identity  throughout. 

Now,  for  us  this  is  a  most  important  consideration  ; 
for  it  meets  at  once  a  whole  host  of  possible  objec- 
tions to  our  proceedings  on  the  threshold.  It  has 
been  our  object,  namely,  to  signalize  the  apodictic 
nature  of  the  proposition  of  causality.  Now,  so  far, 
an  opponent  might,  having  recourse  to  analysis, 
adduce  against  us  a  quite  infinite  number  of  apodictic 
propositions  which,  nevertheless,  were,  in  the  end, 
only  due  to  experience.  So  it  is  that  we  have,  in  the 
first  instance,  eliminated  all  possible  analytic  proposi- 
tions. It  is  our  desire,  namely,  to  confine  attention 
to  propositions  which,  while  apodictic,  are  at  the  same 
time,  also,  not  analytic,  but  synthetic.  It  is  this  now 
which,  as  our  main  interest,  we  proceed  to  explain. 

The  peculiarity  of  the  proposition  of  causality,  we 
say,  is  that,  so  to  speak,  it  is  an  apodictic  synthetic. 
This  is  the  true  universal  and  philosophical  expression 
of  Hume's  problem,  which  is  thus  extended  into  a 
much  more  general  reach.  For  X\iQ  question  now  is 
not  of  a  single  proposition  (causality),  but  of  every 
proposition  that  founds  on  a  priori  synthesis.  And 
we  have  already  seen  other  such  propositiönsT)esides 
that  of  causality:  those  of  action  and  reaction,  for 
example,  and  the  permanence  of  substance.  We  say 
a  priori  synthesis ;  for  apodictic  synthesis,  as  not  pos- 
sibly due  to  experience  (the  evidence  of  which  is 


20 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


always  only  contingent  or  probable),  must,  as  we  Lave 
already  seen,  indeed,  be  at  least  proximately  a  priori. 
But  what  now  if  it  must  be  even  ultimately  a  priori  ? 
The  apodictic  necessity  and  universality  that  rest  on 
analysis  may  be  reduced  to  grounds  in  the  end  which 
are  only  empirical.     But  can  this  be  the  case  with 
the   apodictic   assignments   that   rest   on   synthesis? 
There  is,  of  course,  a  synthesis  which  is  due  to  expe- 
rience; but  just  because  it  is  so  due,  it  can  never  be 
apodictic.     No  direct  evidence  of  experience — and  a 
synthesis  of  experience  is,  by  the  very  terms  of  it, 
necessarily  direct — can  ever  be  more  than  contingent, 
(^ny  apodictic  synthetic,  consequently,  must  and  can 
^y^  '        only  found   its   peculiar  validity  on  a  principle  of 
'J^w^r^      nexus,  that  is,  not  proximately,  but  ultimately  and 
^^k^  "^solutely  a  priori.     The  full,  exact,  and  completely 

^^^M^        general  expression  for  Hume's  problem,  therefore,  is 
iJ^'^^  at  last  this :  How  are  apodictic  synthetic  propositigns 
possible  ? 

When  we  say  all  bodies  are  extended,  we  predicate 
one  notion  (extension)  of  another  notion  (body),  which 
former  notion  already  lay  in  said  latter  notion — as 
we  term  it,  implidter^  not  expliciter.  But  when  we  say, 
a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  possible  between  any 
two  points,  we  predicate  one  notion  of  another  notion 
r^fg^^  \  where  the  first  was  not  already  contained  in  the 
\  \j    second,  whether  impliciter  or  expliciter.     Straightness 

is  a  quality,  namely,  and,  as  such,  is  alien  to  a  con- 
sideration of  quantity  (shortest).  Every  change  has 
its  cause,  again.  Here  the  notion  cause  is  really 
something  quite  other  than  the  notion  change.  *'  The 
Ä  effect,"  says  Hume,   "is  totally  different  from   the 

^  cause,  and  consequently  can  never  be  discovered  in 

it''   {Enquiry^  sec.  iv.  part  1).      The  proposition  of 
causality,  therefore,  is  synthetic,  and  quite  as  much 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


21 


1 A  0 

■Af\§, 


^. 


synthetic  as  that  of  the  straight  line.  But  now  we 
have  to  consider,  further,  that  all  enipirical  pro^osi- 
tions  are,  if  we  may  say  sp^  to  the  very  core  synthetic ; .__ 
the  very  nerve  of  their  nexus  is  synthesis.  We  might 
almost  see  this  in  the  very  terms,  experience,  trial, 
etc. ;  for  they  import,  in  their  very  selves,  that  actual 
sense-examination  of  the  express  matter  of  fact  has 
been  the  means  of  adding  to  one  notion  as  subject 
another  notion  as  predicate.  Take,  for  example.  All 
bodies  are  heavy.  Here  heavy  is  by  no  means  a  pre- 
dicate that  is  involved  or  implied  in  the  bare  notion  »- 
of  body.  A  body  having  extension,  but  no  weight,  aQjc  S-*'^^ 
would  not  contradict  our  general  notion  here.  Such 
notion,  consequently,  would  not  be  self-contradictory. 
That  all  bodies  are  heavy,  then — it  is  not  by  analysis 
or  mental  operation,  it  is  not  a  priori  in  any  degree, 
that  we  see  into  the  truth  in  this  case.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  is  only  in  consequence  of  experience,  of  actual 
trial,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  it  is  only  a  posteriori^ 
that  we  come  to  express  any  such  sentence.  How 
synthetic  propositions  spring  from  experience,  then, 
will  now  be  manifest ;  but  it  will  now  also  be  mani- 
fest that  all  such,  resting  for  proof  on  experience  or 
mere  perception  of  sense,  must  be  devoid  of  strict 
universality  and  rigorous  necessity,  and  can  possess 
only  a^cß222^aa2Yi^jj^universality  and  necessity,  the  force  '  f'^- 
of  which  will  never  exceed,  logically,  the  experience 
on  which  it  is  founded.  And  now  we  can  be  at  no 
loss  to  understand  the  nature  of  that  peculiarity  which 
distinguishes  the  proposition  mainly  before  us.  The 
attribution  of  an  effect  to  a  cause  is  a  synthetic  pro- 
position ;  but,  while  synthetic,  it  is  also  apodictic. 
Being  apodictic  at  the  same  time  that  it  is  not  analytic, 
it  cannot  be  of  an  origin  empirical  or  a  posteriori^  but 
must  depend  at  last  on  a  mental  operation,  a  process 


22 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT  : 


THE  REPRODUCTION. 


23 


of  mind  which,  of  necessity,  also,  can  only  be  a  priorL 
The  other  propositions  which  we  have  seen  in  the 
same  connexion,  permanence  of  matter,  action  and 
reaction,  are  of  an  identical  nature ;  and  we  are  again 
brought  to  the  question  of  the  origin  of  a  priori  syn- 
thesis, as  the  true  general  expression  for  the  problem 
of  Hume.  This  question,  now,  is  the  single  question 
which  constitutes  the  special  and  particular  interest 
of  our  whole  general  inquiry. 

For  said  inquiry,  another  leading  consideration,  too, 
is  this.     It  is  quite  evident,  from  all  that  has  been 
said,  that  these  a^priori  synthetics  will  be  the  result 
of  the  mind  itself,  of  the  intellectual  faculties  them- 
selves.    Now,  this  will  prove  decisive  of  the  distribu- 
tion and  general  procedure  of  our  inquiry  itself     For 
if  the  truths  in  question  flow  from  the  mind  itself, 
from  our  intellectual  powers,  it  is  evidently  by  an 
analysis  of  these  latter,  respectively  in  their  order, 
that  the  former  will  discover  themselves.    In  this  way, 
too,  we  already  provide  our  enterprise,  in  the  signi- 
ficant show  of  anterior  probability,  with  a  ^ge  and 
/guarantee  of  success.    For  this  is  plain  :  that,[u  know- 
\  ledge  be  a  combination  of  elements,  which  elements 
.y  ^are  partly  from  without  and  partly  from  within,  it 
(J  will,  in  these  latter  elements,  necessarily  possess  an 
(ajmori  materialj-an  a  prion  material  which  has  been 
contributed  by  the  mental  faculty  itself  in  the  per- 
formance of  its  proper  function  on  the  matter  presented 
to  it  for  that  purpose  from  without. 

It  is  very  specially  important  that  we  should  be 
aware  of  this,  that  the  faculty  concerned  is  an  intel- 
lectual faculty,  a  cognitive  faculty,  the  faculty  by 
which  we  acquire  knowledge.  We  are  not  to  figure 
mere  passive  sensation  here,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
active  perception.     For  only  so  will  it  be  that  the 


mental  contribution  will  bring  with  it  tlie  force  and 
conviction,  the  necessity  and  universality,  together 
with  the  insight,  of  a  reason.  In  short,  we  shall  pre- 
sently learn  that  the  faculty  mainly  concerned  is  that 
of  judgment,  and  judgment  is,  par  excellence,  the 
faculty  that  discerns.  The  principle  contributed  by 
the  mind,  then,  the  a  priori  element  that,  in  percep- 
tion, is  added  to  the  a  posteriori  element,  must  not  be 
viewed  as  of  the  same  nature  as  an  instinct.  This 
principle,  this  element,  is  not  to  be  called,  with  the 
Scotch  philosophers,  an  implanted  first  principle,  an 
original  principle  of  the  very  constitution  of  the  mind, 
an  innate  and  instinctive  tendency.  We  are  not  to 
say,  as  they,  that  we  are  so  constituted  that  Ave  can- 
not think  otherwise,  etc.  This  was  the  answer  that 
all  the  Scotch  actually  bawled  to  Hume ;  and,  after 
all,  it  waiÖume's  own !  ^  Hume,  in  fact,  has  no 
object  unless  to  show  that,  for  our  expecting  the 
future  to  resemble  the  past,  we  can  allege  not  the 
shadow  of  a  reason,  and  that  it  is  only  through  an 
instinct;  we  anticipate  the  recurrence  of  customary 
conjunctions.  If  Hume's  instinct  here  differs  from  , 
that  of  Reid  and  the  rest  in  the  same  reference,  it  is 
only  in  the  need  of  a  customary  conjunction  to  excite 
it.  Hume  does  not  himself  so  correlate  his  instinct 
with  his  custom  or  his  custom  with  his  instinct ;  but 
perhaps  it  is  not  illegitimate  to  suppose  as  much.  In 
that  case  Reid's  instinct  will  only  diff'er  from  Hume's 
in  being  direct,  while  Hume's,  as  requiring  custom  to 
call  it  into  action,  will  only  be  indirect.  The  instinct,^ 
however,  as  an  instinct,  is  not  more  mJnq  with  Hume 

^  Of  course  I  hold  him  not  to  have  knowTi  Dugald  Stewart  when  I 
say  this  for  Kant.  For  it  is  a  fact  that  everybody  that  in  this  country 
has  come  after  Reid  (I  do  not  speak  of  Benttie  or  Ohwahl),  namely, 
Stewart,  Brown,  etc.,  have,  on  the  whole,  taken  their  causality— very 
absurdly — from  Hume. 


I 


24 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  REPRODUCTION. 


25 


than  it  is  with  Reid  himself.  It  is  to  be  understood, 
then,  that  our  principle  is  by  no  means  of  this  nature ; 
it  is  no  blind  instinctive  tendency,  but  an  act  of  in- 
tellectual insight,  capable  of  asserting,  explaining,  and 
justifying  itself  by  argument  or  reason.  And  thus, 
as  Hume's  call  was  simply  for  this  argument  or  reason, 
we  shall  be  able,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  to  give  a  satisfac- 
tory answer  to  his  question  at  last. 

Our  inquiry,  therefore,  is  capable  of  being  explained 
in  another  manner  than  in  that  with  reference  to  the 
origin  of  apodictic  synthesis,  or  how  apodictic  syn- 
thetic propositions  are  to  be  conceived  possible.  We 
can  say,  namely,  that  the  question  it  involves  is,  In 
receiving  the  material  of  sense,  does  the  intellect,  even 
in  the  act  of  receiving,  add  anything?  In  that  case 
it  would  be  easy  to  understand  that  any  object  pre- 
sented to  us  must  be  a  compound,  a  compound  which, 
even  as  objectively,  sensuously,  perhaps  externally 
there,  contains  in  it  elements  quite  as  much  from  the 
within  of  intellect  as  from  the  without  of  sense ;  quite 
as  much  from  the  seeing  activity  of  the  one  as  from 
the  blind  passivity  of  the  other.     Alexander  explains 

the  (TvvoXov  of  Aristotle  to  be  to  kuO^  eKua-rov  ata-OijTov 
Koi  a-vvafxtporepov  e^  vXfj^  Kat  elSov^  ;  which  means,  that,  tO 

Aristotle,  every  individual  object  of  sense  was  a  com- 
pound at  once  of  both  matter  and  form,  i  Now,  that 
is  precisely  what  any  individual  object  is  to  us ;  it  is 
a  compound  oi  matter  from  the  senses  and  otformfrvm 
the  mind.  That  house,  that  tree,  this  table,  this  pen, 
outward,  external  as  they  are,  are  not  wholly  so,  but . 
have  forms  projected  into  them  from  within  my  own 
self,  even  in  the  very  act  of  my  perceiving  them ; 
which  forms,  however,  present  themselves  to  me  as 
much  externally  as  the  products  proper  of  sense  itself, 

»  Kant,  perhaps,  did  not  know  Alexander,  l»|ii  t]ie  reader  will  pass  me  this. 


and  constitute  thus,  notwithstanding  their  origin 
within,  veritable  outward  realities.  This,  at  least,  is 
our  theory,  this  is  what  suggests  itself  to  us  as  the 
only  possible  means  of  a  priori  synthesis,  the  only 
possible  rationale  of  the  existence  of  a  priori  synthetics 
in  such  an  experience  as  ours.  For  we  have  always 
to  recollect  that  what  we  call  things  are  but  aggregates 
of  our  own  sensations,  and  nothing  really  without. 
But  that  being  so,  any  further  manipulation  of  our 
sensations  can  only  take  place  within ;  and  it  is  only 
within,  therefore,  that  we  must  search  for  the  rationale 
and  the  means  of  the  apodictic  synthesis  which  we 
find  to  be  a  fact  in  experience.  This,  then,  is  what  is 
meant  by  our  Kritik  or  critique.  It  is  an  analysis  of 
our  intellectual  or  cognitive  faculty  in  search  of  those 
principles  or  elements  which  this  faculty,  unobserved 
of  us,  contributes  and  imparts  to  the  special  materials 
of  sense,  thereby  raising  these  from  the  mere  contin- 
gency and  subjectivity  of  feeling  into  the  necessity  and 
objectivity  pf  formal  perception. 

Now  just  this  it  is  that  has  escaped  both  Locke  and 
Hume.  Locke  perceived  that  all  knowledge  began 
with  sensation  and  contained  sensation  ;  but  he  found 
in  sensation,  for  all  that,  principles  of  quite  another 
order,  which,  however,  as  in  sensation,  though  of  a 
validity  quite  beyond  sensation,  he  yet  unreflectingly 
referred  to  sensation.  In  this  way  he  was  tempted  to 
make  use  of  these  principles,  and  advance  with  them 
in  questions  utterly  beyond  the  limits  of  experience, 
which  he  himself  had  given  himself;  and  thus  he  un- 
consciously opened  a  wide  door  of  encouragement  to 
the  visionary  extravagance  of  mere  fanaticism.  Hume, 
again,  awake  to  the  nature  of  the  evidence  of  experi- 
ence, saw  clearly  that,  with  elements  from  experience, 
such  subjects  were  beyond  our  scope ;  and,  indeed,  in 


26 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


regard  to  matters  of  our  everyday  life,  he  found,  or 
thought  he  found,  that  experience,  when  closely  ques- 
tioned, could  assign  no  reason  for  its  own  authority 
but  custom.  No  wonder  then,  now,  that,  such  a  tap- 
root of  existence  as  the  law  of  causality  being  with-^ 
drawn,  there  seemed  left  to  him  no  consistent  philo- 
sophical creed  but  that  of  the  later  Academy.  In  all 
this  Hume  had  for  his  object  truth.  He  had  no  ex- 
pectation, nevertheless,  that  the  doubts  of  the  school 
would  be  transferred  to  the  streets.  "  I  shall  allow, 
if  you  please,  that  the  one  proposition  may  justly  be 
inferred  from  the  other."  "  Though  none  but  a  fool  or 
madman  will  ever  pretend  to  dispute  the  authority  of 
experience,  or  to  reject  that  great  guide  of  human 
life,  it  may  surely  be  allowed  a  philosopher,"  etc. 
"  My  practice,  you  say,  refutes  my  doubts ;  but  you 
mistake  the  purport  of  my  question :  as  an  agent,  I 
am  quite  satisfied  in  the  point,  but  as  a  philosopher," 
etc.  "Nature  will  always  maintain  her  rights,  and 
prevail  in  the  end  over  any  abstract  reasoning  what- 
soever." This  is  what  Hume  says  always  for  himself, 
and  no  Beattie  among  them  could  ever  have  said  any- 
thing more  or  better.  As  bees  rush  out  at  the  attack- 
ing plunderer,  even  so  it  was  with  the  rush  of  the 
Scotch  at  perhaps  the  best  proof  of  their  own  intellect, 
Hume.  "  Metaphysic's  usual  unlucky  fate  willed  it, 
that  he  was  understood  by  nobody  :  one  cannot,  with- 
out a  certain  very  sensible  pain,  remark  how  utterly  and 
persistently  his  opponents,  Reid,  Oswald,  Beattie,  and 
even  at  last  Priestley,  missed  the  point  of  his  problem, 
and,  while  always  assuming  as  undoubted  precisely 
what  he  questioned,  held  up,  on  the  other  hand,  with 
violence,  and  frequently  with  signal  insolence,  proofs 
of  w^hat  it  never  entered  his  head  for  a  moment  to 
doubt"  (Prohg.^  p.  7). 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


27 


Locke,  then,  failed  to  perceive  that  experience 
could  not  authorize  the  application  of  its  own  prin- 
ciples beyond  the  field  of  experience.  Still  his  in- 
dustry has  been  of  great  service ;  and  he  has  well 
illustrated  the  empirical  process  of  the  origin  and 
acquisition  of  knowledge.  He  has  answered  the 
question  Quid  facti?  He  has  shown  the  state  of  the 
fact,  or  what  in  actual  fact  takes  place.  But  he  has 
not  answered  the  question  Quid  juris  ?  The  right  or 
authority  brought,  in  certain  cases  of  experience,  of  a 
validity  beyond  experience,  was  not  inquired  into; 
the  fact  was  simply  accepted.  We^  for  our  part, 
however,  discern,  in  such  cases,  a  right,  an  authority 
asserted  which  experience  cannot  warrant,  and  we 
immediately  ask.  Quid  juris — whence  these  powers  ? 
This,  too,  Hume  asked  ;  but  it  was  in  the  case  of 
cause  and  eff'ect  only.  He  failed  to  perceive  that  the 
question  was  a  universal  question,  and  applied  to  an 
entire  sphere.  Failing  to  universalize  his  problem, 
he  failed  in  his  answer ;  and  believing  that  he  had 
nothing  but  experience  before  him,  he  had  recourse 
only  to  a  principle  in  experience,  a  subjective  prin- 
ciple, which  was  all  too  w^eak  to  authenticate  neces- 
sities and  universalities  at  once  apodictic  and  syn- 
thetic. 

This  question  of  Quid  juris?  practically  put  by  Hume, 
is  what  we  inherit  from  him.  We  put  it,  however, 
not  as  he  put  it,  to  an  isolated  case,  but  to  the  entire 
body  and  the  general  principle  of  all  possible  cases 
of  an  authority  in  experience  which,  as  at  once  apo- 
dictic and  synthetic,  is  beyond  the  powers  of  experi- 
ence. We  perceive  that  necessity  and  universality 
are  perfectly  explicable  and  intelligible  in  the  case  of 
all  analytic  propositions;  for  their  truth  is  inferred 
by  analysis  of  the  mind  according  to  the  law  of  con- 


28 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT: 


tradiction.  We  perceive,  also,  that  there  are  syn- 
thetic propositions  resting  on  experience,  which,  in 
fact,  just  finds,  and  tells  it  finds,  such  and  such  predi- 
cate actually  present  in  such  and  such  subject,  but 
alleges,  withal,  only  the  factum  of  the  existence  for 
sense,  and  not  \\\^  jus  of  any  peculiar  validity  for  the 
intellect.  Now,  it  is  precisely  this  validity  that  ice 
see,  and  precisely  this  jus  that  we  demand.  Should 
there  be  a  proposition  such  that  analysis  cannot  find 
the  predicate  in  the  subject,  and,  moreover,  such  that 
the  predicate  is  still  apodictically  affirmed  of  the  sub- 
ject, then  we  say  that  the  reason  of  this  apodictic 
synthesis  can  only  be  sought  for  in  the  mind — (it  is 
not  possibly  in  experience) — it  can  only  be  a  priori. 
And  thus  it  is  that  we  are  led  to  the  supposition  of 
elements  actually  in  the  object,  but  coming  to  it 
from  within,  not  from  without. 

Any  such  elements  we  shall,  as  already  intimated, 
name  transcendental.  Transcendent^  as  we  have  said, 
is  an  object  such  that  it  is  absolutely  beyond  the 
experience  of  sense.  It  never  can  be  constitutive!'^ 
found  in  the  experience  of  sense.  Nevertheless  what 
is  constitutively  transcendent^  may  still  be  regulatively 
transcendental^  should  its  idea  be  found,  like  those  of 
God,  Free  Will,  Immortality,  in  any  way  to  act  on 
experience.  We  assume,  too,  as  we  may  say  here, 
that  there  are  things  in  themselves  underlying  and 
causing  the  sensations  which  we  combine  into  the 
only  things  actually  known  to  us.  These  things  in 
themselves  we  not  only  do  not  know,  but,  as  sensible 
creatures,  never  can  know.  They  are  really  tran- 
scendent, then ;  nevertheless,  we  may  call  them  tran- 
scendental, and  even  constitutively  transcendental,  inas- 
much as,  though  we  know  them  not,  we  assume  them 
to  be  the  actual   factors   or  stimuli   of  experience. 


THE    RErRODUCTION. 


29 


The  theory  is,  then,  that,  in  perception,  form  from 
within  blends  with  matter  from  without  into  the 
actual  object  of  it.  These  elements  from  within, 
gliding  from  the  faculty  or  faculties  themselves,  are 
the  transcendental  elements — elements  a  priori  or 
mental  in  origin,  but  a  posteriori  or  empirical  in  use. 
It  is  thus  manifest  that  the  work  imposed  upon  us  is 
an  analysis  of  the  cognitive  or  perceptive  faculties  with 
the  hope  of  discovering  thereby  the  special  contribu- 
tions of  these  faculties  to  the  compound  of  experi- 


ence. 


It  may  not  be  seen  at  first,  but  this  apparently  very 
simple  matter  involves  no  less  than  a  revolution — a 
revolution  in  metaphysics   only  comparable,    in   its 
own  way,  with  that  of  Copernicus  in  physics.     As  he 
reversed  the  relation  in  these,  we  reverse  it  in  those. 
Before  him,  it  was  the  heavens  revolved,  while  the 
earth  remained  at  rest:    after  him,  it  is  the  earth 
revolves,  while  the  heavens  remain  at  rest.     Similarly 
here :  while  formerly  the  subject  had  to  depend  upon 
and  wait  for  the  object,  what  is  proposed  now  is  that 
the  object  shall  depend  upon  and  wait  for  the  sub- 
ject.    And  with  this  there  is  at  once  a  glimpse  of 
hope.     So  long,  that  is,  as  we  can  only  know  what 
the  object  tells  us,  we  are  in  subjection  to  experience 
for  all  knowledge,  and,   consequently,  there  is  none 
such  necessary,  but  all  is  contingent.     Should  it  be 
found,    however,    that   we   ourselves    contribute    to 
knowledge,  even   to  the  knowledge  of  objects,  then, 
evidently,  there   is  an  a  2wiori^  and  that   is   meta- 
physic.     Nearer    still,    when    we   consider   that   the 
three  propositions  to  which  we  have  come,  of  sub- 
stantiality,   causality,    and   reciprocity   exhaust    the 
relations^  while  mathematics  apply  to  quantity^  which 
is  another  affection,  of  tlie  loyical  judgment,  it  would 


30 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  REPRODUCTION. 


31 


seem  that  we  have  something  to  confirm  us  in  the 
hope  of  discovery  in  that  we  subject  the  cognitive 
faculty  to  inquest;  for  the  cognitive  faculty  is  judg- 
ment, or  judgment  is  but  another  name  for  the 
intellectual  faculty,  for  thought,  for  the  mind  itself. 
But  of  this,  as  perhaps  premature  now,  and  only 
suggestive  for  the  moment,  later. 

At  all  events,  this  is  plain,  that  if  we  succeed  in 
the  inquest  proposed,  we  shall  succeed,  in  that  we 
answer  the  question  of  Hume,  not  only  in  mediating 
between  Locke  and  Leibnitz,  but  equally  in  mediat- 
ing between  dogmatism  and  scepticism  themselves. 
This  is  the  position  of  cnticism.  Criticism,  thus,  will 
at  once  do  justice  to  the  a  posteriori  and  the  a  priori; 
and  it  will  also  reconcile  as  well  assertion  with  doubt, 
as  doubt  with  assertion,  by  proof. 

With  all  this,  we  must  never  forget  that  the  only 
use  of  the  a  priori  is  to  work  up  the  a  posteriori; — 
that  the  whole  business  is,  on  the  one  hand,  for  the 
a  priori  to  add  to  the  a  posteriori  the  form  that  fails 
it,  as,  on  the  other  hand,  for  the  a  posteriori  to  add 
in  turn,  the  matter  that  is  no  less  wanting  to  the  a 
priori.  All  that  is  concerned,  indeed,  is  the  possi- 
bility of  experience;  and  we  already  see  how  it  will 
be  situated  here,  whether  on  the  one  side  or  the  other ; 
for,  of  course,  this  is  evident,  that  we  can  enter- 
tain no  question  of  any  experience  but  this  sensitivo- 
intelligible  or  intellectivo-sensible  experience  of  ours. 
What,  then,  is  the  faculty,  or  are  the  faculties  in 
question?  Or,  otherwise,  what  are  the  intellectual 
faculties  ?  AVhat  are  those  powers  or  faculties  of  the 
mind  which  all  concur  in  the  one  office  or  function  of 
producing  knowledge?  Now,  it  may  be  objected 
that  what  we  aim  at  here  can  only  be  known  by 
experience,  and  that,  consequently,  we  are  simply 


beginning,  as  Locke  began  and  as  Hume  continued 
— simply  beginning  an  a  priori  inquiry  with  the  old 
exploded  basis  of  the  a  jjosteriorij  of  experience  itself. 
But,  surely,  the  mind  itself  is  a  priori ;  surely  it  pre- 
cedes and  is  independent  of  experience.  Let  the 
common  brocard,  Nihil  est  in  i?iteUectu,  quod  non  fuerit 
in  sensu^  be  as  true  as  it  may,  still,  since  Leibnitz, 
must  we  not  all  say  with  Leibnitz,  Nisi  hitellectus  ipse  f 
Should  we  regard  mind,  then,  as  an  a  prioin  basis — as 
very  specially  the  a  priori  basis — as  much  as  this  may 
prove  warrant  enough.  But,  to  render  the  founda- 
tion even  more  irreproachable,  or,  in  fact,  just  to 
insure  conviction,  we  appeal  to  logic.  All  knowledge 
begins  with  experience,  and  so  also  the  science  of 
logic ;  but  all  knowledge  does  not  require  to  remain 
experience,  and  neither  does  the  science  of  logic,  nor 
did  it.  The  true  science  of  logic  has  eliminated  all 
its  a  posteriori  or  empirical  elements,  and  stands  now 
rigorously  pure  and  all  incontrovertibly  a  priori.  It 
has  so  stood,  indeed,  since  the  days  of  Aristotle,  and 
will  now  in  sempiternum  undoubtedly  so  stand.  Logic, 
of  course,  has  been  differently  treated  by  different 
expositors,  and  it  has  not  always  been  kept  pure.  In 
its  pure  form  it  occupies  no  great  space;  and  so, 
those  who  have  treated  of  it  have  generally  found  it 
convenient,  or  for  their  interests  necessary,  to  enlarge 
its  contents  by  adding  to  them  much  foreign,  though 
perhaps  cognate,  matter.  And  here  we  have  in  mind 
only  universal  or  elementary  logic ;  naturally  exclud- 
ing from  view  the  particular  logic  that  may  precede 
(not  but  that  it  always  comes  last  in  time)  any  par- 
ticular whole  of  inquiry,  as  directing  and  guiding 
its  general  disposition  and  conduct.  It  has  been  the 
interest,  then,  of  many  writers  to  eke  out  the  scanty 
pages  of  general  logic  with  certain  additions.     For 


32 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


instance,  many  have  filled  out  their  books  with  pre- 
liminary matter  bearing  on  psychology ;  and  many, 
again,  have  displayed  a  like  industry  with  reference 
to  those  empirical  circumstances  which  impede  or 
promote  the  process  of  thought,  as  our  passions, 
prejudices,  etc.  The  latter  of  these  references  we 
name  applied  logic  ;  of  which  the  business,  evidently, 
is  neither  organon  nor  caiion,  but  simply  a  catharticon, 

of  thought. 

We  say,  then,  that  the  science  of  logic  in  its  purity 
—universal  logic,  general  logic,  elementary  logic— is 
an  absolutely  complete  and  also  an  absolutely  a  priori 
science.     It  is  complete,  because,  though  existing  now 
for  more  than  two  thousand  years,  and  the  constant 
object  of  consideration  to  the  very  highest  intellects 
of  each  succeeding  age,  it  has  yet,  since  the  days  of 
Aristotle,  not  moved  a  single  step  whether  in  advance 
or  retreat.    It  is  a  priori  because  it  is  a  science  purely 
formal ;  it  excludes  from  consideration  all  matter  of 
thought  whatever,  and  relates  solely  to  the  forms  of 
it.    The  laws  it  establishes,  the  rules  it  prescribes,  con- 
cern not  the  thing,  object,  or  matter  that  is  thought,  but 
simply  the  general  process  and  processes,  the  general 
forms  of  the  mind,  in  thinking.    These  laws  and  rules, 
these  processes  and  forms,  are  absolutely  general  and 
completely   independent    of    any  particular  subject- 
matter  to  which  they  may  be  applied.     Surely,  then, 
in    initiating    an    inquiry   into    the    existence   and 
nature  of  a  priori  knowledge,  w^e  are  quite  entitled 
to  assume  as  a  priori  at  once  mind  and  the  science  of 
mind.     Even  as  such  science,  we  miglit  say,  that  the 
science  of  logic  must  be  a  priori  and  complete  ;  for  it 
depends  on  a  unity,  on  the  concrete,  organic  unity  of 
what  is  itself  a  priori  and  complete,  the  mind. 

The  divisions  of  logic,  therefore,  will  throw  the 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


33 


required  light  on  the  divisions  of  our  subject.     One 
great  division  is  into  the  analytic  and  the  method ; 
the  former  being  a  classified  discussion  of  all  the  ele- 
ments of  the  subject  concerned,  and  the  latter  relating 
to  those  elements  as  applied.     This  distribution  we 
shall   adopt,   but  not  formally.      Our  main  inquiry 
shall   correspond   to  the  analytic;    but  only  certain 
corollaries  thence  shall  represent  the  method.    Again, 
that  part  of  general  logic  which  is  named  dialectic, 
while  nominally  having  place  with  us,  shall  be  sub- 
stantially diff'erent.      The  origin  of  dialectic  lies  in 
this,  that  the  formal  laws  of  thought,  while  furnishing 
merely  a  negative  condition  of  truth,  and  consequently 
adequate  only  to  a  canon  in  test  and  guidance  of  the 
disposition   of  its   matter,  are   actually   used  as   an 
organon  of  enlargement,  discovery,  and  creation.    But 
this  is  manifestly  wholly  incompetent  to  what  is  only 
a  formal   and  negative   guide.      General   logic  can 
never  constitute  any  such  instrument  of  attainment, 
any  such  organon  of  knowledge,  but  simply,  as  said,  a 
caiion  or  standard  for  its  correction  and  safety.     Dia- 
lectic, then,  in  that  it  rests  on  logic  as  an  organon,  is 
evidently  without  support.     What  we  shall  substitute 
for  this  usual  false  dialectic,  will  be  the  consideration 
of  an  unavoidable  dialectic  which  springs  up  naturally, 
as  it  Avere,  from  our  unconscious  application  of  the 
results  of  our  analytic,  not  as  a  canon,  which   it   is, 
but  again  as  an  organon,  which  it  is  not.     For  the 
result  of  our  inquiry,  as  it  is  not  difficult  to  foresee, 
will  be  veritably  a  counterpart   to   general    formal 
logic :  as  the  latter  supplies  the  forms  of  thinking  in 
general,  the  former  will  have  to  find  for  us,  not  mere 
forms,  but  the  pure  or  a  ptriori  matter  thrown  by  the 
mind  into  the  products  of  sense  :  it  will  be  properly 

named,  therefore,   transcendeiital  logic,    the   logic   of 

c 


V\ 


34 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


what  matter  in  the  objects  of  experience,  and  experi- 
ence as  a  whole,  is  a  priori  furnished  by  the  mind 
itself;  and  it  is  really  no  contradiction  that  that 
matter  should  be  only  formal,  or  consist  only  of  forms. 

This  transcendental  logic,  again,  will  have  the  same 
more  particular  divisions  as  general  logic,  which,  for 
its  part,  is  divided  into  simple  apprehension,  judg- 
ment, and  reason.  These,  namely,  are  the  intellectual 
faculties;  these  are  the  mental  powers,  and  all  the 
mental  powers  which  have  to  do  with  the  procuring 
and  extending  of  knowledge.  And  it  is  precisely  from 
an  analysis  of  these  powers  that  we  are  to  expect  a 
discovery  of  the  a  priori  moiety  of  knowledge,  even 
knowledge  perceptive.  Such  faculties  as  imagination, 
memory,  abstraction,  etc.,  are  but  implied  in  these, 
or  are  only  other  names  for  particular  functions  of 
these.  Our  inquiry,  then,  will,  in  the  first  instance, 
fall  into  three  books  under  these  three  headin^rs 
respectively;  and  the  further  subdivisions  will 
develop  themselves  as  we  proceed. 

Our  first  book,  accordingly,  will,  in  consideration 
of  the  pure  or  a  priori  contributions  to  perception, 
treat  of  simple  apprehension ;  our  second  of  judg- 
ment ;  and  our  third  of  reason. 


Book  I. — Apprehension. 
1. 

Relation  of  Sense  to  Apprehension. 

Apprehension  is  the  faculty  by  which,  according  to 
logicians,  notions  are  formed  and  reproduced.  Our 
quest  being  only  what  addition  to  materials  of  sense 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


35 


is  made  by  the  mind  itself  in  receiving  and  dealing 
with  them,  it  is  evident  that,  of  the  two  operations 
here,  formation  will  have  much  more  promise  for  us 
than  reproduction.  The  latter  will  have  its  own  place, 
as  we  shall  afterwards  see,  in  the  scheme  of  the 
general  process  for  the  realization  of  perception ;  but 
in  so  far  as  it  simply  involves  repetition  and  not 
formation,  it  is  evidently  not  addition  that  we  are 
to  look  for  on  its  part.  What,  then,  is  to  have  in- 
terest for  us  here  is — the  formatio7i  of  a  notion  ;  and 
that  suggests  two  questions :  1,  What  are  notions  ? 
and  2,  How  are  notions  formed?  What  we  mean 
liy  notion,  is  what  Hume  meant  by  his  "  idea " 
when  he  called  it  "  copy  of  an  impression."  After 
experience  of  a  sensible  fact,  we  come  away  with  a 
notion  or  idea  of  that  fact ;  which,  obviously,  is 
just  this,  that,  having  had  an  impression  by  sense,  we 
have  a  notion  of  it  by  reflection.  From  this  it 
would  follow  that  a  notion  is  confined  to  reflection 
and  has  no  place  in  the  impression.  This,  however, 
we  shall  find  reason  to  question — impression  being 
understood,  that  is,  to  stand  for  what  in  general  we 
call  object  of  sense. 

As  regards  the  formation  of  objects,  that  is  no  con- 
cern of  general  logic,  so  far  as  it  implies  the  taking  up 
or  apprehension  into  sense  of  the  object  which,  as  the 
original,  precedes  the  notion,  as  the  copy.  With  us, 
however,  this  is  dififerent;  for  it  is  just  possible  that 
in  the  very  taking  up  of  the  object,  the  bare  apprehen- 
sion of  it,  there  may  be  an  addition  made  to  it  by  the 
faculty  that  takes  up  or  apprehends,  and  in  this  very 
act.  The  faculty  or  faculties  of  sense,  then,  if  properly 
omitted  from  a  general  logic,  must,  very  certainly,  have 
place  here  in  the  transcendental  logic.  We,  for  our 
part,  namely,  must  omit  no  step  in  the  general  pro- 


I 


36 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


cess  of  arriving  at  knowledge ;  and  it  is  evident  at 
once  that  the  sources  of  knowledge  can  be  referred  to 
two  heads — sense  bj^  which  objects  are  given,  and 
understanding  by  which  they  are  thought.  We  may 
hazard  the  conjecture  that  these  are  but  two  stems 
from  a  common  root ;  but  we  cannot  as  yet  identify 
them,  and  must  regard  them  apart.  At  all  events, 
to  an  act  of  perception  proper,  we  believe  that  both 
faculties  must  concur;  and  therefore  it  is  that  we 
have  ventured  to  commit  the  apparent  inconsistency 
of  introducing  questions  of  sense  into  an  inquiry  that 
guides  itself  by  the  divisions  of  general  logic, — the 
rather  that  these  questions  with  us  will  concern,  not 
what  is  a  posteriori,  but  what  is  a  j^riori,  even  in 
sense.  A  transcendental  logic  is  bound,  in  its  search 
for  a  priori  elements,  to  investigate  the  sensuous  as 
well  as  the  intellectual  part  of  the  general  process  of 
apprehension. 

The  only  faculties  that  are  commonly  spoken  of 
as  relating  to  sense,  are  sensation  and  perception. 
Of  these,  looking  firstly  at  their  external  use,  the 
former  (special  sense),  plainly,  is  wholly  of  an  a 
posteriori  reference,  and  can  relate  only  to  a  matter 
that  must  be  given.  Smell,  taste,  touch,  sight,  hearing, 
concern  odours,  savours,  feels,  light,  sound ;  and  all 
of  these  can  only  come  to  us  a  j^osteriori,  or  from 
actual  impression  (meaning  by  the  word  impression, 
however,  only,  as  Hume  did,  the  actual  sentient  state 
without  reference  to  any  impressing  cause).  There  is 
no  possibility  of  arriving  a  priori  at  any  smell,  or 
taste,  or  touch,  or  sight,  etc. :  for  these,  come  from 
whence  they  may,  we  have  always  to  wait.  External 
sensation,  then,  evidently  contributes  only  what  is 
strictly  empirical.  Its  function  is  passive  only ;  it  is  a 
mere  receptivity ;  it  simply  takes  up  what  is  given  to  it. 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


37 


And  yet,  again,  does  it  give  what  is  given  to  it? 
Ca7i  a  sense  give  what  is  given  it  ?  In  smell,  for  ex- 
ample, is  the  odour  qua  odour  really  from  the  object? 
That  the  object  precedes  this  state  of  mine  which  I 
call  odour,  I  readily  admit ;  but  this  odour  is,  after  all, 
a  state  of  mine ;  it  is  a  mere  modification  of  my  own 
feeling, — whatever  may  be  in  the  object  to  cause  it. 
What  that  may  be — what  quality  in  the  object  apart 
from  my  feeling,  but  inferred  as  cause  of  my  feeling 
— I  know  not  at  all,  and  never  can  know.  No  sen- 
sation can  give  me  any  information  but  how  /  am 
aftected — /  myself.  Of  any  information  as  regards  the 
object  I  am  entirely  void,  except  that  this  my  state  is 
(inferentially)  of  its  excitation.  A  knowledge  of  this 
my  state,  nevertheless,  let  it  be  as  clear,  distinct,  and 
accurate  as  it  may,  is  not,  and  never  can  be,  a  know- 
ledge of  its  state,  a  knowledge  of  it.  Insight  into  my 
own  self  is  never  insight  into  anything  else.  The 
object,  be  it  what  it  may,  can  only  affect  me  ;  and  I 
can  only  know  how,  as  afl'ected,  I  feel.  In  no  case  of 
afifection  from  something  else — and  all  that  I  can  know 
is  afi^ection  from  something  else — can  I  ever  get  to  any 
consciousness  but  of  some  feeling  of  my  own.  This 
state  of  the  case  is  not  peculiar  to  one  sense  (smell), 
but  is  the  same  in  all.  The  taste  of  sweetness,  for  ex- 
ample, is  mine,  it  is  wholly  a  condition  of  my  own 
self;  I  can  never  get  out  of  my  own  self  to  know  how 
that  is  constituted  which  caused  it.  Were  a  drum 
sentient,  what  could  it  know  of  any  body  that  struck 
it?  It  could  only  know  its  own  vibrations,  and  pre- 
cisely the  same  vibrations  might  be  set  up  by  a 
thousand  diflerent  causes.  Touch,  too,  only  relates 
to  certain  feelings  of  pressure  or  resistance  in  me: 
these  are  conditions  of  mine,  not  of  the  object.  The 
case  is  not  one  whit  diflerent  with  light  or  colour ; 


38 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


and  light  or  colour  is  all  that  sight  can  see.  Lastly, 
has  my  state  of  being  when  under  sensation  of  sound 
any  resemblance  whatever  to  these  trembling  strings 
or  to  this  trembling  air?  To  know  an  object  in 
itself,  or  as  it  is  in  itself,  demands  an  understanding 
that  can  function  directly  on  this  object,  and  not 
one  that  can  act  only  indirectly  on  it  through  a 
medium  of  sense.  But  such  an  understanding  would 
be  one  not  confined,  like  ours,  to  the  reflecting  of 
resultant  notions :  it  would  be  one  that  perceived  at 
the  same  time  that  it  reflected.  It  would  be  directly 
present  to  the  things  themselves  and  as  they  are  in 
themselves.  Such  an  intellect,  as  an  intelkctuelle 
Anschauung^  an  intuitus  originarius,  we  may  attribute 
to  the  Supreme  Being,  but  never  to  man,  who,  con- 
fined to  an  indirect  knowledge  only  through  medium 
of  sense,  can  possess  no  more  than  an  intuitus  deri- 
vativus.  This  fact  is  fundamental  in  our  present 
inquiry,  and  must  never  be  lost  sight  of.  We  know 
only  our  own  affections.  What  we  call  things,  and 
know  as  things,  are  only  these  aflfections  themselves, 
variously  combined,  manipulated,  and  placed.  We 
assume  things  in  themselves  as  antecedents,  antecedent 
stimuli,  of  these  afixictions;  but  these  stimuli^  these* 
antecedents,  these  things  in  themselves^  we  know  not  at 
all,  and  never — remaining  as  we  are — can  know.  The 
affection  of  sense,  on  the  assumption  of  things  in 
themselves,  at  once  reveals  their  presence  and  conceals 
what  they  are  in  themselves  for  ever ;  at  once  grants 
and  denies  access  to  them.  The  window  that  admits 
is  at  the  same  time  the  wall  that  excludes. 

But,  in  such  references,  it  is  not  different  with  inner 
sense.  Joy,  grief,  hate,  scorn,  are  all  subjective  feel- 
ings of  my  own  that  only  follow  a  posteriori  from 
antecedents  that  precede  them.     Accordingly,   as  it 


THE    llErilODUCTION. 


39 


is  only  by  the  intervention  of  sense  that  we  know  the 
outer  object,  which,  therefore,  can  never  be  known 
in  itself,  so  it  is  only  by  the  intervention  of  sense  that 
we  know  the  inner  subject — which,  similarly,  there- 
fore, can  never  be  known  in  itself  No  doubt  every 
consciousness  within  me  must  be  accompanied  by  the 
further  consciousness  /,  or  it  is  I  that  am  here  and  now 
thinking;  but  this  I  is  but  a  logical  copula — it  is 
wholly  without  matter  of  contents — it  is  but  a  point, 
but  a  bare  logical  idea,  that  connects,  certainly,  but 
is  itself  void,  or  has  nothing  to  show  for  itself,  no- 
thing to  exhibit  in  constitution  of  itself  Now,  beside 
this  I,  the  other  I,  the  I  that  undergoes  the  succession 
of  empirical  states,  the  I  of  the  inner  sense,  the  I  of 
empirical  consciousness,  is — so  far  as  it  is  to  be  con- 
sidered in  itself— equally  unknown,  for  any  knowledge 
in  its  regard  is  only  through  intervention  of  sense, 
and  any  such  knowledge  is  in  all  cases  phenomenal 
only,  and  never  noumenal. 

Sensation,  then,  outer  and  inner,  must  be  a  pos- 
teriori, for  it  is  entirely  passive  and  waits — waits  for 
the  affection  that  simply  comes  to  it,  it  knows  not 
how  or  whence.  What,  as  contradistinguished  from 
sensation,  we  call  perception,  however,  has,  while 
still  very  palpably  an  affair  of  sense,  more  than  a 
passive  character :  it  at  least  combines,  and  that  is  no 
function  of  mere  receptivity.  Accordingly,  though 
we  cannot  but  eliminate  sensation  here,  it  is  quite 
possible  that  perception  as  perception  may  have 
elements  for  our  purposes.  Perception,  that  is,  may 
possibly  contribute  to  the  general  web  of  knowledge 
or  experience  a  thread  or  threads  specially  its  own 
and  utterly  independent  of  experience  as  regards 
origin.  The  question,  then,  is.  Are  there  any  pure 
perceptions,  anj^   non-empirical   perceptions?      And 


40 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


if  we  can  but  discharge  from  perception  in  general 
all  the  empirical  colours,  if  we  can  remove  from  the 
general  web,  that  is,  all  materials  that  are  evidently  a 
posteriori  and  from  experience,  the  means  for  an  answer 
will  remain  for  us ;  for  either  we  shall  have  pure  per- 
ceptions left,  or  we  shall  have  none  and  just  nothing 
at  all.  Now  let  us  attempt  this  with  outer  perception, 
let  us  discharge  from  general  outer  perception  any- 
thing of  a  posteriori  origin,  smell,  colour,  taste,  etc., — 
let  us  attempt  this,  and  we  shall  speedily  find  that, 
having  withdrawn  all  objects  whatever  of  an  empirical 
nature,  there  remains  behind — space,  which  we  can- 
not withdraw,  nor  conceive  withdrawn.  In  like 
manner,  when  we  withdraw  from  inner  sense  all  the 
a  posteriori  elements,  all  empirical  states  whatever, 
there  remains  behind — time,  which  we  can  neither 
withdraw,  nor  conceive  withdrawn.  We  can  conceive 
the  removal  of  every  element  of  sense,  inner  or  outer, 
except  space  and  time  ;  which,  so  to  speak,  are  there 
before  all  other  experiences,  as  only  to  receive  these, 
and  which,  consequently,  remain  when  the  others 
disappear.  What,  then,  are  they — what  are  space 
and  time  ?  If  still  entities  of  sense,  they  are  mani- 
festly very  different  from  all  other  such.  Their  abstrac- 
tion is  inconceivable.  Neither  do  they  seem  to  have 
objects,  as  all  other  sensations  have.  Nay,  they  do 
not  seem  indebted  to  any  sense  for  their  introduction, 
like  the  others.  Space  is  not  an  affair  of  any  special 
sense  or  senses,  and  just  as  little  so  is  time.  They  do 
not  seem  things,  then;  nor  qualities  inherent  in 
things;  nor  relations  between  things:  they  are  en- 
tirely independent  of  things  in  any  aspect,  and  would 
subsist  though  the  whole  universe  of  things  were 
bodily  taken  away.  All  things,  indeed,  are  finite, 
but  they  arc  infinitg.    Space  is  absolutely  boundless; 


THE    KEPRODUCTION. 


41 


time  absolutely  without  either  beginning  or  end. 
We  cannot  possibly  call  entities  differing  so  widely 
from  things  by  the  name  of  things.  Such  wnthings 
things  ! — we  cannot  say  so. 

What,  then,  are  they  ?  They  are  pure — not  sen- 
sations— but  perceptions,  pure  objects,  pure  Anschau- 
ungen^ which  word  involves  both  characters.  They 
are  the  contributions  of  the  faculty  itself;  the  one 
attaching  itself  to  all  objects  of  outer,  the  other  to  all 
objects  of  inner  perception,  and  so  also  through  these 
to  all  objects  whatever. 

A  word  or  two  of  argument  may  be  necessary  to 
develop  further  the  position  assumed.  And,  first, 
they  are  non-empirical  and  quite  independent  of 
experience ;  for,  in  regard  of  things,  to  be  able  to 
perceive,  not  only  that  they  are,  the  one  from  the 
other,  different,  but  also  that  they  are  in  different 
places^  is  to  add  an  element  which  the  things  them- 
selves manifestly  do  not  bring,  but  which  is,  equally 
manifestly,  simply  presupposed  as  the  fundamentally 
universal  and  necessary  condition  of  the  existence  of 
things.  And  it  is  precisely  so  with  time.  All  objects 
are  in  time ;  it  is  not  derived  from  them ;  they  are  in 
it^  as  the  universal  and  necessary  condition  of  the 
very  existence  of  them. 

Secondly,  then,  they  are  universal  and  necessary. 
But,  as  such,  they  are  not  possibly  a  posteriori;  they 
must  be,  and  can  only  be,  a  priori  contributions  of 
our  faculties  themselves. 

Thirdly,  they  are  still  perceptions^  not  notions — con- 
tributions of  sense  (general  sense),  not  contributions 
of  the  understanding.  They  are  each  single,  and  have 
not  the  generality  which  a  notion  involves.  A 
notion  has  many  individuals  under  it ;  but  the  parts 
of  a  perception  are  in  it ;  and  such  is  the  constitution 


42 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


of  space  and  time.  The  parts  of  space  and  time  are 
in  each ;  they  are  but  limitations  of  the  one  single 
space  and  the  one  single  time.  Such  parts  do  not 
precede  their  wholes,  as  the  species  precede  the 
genus,  or  the  individuals  the  species;  they  are,  on 
the  contrary,  even  as  parts,  with  their  wholes,  one. 
In  short,  time  and  space  are,  though  infinite,  single, 
each  a  representatio  singularisj  just  like  every  other 
object  of  perception;  they  resemble  in  no  way  a 
notion,  which  is  always  a  generality,  a  representatio 
per  notas  communes ;  they  are  not  of  a  logical  nature 
at  all,  but,  in  very  truth,  sensible.  They  are  percep- 
tions, pure  perceptions,  actually  pure  objects — pure 
objects  of  general  sense. 

How  simple,  now,  the  apodictic  validity  of  all 
evidence  that  concerns  the  relations  in  geometry,  for 
example.  We  simply  see  that  the  straight  line  is  the 
shortest:  it  is  a  truth  perceptive,  it  is  a  truth  in- 
tuitive, as  this  word  used  to  be  understood,  though 
tantamount  now,  for  the  most  part,  only  to  instinctive 
or  immediate  and  at  once.  An  intuition  is  evidence^  and 
no  blind  trick  of  our  original  constitution  itself;  in 
fact,  it  is  truth  at  a  glance,  and  the  glance  should  not  be 
lost  sight  of.  Had  Hume,  who  understood  the  word, 
but  investigated  what  it  implied — the  foundation  of 
the  mathematics,  namely — he  would,  in  all  probability, 
not  have  left  the  general  problem  to  us. 

What  we  perceive,  then,  are  only  phenomena,  and 
never  noumena,  though  we  may  hold  the  former  to  be 
gages  and  guarantees  of  the  existence  of  the  latter. 
In  short,  both  outer  object  and  inner  subject,  being 
perceived  only  through  sense,  are,  by  necessary  con- 
sequence, perceived  also,  not  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves, or  not  as  they  just  are,  but  merely  as  they 
appear.     Whether  we  look  to  space  or  time,  it  is  only 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


43 


our  own  states  we  know  in  either ;  and  the  subject 
of  these  states,  as  in  itself  and  apart  from  these  states, 
apart  from  the  form  or  forms  of  sense,  is  no  more 
known  than  the  alien  object  or  objects  are  known, 
which,  in  the  external  reference,  are  supposed  to  act 
on  said  subject,  and,  in  that  way,  account  for  its  ex- 
ternal states. 

But  such  being  the  nature  of  space  and  time,  we 
see  at  once  how  very  much  mistaken  the  school  of 
Leibnitz  and  Wolff  must  have  been  in  asserting  space 
and  time  to  be  objects  of  the  understanding,  and  in 
attributing  to  us  a  knowledge  in  their  regard  not 
possibly  other  than  obscure  and  confused,  inasmuch 
as  sense  was  in  its  own  nature  but  a  more  obscure 
and  confused  kind  of  understanding.  The  difference 
between  sense  and  understanding  is  generic :  it  is  not 
a  mere  less  or  more  of  quantity ;  it  is  a  difference  in 
kind,  a  total  difference  of  elemental  quality.  By  our 
theory,  in  fact,  we  avoid  not  only  the  difficulties  of 
Leibnitz  and  the  metaphysicians,  but  those  of  the 
mathematicians  as  well.  With  the  former,  for  ex- 
ample, it  was  impossible  to  explain  how  forms  of  the 
understanding,  and  nowise  different  from  the  form 
proper  of  the  understanding  but  in  that  they  were 
specially  less  perfect  and  more  confused  than  it, 
should  yet  possess  evidence  (as  in  geometry)  specially 
clear,  specially  perfect, — specially  apodictic,  in  short. 
With  the  latter,  again,  who  assume  space  and  time  to 
be  simply  objects  of  sense  a  posteriori  made  known 
to  us  like  all  other  such,  there  cannot  be  any  answer 
given  why  empirical  elements  should  yet,  exception- 
ally and  contradictorily,  extend  to  us  an  apodictic 
evidence — at  the  same  time  that  we  are  left  with  two 
infinite  imthings,  totally  unlike  all  that  we  call  things, 
starinff  us  in  the  face. 


44 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  REPRODUCTION. 


45 


2. 

Relation  of  the  Understanding  to  Apprehension. 

Objects,  then,  affect  the  mind  through  sensation, 
and  the  resultant  affections  become  disposed  and 
arranged  (but  under  other  influences  to  be  afterwards 
seen)  in  the  two  receptacula,  as  it  were,  of  space  and 
time.  These  two  receptacula  are  universal  forms,  to 
the  conditions  of  which  all  affections  of  sense  must 
conform ;  and  thus  it  is  that  we  are  enabled,  a  priori^ 
to  know  and  predicate  many  peculiarities  of  objects, 
which  objects  can  themselves  be  known  only  a  posteri- 
ori and  by  experience — all  those  peculiarities,  namely, 
which  all  objects  must  take  on  in  obedience  to  the 
general  forms  of  sense  through  which  alone  they  can 
present  themselves.  Space,  for  example,  has  three 
dimensions,  and,  consequently,  all  objects  of  sensation 
are  similarly  constituted.  Time,  again,  is  only  of  one 
dimension,  and  therefore  it  is  that  all  the  variety  of 
inner  sense  must  present  itself  in  conformity  to  this 
quality.  All  the  conditions  that  pure  science  discovers 
in  the  general  structure  of  either  form,  are  evidently 
predicable  of  all  objects  that  can  ever  come  into  ex- 
perience. So  also  does  it  become  evident  that,  though 
a  priori  and  independent  of  experience,  they  are  there 
only/ö?'experience.  Their  use  and  purpose,  and  thefinal 
cause  of  their  construction,  relate  to  the  a  posteriori 
world  that  is  to  be  given  to  them  through  sensation. 
They  are,  as  it  were,  discs  projected  from  within  for 
the  reception  and  co-ordination  of  the  variety  of  par- 
ticulars from  without ;  and  thus  it  is  that  science  can 
discover  in  them  no  law  or  principle  capable  of  con- 
veying information  relating  to  any  world  but  that  of 
experience.    So  also  is  it,  as  we  can  easily  understand, 


that  no  knowledge  of  either  time  or  space  would 
have  been  possible  without  experience :  it  is  only  in 
actual  experience  that  they  present  themselves  to  us, 
and  without  actual  experience  they  could  never 
have  been  known.  The  moment  that  inner  sense 
is  awakened  to  exercise  by  the  possession  of  objects 
(states  of  empirical  consciousness),  the  subjection  of 
these  objects  to  the  law  of  time  is  obvious ;  and  this 
latter  (time)  takes  up  as  objective  and,  so  to  speak, 
empirical  a  position  as  those  former  (the  objects  or 
states)  themselves.  So,  also,  the  moment  that  outer 
sense  is  awakened  to  exercise  by  the  possession  of  its 
objects,  the  subjection  of  these  to  the  laws  and  modes 
of  space  becomes  equally  obvious ;  and  the  role  played 
by  space  is  as  much  outward  and  real  as  that  of  the 
objects  themselves.  The  objects  are  perceived,  and 
time  and  space  are  perceived  in  connexion  with  them. 
Time  and  space  are,  as  it  were,  the  spectra  projected  for 
reception  of  objects,  and  present  themselves  to  us  only 
tvith  these  objects,  and  as  of  identical  nature  and  origin. 
Locke,  then,  had  perfect  reason  in  assuming  that,  de 
facto^  our  information  in  regard  to  time  and  space 
depends  on  experience ;  at  the  same  time  that  it  is 
only  our  inquiry  dejiif^e,  or  concerning  the  authority 
asserted  by  them,  that  gives  the  key  to  their  true 
nature.  Though  in  sense  and  only  known  by  sense, 
they  bring  with  them  such  peculiarities  as  single  them 
out  from  all  other  objects  of  sense  whatever,  and  it  is 
the  investigation  of  these  peculiarities  that  leads  us  to 
see  that  they  cannot  be  of  an  a  posteriori^  but  must 
be  of  an  a  priori  origin. 

In  asserting,  too,  that  all  objects  of  a  posteriori 
knowledge  must  submit  themselves  to  these  forms,  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  special  form  of  each  individual 
object  is  also  to  be  considered  as  so  due.     How  it  is 


46 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT: 


that  a  mountain  has  this  shape,  and  a  tree  that  one, 
does  not  depend  on  space,  for  example,  but  on  the 
object-in-itself.     That  object-in-itself,  however,  we  never 
can  know :  we  only  know  that,  be  its  special  form 
what  it  maj^,  or,  in  obedience  to  its  own  transcendent 
or  absolute  nature  (and  transcendent  is  easily  seen  to 
be  capable  of  being  allowably  replaced  there  by  tran- 
scendental), let  the  special  form  it  produces  in  us  be 
what  it  may,   that  special  form  must  still   present 
itself  as  in  subjection  to  the  general  laws  of  space. 
It  is  no  objection,  then,  to  say.  This  brick  and  that 
stone  have  each  a  shape  of  its  own,  which  shape  they 
cannot  receive  from  space;  for  the  answer  is  easy. 
We  do  not  say  that  the  special  empirical  form  is  due 
to  space;  there  is  something  in  the  object-in-itself 
that  says  the  special  empirical  form  shall   be   this 
only,  and  not  another.      Still  the  special  empirical 
production   must   obey  the   universal   conditions  of 

space    and    become — but    only   in    its   own    way 

spatiaV 

And  there  is  nothing  really  difficult  in  this.  There 
are  outer  objects— meaning  by  the  term  at  this  mo- 
ment what  we  name  things-in-themselves ;  but  they  are 
wholly  cut  oflf  from  us — even  by  the  very  effects  they 
produce  in  us.  We  are  in  presence  only  of  these 
effects,  or  of  our  own  resultant  affections.  These 
affections  are  therefore  inner ;  and  there  is  no  diffi- 
culty in  the  conception  of  their  receiving  further 
modification  and  development  in  and  from  the  inner 
apparatus  into  which  they  have  been  received,  and 
to  which  they  now  for  ever  belong.    Nay,  it  is  natural 

1  It  wiU  be  seen  here  that,  as  in  some  other  cases,  I  have  not  scrupled 
to  state  and  meet  in  the  reproduction  a  difficulty  which,  as  hinted  in 
another  work,  I  have  not  seen  struck  upon  elsewhere,  but  which,  for  all 
that,  must,  I  should  say,  have  been  very  commonly  felt  by  all  \tvdmts 
of  Kant.    The  reproduction  is  a/rce  one  :  see  "  Apprehension,"  etc. 


THE   REPRODUCTION. 


47 


to  suppose  that  new  arrangements  will  take  place  on 
their  being  thus  received  into  mental  consciousness. 
They  are  in  themselves,  as  a  posteriori,  wholly  dis- 
junct, in  an  element  of  contingency ;  and  if  there  is 
to  be  such  a  thing  as  a  ruled  and  regulated  context 
of  experience  at  all,  in  submission,  namely,  to  neces- 
sary principles  by  which  systematic  arrangement  and 
completeness  will  be  produced,  these  principles  must 
be  of  an  a  j^riori  nature,  and  so  bring  with  them  an 
authority   which    experience    (the   a  posteriori)    can 
never  bring.     If  experience,  in  short,  is  to  be  a  con- 
nected  whole,   it   is   absolutely  necessary   that   our 
contingent   affections  due  to  experience   should   be 
subject  to  an  element  of  necessity ;  and,  these  affec- 
tions being^^^  for  all  within,  that  element  can  only 
come  from  within.     Were  our  objects  the  things-in- 
themselves,  then  there  could  be  no  apodictic  know- 
ledge in  their  regard  possible ;  for,  in  that  case,  we 
could  have  no  knowledge  but  through  experience, 
and  such  knowledge  never  brings,   and  can  never 
bring,  such  authority.     That  is,  evidently,  for  any 
information  that  bore  on  such  things  we  should  be 
w^holly  dependent  on  these  things;  we  should  have 
to  wait  for  them  and  it ;  it,  consequently,  as  a  pos- 
teriori and  empirical,  would  be  and  could  be  contin- 
gent only.     All  would  be  as  we  just  found  it;  and,  as 
with  matters  of  fact  now,  we  could  say  no  more  then 
than  that  the  state  of  the  case  wa^  so  and  so,  but  not 
that  it  must  he  so  and  so.     But  our  objects  are  not 
the  things-in-themselves ;  they  are  not  noumena  but 
phenomena ;  and  so  long  as  our  understanding  is  a 
discursive  one,  and,  consequently,  dependent  on  sense 
for  matter  of  discourse,  or  so  long  as  we  cognise  only 
through  notions,  which  notions,  again,  can  themselves 
only  obtain  filling,  contents,  through  the  information 


48 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


of  senses,  inner  or  outer,  we  never  can  attain — whether 
we  look  to  object  or  to  subject — to  the  presence  of 
things-in -themselves.  Were  our  objects  the  things- 
in-themselves,  they  would  consist  wholly  and  solely 
of  their  own  elements,  and  would  possess  no  ingre- 
dient whatever  derived  from  us;  but  they  are  not 
the  things-in-themselves  —  they  are  not  things  in 
themselves  at  all;  they  are  only  affections  of  our 
own  within,  though  due,  it  may  be,  to  the  action  on 
us  of  such  things  in  themselves.  Now  affections  of 
our  own  within  can  only  receive  order  and  arrange- 
ment from  within.  How,  then,  there  can  be  an  a  piiori 
element  in  what  is  an  actual,  objective,  and,  it  may 
be,  outer  fact,  is  not  difficult  to  see;  and  it  is  not 
more  difficult  to  see  now,  also,  that  that  objective 
fact,  so  far  as  it  is  a  posteriori^  can  only  be  contingent, 
and,  as  contingent,  stands  palpably  in  need  of  some 
further  manipulation  that  shall  raise  it  into  the  neces- 
sity and  law  of  a  consistent  universe ;  such  manipu- 
lation, for  its  part,  evidently  involving  such  principles 
as  are  in  question — principles  which  are  also  within, 
and  attach  themselves  from  within,  but  which  are  of 
an  a  priori  origin  and  necessary  validity.  Thus  it  is 
in  fact  that  we  see  time  and  space  add  themselves  to 
the  phenomena  of  sense,  imparting  (even  in  their  own 
right  and  apart  from  other  elements  in  the  single 
realizing  act)  to  these  phenomena  some  such  co- 
ordinating and  subordinating  conditions  of  necessity 
as  are  required.  And  thus,  too,  there  is  another 
reason  for  the  phenomenal  nature  of  the  objective 
world  which  we  seem  to  perceive  around  us;  for, 
even  if  the  so-called  objects  were  objects  in  themselves 
so  far  as  a  posteriori  sense  is  concerned,  they  could 
no  longer  be  allowed  to  remain  such,  being  under 
the  necessity  of  subjecting  themselves  to  the  modes 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


49 


1 1 


of  space  and  time,  and  so  of  reducing  themselves  to 
mere  phenomena.  So  far,  then,  as  both  the  nature 
of  sense  in  general  and  the  forms  of  our  sense  in 
particular  are  concerned,  we  can  know  only  pheno- 
mena, not  noumena — things  as  to  us  they  appear^  and 
not  as  in  themselves  they  are.  Nor  is  there  any  reason 
that  this  conclusion  should  dissatisfy :  a  phenomenal 
existence  may  be  as  consistent  as  a  noumenal  one; 
nay,  as  in  the  first  instance  probationary,  it  may  have 
its  own  good  ends.  It  does  not  at  all  follow,  in  fact, 
that  objects  are  even  illusory  because,  at  bottom,  only 
manifestations  to  sense,  or  only  appearances.  Rocks 
will  still  remain  rocks  to  us,  for  all  that,  and  as  hard 
as  ever;  fire  will  still  really  burn,  and  water  still 
really  drown — only,  in  metaphysics,  things  must  con- 
sent to  receive  their  true  metaphysical  expressions. 

All  our  knowledge,  therefore,  consists  of  two  fac- 
tors, and  both  are  subjective ;  but  the  one,  being  a 
posteriori^  empirical,  sensational,  is  contingent,  while 
the  other,  as  a  priori^  transcendental,  perceptional,  is 
apodictic.  What  I  call  red,  for  example,  or  sweet,  or 
loud,  or  smooth,  is  red,  and  sweet,  and  loud,  and 
smooth  only  to  me.  It  may  be  also  red,  or  sweet, 
or  loud,  or  smooth  to  you ;  but  we  cannot  know  that 
— even  though  we  certainly  say  that.  We  all  call 
our  feelings,  that  is,  by  the  same  names ;  but  identity 
of  name  is  no  clue  to  identity  of  feeling.  What  all 
other  men  feel  to  be  red,  I  might  feel  to  be  green ; 
but  I  should  still  call  it  red,  for  I  should  have  no 
means  of  knowing  that  I  differed  in  feeling  from 
other  people ;  and  I  should  name  it  what  they  named 
it,  both  I  and  they  being  perfectly  consistent  in  the 
use  of  the  word  for  our  respective  feelings,  however 
different  these  feelings  might  be  in  reality.  In  short, 
it  comes  to  this :  the  a  posteriori  subjective  states  we 

D 


50 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT  : 


have  no  means  of  comparing,  and,  consequently,  can- 
not tell   whether  they  are   the  same  or  not.      No 
language  can  convey  to  you  my  feeling,  or  to  me 
yours.     Name  them  as  we  may,  and  name  them  as 
universally  as  we  may,  feelings  are  still,  in  point  of 
fact,  inexpressible^  and  consequently  incomparable.    But 
it  is  different  with  ajrnori  elements :  they  are  neces- 
sarily universal  forms  which  are  perceived^  and  per- 
ceptions can  be  compared,  for  they  can  be  exhibited, 
their   constitution    can   be   submitted   to  process  of 
intellectual  inspection,  and,  consequently  (with  dis- 
charge of  sensation),  their  fundamental  conditions, 
principles,   and   laws    compared.      That    the    three 
angles  of  every  possible  triangle  are  without  exception 
equal  to  two  right  angles,  this—and  the  same  thing 
can  be  said  for  every  proposition  due  to  the  essential 
nature  of  the  perceptive  forms,  or  time  and  space— is 
not  one  thing  to   one   man,  and  another  tiling  to 
another:  it  is  an  affair  of  reason,  and  not  of  feeling; 
and  while  all  that  relates  to  the  latter  is  Individ ud 
and  incapable  of  comparison,  all  that  relates  to  the 
former  is    universal,  and   consequently   capable    of 
examination   for  assent   or  rejection  by  all   of  us. 
Thus,  then,  space  and  time,  as  universal  and  the  only 
universal  a  priori  perceptive  forms,  are  seen  to  possess 
a  certain  intellectual  nature,  and  to  be  capable  of 
presenting  themselves  in  universal  reason.     If,  then, 
space  and   time,  which   subject  all  objects   to  their 
own  conditions,  be  themselves  subject  to  conditions 
of  the  intellect  or  the  understanding,  all  objects  what- 
ever, outer  or  inner,  must  also  (through  them)  subject 
themselves  to  conditions  derived  from  the  understand- 
ing alone.     And  this,  indeed,  seeing  that  our  know- 
ledge  relates   only   to    contingent   appearances,    we 
should  also  naturally  expect  as  probable  and  even 


THE    REmODUCTION. 


51 


. 


necessary.  For  objects,  at  last,  are  obliged  to  relate 
themselves  to  the  understanding — all  objects  must  be 
understood ;  and  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that,  in 
the  process  of  the  union  of  objects  to  the  understand- 
ing, there  will  be  conditions.  Now,  we  have  already 
seen  the  a  jjriori  conditions  of  sense,  and  we  see  here 
the  anterior  probability  of  the  existence  of  corre- 
spondent a  priori  conditions  (in  perception)  for  the 
understanding  itself:  the  search,  then,  for  these  latter 
seems,  as  the  next  step  here,  to  be  presently  imposed 
upon  us.  That  is,  we  ask  for  those  a  jmori  condi- 
tions of  the  understanding  which  (if  any)  necessarily 
attach  themselves  as  a  further  modifying  element  of 
perception  to  all  objects  that,  as  perceived,  have  already 
submitted  to  the  conditions  of  time  and  space. 

Nor  ought  the  general  idea  of  what  is  essentially 
intellective  becoming  actually  or  empirically  percep- 
tive to  prove  a  perplexing  one.  The  influence  of  a 
notion  on  perceptions  must  have  manifested  itself  to 
every  one.  In  fact,  we  may  say  at  once  that  no  per- 
ception is  complete  until  a  general  notion  has  con- 
joined itself  to  the  multiple  of  sensation.  And  here 
we  may  remark  that  perception,  even  as  perception, 
is  either  crude  and  elementary  or  finished  and  com- 
plete. Now,  crude  perception  is  a  breadth  of  parts,  a 
complex  of  particulars,  a  detail  of  items,  a  multiple, 
a  manifold,  a  many — just  as  sensation  is.  Perception 
as  opposed  to  sensation  involves  more  than  the  mere 
feeling  of  the  latter :  it  involves,  besides  the  appre- 
hension of  elements  into  mere  subjectivity,  their 
apprehension  as  well  into  objectivity.  Perception,  as 
perception,  whether  crude  or  complete,  primary  or 
ultimate,  is  awareness  of  an  object;  and  an  object  is 
always  something  that  a  subject  conceives  itself  to 
discern  as  different  from  itself,  but  presented  to  it, 


52 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


offered  to  it, — as  it  were,  for  inspection,  held  up  to  it. 
Perception,  then,  is  the  sensible  presence  to  conscious- 
ness of  such  discernible  elements  as  we  call  objec- 
tive, or,  indeed,  just  at  once,  objects.  Pure  per- 
ception, for  example,  has  for  objects  the  peculiar 
details  of  time  and  the  peculiar  details  of  space.  So 
long  as  it  is  puj^e^  it  has,  by  way  of  contents,  nothing 
else  whatever.  Now  it  may  be  seen  at  once  that 
these  dttailsj  though  sensible,  cannot  be  called  sensa- 
tions; they  have  not  the  character  of  sensation,  mere 
feeling — the  feeling  of  light,  sound,  etc. :  they  are 
discernments,  awarenesses ;  they  are  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent intellective  and  cognitive  ;  they  are  perceptive ; 
they  are  perceptions.  That  is  what  is  meant  by  the 
word  Anschauung.  Whatever  has  that  character  in 
it — ^beyond  mere  sensation — of  sensible  discernible- 
ness,  perceptivity,  objectivity,  is  an  Anschauung.  But 
an  Anschauung,  a  perception,  is  only  crude  and  ele- 
mentary when,  as  in  the  first  instance,  the  sensible 
details  of  it  alone  stand  before  consciousness.  We 
may  conceive  the  details  of  time  and  space  always  to 
stand  elementarily  thus,  from  the  first,  and  in  the 
background,  sensibly  before  consciousness.  That  is 
crude  perception.  Finished  perception,  complete 
perception,  is  more  than  that:  we  have  then  a7i 
object  before  us,  a  house,  a  ship,  a  cannon-ball,  a 
cushion,  a  glass,  a  stone,  the  sun,  water,  ice,  the  air. 
And  each  of  these  we  can  see  to  consist  at  once  of 
details  of  sensation,  as  well  as  of  details  of  perception  ; 
but  all  combined  at  last  into  a  single  unity,  which 
is  at  last,  too,  only  a  unity  of  percejJtive  details — the 
very  sensations  have  become  perceptions.  This 
ought  to  make  thoroughly  intelligible  what  percep- 
tion is  as  opposed  to  sensation ;  as  well  as,  in  oppo- 
sition to  crude  perception,  what  is  complete  percep- 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


53 


tion ;  and  as  well  the  one  as  the  other.  There  is  a 
temptation  to  speak  of  complete,  in  contradistinction 
to  crude  perception,  as  perception  proper.  This,  in 
view  of  the  completeness.  But  then,  again,  in  view 
of  the  character  of  perceptivity  as  perceptivity,  and 
with  that  only  in  our  eye,  we  might  call  even  crude 
perception,  perception  ^?'ö/)(?r. 

No  matter  of  perception,  then,  is  a  simple ;  or  it 
follows  from  the  very  nature  of  time  and  space  that 
all  such  matter  is  a  plurality,  a  multiplicity,  a  detail: 
all  objects  are  multiples,  consist  of  parts,  of  a  variety 
of  particulars,  a  many  of  details.  Indeed,  there  is  an 
element  of  variousness  in  the  special  senses  themselves; 
for  one  and  the  same  object  may  owe  materials  to  each 
and  all  of  them.  Perception,  then,  while  yet  in  its  first 
crude  form,  as  before  sense  in  the  mere  details  of  time, 
space,  and  sensation,  is  but  itself  a  detail — a  detached 
and  incoherent  and  unconjoined  many.  But  were  it 
to  remain  such,  it  would  be  incomplete ;  there  would 
be  perceptions,  perceptions  as  it  were  in  blur,  percep- 
tions in  the  raw,  but  not  a  perception, — a  formed 
perception,  a  complete  and  finished  perception.  In 
order  to  the  attainment  of  this  latter,  the  detail,  the 
blur,  must  collapse,  so  to  speak,  into  singleness;  the 
multiple  must  pass  into  a  simple ;  the  complexity  and 
multiplicity  must  disappear  into  unity;  the  parts 
must  unite  into  a  whole ;  the  particulars  must  eclipse 
themselves  into  a  universal — that  is,  they  must  be 
thought,  become  notion.  "  For,  as  notions  without  per- 
ceptions are  void,  perceptions  without  notions  are  blind.'" 

Suppose  some  new  object  be  brought  from  abroad 
and  put  before  you  :  you  perceive  it  at  once ;  and  yet 
you  confusedly  feel  that  you  do  not  perceive  it.  You 
confusedly  feel  this,  in  fact,  till,  on  a  sudden  light, 
you  exclaim,  It  is  a  basket,  a  drum,  a  knife,  an  oar, 


54 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


a  club,  or  whatever  else.     Now,  if  you  recall  that 
sudden  light,  you  will  find  that  it  leaped  from  the 
collapse  of  the  detail— the  sensible  many -into  unity. 
What  happened,  indeed,  was,  that  all  the  particulars  of 
the  perceptive  detail,  darkly  and  disconnectedly  before 
you,  sprang  suddenly  together  into  the  unity  and  light 
of  the  universal  —basket,  drum,  knife,  oar,  club.    For 
these,  so  far,  or  though  only  empirical,  are  all  univer- 
sal;  they  are  all  notions,  or  the  words  themselves 
are  general  terms  that  involve  notions  or  represent 
notions.     The  notion  under  each  of  these  words,  in 
fact,  has  an  infinite  variety  of  individuals  under  it ; 
and  is  therefore  a  universal.    When,  one  morning,  the 
day  broke,  and  all  unexpectedly  before  their  eyes  a  ship 
stood,  what  it  was,  was  evident  at  a  glance  to  Crusoe. 
The  perceptive  manifold  collapsed  for  him  at  once 
into  the  unity  and  simplicity  of  the  general  notion, 
ship.     But  how  Avas  it  with  Friday?     As  younger 
and  uncivilized,  his  eyes  were  presumably  better  than 
those  of  his  master.     That  is,  Friday  saw  the  ship 
really  the  best  of  the  two ;  and  yet  he  could  hardly 
be  said  to  see  it  at  all.     He  really  did  not  perceive  it 
— perceive  it  as  more  than  a  crude  and  elementary 
perception ;  he  did  not  perceive  it  as  a  formed  and 
finished  perception.     In  short,  what  to  Crusoe  was  an 
object,  was  to  Friday  only  a  dark  and  amorphous 
blur,  a  perplexing,  confusing,  frightening  mass  of  de- 
tails, which  would  not  collapse  and  become  single 
and  simple  to  him.     It  can  easily  be  understood  that 
this  single  example  applies  to  all  cases,  and  that  we 
really  do  not  perceive  until  by  the  help  of  a  notion  we 
also  understand.     Has  it  never  happened  to  the  reader 
to  lie  in  a  strange  bedroom,  and  to  puzzle  himself  in 
the  morning  about  some  distant  object  which  he  was 
conscious   he   had  known   perfectly  well   the   nin^ht 


THE    RErRODUCTION. 


55 


before,  but  which  he  could  not  put  together  for  the 
life  of  him  now  ?     It  is  an  object  on  a  shelf,  peeping 
out  of  a  cupboard  (say)  :  what  is  it  ?    What  a  strange- 
looking  object  it  is !     A  formless  detail  of  many  per- 
ceptive particulars,  an  incomprehensible  plurality  of 
parts;  but  what  is  it?     Ah!  a  candlestick,  a  family 
Bible,  a  bandbox,  a  general's  battered  hat,  etc.     The 
moment  you  recollect  what  you  had  recognised  it  to  be, 
the  moment  the  notion  attaches  itself,  all  is  plain ; 
and  yet  you  are  not  a  bit  nearer,  and  see  {qua  seeing) 
not  a  whit  clearer,  than  before.     A  man,  of  a  morn- 
ing, may  look  out  of  the  Avindow  of  a  strange  house, 
and,  for  full  five  minutes,  have,  to  his  astonishment, 
before  his  eyes  a  vast  chaos  of  stones  stretching  over 
a  great  plain  to  the  very  verge  of  the  horizon,  which 
incomprehensible  huge  wonder  will  spring  together 
at  last  into  the  very  limited  garden-wall  he  recollects 
to  have  seen  the  day  before.     This  same  principle  it 
is  that  makes  our  ears  so  very  opaque,  to  say  so,  in  a 
foreign  country.     We  think  we  should  understand 
better  did  the  people  but  speak  louder ;  but  the  real 
want  is  that  of  notions.     The  natives  are  able  to 
anticipate  notions— from  tones,  looks,  gestures,  and 
single  words ;  so  that  the  whole  rushes  together  intel- 
ligibly for  them,  even  though  they  may  not  have 
actually  heard  every  syllable  that  was  enunciated. 
Of  course,  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that,  whether  for  ear 
or  eye,  distinct  apprehension  of  the  sensible  details  is, 
on  its  side,  an  important  factor  towards  readiness  of 
perception.     We  see  this  in  those  who  are  dull  of 
hearing,  or  who  are  short-sighted.     Nevertheless,  the 
latter,   without  one   inch  of  increased  propinquity, 
come  often  to  perceive  quite  clearly  and  distinctly 
some  incomprehensible  blur  into  a  familiar  object, 
should  they  but  stand  still  and  wait  for  the  notion. 


56 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KAXT : 


And  here  some  one  may  object  that  the  blind,  with 
all  the  notions  in  the  world,  hqy^t  perceive.  But  that 
is  not  the  case.  A  blind  man  perceives— is  capable 
o{  Amchauung  —  qmiQ  as  much  as  either  you  or  I.  His 
pipe,  his  knife,  his  loaf,  is  really  very  much  the  same 
object  —Anschauung-  to  any  blind  man  that  ours  are  to 
us.  But  on  this  I  do  not  dilate  here.  In  further 
illustration,  I  add  only  that  we  see  certain  persons, 
women  frequently,  stutter  and  stammer  and  stumble 
fearfully  in  the  attempt  to  pronounce  some  long,  or 
for  them  new,  word.  How  is  this  ?  They  have  been 
taught  to  read  as  well  as  others:  what  causes  the 
difficulty  ?  Simply  the  want  of  notions.  These  are 
mechanical,  instinctive  heads,  that  have  not  reduced 
syllables  into  principles  of  sounds ;  and  so  a  long  new 
word  is  for  them  a  wholly  unconjoinable  manifold  of 
perceptive  details  which,  with  such  principles,  with 
notions,  that  is,  would  have  collapsed  into  unity  and 
been  comprehended  at  once. 

It  must  now  be  pretty  evident,  then,  how  percep- 
tions without  notions  are  blind.  As  for  the  other 
part,  that  notions  without  perceptions  are  void,  w^e 
may,  probably,  pass  that  as  intelligible  at  once.  What 
were  the  notion  river,  for  example,  or  the  notion 
justice,  were  it  incapable  of  being  filled  and  verified 
by  perception  of  an  actual  case?  Surely  vacant! 
As  for  perception,  once  again,  it  may  illustrate  the 
point  to  reflect  that  the  lower  animals  do  not  properly 
perceive.  For  many  of  these,  objects  are  but  blurs  of 
perception  in  the  raw  to  awaken  aversion  or  desire. 
The  dog  that  knows  his  master,  doubtless,  has  com- 
bined a  certain  detail  into  a  loved  and  feared  unity; 
but  the  principle  of  this  unity  is,  after  all,  blind ;  it  is 
not  a  notion,  not  a  universal, — though  it  certainly 
does  duty  for  such,  is  a  blind  surrogate  of  such. 


THE   REPRODUCTION. 


57 


The  notions  which  we  have  seen  instanced  are  em- 
pirical notions — basket,  oar,  drum,  etc.     But,  by  tak- 
ing objects  more  and  more  abstract,  we  shall  perhaps 
arrive  at  such  as  are  aprioii  and  not  empirical  at  all. 
This  was  our  procedure  with  objects  in  search  of  the 
a  priori  of  sense ;    and  it  is  only  reasonable  to  try 
whether  the  same  process  shall  succeed  with  us  here 
also.     Here  is  a  nail  that  I  picked  up  to-day.    To  me 
the  perception  is  complete,  for  I  have  united  the  per- 
ceptive  details,  through  a  general  notion,  into  the 
single  objective  reference :  it  is  a  nail.     But  suppose 
I  were  a  Papuan  or  original  Polynesian,   and  had 
never  seen  a  nail,  the  objective  reference  into  which 
the  detail  would  collapse  would  no  longer  be  a  nail, 
but  simply  a  piece  of  iron ;  and  the  two  perceptions 
would  now  be  really  quite  diiferent.    Suppose,  again,  I 
had  never  seen  iron,  though  acquainted  with  some  other 
metals.    The  detail  in  that  case  would  reduce  itself  to 
unity  only  under  the  notion  metal.     But  suppose  I 
had  never  seen  a  metal,  and  knew  only  solids  and 
fluids,  etc.,  the  nail  would  be  for  me  simply  a  solid. 
Suppose,  now,  I  wanted  to  describe  it  and  distinguish 
it  from  other  solids,  I  should  say  it  was  blue,  cubical, 
heavy,  sharp-edged,  pointed,  etc. — in  short,  I  should 
enumerate  all  the  qualities  in  the  object  that  presented 
themselves  to  my  senses.     Suppose,  now,  I  withdraw 
all  these  qualities  one  by  one,  withdraw  in  thought, 
abstract  from  them,  will  the  body  wholly  disappear? 
No,  not  wholly ;  there  will  remain  over  the  space  it 
occupied,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  we  cannot  with- 
draw, because  it  is  a  pure  perception,   an  a  priori 
object.    But,  besides  this  pure  perception  that  remains 
over,  is  there  not  as  w^ell,  and  similarly  situated,  a 
pure  notion?     We  said  it  is  blue,  and  we  remove 
blue.     It  is  no  lonojer  blue.     So  with   all  the  other 


58 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


qualities  which  we  have  seen  in  the  object ;  and  with 
the  result,  therefore,  that  it  is  no  longer  blue,  it  is  no 
longer  heavy,  it  is  no  longer  hard,  it  is  no  longer 
cubical,  etc.  But  what  is  this  it?  Besides  the  quali- 
ties, we  assume  an  it  in  which  these  qualities  resided, 
a  substrate  in  and  through  which  they  were  thought 
to  cohere.  This  it^  this  substrate,  in  fact,  was  the 
notion  substance :  the  nail  as  a  whole,  its  qualities  apart, 
was  to  us  a  substance.  But  is  substance  an  affair  of 
sense  ?  Is  it  of  the  nature  of  odours,  savours,  colours, 
etc.?  Is  it  even  of  the  nature  of  feeling?  All  the 
various /<?<?&  which  the  body  conveys  to  us  through 
touch  are  sensations,  and,  as  such,  abstraction  can  be 
made  from  them;  but  still  the  notion  substance 
remains  behind,  quite  unlike  all  the  qualities  which 
were  supposed  to  be  grouped  around  it,  and  which  it 
was  supposed  to  support.  It  must,  therefore,  be  a 
prioriy  and  as  it  is  not  a  perception,  it  must  be  a 
notion.  There  is  no  conclusion  possible,  consequently, 
but  that  it  is,  in  some  way  or  other,  an  a  priori  result 
of  the  understanding  itself,  of  pure  understanding. 

In  this  way  we  come  to  have  a  glimpse  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  priori  notions  which  shall  reduce  percep- 
tive a  posteriori  details,  under  subjection  to  the  modi 
of  space  and  time,  into  the  unity  of  a  single  objective 
reference,  and  that  is,  into  an  object  or  objects  as 
such.  But  the  very  idea  of  such  is  at  once  suggestive 
in  regard  to  causality.  Possibly,  that  is,  the  very 
question  from  which  we  start  will  find  its  answer 
here.  The  principle  of  causality,  then,  shall  depend 
on  an  a  priori  notion.  On  the  appearance  of  the 
cause  A,  the  necessary  and  universal  expectation  of 
the  effect  B  shall  depend,  not  on  my  habit  or  custom 
of  seeing  A  and  B  together  (which  amounts  simply  to 
empirical  suggestMiö,  aad  is  iltagßthßi:  iasdequate  to 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


59 


supply  an  absolutely  necessary  and  universal  copula), 
but  on  a  law  of  my  understanding  itself,  to  which 
A  and  B  are  reduced  and  submitted  as  empirical 
examples,  and  by  which  they  become  for  us,  with 
rigorous  necessity  and  absolute  universality,  objec- 
tively connected. 

It  will  be  worth  while  to  spend  a  word  here  on  the 
precise  meaning  of  the  term  objective  as  just  used;  for 
it  may  be  objected  here  that,  after  all,  the  principle, 
the  new  principle,  being  still  in  us,  is  necessarily  sub- 
jective.    This  is  true ;  that  is,  so  far  as  said  principle 
arises  from  our  own  constitution,  it  is  to  be  admitted 
to  be  subjective.     Indeed,  according  to  our  theory 
that  the  a  posteriori  can  reach  no  further  than  to  the 
excitation  in  us  of  empirical  feelings,  such  further 
principles  of  modification  and  connexion  must  be, 
and  can  only  be,  within — subjective,  then,  in  that  re- 
ference. What  we  call  the  objects-in-themselves,  things- 
in-themselves,  are  only  adequate  to  the  contingent 
sensations  which,  through  eye,  ear,  etc.,  we  are  con- 
scious of  being  set  up  in  us.     These  sensations  them- 
selves, consequently,  are  henceforth  in  us;    so  that 
any  further  manipulation  of  them,  as  also  within,  is, 
in  that  point  of  view,  necessarily  subjective.     Never- 
theless objects,  though  we  know  nothing  of  objects  in 
themselves,  still  are;  the  term  has  still  a  meaning  for 
us,  and  is  of  unavoidable  use,  even  in  a  phenomenal 
view  of  the  nature  of  things.     We  do  not  call  what  is 
immediately  due  to  the  object-in-itself— we  do  not  call 
the  sensations  objects.     To  be  called  objects  the  sen- 
sations must  coalesce  into  single  perceptions.    A  single 
perception  that  reduces  into  its  own  unity  a  variety 
of  sensations,  or,  looking  to  the  pure  forms  of  space 
and  time,  a  variety  of  perceptions,  is  an  object.     The 
variety,  in  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  collapses  into  unity 


60 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT  : 


through  an  objective  reference  which  is  conditioned 
by  a  notion.  It  is  combination,  then,  conjunction, 
union,  that  is  constitutive  of  the  object;  and  these 
processes  depend  on  principles  within  us,  which,  there- 
fore, are,  in  origin,  subjective.  It  is  with  reference, 
then,  to  the  combination,  that  the  terms  object  and 
objective  come  in.  The  distinction,  in  truth,  turns 
wholly  on  the  word  reference.  All  that  we  know  (as 
we  cannot  know  the  object-in-itself)  is,  in  effect,  sub- 
jective. Still  all  that  we  know  has  either  a  subjective 
or  an  objective  reference.  A  subjective  reference  con- 
cerns only  what  I  feel,  what  the  particular  subject 
empirically  feels,  experiences ;  but  an  objective  refer- 
ence is  the  conversion  (through  insights  both  of  per- 
ception and  understanding)  of  sensuous  details  into 
unities  (called  objects)  that  seem  thus  to  separate  and 
differentiate  themselves  from  the  subject.  It  is  the 
perceptional  forms  (space  and  time)  and  the  notions 
of  the  understanding  (categories)  which  convert  the 
sensuous  states  of  the  same  subject  to  which  these 
forms  and  notions  belong  into  objects.  It  is  also  plain, 
too,  how  what  is  objective  can,  as  capable  of  exhibi- 
tion or  expression,  be  compared,  while  what  is  sub- 
jective must  always  rest  individual. 

Our  theory,  then,  is  that  objectification  of  the 
sensuous  details  depends  (must  depend)  on  mental 
process  within.  This  process,  as  essentially  synthesis, 
or  of  a  synthetic  nature,  can  never  belong  to  sense. 
Sense  is  passive  only,  it  receives,  it  takes  on  only  what 
impression  is  made  on  it ;  but  the  understanding  is 
active;  it  reflects,  it  examines,  it  goes  to  work,  it 
operates  change.  Union,  combination,  connexion, 
synthesis  can,  then,  never  belong  to  the  receptivity 
of  sense,  but  may  and  must  to  the  spontaneity  of  the 
understanding.    The  understanding,  now,  acts  through 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


61 


notions;  and  it  will  be  therefore  these  that  effect 
synthesis.     These  notions,  again,  as  it  is  plainly  not 
the  receptivity  of  sense  that  gives  them,  must  be  pre- 
supposed as  already  in  the  mind— as  already  in  the 
mind  for  accomplishment  of  the  function  of  synthesis 
in  question.     But  we  have  already  arrived  at  a  clear 
conception  of  all  this,  both  as  regards  the  reductive 
(or  redactive)  power  of  notions,  and  the  actual  a  priori 
existence  of  some  such ;  e.g.,  substance  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  causality.     What  we  seem  to  require  now  is 
some  means  of  arriving  at  a  full  catalogue,  at  a  com- 
plete tree  of  these  notions.     For  it  is  evident  that  we 
must  have  a  guarantee  of  completeness  here,  else  our 
whole  business  fails.     Besides  a  guarantee  of  coni- 
pleteness,  we  must  have  also,  however,  one  of  legiti- 
macy or  authenticity.    We  must  possess  grounds  of 
absolute  certainty  in  asserting  that  such  and  such  are 
the  a  priori,  and  that  such  and  such  are  all  the  a  priori 
notions,  that  function   unity  of  objective   reference 
(objectification,  objectivity)  for  all  possible  sensuous 
details,— these  details,  moreover,  being  assumed  to 
have  been  (at  least  potentially)  previously  disposed 
in,  and  according  to,  the  pure  perceptive  forms  of 
space  and  time.     Such  guarantee  (grounds)  we  might 
name  an  architectoric  principle ;  for  it  would  underlie 
creatively   the   whole   structure   that   rose   from    it. 
Such   principle,    then,    must   be   the   object   of   our 
special  quest  now.     But  we  are  supposed  to  have  the 
clue  and  guide  to  our  whole  general  quest  before  us, 
and  the  same  clue  or  guide  must  be  supposed  adequate 
to  every  partial  and  subordinate  quest.     We  were 
led,  for  example,  by  the  fact  of  the  presence  of  apo- 
dictic  truths  in  matters  apparently  quite  empirical  to 
conjecture  that  there  were  two  factors  in  all  know- 
ledge  (perception)  :    one  empirical  proper   and   due 


62 


TEXTBOOK    TO    KANT: 


a  posteriori  to  the  impression  of  objects-in-tlicmselves, 
and  another,  empirical  de  facto^  but  not  empirical  de 
jure,  empirical  in  fact,  that  is,  but  not  empirical  in 
origin  and  authority — due  a  priori,  therefore,  to  the 
operations  of  the  perceptive  or  cognitive  faculty  itself. 
So  led,  we  were  further  led  to  believe  that  scrutiny 
of  the  faculty  itself  would  yield  to  sight  the  peculiar 
additions  which  its  operations  contributed  to  the 
empirical  whole,  the  whole  of  experience. 

An  analysis  of  the  faculty,  then,  was  therefore 
suggested ;  and  to  the  divisions  of  this  faculty,  uni- 
versal or  general  logic  (an  admitted  pure  science  from 
which  all  empirical  elements  were  certainly  eliminated) 
was  adopted  as  guide.  Under  this  conduct  we  have 
already  advanced  well  as  yet ;  and  there  is  no  reason 
why  we  should  discard  it  here,  especially  as  what 
concerns  us  now  is  wholly  the  understanding  (the 
more  particular  object  of  logic),  and  not  sense.  The 
function  which  we  are  examining  now,  the  reduction 
or  redaction  of  a  complex  of  sense  into  the  unity  of  a 
notion,  is  wholly  an  affair  of  the  understanding ;  and, 
inasmuch  as  the  understanding  itself  is  a  unity,  we  can 
anticipate  a  like  quality  for  the  principle  in  demand. 
Could  we  but  find,  indeed,  all  the  functions,  all  the 
inodi  of  the  understanding,  we  should  then,  as  we 
are  now  warranted  to  assume,  be  at  no  loss  for  all 
the  subordinate  forms  of  what  principle  we  seek. 
Our  first  object,  then,  is  a  complete  table  of  the 
functions  of  the  understanding. 

Now,  what  is  the  understanding — ^what  do  I  mean 
when  I  say  I  understand  a  thing  ?  We  have  already 
seen,  in  reference  to  the  illustrations  adduced  of  the 
necessity  of  the  addition  to  the  perceptive  detail  of 
the  unity  of  a  notion,  that  the  understanding  was  a 
necessary  ekneai  OT  wmmmt  even  in  the  everyday 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


63 


seeing  (perceiving)  of  objects ;  that  at  all  to  perceive, 
it  was  necessary  to  understand.    Understanding,  then, 
in  all  the  examples  alluded  to,  is  seen  to  consist  in 
the  uniting  of  a  perceptive  complex  into  the  single 
whole  of  a  universal  notion  (and  then  only  it  is  that 
we  perceive  the  perceptive  complex  itself).     That  is, 
there  was  no  understanding  possible  until  the  class, 
the  universal,   was  found,   of  which  the   perceptive 
detail  was  only  an  example,  only  a  particular.     All 
the  objects  from  abroad,  for  example,  or  those  that 
peeped  perplexingly  from  the  cupboard,  or  the  unin- 
telligible  quarry   of  stones — not   one   of  these   was 
understood,  not  one  of  these  was — Yii^mWy— perceived. 
till  we  found  the  class  of  which  each  was  an  example, 
basket,  oar,  club,  brass  candlestick,  cocked  hat,  wall. 
The  process  by  which  these  were  found  was  thinking : 
we  did  nothing  all  the  time  we  were  longing  to  per- 
ceive  but  gaze  and  think,  though  the  thinking  was 
but  an  obscure  nisus  till,  with  a  light,  the  thought 
wanted,  the  notion,   sprang  to  us.     Understanding, 
then,  is  so  far  identical  with  thinking,  and  both  relate 
to  notions.     Thought  and  understanding,  that  is,  are 
both   discursive   and    proceed    by   notions.      Again, 
judgment  or  judging  is  a  faculty  that  proceeds  by 
notions,  a  faculty  that  compares  notions,  joining  and 
disjoining  them.     Judgment  or  judging,  then,  is  but 
another  name  for  the  understanding,  or  for  thinking. 
Was  it  not,  in  each  case  of  the  adduced  perceptive 
details,  an  act  of  judgment  that  added  the  notion? 
Was  it  not  an  act  of  judgment  that  found  out  the 
class,  the  universal,  to  which  the  particular  or  detail 
in  question  belonged  as  an  example  or  instance  ?     To 
understand  is  to  think,  then,  and  to  think  is  to  judge. 
In  fact,  it  will  be  found  on  trial  that  no  example  of 
thought  or  understanding  can  be  taken  up  that  will 


64 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


not  demonstrate  this.  For  instance,  some  one,  putting 
one  hand  over  my  eyes,  brings  with  the  other  my 
fingers  into  contact  with  a  certain  body.  Well,  I  am 
puzzled  for  a  momeut.  It  is  an  unknown  variety,  an 
unknown  detail,  an  unknown  many ;  but,  on  a  sudden, 
all  becomes  one,  and  I  shout  out.  Water.  Now,  was 
it  not  at  last  by  an  act  of  judgment  that  I  was  able 
to  identify  the  variety  at  the  point  of  my  fingers  as 
water?  Here,  then,  in  the  formation  of  a  single 
notion,  we  find  judgment  necessary,  as  well  as  that 
its  act  or  function  consists  in  the  subsumption  of  a 
given  variety  under  a  certain  known  universal  or 
class.  To  take  more  complicated  instances,  what  is 
it  to  understand  the  theory  of  heat,  of  dew,  of  the 
heavenly  bodies?  Is  it  not  to  attain  by  judgment 
to  the  reduction  of  a  variety  of  particulars  to  the 
simplicity  and  unity  of  a  co-ordinated  and  subor- 
dinated whole  of  general  or  universal  notions  ?  Or, 
once  more,  what  is  it  to  understand  the  universe  ? 
Is  it  not  to  discover  an  ultimate  principle  (God,  the 
absolute)  under  which  we  may  subsume  the  infinite 
all  of  things?  And  what  faculty  subsumes  the  lower 
under  the  higher  but  judgment? 

We  do  not  notice  the  respective  domains  of  under- 
standing, reason,  etc.,  that  are  shadowed  out  here, 
but  we  say  again  that  a  complete  table  of  the  func- 
tions of  the  understanding  is  evidently  our  special 
quest  at  present,  and  that  by  means  of  such  table 
there  is  every  likelihood  of  attaining  to  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  totality  of  pure  notions.  But,  further, 
understanding  being  judgment,  we  know  that  logic 
treats  of  judgment.  Logic,  certainly,  at  least  classifies 
all  formal  judgments.  Now,  are  not  all  possible 
formal  judgments  just,  in  so  many  words,  all  possible 
forms  of  judgment,  and  are  not  all  possible  forms  of 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


65 


judgment,  just,  in  so  many  words  again,  all  possible 
functions  of  judgment?     But  if  general  logic  cata- 
logues all  possible  functions  of  judgment,   we  have 
seen  already  that  we  may,  on  its  part,  safely  accept 
as  much,  for,  admittedly,  general  logic  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  matter,  the   a  posteriori^  the  empirical 
clement,   of  thought,   but  only  with  the  form,   the 
a  ])riori^    the  pure   element,    of  thought.      General 
logic,  too,  has  existed  for  2000  years  without  suffering 
either  diminution   or  increase ;    and,   in  its  regard, 
therefore,  we  may  positively  rely  on  the  presence  of 
correctness,    completeness,    and   sufficiency.       Judg- 
ments, then,  purely  regarded,  will  be  found  to  possess 
in  logic  Quantity,  Quality,  Relation,  and  Modality. 
In    quantity,  judgments   are   either   universal,    par- 
ticular,   or   singular.      In   quality,    they   are   either 
affirmative,    negative,    or    indefinite.      In   relation, 
they  are  either  categorical,  hypothetic,  or  disjunctive. 
And  in  modality,  they  are  either  problematic,  assert- 
oric,  or  apodictic.     It  is  necessary  to  admit  that  this 
classification  is  not  absolutely  identical  with  any  of 
tliose  that  may  be  met  with  in  the  usual  treatises. 
Still    we    dare    assert    that    an    examination     and 
comparison   of  all   that  is  ordinarily  treated  of  in 
general  logic  as  concerns  judgments  will  justify  us 
in  the  assumption  of  the  classification  we  propose, 
and  will  show  that,  while  we  have  essentially  neither 
added  nor  subtracted,  we  have,  by  greater  scientific 
rigour  both  of  distinction  and  association,  possibly,  or 
probably,  in  no  small  degree,  improved.     Well  assured 
ourselves  as  regards  accuracy  and  adequacy,  we  deem 
it  unnecessary  to  retard  our  main  inquiry  by  any 
formal   analysis  and  justification  in  this  place,  but 
simply  proceed. 

Now  what  is  the  general  function  of  a  judgment 


GG 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


according  to  logic  ?  When  we  say,  for  example,  all 
bodies  are  divisible,  what  mental  process  is  indicated 
by  the  assertion?  I  have  certainly  conjoined  two 
notions  :  I  have  asserted  the  one  of  the  other.  But  for 
what  reason  ?  Evidently  for  this  reason,  that  the  one 
notion,  divisibility,  is  implied  in  the  other,  all  bodies. 
Now,  that  is  to  say  that  I  analytically  found  this,  for 
to  bring  several  ideas  under  one  is  an  analytic  act, 
depending  on  process  of  abstraction  and  generalization 
according  to  identity.  But  this  same  sort  of  reason, 
and  similarly  constituted,  obtains  throughout  all  the 
other  judgments,  under  whatever  name  classified. 
Judgments,  in  ordinary  logic,  therefore,  are  analytic- 
ally applied,  and  in  regard  of  notions.  Still  the 
action  itself  of  each  judgment  is  a  synthetic  one ;  for 
even  the  disjunction  of  negative  judgments  involves 
synthesis  with  an  opposite.  All  forms  of  judgment, 
then,  are  various  functions  of  synthesis,  which,  logic- 
ally, are  analytically  applied,  and  between  notions. 
But  may  not  these  various  functions  of  synthesis  be 
conceived  capable  of  being  otherwise  applied  ? 

Any  object,  as  first  apprehended  in  consciousness, 
is  but  a  plural  blur  of  parts,  of  units  of  sensation  and 
crude  perception.  This  is  their  condition  as  received 
into  imagination.  But  imagination  is  productive  and 
reproductive,  is  capable  of  movement,  is  capable  of 
movement  among  these  units.  It  is  capable  thus  of 
recognising  them,  mustering  them,  comprehending 
them,  and,  under  the  unity  of  self  consciousness,  to 
a  certain  extent,  performing  (in  connexion  with  time 
and  space,  which  also  lie  in  it)  synthesis  upon  them : 
it  gives  them  contimdiy.  Such  synthesis,  however, 
would  still  be  contingent  and  subjective.  There 
seems  still  required  something  else  to  bestow  objectivity 
and  necessity.     Now  may  not  that  something  else  be 


THE   REPRODUCTION. 


67 


extended  to  us  precisely  by  these  various  syntheses 
of  the  functions  of  judgment?     The  question,  then, 
is  this.  May  not  the  same  functions  of  judgment  that 
act  analytically  in  logical  application  to  notions  be 
capable    of    a    synthetic    action   when   perceptively 
applied    to   the   complexes   or   manifolds   of  sense? 
The  perceptive  units  are  a  disjunct  plurality  received 
into  the  mind,  and  there  are  at  the  same  time  func- 
tions of  unity  in  the  mind ;  but,  pluralities  received 
into  unities,  affections  received  into  functions,  why 
should  the  latter  not  grasp  and  unite  the  former? 
In  the  three  classes  of  judgment,  for  example,  that 
involve  union,  connexion,  with  reference  to  relation, 
is  it  not  conceivable  that  the  categorical  function,  or 
the  hypothetical  function,  or  the  disjunctive  function, 
may  act  in  uniting,  not  mere  notions  analytically  as  in 
the  reflection  of  logic,  but  the  actual  facts  of  ex- 
perience synthetically  as  in  the  perception  of  sense? 
The  categorical  judgment,  as  we  know,  expresses  a 
direct  relation  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate ; 
the  two  notions  are  there  directly  or  categorically 
related.     We  see,  then,  that  categorical  relation  is  a 
function  of  the  judgment  or  the  understanding,  and 
is  it  inconceivable  that  this  function  should  relate 
itself,  as  Avell  synthetically  to  a  perceptive  variety 
already  offered  to  it,   as  analytically  to  a  notional 
variety  similarly  offered?     Is  it  impossible  to  con- 
ceive two  facts  of  sense  which,  operated  upon  by  the 
function  in  question,  would  reduce  themselves  into 
a  relative   or   correlative   unity?      Categorically  to 
attach    predicates    to   subjects    is    really   to   affirm 
qualities  of  substances.     The  formal  function  of  thought, 
then,  implied  in  the  categorical  judgment  is  the  rela- 
tion of  subsistence  and  inherence,  of  substance  and 
accident.     This  being  a  formal  function  of  judgment, 


68 


TEXT  BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


a  rule  of  synthesis,  it  is  evident  that,  a  complex  of 
sense  to  suit  being  introduced  into  it,  such  action  will 
follow  as  shall  exhibit,  sensuously,  perceptively,  in 
actual  facts  of  experience,  an  example  of  this  function, 
a  case  of  this  rule ;  but  an  example  withal,  a  case 
withal,  which,  however  empirical,  however  much  a 
matter  of  mere  sense,  shall  possess,  nevertheless,  all 
the  universality  and  necessity  of  the  intellectual  in- 
sight  that  lay  in  the  general  function,  that  lay  in  the 
general  rule.  Again,  in  the  hypothetical  judgment, 
the  relation  is  between  two  propositions,  and  all  that 
is  involved  is  the  truth  of  the  consequence.  If 
there  be  perfect  justice,  the  hardened  sinner  will  be 
punished :  we  see  that  what  is  concerned  here  is  a  vis 
consequentice.  It  is  not  the  truth  of  either  proposi- 
tion that  is  considered,  but  simply  that  of  their  rela- 
tion, simply  that  of  the  copula  between  them.  But 
this  is  an  original  function  of  the  intellect,  and  we 
may  certainly  conceive  some  suitable  complexion  of 
facts  reduced  under  it;  in  which  case  what  would 
result  could,  manifestly,  be  only  an  example  of  cause 
and  effect— percejytions,  now,  not  notions,  with  a  vis 
conseguentice  between  them,  which  should  be  universal 
and  necessary.  As  the  ground  or  reason  implies  its 
consequent  or  result,  so  the  cause  implies  its  effect. 
Things  thus,  quite  empirical  themselves,  and,  con- 
sequently, quite  contingent  themselves,  may  quite 
well  bring  with  them  in  their  relation  the  necessity 
and  universality  of  an  intellectual  insight.  Of  course, 
it  is  still  evidently  a  necessity  that  the  sensuous  com- 
plexion should,  as  said,  suit — the  intellectual  ratio  that 
is ;  else  subsumption  were  inconceivable.  But  how 
this  takes  place  we  know  not  at  all— how  objects 
should  present  themselves  in  such  synthesis  or  com- 
plexion as  brings  judgment  ta  act  upon  ihcm,  and 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


69 


reduce  them  to  its  universal  rule,  we  know  not  at  alh 
Why  this  tree  has  its  particular  shape  is  quite  unknown 
to  us ;  still  it  has  to  conform  to  the  general  laws  of 
space,  and  present  itself  in  length,  breadth,  and 
thickness.  So,  what  may  be  the  nature  of  the  object 
in  itself  that  underlies  any  empirical  complexion,  as  of 
magnet  and  steel,  spark  and  powder,  etc.,  is  absolutely 
hidden  from  us ;  we  only  know  that  it  is  such  as  to  be 
necessarily  subsumed  under  the  function  of  judgment 
that  concerns  the  vis  consequentice,  and  comes  forward, 
consequently,  in  the  duplicity  of  a  correlative  cause 
and  effect,  with  the  necessity  of  intellectual  insight 
imparted  to  it.^ 

A  similar  train  of  thinking  will,  we  doubt  not, 
bring  the  reader  to  see  the  legitimacy  of  all  the  other 
members  which,  as  principles  of  perceptive  synthesis, 
we  seek  to  deduce  from,  and  place  parallel  to,  the 
various  affections,  quantitative,  qualitative,  etc.,  of 
the  logical  judgment.  These  principles  we  name 
categories.  Under  quantity,  there  will  correspond  to 
the  functions  or  affections  of  the  judgment  which  we 
have  already  seen,  the  categories  of  unity,  plurality, 
and  totality.  Under  the  other  rubrics,  quality,  rela- 
tion, and  modality,  we  shall  similarly  have  the  cate- 
gories, respectively,  of  reality,  negation,  limitation, — 
substantiality,  causality,  reciprocity, — possibility,  ac- 
tuality, necessity. 

After  what  has  been  already  said,  there  will  be 
little  difficulty  in  understanding  that  these  categories 
are  but  the  various  affections  of  the  logical  judgment 
which  we  usually  find  in  the  ordinary  text-books — 
these  affections,  regarded  as  functions  of  unity,  and 
conceived  to  be  synthetically  applied  in  reduction  of 

»  I  shall  be  found  again,  in  the  above,  to  be  attempting  to  meet, 
suppositiously  in  the  spirit  of  Kant,  my  own  objections  to  Kant. 


70 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


correspondent  sensuous  complexions  (said  complex- 
ions being,  as  must  always  be  borne  in  mind,  only 
subjective  affections,  feelings,  or  perceptions,  of  our  own 
within  us)  :  they  are  notions  substituted  for  the  indi- 
vidual moments  of  each  general  logical  function — pure 
notions  of  the  understanding,  that  would  arise  from 
said  functions,  in  their  various  moments,  being  ap- 
plied  synthetically   to    the   sensuous    or   perceptive 
complexions   of   experience.      Under   quantity,    the 
setting  of  totality  and  universality,  of  plurality  and 
particularity,    of  unity   and  singularity,  as  parallel 
respectively  the  one  to  the  other,  will,  presumably, 
present  no  difficulty.     The  analogy  between  affirma- 
tion  and  reality  is   equally  obvious.      Negation   is 
alike  in  both  tables.     Then  the  function  in  an  inde- 
finite proposition  is  really  one  of  limitation.      The 
soul  is  not  mortal,  for  example :  what  I  have  really 
accomplished  here  is  only  a  certain  limitation ;  the 
sphere  predicable  of  the  soul  is  limited  by  the  pro- 
position;   a  limit   has  been  set  down  exclusive   of 
everything  that  is  mortal.      The  peculiarity  of  the 
proposition  is,  that  we  have  veritable  affirmation  pro- 
duced by  a  negative  predicate.    That  the  problematic 
pairs  with  the  possible,  the  assertoric  with  the  existent 
or  actual,  and  the  apodictic  with  the  necessary,  may 
also  be  accepted  at  a  glance.     The  two  first  moments 
of  relation  we   have   already   discussed,    and   there 
remains  for  our  consideration  only  the  production  of 
the   category  of  reciprocity  by  function  of  the  dis- 
junctive judgment. 

This,  also,  is  easily  made  clear.  Take  the  dis- 
junctive proposition,  The  world  exists  either  through 
blind  chance,  or  inner  necessity,  or  an  outer  cause. 
It  is  evident  that  these  three  clauses  constitute  a 
sphere,  a  whole  sphere,  and  that,  for  exhaustion  of 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


71 


this  sphere,  completion  of  this  sphere,  any  one  clause 
is  necessary  to  the  others.  It  is  also  clear  that  the 
acceptance  of  any  one  clause  is  the  exclusion  of  the 
rest,  or  that  the  exclusion  of  any  two  clauses  is  the 
acceptance  of  the  third  that  remains.  In  short,  a 
mutualness  or  reciprocity  of  action  and  reaction  is 
evident  among  these  clauses ;  and  there  can  be  little 
difficulty  in  conceiving  that  such  an  intellectual 
function  as  is  there  involved,  being  applied  in  corre- 
lation of  phenomena,  would  educe  the  category  of 
reciprocity  between  the  active  and  the  passive. 

In  fact,  we  have  but  to  reach  the  one  general  idea 
concerned  in  all  this,  to  reach  also  the  central  insight 
not  only  into  the  nature  of  a  transcendental  logic, 
but  into  that  as  well  of  our  whole  inquiry,  and,  very 
specially,  of  our  answer  to  Hume.  The  same  under- 
standing that,  by  its  system  of  functions  (judgments), 
analytically  conjoins  notions,  avails  to  introduce,  by 
the  same  functions  synthetically,  necessary  objective 
conjunction  and  connexion  into  the  perceptive  details 
of  sense,  as  present  in  consciousness  whether  generally 
(space  and  time)  or  specially  (actual  sensation).  This 
is  the  key-conception  of  the  entire  enterprise,  and 
Avhat  concerns  pure  or  general  sense  is  but  corol- 
lary and  complementary.  This  is  the  answer  to  the 
Quid  juris  ^ — this  is  the  explanation  of  all  apodictic 
validity,  whether  empirical  or  other. 

What  we  have  desired  to  do,  then,  we  hope  will  be 
now  clear.  We  have  found  out  the  various  functions 
of  judgment  or  the  understanding;  and  we  have  seen 
that  the  operation  involved  in  each  is  a  synthetic  (a 
conjunctive  or  conjoining)  unity.  We  have  decided, 
too,  that  the  whole  business  of  sense  is  limited  to 
receptivity,  while  synthesis,  combination  of  any  kind, 
can  come  from  the  spontaneity  of  the  understanding 


i 


72 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT: 


alone.  Then  we  have  perceived  that  the  a  posteriori 
elements  of  our  knowledge  (and  these  constitute  the 
great  bulk  of  all  and  any  knowledge)  are  but  con- 
tingent affections  of  our  sense,  whose  correlative 
objects-in-themselves  (if  any)  are  wholly  denied  us ; 
which  affections,  then,  on  being  received  within,  re- 
quire from  within  the  aid  of  the  regulating  function 
of  fixed  and  necessary  principles.  But  just  such 
capability  of  reducing  a  variety,  a  multiple,  a  plur- 
ality, a  detail,  a  complex,  a  multiplex,  a  manifold,  of 
sense  we  discovered  to  be  contained  in  the  functions 
of  judgment ;  the  consequent  notions  due  to  these 
functions,  when  synthetically  applied  to  any  manifold, 
readily  suggesting  themselves.  There,  then,  is  the 
want ;  and  here  is  what  is  necessary  for  the  supply 
of  the  want:  what  more  reasonable  than  to  bring 
the  one  to  the  other,  and  transform  into  the  unity, 
and  simplicity,  and  order  of  a  connected  and  articu- 
lated whole  of  experience,  the  infinite  a  posteriori 
variety,  by  means  of  a  certain  number  of  original 
patterns,  rules,  or  standards,  under  which  judgment, 
with  its  own  necessary  insight,  should  subsume  it  ? 
What  more  reasonable  than  such  conception  ?  What 
othef  source  or  explanation  can  we  find  for  that 
peculiar  jus^  that  apodictic  validity,  which  is  cer- 
tainly present  for  us,  not  only  in  what  are  called  the 
pure  sciences,  but  just  in  the  ordinary  facts  of  our 
current,  hourly  experience?  How  otherwise  can 
affections  that  are  within  be  subjected  to  law,  than  by 
functions  that  are  also  within?  Consider,  too,  the 
success  of  the  undertaking.  With  these  categories 
and  the  two  general-sense  forms,  we  really  exhaust 
the  whole  field  of  the  apodictic.  Any  other  apodictic 
principles,  namely,  will  readily  subordinate  them- 
selves  under   those    primary    ones,    taking   up    the 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


73 


position  of  derivatives ;  to  whicli,  whether  springing 
from  union  with  one  another,  on  the  one  hand,  or 
with  the  forms  of  sense,  on  the  other,  we  desire  to 
give  the  name  of  predicahles.  Such  are  power, 
action,  passion,  origin,  decease,  alteration,  etc. 

As  for  the  primary  principles  in  allusion,  we  call 
them  categories  or  predicaments,  in  view  of  the  rela- 
tion which  they  bear  to  the  so-named  classes  of  Aris- 
totle. These,  however,  unlike  our  own,  owe  their 
origin  to  no  systematic  principle,  but  seem  to  have 
been  caught  up  and  set  down  rhapsodically,  as  it 
were.  Now,  no  bare  estimate  of  some  such  mere 
mechanical  aggregate,  gathered,  too,  and  finished,  as 
it  might  be,  at  haphazard,  will,  evidently,  at  all 
avail  in  such  a  case.  On  the  contrary,  we  must  have 
the  systematic  guidance  of  a  common  principle,  and 
in  such  manner  as  to  have  a  voucher  or  guarantee  of 
the  perfect  legitimacy  and  exhaustive  completeness 
of  all  the  members  or  elements  which  shall  distribute 
it.  Such  principle  has  been  found  for  us  in  judg- 
ment. But  the  predicaments  and  post-predicaments 
of  Aristotle  will  be  found  to  constitute  a  mere  indis- 
criminate medley :  some  are  not  pure,  as  motion,  for 
example,  and  some  relate  to  sense,  as  where,  when, 
etc.,  or,  like  action  and  passion,  are  merely  deriva- 
tive. 

The  great  objection  of  the  general  reader  to  our 
rationale  in  explanation  of  apodictic  validity  of  syn- 
thesis will  probably  concern  the  empirical  peculiarity 
in  form  and  connexion  of  the  objects  themselves.  It 
will  be  felt,  for  example,  that  the  reason  is  not  in  me, 
but  in  the  objects  themselves,  why  one,  a  stone  here, 
has  this  shape,  and  another,  a  stone  or  a  brick  there, 
has  that  one.  So,  in  the  series  of  cause  and  effect, 
it  will  be  felt  that  we  cannot  dictate  the  terms  of  it. 


74 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT  : 


and  that,  consequently,  it  lias  a  necessity  of  its  own. 
And  again,  it  will  seem  very  unnecessary  to  make  the 
notion  quantity  depend  upon  an  internal  principle 
when  we  have  just  to  use  our  eyes  to  see  it  before  us 
in  the  objects  themselves.  As  for  quality,  the  general 
reader  will  probably  think  it  absurd  and  quite  super- 
erogatory to  make  an  a  priori  provision  for  a  matter 
that  can  only  be  known  a  posteriori^  and  that  is 
wholly  a  posteriori.  These  are  the  difficulties  of 
uninitiated  empiricism,  however.  Once  for  all,  were 
it  with  things  in  themselves  that  we  had  to  do,  we 
could  have  no  a  priori  knowledge  whatever.  In  that 
case,  to  have  any  particular  knowledge,  we  should 
simply  have  to  wait  for  the  presentation  of  every 
separate  object;  and  all  and  any  knowledge,  con- 
sequently, would,  as  after  the  fact,  be  simply  a  pos- 
teriorij  and,  as  a  posteriori,  necessarily  only  empirical 
and  contingent.  But  as  we  can  perceive  only  through 
affections  of  sense  and  forms  of  perception,  and  think 
only  by  notions  which  relate  to  objects  through  these 
affections,  we  can  neither  perceive  nor  think  things  in 
tliemselves,  but  only  phenomena,  only  appearances. 
As  also  we  do  possess  elements  of  knowledge  apodic- 
tically  necessary  and  universal,  it  is  evident  that  we 
are  not  limited  to  an  a  posteriori  knowledge,  but 
possess  also  such  as  is  manifestly  a  priori.  This  a 
priori  knowledge  is  found  to  unite  itself  to  the  a 
posteriori^  and  to  effect  there  results  of  the  most  ex- 
cellent and,  indeed,  indispensable  nature.  The  a 
priori  and  the  a  posteriori  are  found  to  be  mutually 
correlative  and  complementary,  so  that  either  by  itself 
were  inane  and  futile.  It  stands  to  reason,  then,  that 
the  contingent  a  posteriori  requiring  an  element  of 
necessity,  such  element  is  provided  for  it  in  the 
apodictic  a  jmori     Nor,  indeed,  is  there  anything 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


75 


easier — the  phenomenal  nature  of  the  a  posteriori 
and  the  consequent  necessity  of  an  apodictic  a  p>riori 
being  borne  in  mind — than  to  clear  away  all  the 
special  objections  we  have  mentioned. 

It  is  quite  conceivable  that  the  particular  form  of 
affection  set  up  varies  wdth  the  object  in  itself;  but, 
though  this  form  takes  up  a  certain  length  and  a  cer- 
tain breadth  and  a  certain  thickness  in  space,  it  does 
not  follow  that  length  and  breadth  and  thickness 
themselves,  as  such,  come  from  the  object  in  itself  at 
all.  Were  it  so  indeed,  then,  manifestly,  elements  of 
apodictic  necessity  (quantities)  would  spring  from  ex- 
perience, which  is  quite  impossible.  So  as  regards 
the  particular  causal  form  set  up — for  the  particular 
complexion  is  but  a  particular  affection — it  is  quite 
intelligible  how  the  particularity  might  depend  on  the 
object  in  itself,  at  the  same  time  that  the  general  vis 
consequentice  should  not  come,  nor  be  able  to  come, 
from  the  object  in  itself  at  all ;  for  did  it  so  come,  a 
posteriori,  that  is,  it  were  self-contradictory  to  affirm 
necessity  and  universality  of  the  relation  at  all. 
Surely  it  is  conceivable  that  the  peculiarity  of  the 
object  always  induces  a  peculiarity  of  modification  in 
our  sentiency,  and  that  certain  modifications  are  in 
such  complexion  (why,  of  course,  depending  on  the 
object  in  itself,  we  know  not  how)  that  we  subordinate 
them  under  the  relation  of  antecedent  and  consequent, 
or  cause  and  effect.  Nay,  it  is  not  even  necessary  that 
Ave  should  always  couple  (or  categorize)  rightly ;  what 
we  want  to  do  is  only  to  show,  when  we  do  couple 
rightly,  the  origin  of  the  necessity  that  then  obtains. 

The  particular  form  or  complexion  that  adjusts 
itself  so  and  so  in  time  and  space  must  depend  upon 
the  object  in  itself;  but  it  obeys  the  forms  of  time 
and  space,  as  such,  and  it  is  reduced  to  unity  by  the 


76 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  RKPRODUCTION. 


77 


f 


power  of  an  original  pure  notion  of  the  understand- 
ing, that  is  quite  general  and  universal,  be  the  par- 
ticular what  it  may.  The  object  in  itself  giving  rise 
to  the  peculiar  modification  or  complexion  of  our 
sentiencv  that  arran^jes  itself  so  as  to  invite  the  action 
of  the  category  cause,  we  know  not  at  all ;  we  only 
know  that  this  category,  so  manifesting  itself,  is  a 
general  function  of  judgment  under  which  the  modi- 
fication or  complexion  is  subsumed  into  an  object,  as 
simply  a  case  of  the  rule.  So  it  is  as  regards  quan- 
tity :  did  we  derive  the  conceptions  as  well  of  quantity 
in  general  as  of  unity,  severality,  totality,  etc.,  from 
things  without  us,  these  conceptions  would  not  have 
an  apodictic,  but  only  a  comparative  universality.  It 
is  not  so  certain,  either,  that  these  notions  could  be 
so  derived :  the  sensuous  procession  can  be  conceived 
to  pass  before  us  perfectly  well  without  suggesting 
any  thought  of  causality,  or  even  of  quantity.  There 
is  nothing  supererogatory,  then,  in  making  provision  in 
the  mind  for  such  principles  in  articulation  of  the 
phenomena.  Being,  indeed,  of  an  apodictic  nature, 
they  cannot  be  derived  from  experience  at  all,  but 
must  be  a  jyriori.  Nor  is  it  differently  situated  with 
quality.  We  possess  sense,  and  every  affliction  of 
that  sense  is  quality ;  and  reality,  negation,  limitation, 
can  be  very  readily  seen  to  reconcile  themselves  to 
what  must  be  the  absolutely  pure  and  universal  mo- 
ments of  sensation ;  for  it  is  evident  that  every  sen- 
sation has  elements  that  correspond  to  these  moments 
of  quantity ;  and  there  is  nothing  absurd  in  providing 
a  i^riori  necessary  distinctions  for  the  classifying  of 
sensations  themselves.  ^ 

»  As  said  already,  I  conceive  myself  to  answer,  in  the  above,  my  own 
objections  to  the  scheme  of  Kajit,  and  in  the  spirit,  presumably,  of  Kant 
himself.  Elsewhere  it  will.be  found  that  I  hold  in  the  end  by  my  oAvn 
objectiouSy  and  that  I  reject,  consequently,  my  own  answei's. 


The  reader  by  reflection  will  perceive  that  our 
great  levers  of  argument  are — 1,  the  phenomenal 
nature  of  objective  knowledge,  and,  2,  the  fact  that 
we  do  possess  apodictic  synthetic  principles.  These 
levers  he  will  do  well  to  use  for  himself.  Still,  we 
hope  to  accomplish  conviction  for  every  reader  by  the 
end  of  the  following  Book,  in  which  it  will  be  found 
we  subject  all  our  materials  to  a  final  examination, 
and  articulate  them  together  into  a  systematic  whole 
of  such  perfection  and  completeness  as  ought  to  go  far 
to  prove  itself. 

Such,  then,  is  the  nature  of  our  deduction — a 
deduction  of  the  peculiar  authority  which  certain 
facts  apparently  in  experience  seem  to  challenge 
{deductio  aut  dedaratio  aut  explicatio  juris) — a  transcen- 
dental deduction,  therefore,  which  can  expect  success 
for  itself  only  in  investigating  the  a  jmori  elements 
even  in  empirical  perception.  That  of  Locke,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  may  name  an  empirical  deduction  of 
the  fact  (deductio,  dedaratio,  explicatio  facti) ;  which, 
indeed,  can  present  no  difficulty,  as  experience  is 
nothing  but  an  aggregate  of  examples  of  the  principles 
sought  to  be  explained.  In  this,  however,  it  never 
struck  Locke  that  he  was  providing  a  genealogy^  for 
all  facts  of  knowledge  which,  in  the  case  of  some  of 
them,  would  prove  quite  inadequate  to  the  dignity  of 
their  pretensions  and  the  wide  sway  of  the  powers 
they  arrogated;  for  no  mere  physiological  theory 
can  account  for  the  existence  of  those  principles 
named  apodictic  synthetics. 

Nor,  it  may  be  remarked,  was  Reid  one  whit  more 
successful.  Hume  pointed  out  a  principle  bringing 
with  it  a  peculiar  claim,  which  claim  he  demon- 
strated, on  the  principles  of  Locke,  to  be  incompetent 
to  it.     Reid  rose  in  wrath  and  defended  the  instincts 


/ 


78 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


THE    REPRODUCTION 


79 


which  were  implanted  by  God.  But  this  for  answer 
is  simply  Hume's  own.  He  emphatically  recognised 
the  natural  instinct ;  but  if  there  was  to  be  a  reason 
for  the  necessity  of  insight  which  we  all  acknowledged 
to  lie  in  it,  then  he  challenged  the  production  of  it. 
This,  however,  would  seem  to  have  escaped  the  notice, 
not  only  of  Reid  and  his  followers,  but  of  everybody 
else  as  yet. 

Our  explanation,  then,  is  such  as  endeavours  to 
meet  Hume's  question  really  as  it  was  meant:  it 
attempts  to  produce  the  reason,  the  insight,  by  and  in 
which  the  mind  makes  always  a  necessary  transition 
from  the  effect  to  the  cause.  Our  explanation,  in  effect, 
does  more  than  this ;  for  it  converts  the  one  of  Hume 
into  the  all  of  truth ;  or,  in  other  words,  it  univer- 
salizes Hume's  single  proposition,  and  ushers  universal 
mankind,  through  the  doorway  to  which  Hume  led 
«p,  into  a  mighty,  marvellous,  undiscovered  region, 
in  which  are  seen  the  fixed  foundations  of  the  whole 
huge  universe. 


Book  II.— Judgment. 

[Ending  precisely  where  the  translation  and  the  commentary  end, 
this  Book  would  seem,  if  exhibited  in  extenso^  quite  excellently 
calculated — by  completion,  to  wit,  of  a  threefold  statement — exactly 
to  accomplish  the  purport  of  the  volume  as  an  explanatory  text- 
book. The  relative  explanations,  however,  run  out  into  so  great  a 
length,  and  I  have  already  so  profusely  discussed  elsewhere  the 
particular  subject  principally  concerned,  that  I  feel  induced,  if  for 
nothing  but  the  printer's  paper  (to  say  nothing  of  the  reader's 
patience),  to  confine  myself  here  only  to  certain  extracts — to  such 
extracts,  namely,  as  shall  seem  light-giving  in  themselves,  or, 
especially,  as  shall  bear  to  defend  the  main  principles  of  Kant  from 
my  own  adverse  criticism.] 

The  object  of  our  inquiry  is,  as  we  have  seen.  How 


are  ajriori  synthetic  judgments  possible?  Or  how, 
as  we  may  otherwise  put  it,  is  it  possible  for  us  to 
add  to  a  subject,  in  independence  of  experience  and 
absolutely  a  priori^  a  predicate  nowise  already  implied 
in  the  subject,  and  not  possibly  deducible  from  the 
subject  by  any  process  of  analysis  whatever?  How 
is  it  possible  to  affirm  something  of  something  else 
(B  of  A,  for  example),  unless  we  have  learned  the 
connexion— learned  it  either  from  experience,  or  from 
analytic  consideration  of  the  state  of  the  case  ?  How 
is  it  possible,  that  is,  to  affirm  B  of  A  without  the  aid 
either  of  experience  to  try  the  fact,  or  of  analysis  to 
demonstrate  a  presupposition  ?  How  is  it  possible  to 
affirm  apodictically  and  yet  synthetically?  To  the 
trenchant  distinctness  implied  in  these  questions  we 
have  been  gradually  conducted  by  a  minute  analysis 
and  ultimate  generalization  of  Hume's  problem  in 
regard  to  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect. 

No  previous  investigation  of  any  cause  whatever 
(A)  will  suggest  to  the  investigator  any  effect  (B) ; 
and  no  investigation  of  any  actual  nexus  whatever  as 
between  a  cause  A  and  an  effect  B  will  ever  sugo-est 
to  the  investigator  the  reason  of  this  nexus :  i  how, 

'  These,  of  course,  are  the  assertions  of  Hume  ;  and  tliey  have  been 
imiversally  admitted  and  adopted  since  Hume,  not  only  in  this  country, 
but  I  sui)i)üse  in  all  otliers.  In  this  country,  however,'  tlie  first  note  iii 
controversion  (so  far)  of  Hume  was  sounded  in  the  second  edition  of  my 
As  Regards  Frotqilasm.  The  fulcrum  of  my  controversial  effort  was  there 
referred  to  a  suggestion  of  Hegel  as  to  identity  in  instances  of  finite 
causality.  The  suggestion  is  perfectly  distinct  in  Hegel;  nevertheless, 
as  it  does  not  in  the  least  appear  to  l>e  Hegel's  special  theory  of  causality' 
but  to  have  distinctly,  rather,  the  character  of  a  partial  remark,  it  has 
pretty  well  escaped  notice  and  been  aUowed  to  pass  by.  I  was  happy  to 
observe,  on  consultation,  that  Erdmann  makes  the  identity  peculiarly 
prominent  :  it  is  express  in  Rosenkranz,  too.  Still,  neither  by  Erdmann 
nor  by  Rosenkranz,  and  quite  as  little  by  Hegel  himself,  has  the  suggestion, 
to  my  mind,  been  carried  home,  as  it  were :  it  is  not  by  any  one^of  them 
regarded  in  connexion  with  the  statements  of  Hume.  I  am  told  that  Mr 
Lewes  had  observed  the  reference  in  my  As  Regards  Protoplasm,  and  had 


80 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


THE    HErRODUCTIOX. 


then,  is  it  that  we  attribute  B  to  A — or  how  is  it 
that  on  the  appearance  of  A  we  always  expect  B  ? — 
and  this  apodictically,  or  by  rigorous  necessity  and 
with  absolute  universality  ? 

To  this  Hume  and  Reid  gave  each  his  own  answer, 
both  being  in  effect  identical.  AVe,  for  our  own  part, 
postpone  our  answer  till  we  have  looked  about  us 
over  the  whole  field  implied  by  the  question.  Is 
Hume's  problem  founded  on  a  fact,  and,  stated  quite 
generally,  what  does  that  fact  amount  to  ?  The  fact 
is  unquestionable,  and  the  ultimate  generality  it  may 
be  raised  to  is  this :  It  is  a  fact  that  we  apodictically 
aver  things  which  are  neither  inferential  from  ex- 
perience nor  demonstrable  to  have  been  a  priori 
implied.  They  are  not  inferential  from  experience, 
for  they  are  set  forth  as  apodictic  affirmations ;  and 
to  these  experience  is  wholly  incompetent.  They  are 
not  demonstrable  to  have  been  a  priori  implied,  for  no 
analysis  can  deduce  the  one  from  the  other.  The 
general  fact,  then,  is  evidently  of  a  very  unusual 
and  interesting  nature ;  and  it  imports  much  that  we 
should  thoroughly  understand  and  come  to  be  fairly 
at  home  with  it.  Were  it  to  be  demonstrated  by  ex- 
perience, the  process  of  proof  would  be  of  the  nature 
of  a  synthesis ;  that  is,  we  should  see  from  experience, 

then,  without  note  or  notice,  bodily  carried  it  across  into  his  Prohlems. 
If  Mr  Lewes  did  so,  it  was  probably  because  he  was  perplexed  between 
what  was  to  be  CixUed  specially  Hegel's  and  what  possibly  mine  in  the 
matter.  If  the  thing  were  current  among  Hegelians,  it  would  not  do 
to  speak  of  it  only  in  my  reference,  etc.,  etc.!  I  am  prepared  to  show, 
however,  from  widely-separate  passages,  and  in  widely-separate  i^hilo- 
sophies,  that  identity  as  the  link  of  causality  was,  overtly,  expressly, 
ostensively,  the  doctrine  of  the  Hindoos.  There  is  no  doubt  whatever 
that  Hegel  made  his  relative  remark  in  consequence  of  what  he  had 
seen  in  them.  Mr  Lewes,  if  he  had  known  all  this,  would  have  still 
known  that,  as  concerns  this  country,  as  concerns  a  full  explicit  con- 
sciousness, as  concerns  Hume,  there  was  at  least  some  little  suggestion  of 
merit,  even  at  last  on  my  part. 


81 


h 


from  actual  fact,  that  B  attaches  synthetically  to  A ; 
or  we  should  just  learn  from  experience  that  A  and  B 
together  constitute  a  synthesis  in  actual  fact.     Were 
it  to  be  demonstrated  to  have  been  a  priori  implied, 
the  process  of  proof  would  be  of  the  nature  of  an 
analysis;    that   is,   we  should  be   able    to   see  from 
intellectual  trial  that  B  was  analytically  implied  in  A. 
Now,  without  either  the  synthesis  of  experience,  or 
the  analysis  of  reason,  how  can  we  possibly  pretend 
to  any  such  knowledge?     We  cannot  attain  to  it  by 
experience,  and,  consequently,  we  are  excluded  from 
all  possible  a  j^osteriori  process,  whether  synthetic  or 
analytic.     We  cannot  attain  to  it  by  a  priori  analysis, 
and  therefore  we  seem  wholly  cut  off  from  any  pos- 
sible approach  to  the  fact,  whether  a  jmori  or  a  pos- 
teriori.    Must  we,  therefore,   cover  up  the  mystery 
from  our  eyes  by  simply  writing  over  it  'rinstincr?— 
sceptically  with  Hume,  dogmatically  with  Reid ;  in- 
direct and  a  posteriori  with  Hume,  direct  and  a  jmori 
with  Reid  (not  but  that  Hume's  "  instinct "  here  is  ab- 
solute enough  and  need  not  be  seen  to  rest  on  his  ''cus- 
tom ").     Ah,  but  do  we  not  see  that,  if,  as  regards  the 
a  posteriori,  we  are  excluded  from  synthesis  as  well  as 
analysis,  the  case  is  quite  different  with  the  a  priori, 
where  as  yet  only  analysis  is  spoken  of,  and  we  are 
still  free  to  put  the  question.  But  how  of  a  priori 
synthesis?      May   not   we   ourselves,    may  not  our 
minds,  may  not  our  separate  faculties,  have  power  to 
add— have  power  synthetically  to  add  predicates  to 
possible  subjects,  which  predicates  were  neither  al- 
ready implicitly  contained  in  said  subjects,  nor  such 
as  could  possibly  have  been  determined  by  any  ex- 
perience whatever.     This,  then,  is  the  ultimate  theme 
of  investigation :    Intellectual  a  jmori  synthesis ;  its 
nature,  conditions,  and  limits. 


'\1 


82 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  REPRODUCTION. 


83 


Of  the  existence  of  such  we  are  not  now  permitted 
to  doubt;  for  causality  alone  lies  there  before  us, 
clear,  obvious,    undeniable,   in   the   great   highway. 
Our  inquiry,  then,  has  narrowed  itself  to  the  a  priori, 
and,  closer  than  that  still,  to  the  synthetic  a  priori. 
In  fact,  if  there  is  to  be  an  a  prion  at  all,  there  must 
be  a  synthetic  such;   for  the  analytic  a  puiori,  de- 
pending on  a  process  of  regression,  would  be  speedily 
exhausted  by  said  process  itself,  were  it  not  supported 
at  last  and  definitively  on  a  j^nm  synthetic  facts ;  for 
it  is  evident  that  the  regression  of  analysis  must  end 
in  an  ultimate  fact  that  is  either  a  posteriori  or  a  priori. 
Be  it  a  posteriori,  it  has  no  relation  to  our  inquiry ; 
and  be  it  a  priori,  then  it  is  synthetically  so,  for  the 
analysis  is  by  supposition  terminated,  and  it  has  no 
other  possible  termini  than  these  named.    The  ground- 
fact,  then,  for  metaphysical,   or  even  psychological 
inquiry,  is — The  possibility  of  a  priori  synthesis ;  and 
that   amounts  to — ^The   possibility   of  principles   of 
necessity   and    objectivity   towards    such    subjective 
sense-experience  as  this  of  ours.     On  the  principle  of 
causality  we  judge  that  B  belongs  apodictically  to  A: 
this  judgment  Ave  cannot  found  on  experience,  for 
experience  is  only  contingent ;  neither  can  we  found 
it  on  any  a  priori  analysis  of  A,  for  the  notion  B  is 
by  no  means  implied  in  the  notion  A :    it  must  be 
founded,  therefore,  on  a  priori  synthesis — the  judg- 
ment that  affirms  B  apodictically  of  A  founds  on  a 
principle  of  synthesis  a  priori.     To  exhaust  and  com- 
plete our  whole  subject,  consequently,  we  have  simply 
exhaustively  to  demonstrate  and  tabulate  all  such 
principles. 

But  how  and  where  to  find  these  principles  can 
present  no  difficulty;  for  they  are  a  jrmori,  they 
are   products  of  the   mind,   they  are  contributions 


i 


A' 

t 


of  the  faculties,  and  will  give  themselves  to  view 
should  our  process  in  consequent  analysis  be  but 
exact  enough.  And,  indeed,  we  have  already  accom- 
plished this ;  for,  of  the  two  complementary  factors 
of  knowledge,— sense,  by  which  objects  are  materially 
given,  and  understanding,  by  which  objects  are  for- 
mally construed, — we  have  now  discovered  all  the 
a  jmori  contributions,  and  by  means  of  processes  in 
regard  to  which,  on  the  score  of  infallible  accuracy 
and  exhaustive  completeness,  we  are  not  permitted 
to  doubt. 

The  possibility  of  a  priori  synthetic  judgments, 
then,  is  seen  to  depend  on  the  existence  of  certain 
universal  and  a  priori  forms  both  of  sense  and  under- 
standing; those  of  the  former  being  pure  perceptions 
(space  and  time),  those  of  the  latter  pure  notions  (the 
categories).  It  remains  for  us  to  see  how  the  a  priori 
synthetic  judgments  themselves  result  from  the  union 
and  combination  of  said  pure  notions  with  said  pure 
perceptions.  For  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that,  the 
mind  once  for  all  containing  pure  notions  and  pure 
perceptions,  these  will  not  remain  apart,  but,  the 
former  subsuming  the  latter,  a  system  of  a  priori 
judgments  will  result — a  universal  schematism— to 
the  conditions  of  which  the  whole  subsequent  wealth 
of  the  a  posteriori— chaos  else— will  be  obliged  to 
submit  itself. 

For  it  is  worth  while  remarking  that  the  nature  of 
a  judgment  is  by  no  means  accurately  specified  by 
affirming  that  it  is  the  comparison  of  two  ideas,  unless 
the  correlativity  of  these  two  ideas  be  also  specified. 
These  two  ideas,  in  fact,  are  always  correlatively  so 
situated  that  the  one  is  higher  than  the  other,  and 
that,  by  consequence,  the  latter  is  subsumed  under 
the  former.     There  is,  in  truth,  no  judgment  that  is 


r 


i . 


84 


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THE    «EPKODUCTIUN. 


85 


|) 


not  the  subsumption  of  a  particular  under  a  general. 
In  this  process,  however,  judgment  itself,  the  faculty, 
exercises  a  merely  formal  function :  it  is  simply  the 
operating  power,  the  agent  that,  plying  between  two 
things  (a  and  A),  brings  the  one  to  the  other,  but 
discriminatively  so, — that  is,  in  such  wise  that  the 
mere  example  or  particular  case  a  is  reduced  or  sub- 
sumed under  the  general  principle,  law,  or  rule  A, 
and  not  vice  versa.  It  is  as  if  it  were  thus :  Sense 
supplies  an  infinitude  of  particular  cases,  understand- 
ing a  finitude  of  rules,  and  judgment,  in  exercise  of 
its  discriminating  and  associating  function,  subsumes 
the  former  under  the  latter.  It  is  thus  easily  seen 
how,  as  indeed  belongs  to  the  proverbial  wisdom  of 
aU  times  and  of  all  peoples,  judgment  is  a  faculty 
that  is  strong  or  weak  just  as  given  us  by  nature. 
Instruction,  books,  schools,  etc.,  may,  in  a  thousand 
different  ways,  make  us  thoroughly  acquainted  with 
the  rules,  but  still  it  depends  wholly  on  our  own 
particular  judgment  whether  we  shall  subsume  under 
the  rules  truly  or  not.  Every  medical  man  knows 
well  enough,  by  name  and  nature,  all  the  possible 
genera  and  species  of  disease;  but  it  is  not  every 
medical  man  can  rightly  subsume  the  case  of  each 
particular  patient. 

It  does  not  follow,  then,  that,  if  only  cognisant  of 
the  rules  of  the  understanding,  judgment  will  forth- 
with duly  subsume.  To  that  there  is  necessary  a 
certain  peculiarity  in  the  faculty  itself.  No  rules  can 
guide  what  is  itself  the  art  of  using  ruks.  Or  the 
rules  lie  there  before  judgment,  whicli,  as  concerns 
choice,  action,  without  assistance  from  them,  is  left  to 
its  own  self  and  its  own  powers ;  a  mighty  source  of 
difference  between  man  and  man  is  herein  indicated. 

The  general  conception  so  far  is  tliat,  the  pure 


'# 


^ 


4 


forms  of  perception  in  the  peculiar  varieties  of  their 
characteristic  details  (units  side  by  side,  units  after 
one  another,  etc.,  etc.),  as  on  the  one  side,  being  sub- 
sumed by  judgment  under  the  pure  forms  of  under- 
standing,  as  on  the  other  side,  there  will  result  a 
primitive,    pure,   a  priori  mental   schematism,    sub- 
jacent to,  and  modificative  of,  experience ;  of  which 
schematism  the  expression  in  words  will  be  certain 
propositions,  certain  ground  judgments,  which  will  re- 
spectively show  as  (uioms^  anticipations^  analogies^  and 
postulates.     By  the  word  subjacent,  we  would  wish  it 
to  be  understood  that  the  forms  so  characterized  are 
not  to  be  conceived  to  precede,  so  much  as  to  underlie, 
experience.     Till  experience  there  is  no  mental  life 
whatever;   and  all  a  priori  schematism  must  await 
the  stimulus  of  experience  before  it  can  realize  itself 
in  actual  operation.     Nevertheless,  though  excited  by 
experience,  and  wholly  calculated  for,  and  directed 
to,  experience,  it  is  quite  independent  of  experience, 
and  takes  place  in   obedience  only  to  its  own  con- 
ditions; but  forming  so  an  a  priori  ground-net,  a 
fundamental  dirradiation  on  which,  and  accordinsf  to 
which,  the  world  of  experience  deposits  itself.     We 
thus  see  that,  from  this  provision  of  pure  forms  both 
of  sense  and  understanding,  there   is   subjacent  to 
experience   an    entire   a  priori   ground-system,    the 
special  peculiarities  in  the   formation  of  which  we 
have  now  more  particularly  to  consider. 

In  the  preceding  Book  (Simple  Apprehension) 
we  have  seen  the  transcendental  forms  as  well  of  sense, 
as  of  understanding :  those  forms  without  which  no 
empirical  contribution,  no  actual  sensuous  matter, 
could  become  for  us  a  perception,  or  what  we  call 
an  object  of  experience.      There  it  has  been  proved 


86 


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THE    REPRODUCTION. 


87 


I  ^ 


that  without  the  unity  of  apperception,  the  synthesis 
of  imagination,  and  the  conjunctive  function  of  the 
categories,  this  whole  daily  life  that  we  name  experi- 
ence would  be  impossible  for  us.  There  also  has  it 
been  proved  that  every  single  empirical  particular, 
introduced  by  the  channels  of  special  sense,  must 
take  on  the  form,  or  rather  adapt  itself  to  the  mul- 
tiple, of  pure  perception  in  its  two  modi  of  space  and 
time.  We  know  now  perfectly,  then,  the  various 
parts  of  the  a  priori  machinery,  the  various  members 
of  the  transcendental  apparatus,  which  is  transcen- 
dental just  for  this,  that  it  is  at  once  a  jmori  and 
a  posteriori,  le.^  a  jmori  in  origin,  but  a  j^osteriori  in 
use,  or  as  it  presents  itself  in  actual  fact  in  the 
various  things  we  perceive,  in  the  various  objects  of 
experience.  We  have  seen  all  this ;  but  we  have 
not  exactly  seen  yet  the  precise  operation  of  the 
machinery:  we  have  not  exactly  seen  yet  how  the 
various  parts  are  fitted  into  each  other,  how  the 
various  movements  are  co-ordinated  so  as  to  complete 
the  wholeness  of  the  entire  fabric  and  the  unity  of  its 
function.  This,  now,  is  all  that  we  have  once  for  all 
to  see — how  the  particulars  combine  and  work  together 
into  the  general.  In  order  that  what  we  name 
experience  may  be  possible,  such  and  such  an  appa- 
ratus must  be  presupposed ;  and  we  have  now  only  to 
see  how  it  actually  works.  We  have  experience  ;  but 
experience  involves  such  and  such  subjective  conditions 
on  our  part,  else  it  would  be  impossible.  These,  then, 
are  to  us  the  possibility  of  experience— the  possibility  of 
such  an  experience  as  this  of  ours.  It  becomes  us,  then, 
to  classify  these  conditions,  or  to  separate  and  arrange 
them  towards  an  explanation  of  their  particular 
action,  and  the  manner  of  it.  Briefly,  we  have 
found  that  the  various  parts  of  experience  can   be 


^ 


t 


grouped  under  two  forms  :  sense  and  understanding; 
for  the  latter  term  includes  apperception,  imagination, 
etc.     The  characteristic  of  sense  is  plurality,  multi- 
plicity, variety,  maniness,— a  manifold,  a  complex,  a 
detail  of  constituent  terms,  members,  particulars,  or 
parts.     That,  in  a  word,  is  the  characteristic  of  aff^ec- 
tion  as  affection,  as  also  of  the  general  forms  under 
which   alone  it  can  come  into  consciousness.      The 
characteristic  of  understanding,  again,  is  sino-leness, 
wholeness,    simplicity,    unity,    oneness.      These    two 
agents,    then,    evidently  mutually  complement    and 
complete  each  other.       Understanding  adds  to  the 
many  of  affection  the  unity  of  function  ;  and  without 
the  latter  the  former  would  remain  a  disarticulate, 
unintelligible  blur.     Sense  is  merely  receptive  and, 
consequently,   passive;    the   matter  it  yields  would 
never  present  itself  as  knowledge,  perception,  were  it 
not  re-acted  on  by  the  spontaneity  of  the  understand- 
ing.      For  it  is  not  things  in  themselves  that  ever 
come  before  us,  but  only  the  states  or  affections  of 
ourselves  set  up  in  us  we  know  not  how,  by  objects 
in  themselves  we  know  not  what;    and  these  affec- 
tions, which  we    call    empirical,  as   being  produced 
a  posteriori,    to    constitute    the    connected    rational 
whole,  named  by  us  experience,  must  be  combined 
within,  and  arranged  according  to  the  laws  of  the 
understanding     within,  —  of    that     understanding, 
namely,  into   which   they  are   received.      What  we 
have  now  specially  to  see,  then,  is  how  the  multiple, 
the  many,  of  sense  is  reduced  into  the  simple  or  unity 
of  the  understanding. 

In  fact,  there  is  at  once  considerable  difficulty 
suggested  by  the  question  that  presents  itself  here. 
How  are  objects,  how  is  empirical  matter,  which  is 
wholly  an  affair  of  sense,  to  be  brought  under  the 


88 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


ufidersfiiicKng,  which,  contrariwise,  is  wholly  intel- 
lectual? There  must,  surely,  be  something  inter- 
mediate  interposed,  if  there  is  unity  to  be  established 
between  two  such  discrepant  extremes.  But  just 
such  intermediate  element  do  we  possess  in  what  we 
have  discussed  as  pure  perception,  the  forms,  namely, 
of  space  and  time.  For  these,  if  on  the  one  side 
a  priori,  like  the  forms  of  the  understanding  (the 
categories),  are,  on  the  other  side,  sensuous,  like  the 
matter  of  special  sense :  in  them  and  loilh  them  docs 
all  such  matter  present  itself.  They  are  at  once  not 
less  intellectual  and  a  priori  on  the  one  hand,  than 
sensuous  and,  as  it  were,  a  posteriori  or  empirical  on 
the  other. 

We  can  conceive,  then,  the  possibility  of  the  cate- 
gories acting  directly  on  the  multiples  of  space  and 
time,    and,    through  these,    on   those   of  empirical 
sense.     It  is  evident,  too,  that,  of  these  forms,  the 
inmost   and   most   general   is  time;    for  into  it  all 
matters  of  sense,  both  outward   and   inward,  must 
be  received.      If,  then,  the  multiple  or  multiples  of 
time  be  conceived  as  susceptible  of  the  uniting  and 
connecting  influence  of  the  categories,  it  is  evident 
that  there  is  a  possibility  established  of  conveying 
this  influence  to  the  whole  infinitude  of  particulars 
that   present   themselves  in   actual  empirical  sense. 
We  can  thus  conceive  a  system  of  schemata  produced 
and  brought  about  by  the  operation  of  the  pure  forms 
of  the  understanding  on  the  pure  forms   of  sense. 
This  operation  of  the  understanding  might  appropri- 
ately be  named  the  schematism  of  the  understanding; 
and  to  that  schematism,  to  these  schemata,  it  is  evident 
that  all  other  contributions  of  sense  must  submit  and 
subject  themselves. 

The  schema,  we  may  remark  by  the  way,  is  dif- 


TIIE    UErKODUCTlON. 


89 


ferent  from  what  we  may  name  the  type  or  image. 
The  type  has  a  certain  definiteness  and  particularity 
about  it,  while  a  certain  indefiniteness  and  generality 
attach  to  the  schema.     Five  points,  or  five  counters, 
or  five  pips,  or  five  fingers,  are  severally  a  type  or 
image   of    the   number   five;     but   any  triangle  in 
general  you   can  construct  or  think,   any  horse  or 
dog   in   general  you  can  imagine,  can   by  no  possi- 
bility represent  a  type ;    it  must  remain  a  schema. 
The  general  notion  triangle  is  simply  a   conceived 
formula  whereby  you  can  construct  a  type ;  but  it  is 
itself  a  schema,  for  it  is  of  no  single  form,— rather  it 
i3  of  an  infinitude  of  forms.      To  be  an  absolutely 
general  notion,  namely,  the  triangle  must  be  neither 
scalene,  nor  isosceles,  nor  equilateral ;   neither  right- 
angled,  obtuse-angled,  nor  acute-angled  :  it  must  just 
be  a  triangle  in  general ;  that  is,  not  a  type,  but  a 
schema.      So  with  the  general  notions,  dog,  horse, 
man,  etc. :  these  are  not  types,   but  schemata.     The 
type  is  a  single  image  or  figure  set  up  by  the  em« 
pirical    imagination;     whereas    the    schema    is    an 
absolutely  general  formula  for  the  production  of  a 
whole  family  of  types :    it  is  a  monogram  of  pure 
imagination.     Evidently,  indeed,  the  entire  operation 
alluded  to  here  is  one  of  the  deeply-hidden  arts  or 
processes  of  the  human  soul.^ 

»  Kant  here  is  seen  to  make  an  easy  end  of  our  ordinary  modern 
noininalistic  quibb  ing.  "An  idea,"  says  Berkeley  {Prim.  Hum.  Knoxd. 
Introd.,  12),  "which,  considered  in  itself,  is  particular,  becomes  general 
by  being  made  to  represent  or  stand  for  all  other  particular  ideas  of 
the  same  sort-a  line  which  in  itself  is  a  particular  line,  is  nevertheless 
with  regard  to  its  signification  general— a  line  in  general."  Hume 
characterizes  this  proposition  of  Berkeley,  that  "  all  general  ideas  are 
nothing  but  particular  ones  annexed  to  a  certain  term,"  as  "  one  of  the 
greatest  and  most  valuable  discoveries  ever  of  late  made  "  (T.,  i.  i.  vii )  • 
and,  in  the  Enquiry,  section  xii.,  he  says  further,  "  Let  any  man  try'tj 
coaceive  a  triangle  in  general,  which  is  neither  isosceles  nor  scalenum, 


90 


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If 


We  can  conceive,  then,  the  possibility  of  the  con- 
junction of  pure  understanding  and  pure  sense  pro- 
ducing schemata,  and  we  can  further  conceive  the 
conjunction  of  these  schemata  with  empirical  multiples 
(actual  sensations)  producing  the  arranged  world  of 
experience.  Now  it  is  judgment  that  in  both  cases 
will  produce  the  conjunction :  it  is  judgment  that 
will  subsume  the  particular  empirical  multiples 
under  their  respective  schemata;  and  it  is  judgment 
that  will  subsume  the  pure  multiples  under  the  pure 
notions  to  the  production  of  the  schemata  themselves. 
Now,  the  action  of  judgment  in  all  this  is  simply 
formal;  it  adds  nothing,  it  merely  brings  together 
and  subsumes  the  relatively  particular  under  the 
relatively  general :  it  decerns  the  casus  legis  datce.  We 
cannot  lay  down  a  rule,  then,  with  a  view  to  guide 
judgment;  for,  under  such  rule  itself,  judgment  could 
only  again  subsume, — standing  in  need,  then,  of  yet 
another  rule  to  guide  it  there!  In  point  of  fact, 
judgment  is  what  we  call  mother-wit^  and  is  incapable 
of  being  learned.  No  instruction  can  supply  its  want ; 
and  that  is  the  secunda  Petri,  the  pars  altera  Petri, — 
stupidity, — that  which  is  the  characteristic  of  the 
blockhead,  dolt,  dunce,  etc.  The  statesman,  the 
jurist,  the  physician,  may  be  very  learned  men,  and 
possess  a  thorough  knowledge  of  every  general  rule ; 
but,  without  judgment,  they  cannot  discern  the  par- 
ticular cases  that  apply  to  the  general  rules,  and  so 

nor  has  any  particular  length  nor  proportion  of  sides,  and  he  will  soon 
perceive  the  absunlity  of  all  the  scholastic  notions  with  regard  to  abstrac- 
tion and  general  ideas."  Dr  Thomas  Brown  (Lect.  46)  very  clearly  shows 
that  Berkeley  here  only  implicitly  accepts  what  he  explicitly  rejects. 
As  for  Hume,  again,  when  he  defies  a  man  to  make  a  schema  a  type,  he 
actually  fancies  that  he  is  exploding  all  scholastic  absurdities !  Surely 
it  is  common  sense  to  see  that  a  genertil  idea  involves  in  imagination  only 
a  schema,  and  that  a  schema  there  is  not  a  type,  but  a  general  receipt  for 
a  whole  infinitude  of  types. 


t 


1 


THE    REriiODUCTlüN. 


91 


are  unable  to  subsume.  Judgment,  however,  if  it 
cannot  be  learned,  may  be  exercised  or  practised,  and 
accordingly  strengthened  and  improved.  For  a  cer- 
tain familiarity  with  examples  is  necessary  to  the 
very  best  judgment.  At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be 
acknowledged  that,  as  no  example  can  come  up  to 
the  rule,  a  too  great  commerce  with,  and  confidence 
in,  examples,  are  apt  to  confuse  and  taint  the  pre- 
cision and  purity  of  the  rule.  And  thus  examples 
become,  as  it  were,  the  go-cart  of  the  understanding, 
and  almost  counterbalance  by  disadvantages  the  very 
advantages  of  them. 

What  we  have  here,  then,  in  this  transcendental 
logic  where  there  is  matter  as  well  as  form,  is  a 
doctrine  of  judgment,  a  doctrine  of  the  faculty  as  it 
plies  between  the  two,  as  it  exercises  its  function  of 
bringing  the  one  under  the  other.  But  what  that 
means  is  that  certain  pure  multiples  of  time,  beino- 
brought  under  correspondent  categories,  will  give  rise 
to  an  equal  number  of  similarly  correspondent 
schemata.  Taking  the  categories  in  hand,  then,  we 
have  simply  to  find  out  what  multiples  of  time  re- 
spectively correspond  to  them,  and  the  relative 
schemata  will  at  once  show. 

Now,  the  succession  of  time  is  at  once  a  sensible 
multiple  of  what  intellectual  multiple  is  implied  in 
the  notion  of  quantity  :  it  is  the  homogeneous  comin«- 
together  of  like  with  like ;  but  that  is  number.  As 
for  quality,  again,  no  multiple  in  time  itself  can  be 
found  to  correspond  to  it ;  nevertheless  we  are  quite 
entitled  to  take  the  absolute  universal  of  sensation  as 
sensation,  and  conceive  time  filled  by  it.  But  so  con- 
ceiving, it  suggests  itself  at  once  that  there  is  a  pro- 
cess in  this  filling  from  any  imaginable  amount  down 
to  zero,  or,  equally,  up  from  zero  to  any  imaginable 


92 


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THE  REPRODUCTION. 


93 


amount.  That  now  is  degree,  and  degree  will  be  the 
schema  of  quality.  By  degree  we  mean  the  coming 
together  of  filled  moment  with  filled  moment  of  time ; 
as  quantity,  which  is  simply  the  homogeneous  addi- 
tion of  pure  to  pure,  is,  so  to  speak,  literally  sensualized 
in  the  mere  succession  of  time  as  a  homogeneous 
addition  of  bare  moment  to  bare  moment.  We  may 
understand,  therefore,  that,  in  this  latter  case,  any 
homogeneous  empirical  succession  is  not  left  in  its 
mere  indifferent  separation,  but,  unit  being  con- 
nected  with  unit  in  the  synthesis  of  imagination, 
collapses  into  the  unity  of  apperception  through  the 
notion  quantity.  For  it  is  evident  that  quantity  is 
the  notion  under  which  any  such  multiple  as  that 
which  is  represented  in  the  succession  of  time  will 
fall  to  be  subsumed;  which  notion,  indeed,  it  is 
equally  evident,  is  essential  to  produce  unity  in  any 
such  multiple,  the  mind  otherwise  being  only  passively 
filled  with  a  perpetually  fleeting  sequence.  Nor  is  it 
less  manifest  that,  in  quality,  a  corresponding  function 
is  required  in  order  to  induce  unity  on  the  amount 
exhibited  in  the  filling  of  time. 

Under  these  two  headings  (quantity  and  quality) 
we  have  only  two  schemata ;  there  is  only  a  schema 
for  each  general  rubric,  and  we  might  expect  one  as 
well  for  each  of  the  six  subordinate  categories.  The 
reason  is  that  quantity  can  have  in  kind  only  one 
multiple ;  it  can  differ  only  in  amount  (of  extension) ; 
and  that  quality,  similarly,  can  have  also  in  kind  only 
one  multiple ;  it  can  differ  only  in  amount  (of  inten- 
sion), and  that  is  in  degree.  But  will  this  be  the 
case  as  well  with  the  categories  that  follow  ?  What 
of  the  next  category,  for  example,  relation  ?  Is  there 
only  one  kind  of  pure  relation,  or  are  there  several  ? 
If  we  glance  at  the  particular  catigacigs,  I  think  we 


w 


shall   expect   a  difterent  schema  for  each;    and  for 
this  reason,    that   each   represents   a  very   different 
relation.    But  that  necessitates  for  each  different  rela- 
tion   a    correspondently   difterent    multiple.     Now, 
will  time  be  able  to  supply  this  ?     It  was  no  act  of 
usurpation  to  assume  time  as  (in  its  succession)   a 
type  or  exemplar  of  number  and  quantity  ;  and  it  was 
certainly  perfectly  justifiable  to  regard  time  when  put 
in  relation  with  its  absolute  generale  of  filling:  we 
cannot  rightly  think  usurpation,  or  assumption,  or 
presupposition,  or  begging  the  question,  of  that  either. 
But,  really,  the  multiple  of  time  seems  so  uniform, 
simple,  and  monotonous,  that  one  fears  for  the  possi- 
bility of  extracting  from  it  more  in  that  reference  than 
we  have  already  extracted—  one  fears,  indeed,  that  it 
must  be  altogether  impossible  and  out  of  the  question 
to  extract  from  it  actually  no  less  than  three  more 
modifications,  and  these  very  special  ones  too.     Sub- 
stance and  accident,  cause  and  effect,  action  and  reac- 
tion :  how  find  in  a  mere  flux  of  homogeneous  units 
three   special  multiples  that  shall  be  sensible  types 
of  the  intellectual  multiples  implied   in   these   very 
peculiar — and  peculiarly  different   and  distinct — in- 
telligible relations  ?    We  can  still,  of  course,  allowably 
resort  to  space  and  the  generale  of  the  faculty  of  ap- 
prehension for  a  filling  in  time.     As  much  as  that  is 
certainly  to  be  regarded  as  a  priori  and  pure,  and 
quite  legitimately  at  our  disposal.     If  we  can  even 
wring  out  of  time,  and  in  these  references,  multiples 
to  suit  the  three  relations  in  view,  it  will  not  be  com- 
petent to  any  man  to  except  or  reject.     Let  us,  then, 
take  said  three  relations  in  their  order,  and  correspon- 
dently examine  time,  in  connexion  as  well — if  neces- 
sary— with  its  allowed  lemmata  or  postulates. 

First,  then,  can  we  find  so  any  multiple  that  will 


;T 


94 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


correspond  to  the  relation  of  substance  and  accident? 
Why,  yes.  Time  is  a  flux  and  yet  it  abides.  It  is  as 
though  time,  to  its  own  broken  and  fluent  side,  turned 
ever  a  whole,  unbroken,  and  permanent  side.  Time 
is  the  vast  unchanging  ocean  that  gives  foundation, 
place,  and  room  to  all  its  own  bubbles.  Time  as  a 
whole  stands  in  the  relation  of  substance  to  its  own 
fluent  parts,  which  are  as  accidents.  All  passes 
through  times  in  time,  but  time  passes  not :  time  is  as 
substance,  then,  and  times  as  accidents.  Nay,  reality 
as  reality,  space  itself,  can  be  legitimately  assumed  as 
the  a  priori  permanent  substrate  that,  in  time,  cor- 
responds to  time  itself  A  void  time  were  unperceiv- 
able.  Time  and  times  are  discernible  only  on  occa- 
sion of  the  experience  of  empirical  matter.  Time  and 
times,  then,  are  perceived,  and  they  are  perceived  in 
this  mutual  relation.  But  they  were  so  perceived 
only  through  mediation  of  empirical  matter.  Said 
matter  itself,  therefore,  is  in  the  same  relation.  Or 
there  is  a  substrate  permanent,  fixed,  invariable, 
constant,  that  corresponds  to  time;  and  there  are 
modi,  unfixed,  variable,  transitory,  which  correspond 
to  times.  We  see,  then,  that  filled  time  and  filled 
times  relatively  constitute  the  sensuous  multiple  that 
will  correspond  to  the  intellectual  multiple  which  is 
thought  or  implied  in  the  notion  substance.  Empirical 
realities,  to  become  realities  for  us,  or  to  enter  into 
and  be  united  with  our  apperception,  will  assume  this 
multiple  in  time,  and  collapse  to  unity  under  the 
notion. 

Now,  the  principle  that  turned  up  under  quantity 
we  named  an  aodom;  for  it  conditioned  the  very 
possibility  of  objects— no  object  could  be  an  object 
for  us  that  did  not  present  itself  formed  on  that 
principle.     Again,  the  principle  that  turned  up  under 


# 


THE   REPRODUCTION. 


95 


quality   we   named   an   anticipation;    and   this,    too, 
involved  conditions  that  necessarily  entered  into  and 
manifested  itself  as  constituent  and  constitutive  of  the 
object.     These  two  principles,  then,  may  be  named 
mathematical ;  for  they  form  a  large  portion  of  the 
very  structure  of  every  object.      The   principle  in- 
volved under  substance,  however,  is  a  relation,  and 
asserts  only  that  empirical  realities  will  be  related  on 
analogy  with  the  logical  function  of  judgment  implied 
in  substance.     This,    then,   is   not   a   principle   that 
appears  as  an  ingredient   entering  into  the   object 
itself,  but  a  principle  that  relates  or  connects  object 
with  object, — in  other  words,  a  principle  that  regulates, 
but  does  not  constitute    (or  enter  into)   the  pheno- 
mena— a  principle,  therefore,  that  is  regulative^  not 
constitutive.     Again,  and  for  the  same  reason,  it  is  not 
mathematical  but  dynamical ;  it  relates  to  the  com- 
portment of  existence  to  existence  mutually ;  it  does 
not  determine  any  existence  as  such.     Relatively  to 
any  existence  as  such  it  is  contingent ;  it  prescribes 
nothing   a  2^'^iori   which   will  be   found  necessarily 
in  each  and  every    existence.      Relatively  to  exist- 
ences  mutually,    however,  it  is  necessary   and  pre- 
scribes their  common  reference.     The   difiference  of 
its  evidence  is  thus  plain :    objects  do  not  present 
themselves  according  to  it  as  so  and  so  mathematically 
formed  or  qualitatively  constituted,  but  as  thought  in 
such  and  such  mutual  relation,  necessarily,  on  analogy 
with  a  certain  function  of  judgment.     And  yet  it  is 
not  so  much  a  relation  connecting  all  realities  the  one 
with  the  other,  as  a  condition  of  such  relation.     It  is 
simply  this,  that,  in  all  the  vicissitude  of  accidents, 
substance  abides. 

In  a  word,  for  the  analogies  and  the  postulates  we 
may   preliminarily   sum   up   thus:    Time   relatively 


K 


I 


96 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT  : 


viewed,  but  still  only  in  its  own  self  or  abstractly,  pre- 
sents three  multiples,  which,  otherwise  also,  may  be 
regarded  as  its  three  inherent  relations ;  and  these  arc 
respectively  duration^  change,  and  interchange.     Again, 
time  relatively  viewed,  but  concretely  or  with  refer- 
ence  to  its  filling,  similarly  exhibits  another  triplet  of 
relations.     Said  filling,  namely,  may  be  possible,  or  it 
may  be  actual,  or  even  necessai^.     Time,  in  relation  to 
its  own  succession,  is  very  conspicuously,  as  already 
said,  simply  a  type  of  duration,  substance ;  while  the 
succession,  in  contrast  with  it,  is,  as  conspicuously, 
but  a  type  of  its  accidents.     Time,  as  it  fleets  from  past 
to  present  (in  which  fleeting  the  present  is  ever  the 
result  of  the  past,  and  only  reachable  through  the 
past),    is  but  type  of  a  reality   which  being   given 
involves  a  consequent;  and  that  is  but  a  schema  of 
causality.     Or  time,  as  it  fleets,  is  a  type  of  change  ; 
and  change,  being  the  same  thing  existent  and  per- 
sistent under  two  opposed  determinations,  implies  an 
antecedent.      Time  in  itself  presents  no  relation  of 
interchange ;  but  by  means  of  space  and  the  filling  of 
space,  we  can  see  that  things  may  be  together.     The 
multiple  contemporaneous  times,  then,  is  but  a  type  of 
communion,  and  communion   is   the  schema  of  the 
abstract  notion  reciprocity.     Time,  or  a  time,  complete 
in   its  conditions,  but  indefinite,  is  a   type   of  the 
agreement  of  a  notional  synthesis  with  the  general 
conditions  of  time  ;  and  this  is  a  schema  o£  jwssibilitg. 
Time,  or  a  time,  complete  in  its  conditions,  and  de- 
finite, is  a  type  of  existence,  and  a  schema  to  the 
notion  actuality.     Definite  existence  in  all  time  is  a 
schema  o(  necessity,  ♦ 

[Here  follows  a  long  discussion  in  very  full  detail. 
As  intimated,  I  only  select  from  it  sentences  that 
seem  happily  to  explain  or  defend.] 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


97 


\) 


A  time  is  unity  of  a  homogeneous  successive  multi- 
tude ,•  theretbre  a  time  is  an  extensive  magnitude ; 
and  in  like  manner  space  is  an  extensive  magnitude! 
But  again  every  object  or  phenomenon  is,  though 
with  empirical  filling,  just  a  time  or  a  space ;  there- 
fore  every  object   or   phenomenon  is   an   extensive 
magnitude.     All  empirical  multiples,  in  fact,  corre- 
spond^  unit  by  unit  with  the  pure  multiples  of  space 
and  time  which  contain  them;  and  as  these  latter 
are  apprehended  by  the  synthesis  of  imagination,  and 
conjoined  into  unity  by  the  category,  so  must  those 
former.     Thus,  then,   is  it  that  the  function  of  the 
category  is  conveyed  to  empirical  matter;  and  thus, 
too,  is  it  that  such  matter  contains  in  it,  even  as  it 
presents  itself  to  our  sensuous  consciousness,  elements 
of  necessity;  for  all  such   matter,  once   objectively 
placed  before  consciousness,  is   a  compound  of  ele- 
ments as  well  a  priori  as   a  posteriori      Or,   again, 
thus  is  it  that  all  empirical  objects  contain  a  priori 
elements  and,  through  them,  an  authority  apodictic 
and  absolutely  universal.     It  is  not  things  in  them- 
selves we   know,  but  phenomena,  into  which  enter 
the  a  priori  forms  as  well  of  sense  as  of  understand- 
ing, and  what  holds  of  these  latter,  holds  also  of  the 
former.     Thus  it  is  that  we  can  a  priori  prescribe 
laws  and  conditions  to  objects  which,  as  a  posteriori 
themselves,  have  still  to  be  waited  for. 

The  necessity  of  imagination  towards  the  possi- 
bility of  what  synthetic  processes  are  involved  is 
obvious ;  for  through  that  faculty  only  can  the  past 
items  be  reproduced  for  summation  with  the  present : 
without  such  reproduction  we  could  have  no  con- 
sciousness but  of  insulated  and  disconnected  units. 
Imagination,  in  short,  is  par  excellence  the  place  of 
ideas;  it  is  the  element  in  which  they  live;  in  which 

G 


1» 


98 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT: 


they  are  received,  conserved,  and  reproduced.  But 
every  unit  of  consciousness,  sensuous  or  intellectual, 
is  an  idea.  It  is  in  imagination,  therefore,  that  every 
process  whatever  of  intellection  must  take  place ;  or 
imagination  is  the  universal  intellectual  menstruum, 
the  universal  vehicle  of  mediation  between  sense  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  functions  of  apperception  on 
the  other.  Through  imagination,  acting  by  means  of 
the  pure  form  of  time  on  the  pure  form  of  space- 
through  imagination  it  is  that  we  have  the  science  of 
geometry,  etc.,  etc. 

[Further  references  to  quantity,  quality,  and  sub- 
stance omitted.] 

^  Here,  then,  we  demand,  first,  what  notional  mul- 
tiple is  implied  in  the  function  itself  (of  judgment) 
which  is  to  be  the  original  of  the  category  of  cause 
and  effect  ?     This  multiple  is  evidently  a  relation  be- 
tween two  members  such  that  the  one  of  them,  the 
antecedent,    determines  the   other,   the   consequent. 
That  is,  there  is  a  process  implied,  with  a  necessary 
first  and  a  necessary  second.     Can  time,  now,  pre- 
sent a  sensuous  multiple  that  will  correspond  to  this 
notional  multiple?      Well,  the   function  involves  a 
process;    but  what  is  the  process  of  time?      It  is 
simply  change.     The  present  is,  and  we  feel  it ;  the 
past  was,  and  we  feel  it  no  longer:  this  is  chano-e. 
To  be  aware  of  this  process  of  time,  we  must  ha^ve 
been  aware  of  empirical  realities  in  a  like  process. 
Therefore  there  are  such,  and  they  assume  this  pro- 
cess in  time ;  for,  though  we  know  time  on  occasion 
of  them,  time  does  not  depend  on  them,  but  they,  on 
the  contrary,  depend  on  it.     Still  time  is  not  an  abso- 
lute object  in  which  empirical  realities  present  them- 
selves :  were  it  an  absolute  object,  its  contained  objects 
would  have  each  its  necessary  relative  place.    It  is  not. 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


99 


then,  by  the  mere  perception  of  time  that  we  perceive 
the  succession  of  objects.  Time  is  quite  apart  from  these, 
and  they  themselves  are  only  related  to  time  by  us  after 
we  have  apprehended  them,  and  according  as  we  have 
apprehended  them.     For  sense,  as  it  is  affected  from 
without,  is  merely  receptive  and  passive,  and  all  further 
reference,  relation,  combination,  is  product  of  the  various 
principles  of  our  spontaneous  understanding.      These 
affections,  in  fact,  constitute  but  a  succession  of  sub- 
jective states,  and  all  that  is  empirical  would  appear 
mere  sensuous  subjective  modification,  did  not  the 
understanding  synthetically  interfere.     It  is  this  syn- 
thetic function  of  the  understanding  that  externalizes 
mere  internal  affections, — that  throws  out  our  mere 
inner  subjective  modification  into  a  very  world  of 
outer  objective  realities. 

Still,  should  the  question  be  put  to  us,  we  may 
proceed   to   admit   that,    though   the   synthesis  pura 
constituted  by  the  a  priori  or  transcendental  machinery, 
potentially  precedes  analysis,  an  act  of  analysis  must, 
nevertheless,  always  be  involved  in  the  bringing  into 
operation  of  the  various   steps  which,   materials  of 
sensation  being  given  from  without,  produce  realiza- 
tion of  this  synthesis  pura  into  the  world  of  experience. 
For  the  synthesis  pura  is  realized  only  on  occasion  of 
experience,  and  the  very  first  act  of  experience  in- 
volves analysis.     To  prove  this  we  have  only  to  con- 
sider that  the  synthesis  pura  consists  of  various  parts. 
It  consists  of  several  ground-multiples  of  time  united, 
through  imagination,  by  function  of  several  ground- 
unities  or  notions  (categories),  into  the  one  of  apper- 
ception (self-consciousness).     The  sensuous  affections, 
again  (set  up  in  us  we  know  not  how,  by  things  in 
themselves  we  know  not  what),  will  not  possibly  enter 
indiscriminately,  so   to   speak,    into   this   system   of 


\ 


100 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


multiples  and  unities.  They  must  recognizably  pos- 
sess correspondences  respectively  adapted  to  these 
multiples  and  unities,  and  be  accordingly  distributed 
and  assigned.  The  a  jiosteriori  matter  must  be  as 
variously  modified  as  the  a  priori  form.  Certain 
affections  will  be  subsumed  under  this  function  and 
its  correspondent  pure  multiple,  certain  others  under 
that,  and  so  on,  till  every  function  is  supplied,  not 
only  with  its  own  pure  multiple  (of  time),  but  also 
with  its  own  empirical  multiple  (of  sensuous  afifec- 
tion).  That  is,  judgment  will  discriminate,  in  every 
separate  instance,  the  empirical  cases  of  the  pure  rule. 
Discrimination,  however,  can  only  take  place  through 
analysis.  The  synthesis  and  the  analysis  are  simul- 
taneous, then ;  or,  indeed,  to  the  production  of  any 
empirical  object,  the  analysis,  so  far  as  action  is  con- 
cerned, precedes  the  synthesis  (emjdrica) ;  for  the 
empirical  matter  cannot  enter  the  non  -  empirical 
system  of  moulds  till  judgment,  acknowledging  the 
right,  permits  the  transit.  That  indeed  seems  plain  : 
that,  if  there  is  a  pure  diversity,  a  correspondent 
empirical  diversity  must  be  admitted  and  assumed ; 
for,  if  not,  how  could  we,  without  direction  or  guide, 
hope  correctly  to  accomplish  all  these  infinite  actual 
subsumptions  ? 

Empirical  matter  has  thus  a  necessity  of  its  own. 
We  cannot  set  up  our  own  sensuous  affections ;  as 
such,  they  are  independent  of  us,  and  as  such  we 
cannot  alter  or  reject  them.  We  are  subject  to  their 
necessity;  we  entirely  depend  on  them.  But  this 
necessity  is  for  us  contingent,  in  the  sense  that  we  do 
not  see  into  it,  that  we  do  not  see  its  rationale  and 
grounds.  It  comes,  and  we  submit  to  it,  and  bur 
submission  is  absolutely  necessary.  Still  it  itself  is 
contingent  in  this  way,  that  we  caauöt  say,  it  could 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


101 


not  have  been  otherwise.     The  sense-affections  I  have 
are  entirely  contingent.     I  might  have  had  in  their 
place  any  others.     I  only  feel  that  they  are  as  they 
are,  but  no  more.     This— that  they  are  as  they  are- 
is,  as  such,  however,  entirely  independent  of  me.     I 
have  therefore  to  obey  the    empirical   matter,   and 
group   according  to  its   peculiarities.      There   must 
be  a  hint  in  the  empirical  succession  itself,  which 
determines  when  quantity,  when  quality,  causality, 
reciprocity,  etc.,  shall  be  the  proper  category  to  act, 
and  subsume  into  experience.     The  empirical  succes- 
sion  that   is   to   be    grouped    under    causality,    for 
instance,  cannot  be  the  same  as  that  which  is  to  be 
grouped  under  reciprocity;    the  succession,  namely, 
that  calls  for  a  reversible  number  must  surely  be  cor- 
respondently  different  from  a  succession  that  calls 
quite  as  imperatively  for  an  irreversible  number.    The 
empirical  variety  itself  must  be  furnished  with  a  cue, 
must,  as  it  were,  blow  its  own  prompter's  whistle, 
before  my  judgment  can  be  expected  duly  to  subsume 
it  into  the  appointed  checker. 

Even  when  subsumed  it  will  continue  to  manifest 
its  own  individual  necessity.  The  amount  of  time  or 
space  assumed  by  any  empirical  object  depends  on  it, 
the  object  itself,  though  its  general  subjection  to  time 
and  space  depends  on  me.  The  particular  quality  or 
degree,  too,  of  any  object  depends  on  it,  though  the 
general  law  depends  on  me.  It  is  not  really  an 
objection,  then,  the  fact  that  particular  shape  and 
particular  form  are  entirely  independent  of  the 
general,  so  far  as  each  is  particular,  though,  again, 
each  must  assume  the  laws  of  the  general.  The 
general  laws  of  space  are  verily  in  every  particular 
object  through  me,  although  the  particular  form  and 
quantity  of  this  object  in  space  depend  entirely  on  its 


I 


102 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  REPBODUCTION. 


103 


own  transcendental  matter.  So  it  is  with  causality. 
I  can  subsume  under  that  notion  a  sensational  or 
empirical  reality  only  when  that  reality  exhibits  its 
pass, -when  it  manifests  such  particular  nature  as 
renders  it  amenable  to  such  particular  rule.  There 
is  thus,  then,  a  certain  pre-established  harmony  be- 
tween pure  form  and  empirical  matter :  the  one  could 
never  be  subsumed  under  the  other,  were  they  wholly 
disparate,  wholly  incommensurable.  This  pre-estab- 
lished harmony,  however,  between  the  empirical  and 
the  intellectual  does  not  render  the  intellectual  super- 
fluous. The  intellectual  is  absolutely  necessary  in 
order  to  raise  what  is  subjective  and  contingent  into 
what  is  objective  and  necessary. 

In  the  case  of  certain  categories,  however,  the  fact 
of  even  the  empirical  succession  being  necessarily 
credited  with  the  possession  of  necessity  is  not  to  be 
slurred  over,  but  fairly  faced.  And  here  we  mean  suc- 
cession as  such,  succession  that  remains  succession. 
In  quantity  and  quality,  the  succession  in  conscious- 
ness of  the  constituent  units  of  the  particular  detail, 
complex,  or  manifold  disappears :  these  units  become 
united  into  a  single  object.  But  in  causality  and  reci- 
procity it  is  not  with  successions  of  units  collapsing 
into  single  objects  that  we  are  concerned,  but  with  suc- 
cessions among  objects  themselves,  successions  as  suc- 
cessions, successions  that  are  not  only  at  first  but  even  at 
last  successions.  Then  these  successions  are  different 
the  one  from  the  other, — so  different  that  each  must 
bring  with  it  nothing  less  than  an  empirical  necessity, 
an  empirical  necessity  of  its  own  and  peculiar  to 
itself.  Causality,  as  we  have  seen,  is  distinguished 
from  reciprocity  just  by  this,  that  its  succession  cannot 
be  reversed,  while  that  of  reciprocity  not  only  can  be 
reversed,  but  must.     From  this  it  follows  that  there 


' 


is  a  certain  order  in  the  phenomena  themselves,  adapt- 
ing them  noAv  to  causality  and  again  to  reciprocity. 

That  is  the  difficulty,  then.  As  the  order  is  pre- 
cisely what  constitutes  the  distinguishing  peculiarity 
of  the  two  cases,  why  call  upon  an  intellectual  order 
from  within  for  the  attribution  of  necessity,  while 
such  necessity  is  already  a  manifest  possession  of  the 
phenomenal  order  from  without?  Even  phenomen- 
ally what  we  term  cause  must  precede  what,  in  the 
same  connexion,  we  term  again  effect.  Even  pheno- 
menally we  cannot  transpose  the  order.  And  is  it 
not  just  this  incapability  of  transposition  that  decides 
us  to  call  in  this  category  (causality),  and  not  that 
one  (reciprocity)  ?  Where  is  the  reason  for  a  double 
necessity,  then  ?  The  phenomenal  necessity  being  ad- 
mitted, what  occasion  is  there  for  the  apparent  super- 
fluity of  an  intellectual  necessity?  The  intellectual 
necessity  does  not  even  explain  the  phenomenal 
necessity;  for  the  latter  must  be  admitted  to  be 
independent  of,  and  to  precede,  the  former.  Does  not 
the  old  difficulty  of  causality  remain,  then,  and  is  not 
the  very  thing  we  want  explained  just  this  pheno- 
menal necessity?  Before  your  intellectual  category 
can  act,  and  superinduce  its  peculiar  vis  necessitatis^ 
you  admit  that  there  must  be  a  fixed  phenomenal 
order.  What  Hume  wants  explained,  then, — what  l:^ 
we  all  want  explained, — is  just  why  is  this  pheno- 
menal order  fixed  ?  Why  is  the  order  always  A  B, 
and  not  sometimes  B  A  ?  Or  how  do  we  know  that 
it  is  really  so, — how  do  we  know  that  the  order  is 
always  A  B,  and  never  A  C  or  A  D,  etc.  ?  Hume, 
in  examining  the  whole  process  itself  and  every 
member  of  it,  both  before  the  event  and  after  it,  was 
quite  unable  to  detect  the  copula  that  was  the  visr 
nexus,    the   actual   necessity   in   question.      He   was 


// 


104 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


driven,  therefore,  to  look  upon  the  whole  business  as 
dependent,  naturally,  on  instinct,  or,  philosophically, 
on  custom.  We  simply  expected  to  find  conjoined 
what  we  had  been  in  the  habit  of  seeing  conjoined. 
And,  really,  if  there  can  be  no  objective  reason  dis- 
covered, it  is  good  ratiocination  to  have  recourse  to  a 
subjective  reason.  Nor  is  the  subjective  reason  in 
question  a  weak  one;  rather  it  is  one  that  obtains 
widely,  and  even  deeply,  in  human  affairs.  Never- 
theless, it  is  quite  true,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  that 
no  customary  association  is  adequate  to  a  connexion 
that  is,  conspicuously,  apodictically  necessary  and 
universal ;  and  Hume's  explanation  is  to  be  defini- 
tively rejected.  What  we  have  here  before  us,  how- 
ever, is  this,  that  our  own  explanation  is  incom- 
petent,— that  we  ourselves  seem  to  fail,  indeed,  in  the 
very  key-stone  of  our  whole  system.  The  presence  of 
apodictic  synthesis  in  contingent  matter, — the  presence 
of  apodictic  synthesis  at  all, — that  we  have  under- 
taken to  explain, — precisely,  too,  in  connexion  with 
Humes  problem,— and  precisely  that  do  we  seem  to 
fail  to  explain.  Our  answer,  after  all, — and  especially 
as  regards  causality,—  seems  to  turn  only  on  a  super- 
fluous and  supererogatory  pre-established  harmony 
between  the  facts  of  sense  and  the  functions  of  the 
intellect.  The  phenomenal  necessity  being  simply 
assumed,  and  not  explained,  an  awkward  intellectual 
necessity  is  then  merely  mechanically  added  to  it. 

Nevertheless,  we  have  already  said  what  is  neces- 
sary here.  Sensuously  we  know  only  the  units  of  a 
phenomenal  succession.  That  this  succession  does 
not  remain  such,  but  gets  combined  into  the  various 
objects  and  connexions  of  experience,  cannot  depend 
upon  the  receptivity  of  sense,  but  must  depend  upon 
the  spontaneity  of  tbe  intelkfii    Let  thfi  j^ 


t 


y 


I 


fi 


, 


THE    REPRODUCTION. 


105 


be  what  they  may,  the  general  law  and  laws  which 
they  are  found  to  obey  can  only  issue  from  within. 
These  laws  are  still  absolutely  necessary  in  order  to 
convert  disarticulate  units  of  subjective  affection  into 
—just  to  say  it  at  once — the  formed  universe.     The 
phenomenal   order   is   really   granted    to    be    fixed. 
Nevertheless,  this,  in  the  first  instance,  is  but  a  matter 
of  subjective  judgment,  and  the  necessity  it  involves 
is,  equally,  not  more  than  subjective.     Still  this  is 
not,    exceptionally,    so   with    causality  merely.     All 
empirical  elements  bring  with  them,  in  fact,  a  certain 
empirical   necessity.      Leaves   are  green,    rocks   are 
solid,  seas  are  liquid :  I  must  so  accept  them,  I  cannot 
alter  them.     This  is  their  qualitative  necessity,  and  it 
is  wholly  independent  of  me.     In   the   same   way, 
among  these  things,  and  all  things,  there  obtains  an 
empirical  order,  which  is  empirically  necessary,  and 
which  I  have  simply  to  accept,  without   power  to 
move  a  finger  in  change  of  it.     There  are  phenomena 
in  which  I  cannot  return  from  the  second  to  the  first ; 
and  there  are  equally  others  in  which   it  is   their 
express  distinction  that  I  can  take  the  units  of  the 
relative  manifolds  in  any  order  I  please.     The  former, 
presenting  an  analogy  to,  are  subsumed  under,  the 
logical  process  involved  in  the  relation  between  ante- 
cedent and  consequent,  which  process  synthetically 
applied  to  phenomena,  is  named  causaKty.    The  latter, 
presenting  an  analogy  to  the  logical  function  that  is 
concerned  in  a  disjunctive  proposition,  are  subsumed 
under  reciprocity.     And  observe  the  effects  of  the 
subsumption.     So  long  as  we  have  merely  the  facts 
of  sense  before  us,  we  have  an  unconnected  succession  ; 
my  imagination,  which  receives  them,  finds  the  one 
first  and  the  other  second,  and  it  is  a  subjective  fact 
that  I  always  find  them  so.     But  this  necessity  is  like 


lOG 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


that  of  the  greenness  of  the  leaves,  etc.;  what  the 
things  are  in  themselves  that  lie  under  the  special 
quantities,  or  under  the  special  qualities,  or  under 
the  special  arrangements, — what  are  the  noumena 
that  lie  under  the  phenomena, — I  know  not  all. 
These  things  in  themselves,  these  noumena,  must 
dictate:  they  must  prescribe  their  own  quantities, 
qualities,  and  arrangements ;  but  still  these  quantities, 
qualities,  and  arrangements  are,  as  they  are  in  the 
first  instance,  or  only  in  sense,  simply  subjective, 
merely  contingent.  As  they  are  I  find  them,  and  as 
they  are  I  accept  them ;  but  still  I  am  quite  blind  in 
their  regard.  What  that  is  that  lies  under  the  double 
we  call  cause  and  effect,  I  know  not  at  all ;  and  I  see 
no  rationale  whatever  in  the  duplicity  presented  until 
I  myself  regard  it  in  the  light  of  a  logical  relation 
of  my  own,  that  of  antecedent  and  consequent.  In 
short,  phenomena,  while  only  in  sense,  must  be  but 
subjective  and  contingent  units:  they  can  become 
objective  and  necessary  only  when  lifted  into  the 
functions  of  intellect,  which  functions  are  alone  there 
beside  them,  are  alone  left  as  any  possible  agencies  to 
manipulate  them  further. 

Thus,  then,  there  are  two  judgments  involved  in 
every  act  of  the  perception  of  experience.  There  is,  first, 
a  subjective  judgment  that  attaches  itself  only  to  the 
phenomena  themselves  (and,  consequently,  to  the 
order  of  them);  and  there  is,  second,  an  objective 
judgment  that,  through  due  distribution  and  assign- 
ment of  the  categories,  projects  these  phenomena — 
our  own  contingent  subjective  afifections— into  the 
articulate  world,  into  the  ruled  and  regulated  con- 
text of  experience.  All  phenomena  are  received  first 
into  time,  and  the  functions  of  unity  implied  in  the 
categories  have   already  potentially  converted   the 


THE   REPRODUCTION. 


107 


various  multiples  of  time  into  schemata — checkers,  as 
it  were,  for  the  final  completion  into  experience  of 
our  mere  subjective  sensations.  As  regards  causality, 
for  example,  the  unity  of  apperception  (self-conscious- 
ness) possesses  a  logical  function  which  we  name 
antecedent  and  consequent  (or  the  hypothetical  judg- 
ment); time,  again,  which  is  only  a  form  within  us 
of  general  sense,  as  it  were,  of  a  priori  sense,  even  of 
pure  or  non-empirical  sense,  transcendental  sense 
(a  2^rio7i  in  place,  but  empirical  in  use) — time,  again, 
possesses,  on  its  side,  a  multiple  or  series, — namely, 
in  its  potential  or  dynamical  process, — which  may  be 
assumed  as  the  type  of  change ;  said  pure  function  of 
unity  and  said  pure  sense-multiple  (affection)  coalesce 
into  a  schema ;  this  schema  receives  into  itself  such 
multiples  of  special  sense  as  present  an  analogous 
order;  and  thus  it  is  that  certain  mere  subjective 
phenomena  are  perceived  as  objects  bearing  to  each 
other  the  mutual  relation  of  cause  and  eflfect.^ 

We  have  probably  seen  enough  of  reciprocity  in 
the  preceding,  and  may  now  pass  it. 

Of  modality^  the  categories  possibility^  actuality,  and 
necessity  are,  also,  from  what  has  been  already  said, 
probably,  intelligible  enough.  They  are,  so  to  speak, 
but  the  other  three  categorical  classes  in  act.  Fulfil- 
ment of  quajitity  is  to  satisfy  the  requisitions  of  form, 
the  requisitions  of  the  understanding,  and  that  is  what 
characterizes  possibility.     Fulfilment  of  quality,  again, 

*  An  apology  is  here  due  for  the  length  of  the  discussion,  which,  how- 
ever, is  much  more  detailed  in  the  manuscript.  As  may  be  known  from 
other  works,  too,  I  do  not  admit  at  last  the  validity  of  the  relative  de- 
fence. It  itself,  however  (the  defence),  will  be  allowed,  perhaps,  to  be 
not  alien  to  the  spirit  of  Kant.  At  all  events,  it  will  show  that  the 
student  at  work  must  have  made  a  very  serious  business  of  the  various 
pieces  of  Kant's  machinery,  and  must  have  remained  very  long,  faith- 
fully, and  even  trustingly  by  them. 


108 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


THE   llEPRODUCTION. 


109 


is  to  satisfy  the  requisitions  of  matter^  the  requisitions 
oi  judgment^  and  that  is  what  characterizes  actuality. 
Fulfilment  of  relation^  lastly,  is  to  satisfy  the  requisi- 
tions of  connexion^  the  requisitions  of  reason^  and 
that  is  what  characterizes  necessity. 

It  is  not  now  necessary  to  repeat  either  that  all 
these  forms  are  only  for  the  filling  of  sense,  only  for 
experience,  and  that  they  are  quite  idle  and  useless 
else.  Nay,  they  are  even  mischievous  should  any 
attempt  be  made  to  deduce  results  from  them  inde- 
pendently regarded,  or  a  priori  and  alone.  They 
themselves  are  a  jyriori;  but,  even  so,  they  are  only 
the  possibility  of  experience,  or,  for  that  matter  also, 
only  the  possibility  of  experience ;  and  they  are  nothing 
more.  We  know,  too,  only  the  one  experience,  only 
the  experience  we  have;  to  conceive  another,  any 
other, — and  it  is  quite  possible  to  conceive  any 
number  of  different  experiences, — is  not  to  realize  it. 
We  are  bound,  not  onlv  to  forms  of  sense  on  the  one 
hand,  but  to  forms  of  understanding  on  the  other : 
we  may,  indeed,  conjecture  others ;  but  conjecture  is 
not  discovery.  With  the  same  sense-forms,  we  might 
possess  different  categories ;  or,  the  latter  remaining, 
the  former  might  be  changed ;  or  we  may  conceive 
both  changed ;  or  we  may  even  conceive  an  intellect 
that  would  not  think  discursively  through  categories 
or  notions,  and  not  perceive  vicariously  through 
forms  of  sense,  but  that,  like  the  divine  mind,  it  may 
be,  would  directly  perceive,  or  see  into. 

Thus,  then,  we  have  completed  all  that  relates  to 
transcendental  judgment.  Under  transcendental  ap- 
prehension (understanding)  we  were  enabled  to  perceive 
the  nature  and  necessity  of  certain  a  2mori  subjective 
forms,  both  of  sense  and  intellect,  without  which  this 
regulated  MhM  whiidiwe  ciOl  eÄpiißöce  would  be 


manifestly  impossible ;  and  now,  in  the  present  book, 
we  have  seen  the  manner  in  which  these  a  priori 
elements  mutually  relate  themselves  into  an  a  priori 
system  antecedent  to,  and  in  provisional  condition  of, 
experience,  as  well  as  that  also  in  which  the  elements 
proper  of  experience — those,  namely,  which  result 
from  special  sensation  and  are  termed  a  posteriori — 
become  arranged  and  subsumed  under  said  a  priori 
system.  In  correspondence  with  all  the  ground- 
notions  of  the  understanding,  time  was  found  to 
furnish  ground-multiples  of  sense :  the  subsumption 
of  the  latter  under  the  former  gave  rise  to  schemata ; 
and  these  again  readily  discovered  to  us  the  principles 
which  judgment  would  adopt  in  subsuming  under 
them  the  whole  wealth  of  the  empirical  all.  The 
nature  and  evidence  of  these  principles  presented 
such  points  of  relative  difference  that  they  were  of 
necessity  named  differently.  The  a  priori  principles 
that  concerned  extensive  magnitudes  were,  consist- 
ently and  appropriately,  termed  axio7)is.  Those  that 
related  to  degree  were  similarly  denominated  anti- 
cipations. And  while,  with  reference  to  the  intel- 
lectual relations,  the  laws  of  sensuous  relations  ap- 
peared as  a7ialogies,  those  of  modality  could  only  lay 
claim  to  the  name  of  postulates. 

All  of  these  principles,  both  sensuous  and  intel- 
lectual, were  found  to  have  no  intention,  no  validity, 
no  meaning,  no  reference,  unless  to  the  a  posteriori 
empirical  matter,  from  which  alone  they  could 
receive  filling  and  objective  actuality.  The  world 
that  resulted  was  seen,  however,  to  be,  in  every 
respect,  phenomenal ;  and  this,  not  only  because  the 
empirical  filling  was  required  to  adapt  itself  to 
certain  internal  forms,  but  because,  also,  this  very 
empirical  filling  itself  was  only,  and  could  only  be, 


110 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


sensuous  affection.  This  phenomenal  life  we  found 
to  be  as  true  for  the  inward  as  for  the  outward 
world,  and  that  we  knew  the  noumenon  subjacent  to 
our  phenomenal  consciousness  just  as  little  as  we 
knew  the  noumena  subjacent  to  the  phenomena  we  call 
things  without.  It  by  no  means  follows,  however, 
that  this  word  noumenon  is  entirely  empty  and 
meaningless  for  us.  We  cannot  assert,  indeed,  that 
we  affirmatively  know  any  noumenon.  Such  know- 
ledge is  utterly  impossible  to  beings  constituted  as  we 
are,  whether  sensuously  or  intellectually.  Or  limita- 
tion and  finitude  in  both  respects  have  been  clearly 
and  convincingly  demonstrated ;  and  a  knowledge  of 
noumena  is  only  possible  for  an  intellect  which  we 
may  name  original  and  primary,  while  ours,  plainly, 
is  but  derivative  and  secondary.  Such  original  and 
primary  intellect  we  may  conceive  to  belong  only  to 
the  Deity ;  who  will  not  think  through  finite  cate- 
gories, nor  perceive  through  finite  senses,  but  will 
intuitively  and  directly  know  all  things,  not  as  they 
appear,  but  as  in  themselves  they  are. 

But  if  we  are  so  situated  as  regards  affirmative 
noumena,  the  case  is  different  with  those  which  we 
may  call  negative.  These  we  may  assume.  Nay,  a 
phenomenal  world  implies  a  noumenal;  and  the 
assumption  of  such  is  absolutely  necessary  in  order 
duly  to  subordinate  and  limit  the  pretensions  of  sense. 
It  does  not  follow,  nevertheless,  that  its  phenomenal 
nature  attaches  any  character  of  uselessness  and 
meaninglessness  to  this  the  world  of  time  which  we, 
in  time,  inhabit.  Here,  as  evidence  from  every  side 
assures  us,  existence  is  but  probationary.  There, 
beyond,  is  our  true  and  noumenal  home  awaiting  us 
for  eternity,  with  God,  when  time  and  the  shows  of 
time  shall  have  worked  out  their  function  on  us. 


] 


THE   REPKODUCTION. 


Ill 


^t 


That  these  are  true  views,  and  that  our  system  is 
co-extensive  with  the  universe  of  things,  will  appear 
more  and  more  evident  as  we  proceed.  The  world  we 
have  yet  seen  is  a  world  conditioned  merely.  Under 
reason  (our  third  book),  we  shall  discover  those 
relations  to  the  necessary  unconditioned,  that  round 
and  complete  it  (our  world)  as  an  object  of  intellect. 
Out  practical  critique^  again,  will  introduce  us  to  the 
veritable  noumenal  world  ;  while  our  inquiry  into 
judgment  will  mediate  and  justify  transition  from  the 
one  world  to  the  other.  In  this  way,  the  whole  of 
those  first  principles  on  which  man,  intellectually, 
morally,  and  aesthetically,  founds,  will  be  given  to 
sight ;  and  the  course  and  method  of  their  applica- 
tion to  our  whole  actual  existence  will,  without  diffi- 
culty, suggest  themselves. 

Before  proceeding  to  our  third  book  (on  reason)^ 
however,  we  interpose  certain  intercalary,  introduc- 
tory, and  transitionary  matter  relative  to  noumena 
and  phenomena,  as  well  as  to  what  we  have  named 
the  notions  of  reflection.  These  last  will  be  found  of 
considerable  interest  in  themselves,  and  very  strikingly 
illustrative  of  the  value  of  our  principles  as  applied 
judicially  to  certain  views  of  Leibnitz. 


Translation. 


/ 


II 


THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 

(TRANSLATION.) 


.^■B. 

^N^ 


Introduction. 
I. 

Of  the  Difiference  between  Pure  «and  Empirical  Cognition. 

It  is  beyond  a  doubt  that  all  our  knowledge  begins 
with  experience.  For  by  what  should  our  faculties 
be  roused  to  act,  if  not  by  objects  that  aflFect  our 
senses,  and  thus  partly  of  themselves  produce  impres- 
sions, partly,  again,  bring  the  understanding  itself 
into  movement,  in  order  to  compare  these,  to  join 
or  disjoin  them,  and  in  this  manner  work  up  such 
crude  material  of  the  intimations  of  sense  into  a 
cognition  or  recognition  of  objects  which  is  named 
experience.  So  far  as  time  is  concerned,  then,  no 
cognition  of  ours  precedes  experience,  and  with 
experience  all  our  knowledge  begins. 

But,  though  all  our  knowledge  begins  nith  experi- 
ence, it  does  not  follow  that  therefore  it  all  derives 
from  experience.  For  it  is  just  possible  that  experience 
is  itself  a  compound.  It  is  just  possible,  that  is,  that 
there  is  in  experience,  besides  what  is  due  to  the 
impression  of  sense,  something  in  addition  that  comes 
from  our  faculties  themselves  (when  merely  acting 
because  of  impression) ;  and  in  that  case,  it  would 
take  long  practice,  it  may  be,  to  enable  us  to  dis- 
tinguish the  latter,  and  separate  it  from  the  former. 


116 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


It  is  at  least  not  a  question  to  be  summarily 
dismissed,  but  one  that  demands  more  particular 
consideration,  this,  to  wit :  whether  there  really  be 
such  component  part  of  knowledge  as  is  independent 
of  experience  and,  indeed,  of  any  impression  of  sense 
whatever?  Such  component  part  of  knowledge, 
did  it  exist,  were  alone  to  be  truly  termed  a  priori ; 
and  it  would  evidently  stand  in  contradistinction  to 
what  other  component  part  of  knowledge  is  called 
empirical:  the  latter,  namely,  having  its  source 
only  a 'posteriori^  or  in  experience. 

The  expression  a  priori^  at  the  same  time,  is  not 
precise  enough  to  designate  the  entire  sense  of  the 
preceding  question.  For  of  many  a  mere  empirical 
fact,  we  say,  that  we  know  it  a  priori^  simply  because 
we  do  not  directly  derive  it  from  experience,  but  from 
a  general  rule ;  and  this,  even  notwithstanding  that  the 
rule  itself  may  be  so  derived.  For  example,  we  say  of 
a  man  that  shall  have  undermined  his  house,  he  mi^ht 
have  known  a  priori  that  it  would  fall  in ;  he  had 
no  occasion  to  wait  for  the  experience  of  the  actual 
event.  Nevertheless,  he  could  not  have  known  this 
absolutely  a  priori.  For  that  bodies  are  heavy  and, 
consequently,  fall  when  their  supports  are  withdrawn 
— this,  at  least,  he  must  have  known  by  experience 
beforehand. 

In  what  follows,  therefore,  we  shall  understand  by 
cognitions  a  priori^  not  such  as  are  independent  of  this 
or  that  experience,  but  such  as  are  totally  independent 
of  any  experience  whatsoever.  Opposed  to  these  are 
empirical  cognitions,  or  such  as  are  only  possible  a 
posteriori^  or  from  experience.  Pure,  again,  are  those  a 
priori  cognitions  which  are  quite  free  from  all  and  every 
empirical  admixture.  Thus,  for  example,  the  proposi  • 
tion,  that  all  change  has  its  cause,  is  an  a  priori  proposi- 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


117 


tion  ;  but  it  is  not,  at  the  same  time,  purely  such,  for 
change  is  an  idea  which  can  only  be  derived  from 
experience. 

II. 

We  do  possess  certain  a  priori   Cognitions,    and    even  Common 

Sense  is  never  without  such. » 

What  is  wanted  here  is  a  criterion,  by  means  of 
which  we  may,  with  certainty,  distinguish  what   is 
pure  from  what  is  empirical.    Now  experience  informs 
us  that  something  is  so  and  so,  but  not  that  it  cannot 
be  otherwise.     Firstly,  then,  should  there  be  a  pro- 
position such  that  it  is  thought  together  with  its  neces- 
sity, then  it  is  a  judgment  a  priori;  and,  if  underived 
from  any  other,  absolutely  a  pinori.     Secondly,  experi- 
ence extends  to  its  judgments  never  strict  or  true 
but   only    (through   induction)   assumptive  or  com- 
parative universality ;    so  that,  properly,  it  can  only 
be  said,  So  far  as  we  are  yet  aware,  there  is  no  excep- 
tion to  this  or   that   rule.      Should  any  judgment, 
then,  be  thought  in  strict  universality,  or  so,  that  is, 
that  exceptions  are  impossible,  we  may  be  sure  that 
that  judgment  is  no  derivative  from  experience,  but 
directly  a  priori.     Empirical  universality,  therefore, 
is  only  an   arbitrary  raising  of  validity  from  that 
which    obtains   in    most  cases  to  that   which    holds 
good  in  all,  as  in  the  proposition,  for  example,  that 
all  bodies  are  heavy.      Whereas,  when  strict  univer- 
sality attaches  to  a  judgment,  such  universality  points 
to  a  special  cognitive  source,  namely,  to  a  faculty  of 
cognition  a  jjriori     Necessity  and  strict  universality, 
therefore,  are  sure  criteria  of  a  priori  cognition,  and 

^  Rosenkranz  has  here  "  der  gemeine  Stand."  I  prefer  to  read  "  der 
gemeine  Verstand,"  as,  indeed,  is  supported  by  the  text  :  examples  of 
ordinary  common  sense  follow  examples  of  science. 


♦-^^ 


^ 


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TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


inseparably  found  together.  In  practice,  however,  as 
it  is  easier,  now  to  apply  the  one  and  now  the  other, 
it  will  be  advisable  to  avail  ourselves,  as  occasion 
may  suggest,  of  either  criterion  separately ;  for,  even 
separately,  either  of  them  is  quite  infallible. 

Now,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  there  actually  are  in 
our  knowledge  such  necessary  and,  in  the  strictest 
sense,  universal  (consequently  pure  a  jmori)  judg- 
ments. Would  we  have  an  example  from  science,  v/e 
have  only  to  turn  to  any  proposition  in  mathematics ; 
while,  as  for  the  most  ordinary  common  sense,  there 
is  obviously  to  hand,  by  way  of  instance,  the  pro- 
position that  every  change  must  have  a  cause,  where 
the  very  notion  cause  so  manifestly  implies  necessity 
(of  connexion  with  an  eflfect)  and  strict  universality 
(of  rule),  that  it  would  be  altogether  lost  did  we 
derive  it,  like  Hume,  from  our  conjoining  what 
simply  follows  with  what  simply  precedes,  through 
the  mere  habit  of  the  experience,  and  the  consequent 
simple  custom  of  connecting  ideas  (where  the  neces- 
sity could  be  only  subjective).  Besides  demonstrating 
the  actual  existence  in  our  knowledge  of  principles  a 
priori  by  a  reference  to  fact,  we  might  even  a  priori 
prove  as  much.  We  might  demonstrate,  that  is,  the 
indispensable  necessity  of  such  principles  to  the  very 
possibility  of  experience.  For  how  should  there  be 
any  certainty  in  experience,  were  all  the  rules  in  it 
only  empirical  and  (consequently)  contingent?  It 
w^ere  hardly  possible,  evidently,  to  allow  any  such 
rules  the  name  of  first  principles.  But  it  may  suffice 
here  to  have  demonstrated  the  fact  of  the  possession 
of  pure  cognition  on  our  part,  together  with  the  signs 
of  the  latter.  Nay,  not  merely  judgments,  but  even 
certain  ideas,  may  claim  for  themselves  an  a  priori 
origin.     Suppose,  iii  the  case  of  our  empirical  idea  of 


THE    KRITIK    OF  PURE    REASON. 


119 


a  body^  we  successively  withdraw  all  its  empirical  con- 
stituents, such  as  colour,  consistency,  weight,  even 
impenetrability,  we  shall  still  find  it  impossible  to 
withdraw  the  space  it  occupied.  This  space  will  still 
remain  when  the  body  itself  has  disappeared.  In  like 
manner,  if,  in  regard  to  our  empirical  idea  of  an 
object  in  general,  whether  corporeal  or  incorporeal,  we 
withdraw  all  properties  known  to  us  from  experience, 
we  shall  still  be  unable  to  withdraw  from  it  those  by 
which  we  think  it  as  substance,  or  as  attributive  to 
substance  (though  this  notion  of  substance  has  more 
determination  in  it  than  that  of  an  object  in  general). 
We  must,  therefore,  overborne  by  the  necessity  with 
Avhich  said  notion  forces  itself  upon  us,  admit  that  it 
has  its  seat  aptriori  in  our  faculties  of  cognition. 

III. 

Philosophy  stands  in  need  of  a  Science  which  shall  determine  the 
Possibility,  the  Principles,  and  the  Limits  of  all  a  priori  Cog- 
nition. 

But,  to  go  still  further,  it  is  a  fact  that  there  are 
cognitions  which  even  quit  the  bounds  of  all  possible 
experience,  and  actually,  by  means  of  ideas  for  which, 
so  far  as  experience  goes,  no  correspondent  object  can 
be  found,  assume  to  extend  the  range  of  our  judgments 
beyond  any  experience  whatever. 

And  just  in  these  latter  cognitions,  transcending 
as  they  do  the  world  of  sense,  and  unaccompanied 
by  experience  to  guide  and  correct  them,  there  lie  in- 
terests of  reason  which  we  hold  to  be  of  far  greater  con- 
sequence and  loftier  aim  than  anything  or  all  that  un- 
derstanding can  teach  us  in  the  domain  of  experience. 
In  these  cognitions,  indeed,  even  at  the  risk  of  failure, 
we  rather  venture  everything  than,  for  any  reason  of 


I 


120 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PUKE  REASON. 


121 


doubt,  or  carelessness  and  indifference,  consent  to  forego 
what  is  of  such  an  import.  Such  unavoidable  problems 
of  pure  reason's  own  are  God,  Free  Will,  and  Immortal- 
ity. The  science,  again,  which,  as  well  in  the  end  it  con- 
templates, as  in  all  its  complement  of  means,  is  alone 
directed  to  the  solution  of  these,  we  name  metaphysic 
— a  science  that,  in  its  procedure,  starts  as  yet  only 
dogmatically ;  that  is,  having  instituted  no  previous 
inquiry  into  sufficiency  or  insufficiency  on  the  part  of 
reason  for  so  great  an  enterprise,  it  yet  confidently 
undertakes  completion  of  it.  ^ 

Now,  it  seems  no  more  than  natural  that,  once  we 
have  left  the  solid  ground  of  experience,  we  should 
not  forthwith  proceed  to  build,  without  having  care- 
fully assured  ourselves,  first  of  all,  in  regard  to  a 
foundation,  and  that,  too,  all  the  more,  should  we 
find  ourselves  provided  only  with  principles  which 
are  unauthenticated,  and  have  come  to  us  we  know 
not  whence.  It  seems  no  more  than  natural,  I  say, 
that,  rather  than  this,  we  should  have  long  before 
started  the  question.  How  have  we  got  to  these 
principles,  and  of  what  extent,  import,  and  value  are 
they  ?  In  efl^ect,  nothing  is  more  natural  when  by  the 
word  natural  we  understand  what,  rightly  and  reason- 
ably, ought  to  take  place ;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
when  we  mean  by  natural  only  what  usually  takes 
place,  then  nothing  is  more  natural  than  that  any 
such  preliminary  inquiry  should  remain  long  null. 
For  the  fact  is,  that  some  of  the  principles  in  view 
(as  the  mathematical  ones)  possess  authentication 
from  of  old,  and  reflect,  consequently,  a  similar 
presumption  on  to  others  which  may  in  reality  be 
altogether  different.  Besides,  when  one  is  beyond 
experience,  one  is  safe  not  to  be  contradicted  bv  ex- 

^  Eosenkranz  would  seem  to  omit  a  sentence  oi  twft  liere. 


»X 


perience ;  and,  eager  as  we  are  to  extend  our  know- 
ledge, only  when  so  contradicted  is  it  that  we  can 
allow  ourselves  a  halt.    But  even  this  may  be  avoided, 
should  we  be  but  careful  with  our  fictions ;  for  fictions, 
in  such  circumstances,  they  must  be.     On  the  other 
hand,  mathematics  afford  us  a  splendid  example  of 
success   in  the  cognition  in  question.     Objects  and 
ideas,  it  is  true,  are  considered  there  only  so  far  as 
they  are  capable  of  being  exhibited  in  objective  re- 
presentation.    But  this  is  easily  overlooked,  because 
said  representation  can  itself  be  a  priori  given,  and  is, 
consequently,    scarcely   to   be   distinguished  from  a 
pure  notion  proper.     Led  away  by  such  a  proof  of 
the  power  of  reason,  we  can  see  no  bounds  to  the 
extension  we  desire.     The  light  dove,  in  feeling  the 
resistance  of  the  air  its  free  flight  cleaves,  might  very 
well  think  to  itself  that  it  would  have  a  still  better 
chance  in  a  space  that  were  void.     Even  so  Plato, 
because  of  the  narrow  limits  it  set  the  understanding, 
forsook  the  world  of  sense ;  and,  beyond  its  bounds, 
buoyed  up  on  the  wings  of  the  ideas,  committed  him- 
self to  the  blank  inane  of  the  pure  intellect.     He  did 
not  perceive  that,  with  every  effort,  his  progress  was 
null;  for  foothold  he  had  none,  against  which  steadied, 
he  might  have  exerted  his  strength  to  bring  reason 
from  the  spot.     It  is,    however,  an  ordinary  fate  of 
speculative   reason,    to    complete   its   edifice   at   the 
soonest,  and  only  then  to  examine  whether  the  foun- 
dations are  well  laid  or  not.     All  manner  of  excuses, 
rather,  is  indulged  in  to  comfort  us  in  regard  of  their 
entire  sufficiency,  or  even  to  prove  such  late,  danger- 
ous examination  wholly  inexpedient.     What  saves  us 
during  the  work  from  any  fear  or  suspicion,  deceiving 
us  with  apparent  substantiality  indeed,  is  this.     A 
great  part,  perhaps  the  greatest,  of  the  business  of 


1 


122 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


our  reason  consists  in  the  analysis  of  ideas  which  we 
have  already  formed  of  objects.  This  furnishes  us 
with  a  number  of  cognitions  which,  although  they  are 
nothing  more  than  elucidations  or  explanations  of  what 
is  already  (confusedly)  implied,  are  still,  at  least  in 
form,  regarded  as  new :  in  matter  or  contents,  not  ex- 
tending our  notions,  they  explicate  them.  But  this 
process  furnishing,  as  it  does,  an  actual  a  priori  cogni- 
tion, accompanied,  too,  by  a  certain  safe  gain,  our 
reason  interpolates  unawares  into  this  false  show  of 
extension  allegations  of  quite  another  nature ;  foisting 
in  with  given  notions  other  notions  quite  alien,  and 
that,  too,  apriorij  without  our  knowing  how  or  whence 
these  latter  come,  or  even  without  any  such  question 
being  ever  once  entertained  by  us.  Accordingly,  I 
shall  treat  directly  now  in  the  beginning  of  the 
difference  between  these  two  modes  of  cognition.  ^ 


IV. 

Of  the  Difference  between  Analytic  and  Synthetic  Judgments. 

In  all  judgments  in  which  the  relation  of  a  subject 
to  a  predicate  is  thought  (affirmatives  alone  con- 
sidered— application  to  negatives  being  afterwards 
easy)  this  relation  is  possible  in  two  ways.  Either 
the  predicate  B  belongs  to  the  subject  A  as  something 
that  (covertly)  is  contained  in  it ;  or  B  lies  completely 
outside  of  the  notion  A,  though  possessing  connexion 
with  it.  In  the  first  case  I  call  the  judgment 
analytic ;  in  the  second  synthetic.  Analytic  judgments 
(the  affirmative  ones)  are  therefore  those  in  which 
the  connexion  of  the  predicate  with  the  subject  is 

*  One  or  two  trifling  expressions  in  the  above  are  not  found  alike  in 
the  dillerent  editions. 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


123 


^ 


-^'   r' 


thought  through  identity ;  synthetic,  again,  those  in 
which  this  connexion  is  thought  without  identity. 
We  might  name  them  also,  the  former,  judgments  of 
explication ;  the  latter,  judgments  of  extension.  The 
former,  namely,  add,  in  the  predicate,  nothing  to  the 
notion  of  the  subject,  but  only  separate  this  notion  into 
its  subnotional  parts,  which  parts  are  already  (ob- 
scurely) thought  in  the  notion.  The  latter,  on  the 
other  hand,  add  to  the  subject  a  predicate  which  was 
not  at  all  thought  in  it,  and  could  not  by  any  analysis 
have  been  extracted  from  it.  For  example,  if  I  say, 
All  bodies  are  extended,  this  is  an  analytic  judgment. 
For,  in  order  that  I  may  find  extension  as  connected 
with  it,  I  need  not  leave  what  notion  itself  I  attach  to 
body,  I  have  only  to  analyze  it,  or  open  my  eyes  to 
what  complex  I  think  in  it,  to  become  aware  of  this 
predicate  as  contained  in  it.  The  judgment,  therefore, 
is  analytic.  On  the  other  hand,  if  I  say.  All  bodies 
are  heavy,  in  that  case  the  predicate  is  something 
quite  different  from  anything  I  think  in  the  mere 
notion  of  a  body  as  such.  The  addition  of  such  a 
predicate  produces,  therefore,  a  synthetic  judgment. 

Judgments  of  experience,  as  such,  are  all  synthetic. 
For  it  were  absurd  to  have  recourse  to  experience  for 
an  analytic  judgment,  seeing  that  I  need  not  go  out 
of  my  notion  itself  to  get  the  judgment,  nor  require, 
therefore,  any  testimony  of  experience  in  the  case. 
That  a  body  is  extended  is  a  proposition  a  priori 
evident,  and  not  a  judgment  of  experience.  For, 
without  having  recourse  to  experience,  I  have  already 
in  the  notion  all  the  conditions  necessary  for  my 
judgment.  I  have  only,  according  to  the  principle 
of  contradiction,  to  extract  the  predicate  from  the 
notion.  In  so  acting,  I  become  aware,  also,  of  the  neces- 
sity of  the  judgment,  and  necessity  is  no  declaration 


i 


/. 


124 


TEXT-BOOK    TO   KANT: 


of  experience.     On  the  other  hand,  although  I  do  not 
include,  in  the  notion  of  a  body  in  general,  the  pre- 
dicate heavy,  still  said  notion  (body)  designates  an 
object  of  experience,  by  a  part  of  experience,  to  which 
part  I  can  add  other  parts  of  the  same  experience,  not 
comprehended  in  the  first.     I  know  the  notion  body 
already  analytically,  say,  through  the  characters  ex- 
tension, impenetrability,  figure,  etc.,  which  the  notion 
simply  implies.     But  now  I  extend  my  knowledge, 
and  in  once  more  consulting  experience  (from  which 
I  had  derived  this  notion  of  body),  I  find,  always 
conjoined  with  the  said  characters,  that  also  of  weight, 
which,  as  a  predicate,  therefore,  I  add  synthetically  to 
the  notion  in  question.     It  is,  therefore,  on  experi- 
ence  that  the  possibility  is  founded  of  the  synthesis 
of  the   predicate  heavy  with  the  subject  body,  be- 
cause, though  the  one  is  not  implied  in  the  other, 
still  both  notions,  as  parts  of  a  whole  (namely  ex- 
perience, which  is  itself  a  synthetic  conjunction  of 
perceptions),  belong  to  each  other,  if  only   contin- 
gently. ^ 

But,  in  the  case  of  a  priori  synthetic  judgments, 
this  expedient  (of  experience)  is  altogether  inappli- 
cable. If,  in  such  reference,  I  am  to  go  beyond  the 
notion  A  in  order  to  recognise  another,  B,  as  connected 
with  it,  on  what  do  I  support  myself,  and  by  what  is 
the  synthesis  made  possible,  seeing  that  I  have  not 
the  advantage  in  this  case  of  looking  about  me  for  it 
in  the  field  of  experience  ?  Let  us  take  the  proposi- 
tion. All  that  happens  has  a  cause.  In  the  notion  of 
something  that  happens  (an  eflTect),  I  think  something 
come  to  be,  which,  therefore,  had  a  certain  time 
before  it,  etc.,  and  from  this  something,  as  it  is  there 
before  me,  it  is  possible  for  me  to  deduce  various 
analytic  judgments.      But  the  notion  cause  lies  quite 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


125 


out  of  this  notion.  Denoting  something  quite  difier- 
ent  from  that  which  happens  (the  effect),  it  is  not  at 
all  implied  in  it.  How  do  I  come,  then,  to  say  of  any 
fact  in  event  something  quite  diflerent  from  the  fact 
itself,  and  to  recognise  the  notion  cause,  though  not 
contained  in  said  fact,  nevertheless  as  belonging  to  it, 
and  that,  too,  necessarily  ?  What  is  the  unknown  x 
on  which  the  understanding  supports  itself,  when  it 
believes  itself  to  discover  from  the  notion  A  a  predi- 
cate B,  alien  to  it,  but  which  it  judges,  nevertheless, 
to  be  connected  with  it  ?  It  cannot  be  experience, 
because  the  relative  proposition  adds  the  latter  to  the 
former,  not  only  with  a  greater  universality  than 
experience  can  supply,  but  even  with  the  expression 
of  necessity,  and  consequently  wholly  a  priori  or 
through  mere  notions.  Well  now,  the  entire  end  and 
aim  of  our  speculative  cognition  a  priori  concern  such 
synthetic  principles,  or  judgments  of  extension.  For 
the  analytic  ones  are  certainly  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance and  necessity,  but,  here  with  us,  they  are  avail- 
able only  for  the  sake  of  that  precision  of  ideas  which 
is  required  for  an  accurate  and  complete  synthesis,  as 
an  acquisition  veritably  new.  ^ 


V. 

Tn  call  the  Rational  Theoretic  Sciences,  Synthetic  a  priori  Judg- 
ments are  present  as  Principles. 

1.  Mathematical  judgments  are  all  synthetic.  This 
proposition  seems  hitherto  to  have  escaped  the  obser- 
vation of  the  anatomists  of  human  reason — nay,  to 
be  directly  opposed  to  all  their  suppositions,  although 
it  is  undeniably  certain,  and  very  important  in  result. 

*  Rosenkranz  has  some  slight  differences  here  too,  besides  some  errors 
of  press. 


126 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


For,  because  it  was  found  that  mathematical  reason- 
ings proceed  all  of  them  on  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion (as  the  nature,  indeed,  of  apodictic  certainty  re- 
quires), there  ensued  the  conviction  that  by  means  of 
the  same  principle  also  it  was  that  the  fundamental 
propositions  themselves  were  to  be  seen  into.  In  this 
they  erred.  For  a  synthetic  proposition  may  cer- 
tainly be  understood  from  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion ;  still,  only  in  this  way,  that  another  synthetic 
proposition  is  presupposed  from  which  it  may  be 
inferred, — but  never  independently. 

First  of  all,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  mathematical 
judgments  as  such  are  always  a  priori^  and  not  em- 
pirical ;  for  they  bring  with  them  necessity,  which  is 
not  to  be  got  from  experience.  Should  this,  however, 
as  a  general  proposition,  appear  doubtful,  I  will  con- 
fine it  to  pure  mathematic,  the  very  notion  of  which 
implies  that  it  is  not  concerned  with  empirical,  but 
only  with  pure  a  priori  cognition. 

We  might  be  apt  to  think  at  first  that  the  pro- 
position 7  +  5  =  12  is  merely  an  analytic  proposition, 
which  follows  from  the  notion  of  a  sum  of  7  and  5, 
according  to  the  principle  of  contradiction.  But  if 
we  look  closer,  we  shall  find  that  the  notion  of  the 
sum  of  7  and  5  implies  nothing  but  the  uniting  of 
the  two  numbers  into  one,  there  being  no  thought, 
at  the  same  time,  of  what  this  one  number  itself  is 
which  comprehends  the  two.  The  notion  of  12  is 
not  thought  in  this,  that  I  think  to  myself  the  uniting 
of  7  and  5 ;  and  I  may  analyze  my  notion  of  such 
possible  sum  as  long  as  I  please  without  finding  the 
12  in  it.  We  must  go  out  of  these  notions,  and  take 
help  from  perception.  We  must  assist  ourselves, 
that  is,  by  such  objective  representation  as  corre- 
sponds to  one  of  the  two  nupibieii  (say  five  pdiits  or 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


127 


the  five  fingers),  and,  so  assisted,  add  the  units  of  the 

number  perceived  (5),  one  by  one,  to  the  notion  of 

the  number  thought  (7).     I  take  first  the  number  7  ; 

next,  for  the  notion  of  the  5,  I  refer  to  my  fingers  as 

perceived ;  and  then  I  add  the  units  (which  together 

constitute  the  number  5),  one  by  one,  in  guidance  of 

the  representation  perceived,  to  the  number  7.     In 

this  way,  for  result,  I  see  the  number  12  emerge. 

That  7  should  be  added  to  5,  I  have  indeed  thouorht 
.  .  ® 

in  the  notion  of  a  sum  7  +  5,  but  not  that  this  sum 

is  equal  to  the  number  12.  An  arithmetical  proposi- 
tion is,  therefore,  always  synthetic,  as  we  may  more 
distinctly  discern,  should  we  assume  somewhat  larger 
numbers;  in  which  case  it  will  clearly  appear  that, 
let  us  turn  and  twist  our  notions  as  we  may,  we  never 
can,  by  mere  analysis  of  notions,  and  unassisted  by 
perception,  discover  their  sum. 

Just  as  little  is  any  proposition  of  pure  geometry 
analytic.  That  the  straight  line  between  any  two 
points  is  the  shortest,  is  a  synthetic  proposition. 
For  my  notion  of  straight  includes  in  it  nothing  of 
quantity,  but  only  a  quality.  The  notion  shortest  is 
wholly  something  adscititious,  something  added  to  it, 
and  cannot  by  any  analysis  be  derived  from  the 
notion  straight  line.  Perception,  then,  must  be  here 
called  in  to  assist,  and  only  by  its  intervention  is  the 
synthesis  possible. 

Some  few  propositions  which  are  presupposed  in 
geometry  are,  it  is  true,  really  analytic  and  rest  on 
the  principle  of  contradiction.  They  serve,  however, 
only  as  identical  propositions,  for  the  chain  of  the 
method,  and  not  as  principles.  For  example,  it  is 
said  a  is  equal  to  a,  that  is,  the  whole  is  equal  to 
itself;  or  a  +  6  is  greater  than  a,  which  is,  the  whole 
is  greater  than  its  part,     ^ftd  yet  even  these,  that 


128 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


I 


I  i 


pass  valid  on  the  authority  of  mere  notions,  are  only 
allowed  place  in  mathematic  because  they  can  be 
exhibited  in  perception.  What  commonly  leads  us 
here  to  suppose  that  the  predicate  of  such  apodictic 
judgments  is  already  contained  in  our  notion,  and 
that,  consequently,  the  judgment  is  analytic,  is  solely 
the  peculiarity  of  the  expression.  To  a  given  notion, 
namely,  we  must  think  a  certain  predicate,  and  this 
necessity  is  already  present  with  the  notions.  But 
the  question  is  not  what  we  must  think  to  the  given 
notion,  but  what  we  actTially,  though  obscurely,  think 
in  it ;  and  then  we  see  that  the  predicate  belongs  to 
the  notion,  necessarily  indeed,  not,  however,  because 
of  being  thought  in  it,  but  because  of  a  perception 
which  must  be  added  to  it. 

2.  Natural  philosophy  possesses  synthetic  a  priori 
judgments  as  principles.  I  will  only  adduce  a  couple 
of  propositions  in  example ;  as  that  in  all  changes  of 
the  corporeal  world  the  quantity  of  matter  remains 
the  same,  or  that  in  all  communication  of  motion, 
action  and  reaction  are  always  alike.  In  both,  not 
only  the  necessity  is  clear,  and  by  consequence  their 
a  priori  origin,  but  also  the  fact  that  they  are  synthetic 
propositions.  For  in  the  notion  of  matter  I  do  not 
think  its  permanence,  but  only  its  presence  in  space 
as  filling  it  That  is,  I  actually  go  beyond  the  notion 
of  matter  in  order  to  think  a  priori  to  it  something 
that  1  did  not  think  in  it.  The  proposition,  there- 
fore, is  not  analytic,  but  synthetic,  and  yet  a  priori ; 
so  it  is  with  the  other  propositions  of  the  pure  part  of 
the  science. 

3.  In  metaphysic  (though  we  should  only  regard  it 
as  a  science  which  has  been  hitherto  desiderated,  but 
which,  from  the  very  nature  of  human  reason,  never- 
theless, is  a  science  indispensable),  synthetic  cogni- 


KV 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


129 


tions  a  priori  simply  must  be.  For  it  is  not  its 
business  merely  to  unravel  notions  which  we  a  priori 
form  of  things.  On  the  contrary,  the  business  here 
is  to  extend  our  a  priori  cognition ;  and  to  that  we 
must  avail  ourselves  of  such  propositions  as  add  on 
something  beyond  the  given  notion,  something  not 
contained  in  it ;  and  in  this  way,  by  means  of  syn- 
thetic a  priori  judgments  alone,  advance  indeed  so 
far  that  experience  itself  is  unable  to  follow  us.  For 
example,  there  is  the  proposition,  among  others,  that 
the  world  must  have  a  beginning.  And  by  this  we 
see  that  metaphysic,  at  least  in  its  aim,  consists  of 
pure  a  priori  synthetic  propositions. 


VI. 


General  Problem  of  Pure  Reason. 

It  is  already  not  a  little  won,  if  we  can  bring  a 
variety  of  questions  under  the  formula  of  a  single 
problem.  For  in  this  way,  through  exact  determina- 
tion of  it,  we  not  only  lighten  to  ourselves  our  own 
work,  but  we  facilitate  for  everybody  else  as  well, 
who  will  examine  it,  the  judgment  whether  we  have 
done  justice  to  our  own  design  or  not.  The  problem 
proper  of  pure  reason,  now,  is  comprised  in  the  ques- 
tion, How  are  a prioii  synthetic  judgments  possible? 

That  metaphysic,  hitherto,  has  remained  in  so 
vacillating  a  condition  of  uncertainty  and  contra- 
diction, is  solely  to  be  ascribed  to  the  fact  that  we 
have  not  sooner  attained  to  the  conception  of  this 
problem,  or  even  to  that  of  the  distinction  between 
analytic  and  synthetic  judgments.  On  the  solution 
of  this  problem  now,  or  on  a  satisfactory  proof  that 

the  possibility  it  would  wish  demonstrated  does  not 

I 


**^ 


130 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KAKT  : 


exist,  it  depends  whether  metaphysic  shall  stand  or 
fall.      David  Hume,  who  of  all  philosophers   came 
nearest  to  this  problem,  thought  it  not  out,  however, 
by  any  means  determinately  enough,  or  in  its  gener- 
ality, but  merely  took  his  stand  by  the   synthetic 
proposition  of  the  connexion  of  the  effect  with  its 
cause   {jmncipium  causaUtatis),     Accordingly,  he  as- 
sumed to  make  out  that  such  a  proposition  is,  a  priori, 
wholly  impossible.     His  reasonings  went   to  prove, 
indeed,  that  all  we  call  metaphysic  terminates  in  a 
mere  delusion  of  a  supposed  insight  on  the  part  of 
reason,  into  what  in  effect  is  merely  borrowed  from 
experience,  and  has  only  taken  on,  through  custom, 
the  semblance  of  necessity.     But  such  an  allegation' 
subversive  as  it  is  of  all  pure  philosophy,  would  never 
have  occurred  to  him  had  he  but  caught  sight  of  our 
problem  in  its  universality.     For  he  would  have  then 
been   conscious   that,   on   his   argument,   even  pure 
mathematic  would  be  impossible,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a 
science  built  on  a  priori  synthetic  propositions— a 
conclusion,  plainly,  from  which  his  own  good  sense 
would  certainly  have  saved  him. 

In  the  solution  of  the  above  problem  there  is  in- 
volved, at  the  same  time,  the  possibility  of  an  applica- 
tion of  pure  reason  in  foundation  and  completion  of 
all  the  sciences  in  which  any  theoretical  a  priori 
cognition  of  objects  is  concerned ;  that  is,  an  answer 
to  the  questions.  How  is  pure  mathematic  possible  ? 
How  IS  pure  natural  philosophy  possible  ? 

Of  these  sciences,  inasmuch  as  they  once  for  all 
are,  we  may  certainly  with  propriety  ask,  how  they 
are  possible ;  for  that  they  must  be  possible  is  de- 
monstrated by  their  actuality.^     As  for  metaphysic, 

'  This  may  be  doubted  as  regards  a  pure  natural  philosophy.     But  we 
have  only  to  look  to  the  first  propositions  of  physic  proper  (eiupirical),  as 


/ 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


131 


again,  we  may  reasonably  doubt  of  possibility  in  its 
regard,  in  view,  namely,  of  its  unsatisfactory  progress 
hitherto,  as  well  as  of  the  fact  that,  considering  its 
essential  aim,  we  cannot  say  it  has,  in  any  instance, 
actually  been. 

And  yet,  again,  knowledge  of  this  kind  is  really,  in 
a  certain  sense,  to  be  assumed  as  given,  or  metaphysic 
is  actual  after  all— if  not  as  science,  then  as  natural 
capability  {metaphysica  naturalk).  For  human  reason, 
not  moved  by  any  vanity  of  more  learning,  but  im- 
pelled by  necessity  of  its  very  nature,  strives  ever 
irrepressibly  forward  towards  such  questions  as  can- 
not  possibly  be  answered  by  any  mere  empirical  con- 
sideration, or  principles  derived  thence.  So  it  is 
that  really  in  all  men,  so  soon  as  reason  has  advanced 
to  speculation,  a  metaphysic  of  some  kind  always  has 
been  and  always  will  be.  And  now,  from  the  same 
source,  we  have  this  question  also:  How  is  meta- 
physic as  natural  capability  possible  ?  That  is,  how 
do  the  questions  which  pure  reason  starts  for  herself, 
and  which,  in  some  way,  she  must  answer— how  do 
these  questions  originate  in  the  very  nature  of  reason 
as  such?^ 

It  is  the  fact,  however,  that  unavoidable  contradic- 
tions have  always  shown  themselves  in  any  attempt 
yet  to  answer  these  natural  questions  (e.g.,  whether 
the  world  has  had  a  beginning,  or  whether  it  exists 
from  all  eternity,  etc.)  ?  We  cannot,  therefore,  remain 
satisfied  with  a  mere  natural  capability  for  metaphysic, 
or  with  the  mere  faculty  of  reason  itself,  in  possession 

the  permanence  of  matter  in  quantity,  inertia,  the  equality  of  action  and 
reaction,  etc.,  to  be  convinced  that  they  constitute  a  physicam  puram  (or 
rationalem),  which  certainly  deserves  to  be  separately  established,  in  its 
whole  extent,  whether  large  or  limited,  as  science  proper.— K. 

»  Rosenlcranz  omits  here  a  very  important  "die"  (before  "Frage"), 
as,  near  the  end  of  the  preceding  section,  a  not  unimporfcint  "  und."'' 


132 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


133 


) 


of  which  there  is  always  that  necessity  of  a  meta- 
physic  of  some  kind,  be  it  what  it  may.  It  must  be 
possible,  rather,  to  bring  matters  relatively  to  some 
certainty  as  concerns  either  the  knowing  or  the  not 
knowing  of  the  objects  in  question,  either  the  ability 
or  the  inability  of  reason  to  judge  in  their  regard. 
That  is,  it  must  be  possible  for  us  either  confidently 
to  extend,  or  else  duly  limit,  reason.  This  last  ques- 
tion, which  flows  from  the  general  problem,  were 
rightly  put  thus:  How  is  metaphysic  as  a  science 
possible  ? 

A  criticism  of  reason  leads,  therefore,  at  last 
necessarily  to  science ;  while,  without  criticism,  dog- 
matically to  set  to  work  with  reason,  results  only  in 
groundless  allegations,  to  which  others  equally  spe- 
cious may  be  opposed,  and  the  end,  consequently, 
is  scepticism. 

Neither  will  this  science  be  of  great  and  forbidding 
extent.  It  is  not  with  the  objects  of  reason,  namely, 
the  multiplicity  of  which  is  infinite,  but  with  reason  s 
self,  that  it  has  to  do.  The  problems  it  considers  take 
birth  in  the  bosom  of  reason  only :  they  are  not  im- 
posed upon  reason  by  the  nature  of  things,  which  are 
different  from  it,  but  by  itg  own  nature.  Accordingly, 
therefore,  if  reason  has,  first  of  all,  come  perfectly  to 
know  its  own  powers  in  regard  of  objects  which  may 
be  offered  in  experience,  it  must  be  easy  fully  and 
surely  to  determine  the  range  and  extent  of  its  desired 
application  beyond  all  bounds  of  experience. 

^  We  may  and  must,  therefore,  regard  all  these  pre- 
vious attempts  dogmatically  to  bring  about  a  meta- 
physic as,  in  effect,  null.  For,  whatever  there  may 
be  of  analytic  in  the  one  or  the  other  of  them,  as 
regards  the  mere  dissection  of  the  notions  which  a 
priori  attend  our  reason,  such  material  is  not  the  end 


and  aim  of,  but  only  a  preparation  for,  metaphysic 
proper.  To  this  science  it  belongs,  namely,  to  extend 
our  synthetic  a  priori  knowledge,  and  to  that,  said 
analytic  material  is  inapplicable,  as  it  merely  shows 
what  is  contained  in  those  notions,  but  not  how  we  a 
priori  attain  to  them.  Accordingly,  we  are  not  enabled 
thereby  to  determine  their  due  and  valid  use  in  regard 
of  the  objects  of  cognition  generally.  It  is  no  great 
hardship  to  abandon  such  pretensions  wholly,  see- 
ing that  the  undeniable  and  dogmatically  inevitable 
contradictions  of  reason  have  long  since  cost  every 
previous  metaphysic  all  its  credit.  It  will  demand 
more  self  reliance,  in  view  of  the  difficulty  within 
and  the  opposition  without,  to  resist,  in  regard  to  a 
science  indispensable  to  human  reason  (whose  root,  let 
us  hew  off  whatever  actual  stems  we  may,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  tear  up),  discouragement  from  the  attempt  to 
further  it,  once  for  all  at  last,  into  a  prosperous  and 
fruitful  growth,  by  means  of  another,  and,  to  those  in 
the  past,  wholly  opposed  method. 


VII. 


Idea  and  Division  of  a  Special  Science  under  the  Name  of  a  Critique 

of  Pure  Reason. 

There  results  from  all  this,  now,  the  idea  of  a  special 
science,  which  may  be  named  critique  of  pure  reason. 
For  reason  is  the  faculty  which  furnishes  the  prin- 
ciples of  a  priori  cognition.  Pure  reason  will  there- 
fore contain  the  principles  towards  an  absolute  a 
priori  cognition.  An  organon  of  pure  reason  would 
be  a  whole  of  those  principles,  in  accordance  with 
which  all  pure  a  jmori  cognitions  can  be  acquired  and 
actually  realized.     The  complete  application  of  such 


134 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KÄKT : 


) 


an  organon  would  have  for  result  a  system  of  pure 
reason.    Inasmuch,  however,  as  this  is  asking  a  great 
deal,  and  it  is  yet  uncertain  whether  and  in  what 
cases  an  extension  of  our  knowledge  is  in  this  way  at 
all  possible,  we  may  conceive  rather  a  science  of  the 
mere  investigation  of  pure  reason,  its  sources  and 
limits,  as  the  jjrojwdeutic  to  the  system  of  pure  reason. 
Such  a  science  would  necessarily  be  considered  not  a 
doctrine,  but  only  a  critique  of  pure  reason ;  and  its 
use  in   speculation   would,    in    reality,    be    merely 
negative.      Serving    not    to    extend,    but    to    clear 
reason,    it   would  guard   it  from    errors,    which   is 
already  much.      I   call   all  cognition   transcendental, 
which  is  occupied  not  so  much  with  objects,  as  with 
the  process  by  which  we  come  to  know  them,  in  so  far 
as  that  process  has  an  a  priori  element.     A  system  of 
such  elements  would  be  a  transcendental  philosophy. 
But,  for  a  beginning,  this  again  is  too  much.     For 
such  a  science,  necessarily  embracing  as  well  analysis 
as  synthesis,  would  extend  beyond  our  intention  at 
present,  seeing  that  we  shall  apply  the  former  only  so 
far  as  is  indispensable  for  a  complete  survey  of  the 
principles  of  the  synthesis  a  priori;  which  is  our  one 
general  object.     It  is  with  this  inquest  that  we  now 
occupy  ourselves— an  inquest  that  cannot  properly  be 
named  a  doctrine,  but  only  a  transcendental  critique, 
and  for  this  reason,  that  it  has  in  view,  not  the  exten- 
sion, but  the  clearing  of  our  knowledge,  and  would 
seek  to  furnish  merely  a  touchstone  of  the  worth  or 
worthlessness  of  our  cognitions  a  j^riori     Such   a 
critique,  accordingly,  is  a  preparation,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, for  an  organon,  or,  failing  that,  a  canon,  by 
means  of  which  we  shall  certainly  be  able  to  realize, 
some  time,  a  completed  system  of  the  philosophy  of 
pure  reason,  as  well  analytic  a^  synthetic,  let  it  con- 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


135 


sist,  as  it  may,  in  extension  or  in  mere  limitation  of 
the  relative  knowledge.  For,  that  this  is  possible, 
nay,  that  such  system  cannot  be  of  too  great  extent 
to  allow  the  hope  of  completing  it,  may  already 
beforehand  be  judged  from  this,  that  what  constitutes 
the  object  here  is  not  the  nature  of  things,  which 
is  inexhaustible,  but  the  understanding,  which  pro- 
nounces on  the  nature  of  things,  and  this  understand- 
ing itself,  too,  only  in  regard  of  its  cognition  a 
jiviori;  its  provision  of  which,  moreover,  seeing  that 
we  have  not  to  seek  it  from  without,  cannot  pos- 
sibly remain  concealed  from  us,  and  in  all  likelihood 
is  small  enough  to  be  perfectly  taken  up,  duly  esti- 
mated, and  in  Avorth  or  worthlessness  competently 
appreciated.  Still  less  must  there  be  expected  here  a 
critique  of  the  books  and  systems  of  pure  reason,  but 
only  of  the  faculty  itself  that  is  so  denominated. 
Only  in  such  critique  as  basis  have  we  a  sure  and 
certain  touchstone  whereby  to  try  the  philosophical 
worth  of  earlier  or  later  works  in  this  department ; 
otherwise,  we  have  only  an  unaccredited  historian 
and  judge  pronouncing  on  the  groundless  opinions  of 
others  solely  through  opinions  of  his  own  which  are 
equally  groundless. 

The  transcendental  philosophy  is  the  idea  of  a 
science  whereto  the  critique  of  pure  reason  shall 
sketch  the  entire  plan — architectonically,  that  is  from 
principles,  with  plenary  guarantee  of  the  complete- 
ness and  security  of  all  the  pieces  which  compose  the 
structure.  It  is  the  system  of  all  the  principles  of 
pure  reason.  That  this  critique  is  not  itself  already 
the  transcendental  philosophy,  depends  solely  on  this, 
that,  in  order  to  be  a  complete  system,  it  ought  to 
comprehend,  as  well,  a  completed  analysis  of  the 
entire  human  cognition  a  priori.     Our  critique,  in- 


136 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


) 


deed,  must  certainly  exhibit  a  complete  enumeration 
of  all  the  primitive  notions  which  constitute  the  pure 
cognition  in  allusion.  But  from  the  detailed  analysis 
of  these  notions,  as  from  the  detailed  revision  of  their 
derivatives,  it  will  rightly  refrain;  partly  because 
such  analysis  were  to  little  purpose,  inasmuch  as  it 
has  not  the  significance  peculiar  to  the  synthesis, 
which  synthesis,  properly,  is  the  special  motive  of  the 
entire  critique ;  and  partly  because  it  would  contra- 
dict the  unity  of  the  plan,  to  undertake  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  completeness  of  any  such  analysis  and 
derivation ;  from  which,  indeed,  in  consideration  of 
one's  design,  one  might  reasonably  be  dispensed.  At 
the  same  time,  it  will  be  easy  to  supply  this  com- 
pleteness of  analysis  and  derivation  from  the  a  priori 
notions  themselves,  directly  they  are  once  for  all 
established  as  the  complete  principles  of  synthesis, 
with  nothing  wanting  to  them  in  that  essential  refer- 
ence. 

According  to  this,  then,  there  belongs  to  the 
critique  of  pure  reason  all  that  is  constitutive  of  a 
transcendental  philosophy,  and  of  such  philosophy  it 
is  the  entire  idea,  but  it  is  not  that  philosophy; 
because,  on  the  side  of  analysis,  it  goes  no  further 
than  is  required  for  a  complete  estimate  of  the  a 
priori  synthesis. 

As  regards  the  divisions  of  such  a  science,  the  main 
consideration  is,  that  there  must  be  no  admission  for 
notions  in  anywise  empirically  tinged;  or  that  the 
a  priori  elements  must  be  perfectly  pure.  Hence  the 
exclusion  from  transcendental  philosophy  of  the 
principles  of  morality,  notwithstanding  that  the  chief 
moral  notions  and  propositions  are  really  cognitions 
a  priori.  And  the  reason  is,  that,  as  regards  the 
notions  of  pleasure  and  pain,  desire,  passion,  etc., 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PUKE    REASON. 


137 


lifcll«!" 


V 


I 

V 

\ 


W 


\\ 


Jt 


> 


which  are  all  of  empirical  origin,  said  principles  do 
not,  indeed,  regard  these  notions  as  basis  of  their  own 
moral  prescripts ;  but  yet,  in  construction  of  the 
system  of  pure  morality,  they  must  necessarily  admit 
them  as  (in  duty)  obstacles  to  be  overcome  or  temp- 
tations to  be  resisted.  The  transcendental  philosophy, 
therefore,  is  a  philosophy  of  the  merely  speculative 
pure  reason.  For  all  moral  practice,  so  far  as  it 
involves  motive,  refers  to  feeling,  and  feeling  always 
is  of  empirical  origin. 

As  concerns  division,  then,  this  our  science  will,  on 
the  usual  general  principles  of  such,  consist  of  a 
theory,  firstly,  of  the  elements,  and,  secondly,  of  the 
method  of  pure  reason.  Each  of  these  parts,  again, 
will  have  its  own  sub-parts,  the  conditions  of  which, 
however,  we  do  not  discuss  here.  Only,  it  may  be 
of  advantage,  perhaps,  to  be,  introductorily,  or  pre- 
fatorily,  reminded,  that  there  are  two  stems  of 
human  cognition,  sprung,  both,  it  may  be,  from  a 
common  but  unknown  root,  namely,  sense  and  under- 
standing, by  the  former  of  which  objects  are  given 
to  us,  and  by  the  latter  thought.  Even  sense,  then, 
if  it  be  found  to  possess  for  us  intimations  a  j^riori, 
which  constitute  conditions  under  which  alone  objects 
can  be  perceived  by  us,  will,  for  that  reason,  enter  as 
a  constituent  into  a  philosophy  that  is  transcendental. 
And,  accordingly,  the  transcendental  sense-elements 
will  necessarily  constitute  the  first  part  of  our  theory 
of  elements,  inasmuch  as  the  conditions  under  which 
objects  are  given  precede  those  under  which  they  are 
thought. 


i 


138  TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


Transcendental  iEsTHETic* 

§1- 

Let  cognlfion  refer  itself  to  objects  in  what  manner 
it  may,  perception  is  such  reference  direct  or  imme- 
diate ;  while  the  reference  of  thought,  as  only  through 
perception,  is  mediate.  Perception,  again,  takes 
place  only  so  far  as  an  object  is  given  us,  which  for  us 
men,  further,  is  only  possible  in  this  way,  that  said 
object,  in  some  certain  way,  affects  our  mind.  The 
capability  (receptivity)  of  receiving  intimations 
through  the  mode  in  which  we  are  affected  by  objects 
is  called  Sensibility.  By  sensibility  alone,  then,  are 
objects  given  us,  and  sense  alone  affords  us  Percep- 
tions ;  which  being  thought  by  Understanding,  there 
result  Notions.  All  thought  must,  at  last,  directly  or 
indirectly,  refer  itself  to  perception  and,  consequently, 
to  sense ;  for  in  no  other  way  can  an  object  be  given 

us. 

The  effect  of  an  object  on  our  susceptibility  of  im- 
pression, so  far  as  we  arc  affected  by  it,  is  Sensation. 
Any  perception  that  refers  itself  to  an  object  through 
sensation  is  said  to  be  Empirical.  The  undetermined 
(afterwards  seen  to  be  the  uncategorized)  object  of  an 
empirical  perception  is  what  we  call  an  Ersclieinimg 
(a  sense-appearance,  a  sense-presentation:  it  is  the 
mere  sensation  in  crude  perception — time  and  space 
— but  as  yet  without  notion  or  category). 

In  this  object,  I  call  what  corresponds  to  sensation 
(the  mere  feeling)  its  inatter ;  while  what  again  so 
acts  that  the  units  of  the  impression  are,  in  each 

1  Kant's  headings  are  mostly  so  compound  that  they  give  a  look  of 
difficulty  of  themselves.  We  translate  here  only  what  is  simple  and 
dii-ect. 


r 


I 


i 


TUE   KUITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


139 


other's  regard,  peculiarly  disposed  (as  so  and  so  beside 
each  other,  or  so  and  so  after  each  other),  I  call  its 
form.  As  this  latter  constituent  (the  order  in  the 
units  of  impression)  cannot  possibly  be  itself  sensa- 
tion, we  must  hold  that,  while  the  matter  of  impres- 
sion is  only  a  posteriori  given,  its  form,  on  the  con- 
trary, must  a  priori  lie  ready  for  all  impression  in  the 
mind,  and  be  capable,  therefore,  of  separate  considera- 
tion, apart  from  sensation. 

I  call  all  intimations  pure  (in  transcendental  sense), 
in  which  there  is  nothing  found  that  belongs  to  sensa- 
tion. The  pure  form  of  sensuous  perception,  conse- 
quently, will  be  met  with  a  j^^ri  in  the  mind, 
wherein  all  units  of  impression  are  perceived  in  cer- 
tain relations.  This  pure  form  of  sense  or  sensibility, 
accordingly  (as  without  sensation),  may  be  legiti- 
mately named  pure  perception.  Thus,  when  I  with- 
draw from  what  makes  up  my  consciousness  of  a  body, 
what  elements  in  it  belong  to  the  understanding, 
as  substance,  force,  divisibility,  etc.,  and  again  what 
elements  in  it  belong  to  sensation,  as  impenetrability, 
hardness,  colour,  etc.,  still,  of  this  empirically  per- 
ceived object,  there  remains  something  over,  namely, 
extension  and  figure.  These  belong  to  pure  percep- 
tion which,  as  a  mere  form  of  sensibility,  and  without 
any  actual  object  of  sense  or  sensation,  exists  in  the 
mind  ajmori. 

A  science  of  all  the  a  priori  principles  of  sense,  I 
call  Transcendental  ^Esthetic.^  There  must,  there- 
fore, be  such  science  which,  constituting  the  first  part 
of  the  transcendental  theory  of  elements,  will  oppose 
itself  to  the  second  part,  which  is  devoted  to   the 

»  In  a  note  here  Kant  vindicates  this  word  for  his  own  use  of  it,  and 
against  that  of  Baumgarten.  To  this  note  the  second  edition  adds  a 
clause  which  is  wanting  in  that  of  Rosenkranz.  The  note  itself  is 
omitted  here  as  of  no  importance. 


.a' 


\\ 


i 


} 


ii 


140 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


principles    of   pure    understanding,    and    is   named 
Transcendental  Loffic. 

In  the  transcendental  aesthetic,  we  shall  isolate 
sense,  first,  by  withdrawal  of  all  that  the  understand- 
ing thinks  into  it  through  its  notions,  and  second,  by 
further  withdrawal,  from  the  bare  empirical  sense- 
presentation  that  then  remains,  of  all  that  belongs  to 
sensation.  For  result  we  shall  have  nothing  but  pure 
perception  and  the  mere  form  that  adds  itself  to 
sense-matter ;  and  that  is  all  that  the  sensibility  can 
a  jmori  yield.  But,  through  such  investigation,  it 
will  be  found  that,  as  principles  of  a  priori  cognition, 
there  are  two  pure  forms  of  sensuous  perception, 
namely  Space  and  Time,  with  the  consideration  of 
which  we  shall  now  occupy  ourselves. 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


141 


Section  I. — Of  Space. 

§  2.  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  this  Notion. 

By  means  of  external  sense,  which  is  a  function  of 
our  mind,  we  perceive  objects  as  external  to  our- 
selves, and  collectively  in  space.  In  it  their  figure, 
magnitude,  and  relation  the  one  to  the  other,  are 
determined  or  determinable.  Inner  sense,  by  means 
of  which  the  mind  contemplates  itself,  or  its  internal 
condition,  furnishes,  indeed,  no  perception  of  the 
soul  itself  as  an  object ;  but  there  is,  nevertheless,  a 
single  determinate  form,  in  connexion  with  which 
the  perception  of  its  internal  state  is  alone  possible  ; 
or  all  that  belongs  to  our  inner  affections  presents 
itself  in  relations  of  time.  Time  can  be  as  little 
perceived    externally,  as  space  can  be    perceived  as 


though  it  were  something  internal.     What,  then,  are 
space  and  time  ?      Are  they  actual  things  on  their 
own  independent  account  ?    Are  they  only  affections, 
or,  it  may  be,  relations  of  things,  but  such  that  they 
would  attach  to  things  in  their  own  selves,  even  if 
these  things  were  not  perceived  ?     Or  are  they  such 
(affections  or  relations)  that  they  only  hold  of  the  form 
of  the  function  of  perception,  and,  consequently,  of  the 
subjective  conformation  of  our  mind,  without  which 
they  could  not  be  predicated  of  anything  whatever? 
For  answers    here  we  will   first   discuss  the  notion 
of  space.     I  understand,  however,  by  discussion  or 
exposition  the  distinct  statement  (if  not  at  full)   of 
what    belongs    to    a    notion.      Such    exposition    is 
metaphysical,  moreover,  when   it   demonstrates   the 
notion  to  be  given  a  priori^ 

1.    Space  is  not  an  empirical   notion   which  has 
been    derived   from  external  experience.     For,  that 
certain  sensations  are  referred  to  something  out  of 
me  (that  is,  to  something  in  another  part  of  space 
than  that  in  which  I  am),  and  further,  that  I  can 
perceive  them  as  out  of  and  near  each  other,  conse- 
quently, then,  not  merely  as  different  themselves,  but 
as  in  different  places  :  to  that  the  perception  of  space 
must    be    already  presupposed.       Accordingly  the 
cognition  space  cannot    be  derived    from   the   rela- 
tions of  external  impression,  through  experience ;  but, 
contrariwise,  this  external  experience  is  itself  only 
possible  through  said  cognition. 

2.  Space  is  a  necessary  perception  a  priori^  which  is 
presupposed  by,  and  underlies,  all  external  percep- 
tions. We  can  never  realize  to  ourselves  the  con- 
ception   of  there    being   no   space,    though  we  can 

^  This  last  very  important  sentence  seems  omitted   by  Rosenkranz 
as  also  a  single  not  very  important  word  in  the  next  paragraph. 


It 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


143 


142 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


perfectly  well  think  of  no  objects  being  found  in 
space.  It  is  taken  for  granted,  therefore,  as  condi- 
tion of  the  possibility  of  the  appearance  of  objects  to 
external  sense,  and  not  as  an  affection  or  form 
dependent  upon  objects:  it  is  an  a  priori  percep- 
tion, which  is  necessarily  presupposed  as  ground  (or 
canvas)  for  the  reception  of  all  external  conscious- 
nesses. 

3.  Space  is  not  a  discursive  or,  as  we  say,  general 
notion  of  the  relations  of  things,  but  a  pure  percep- 
tion. For,  firstly,  we  can  conceive  only  a  single 
space,  and  when  we  speak  of  spaces,  we  mean  only 
parts  of  one  and  the  same  sole  space.  These  parts 
cannot  precede,  either,  the  one  all-comprehending 
space  as  though  they  were  the  particulars  from  which 
it  is  generalized ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  they  are  only 
thought  in  it.  It  is  essentially  one ;  any  plurality  of 
parts  or  units  in  it  (consequently,  also,  the  general 
notion  of  spaces)  rests  solely  on  limitations  of  itself. 
From  this  it  follows  that  a  perception  a  priori  under- 
lies all  notions  of  it.  This  is  the  reason  why  every 
geometrical  proposition,  as,  for  example,  that  any 
two  sides  of  a  triangle  are  together  greater  than  the 
third  side,  is  never  by  any  possibility  to  be  deduced 
from  mere  general  notions  of  triangle,  line,  etc.,  but 
from  perception,  and  a  priori^  with  apodictic  cer- 
tainty. 

4.  Space  is  conceived  as  an  infinite  magnitude 
there  before  us.  Now  a  notion  must  be  conceived, 
indeed,  as  common  to  an  infinite  number  of  different 
possible  individuals  (it  is  their  common  type),  which 
individuals,  therefore,  it  holds  under  it;  but  no 
notion  as  such  can  be  so  thought  as  though  it  con- 
tained an  infinite  number  of  individuals  in  it.  But  it 
is  thus  that  space  is  thought  (for  all  the  parts  of  space 


''I 


are  at  one  and  the  same  time  together  in  it  ad 
infinitum).  Consequently  the  original  of  space  is 
perception  a  prioii,  and  not  notion. 


§  3.  Transcendental  Exposition  of  the  Notion  of  Space. 

By  transcendental  exposition  I  understand  the 
demonstration  of  any  notion  as  a  principle  such,  that, 
through  it  or  from  it,  the  possibility  of  other  a  ^mori 
synthetic  cognitions  may  be  understood.  The 
requisites  here,  then,  are :  1,  that  such  cognitions 
actually  do  derive  from  the  given  notion  ;  2,  that 
these  cognitions  are  only  possible  on  presupposition 
of  a  certain  mode  of  interpreting  or  explaining  the 
given  notion. 

Geometry  is  a  science  determinative  of  the  pro- 
perties of  space,  synthetically,  but  yet  a  priori. 
What  must  space  itself  be,  then,  that  such  cognition 
is  possible  of  it  ?  It  must  be  originally  perception  ; 
for  no  propositions  that,  as  is  the  case  in  geometry 
(Introduction,  V.),  exceed  (contain  more  than)  a 
notion,  can  possibly  be  derived  from  that  notion. 
The  perception,  again,  must  be  a  jmori,  or  found  in 
us  before  any  special  sense-perception  ;  pure,  there- 
fore, or  non-empirical.  For  geometrical  propositions 
are  all  apodictic  ;  that  is,  they  bring  with  them  their 
own  necessity ;  as  the  proposition,  for  example,  that 
space  has  only  three  dimensions.  But  such  pro- 
positions cannot  be  empirical  judgments  (judgments 
of  experience)  ;  neither  can  they  be  inferred  from 
these  (Introd.,  II.) 

How,  now,  can  there  be  in  the  mind  an  external 
perception,  which  yet  precedes  any  perception  of 
objects,  and  in  which  (from  its  nature,  namely)  the 
notion  of  these  may  be  a  priori  determined?     In  no 


r      I 


\ 


/ 


^s7 


144 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  KRITIK  OF  TÜRE  REASON. 


145 


other  way,  plainly,  than  that  this  perception  has  its 
seat  only  in  the  subject,  as  mere  form  of  general 
external  sense,  or  as  mere  formal  susceptivity  of  the 
subject  in  assumption  of  objects  when  affected  by 
them ;  through  (and  with)  which,  then,  there  is 
obtained  immediate  cognition^  that  is,  jjercejjtion,  of 
these  objects. 

Our  explanation  alone,  therefore,  makes  geometry 
conceivable  as  a  synthetic  cognition  a  priori.  Every 
mode  of  explanation  which  does  not  effect  this,  what- 
ever similarity  it  may  exhibit,  can,  in  the  surest  way, 
through  this  characteristic,  be  distinguished  from  it. 

Inferences  from  tliese  Idctis. 

a.  Space  exhibits  no  property  of  things  in  them- 
selves, nor  yet  themselves  in  their  own  mutual 
relations.  It  neither  represents  nor  conveys  any 
affection  or  attribute  of  things,  which  were  theirs  in 
themselves,  and  which  would  remain  even  if  abstrac- 
tion were  made  from  every  subjective  condition  that 
belongs  to  perception  (as  a  function).  For  neither 
absolute  nor  relative  attributes  can  a  priori  be  per- 
ceived, that  is,  before  existence  of  the  things  them- 
selves in  which  they  are  found. 

6.  Space  is  nothing  else  than  merely  the  form  of  all 
presentations  in  external  sense.  It  is  that  subjective 
condition,  under  which  alone  external  perception  is 
possible  for  us.  Inasmuch,  now,  as  the  susceptibility 
of  the  subject  to  be  affected  by  objects  necessarily 
precedes  any  perception  of  these  objects,  we  can 
easily  understand  how  the  form  of  all  perceptions 
may  be  already  present  in  the  mind  before  all  or  any 
actual  special  perception,  and,  consequently,  a  prioii. 
So  present  in  the  mind,  we  can  readily  understand, 


% 


also,  how  zY,  this  form,  as  a  pure  perception,  in  which 
all  objects,  as  presenting  themselves  in  it,  must 
submit  to  determination  from  it,  may  possess  prin- 
ciples of  the  relations  of  things  before  any  experience. 
Only,  then,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  human 
being  is  it  that  we  can  speak  of  space,  of  extended 
substances,  etc.  Directly  we  discount  the  subjective 
condition  under  which  alone  external  perception  is 
possible  to  us  (so  far,  namely,  as  we  may  happen  to  be 
affected  by  objects),  the  expression  space  is  without 
meaning.  This  term  is  referred  to  things  only  in  so 
far  as  they  appear  to  us,  only  in  so  far  as  they  are 
objects  of  sense.  The  invariable  form  of  this  recep- 
tivity, which  receptivity  we  name  sense  or  sensibility, 
is  a  necessary  condition  of  all  the  relations  in  which 
objects  are  perceived  as  external  to  us;  but  these 
objects  being  abstracted  from,  it  is  only  a  pure  per- 
ception (a  void  subjective  form)  which  has  got  the 
name  space.  Inasmuch  as  we  cannot  make  the  peculiar 
conditions  of  sense,  conditions  as  well  of  the  very  pos- 
sibility of  things,  but  only  of  their  appearance  to  sense,  it 
is  impossible  for  us  to  say  that  space  contains  all  things 
as  they  are  in  themselves,  no  matter  what  subject  per- 
ceives them,  and  no  matter  whether  they  are  perceived 
or  unperceived  by  any  subject,  but  only  that  it  con- 
tains all  things  so  far  as,  externally,  they  sensuously 
appear,  and  to  W5.  For,  as  regards  the  perceptions  of 
other  thinking  beings,  we  cannot  at  all  judge  whether 
they  are  confined  to  the  same  conditions  which  limit 
our  perception  and  are  universally  binding  for  us. 
Only  when  we  add  the  mode  to  judgments,  do  they 
become  unconditionally  true.  The  proposition.  All 
things  are  together  in  space,  holds  good  under  the 
limitation  that  these  things  are  understood  to  be 
objects  of  our  perception  of  sense.     When  I  add  the 


y 


146 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


condition  here,  and  say,  All  things,  as  external  j^ercep- 
tions,  are  together  in  space,  then  the  rule  is  valid 
universally  and  without  restriction.  Our  exposition 
asserts,  therefore,  the  reality  of  space  in  regard  to  every- 
thing that  may  come  externally  before  us  as  an  object, 
but  no  less  the  ideality  of  this  same  space  in  regard  to 
things  when  these  things  mean  things  in  t/wmselves 
as  taken  up  in  their  truth  by  reason  and  without 
reference  to  the  special  nature  of  our  sensibility.  We 
maintain,  therefore,  the  empirical  reality  of  space  in 
regard  of  all  possible  external  experience,  but  also  its 
transcendental  ideality,  in  this  respect,  that  it  is  nothing 
so  soon  as  we  cease  to  regard  it  as  condition  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  all  experience  for  us,  and  assume  it,  rather, 
to  be  something  that  is  involved  in  the  very  nature 
of  things  in  themselves. 

But,  besides  space,  there  is  no  other  external  cog- 
nition which,  though  subjective,  can  be  called  ob- 
jective, and  that,  too,  a  jmori.  For  from  no  other 
can  we  derive  synthetic  a  priori  propositions,  as  we 
derive  them  from  perception  in  space,  §  3.  Hence, 
to  speak  accurately,  ideality  attaches  to  no  such 
others,  even  though  agreeing  with  space  in  this,  that 
they  belong  merely  to  the  subjective  nature  of  the 
particular  form  or  mode  of  sense,— of  sight,  hearing, 
feeling,  for  example,  through  the  sensations  of  colours, 
sounds,  warmth;  which,  at  the  same  time  as  well, 
being  merely  sensations  and  not  perceptions,  enable 
us,  of  themselves,  to  know  no  object  whatever,  and 
certainly  not  possibly  a  imon, 

I  say  this  only  to  prevent  resort  on  our  part  to 
inadequate  exemplification  of  the  ideality  concerned, 
as  from  colours,  taste,  etc.,  which  are  rightly  enough 
regarded,  not  as  qualities  of  things,  but  as  changes*of 
our  own  subject;  which,  further,  may  even  be  dif- 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


147 


f 


ferent  in  different  individuals.  For,  in  that  case, 
what  is  originally  only  appearance  to  sense,  say  a  rose, 
notwithstanding  that  it  may  differ  in  colour  to  every 
different  eye,  is  still  held  valid  in  the  empirical  under- 
standing as  a  thing  in  itself.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
transcendental  understanding  of  perceptions  in  space 
is  a  critical  reminder  that  nothing  at  all  that  is  per- 
ceived in  space  is  a  thing  in  itself,  and  that  space 
itself  is  not  a  form  of  things  which  were  appertinent 
to  them  in  themselves ;  but  that  the  things  in  them- 
selves are  not  at  all  known  to  us,  and  that  what  we 
call  external  things  are  nothing  else  than  mere  pre- 
sentations of  our  own  sensibility ;  of  which  presenta- 
tions the  form  is  space,  but  of  which,  again,  the  true 
correlates,  that  is,  the  things  in  themselves,  neither 
are  nor  can  be  known  thereby ;  after  which  things, 
indeed,  there  is  never  in  experience  even  any  inquiry. 


Section  II. — Of  Time. 

§  4.  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  the  Notion  of  Time. 

1.  Time  is  not  an  empirical  notion  which  has  been 
derived  from  any  experience.  For  co-existence  and 
succession  would  not  themselves  be  found  in  the 
things  perceived,  were  not  time  a  priori  implied. 
Only  on  the  presupposition  of  time  is  it  conceivable 
that  some  things  are  at  one  and  the  same  time  (to- 
gether) or  that  others  are  in  different  times  (after  one 
another). 

2.  Time  is  a  necessary  cognition  which  is  implied 
in  all  perceptions.  We  cannot  suppress  time  as  in 
regard  to  things,   but   we    may  very  well   suppress 


K\ 


i . 


"^ 


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W^^^'' 


n* 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


U9 


things  as  in  regard  to  time.  Time,  therefore,  is  a 
datum  a  jmori  Only  in  it  is  all  actuality  of  things 
possible.  These  may  fall  away  bodily,  but  it  (as  the 
universal  condition  of  their  possibility)  cannot  be  dis- 
pensed with. 

3.  On  this  a  j^riori  necessity,  the  possibility  of 
apodictic  propositions  in  regard  to  relations  of  time,  or 
axioms  in  regard  to  time  generally,  is  established.  It 
has  only  one  dimension :  different  times  are  not  to- 
gether, but  after  one  another  (just  as  different  spaces 
are  not  after  one  another,  but  together).  These  pro- 
positions cannot  be  derived  from  experience,  for  ex- 
perience would  yield  neither  strict  universality  nor 
apodictic  certainty.  Were  experience  the  source,  we 
should  only  be  able  to  say :  That  is  what  common 
observation  tells  us ;  but  not :  That  is  what,  of  neces- 
sity, must  be.  These  propositions  are  binding  as 
rules,  under  which  experience,  generally,  is  possible,  . 
and  advise  us  before  it,  not  through  it. 

4.  Time  is  not  a  discursive  or,  as  we  say,  general 
notion,  but  a  pure  form  of  sense-perception.  Different 
times  are  only  parts  of  precisely  the  same  time.  The 
cognition  which  can  be  yielded  only  by  a  single  object 
is  perception.  The  proposition,  also,  that  different 
times  are  never  co-existent  cannot  be  deduced  from  a 
general  notion.  It  is  a  synthetic  proposition,  and  not 
dependent  on  mere  notions.  It  is  directly  implied, 
therefore,  in  the  simple  perception  and  conception  of 
time.      «t 

5.  The  infinitude  of  time  amounts  to  no  more  than 
that  every  particular  magnitude  of  time  is  possible 
only  through  limitations  of  a  one  universal  under- 
lying time.  Hence  the  original  cognition  time  must 
be  given  as  unlimited.  That  object,  however,  the 
parts  and  every  magnitude  of  which  can  be  conceived 


1 


J! 


"• 


as  determined  only  through  limitations,  cannot,  as  a 
totality,  be  given  through  notions  (for  notions  only 
contain  subnotions  which,  as  particulars,  precede  their 
principals),!  but  must  involve  a  direct  perception. 

§  5.  Transcendental  Exposition  of  the  Notion  of  Time. 

I  may  refer  in  this  connexion  to  §  4,  No.  3,  where, 
for  the  sake  of  brevity,  I  have  introduced  into  the 
metaphysical  exposition,  what,  properly,  is  transcen- 
dental. I  add  now  that  the  notion  of  change  (with 
that  of  motion  as  local  change)  is  possible  only  through 
and  in  time :  that  if  tLme  were  not  perception  a  prion 
(internal),  no  notion  whatever  could  make  intelligible 
the  possibility  of  a  change;  that  is,  of  a  conjunction 
in  one  and  the  same  object  of  predicates  contradic- 
torily opposed  the  one  to  the  other  (as  the  being  and  not 
being  of  one  and  the  same  thing  in  one  and  the  same 
place).  Only  in  time  can  such  predicates  be  found 
together  in  the  same  thing— 2.^.,  after  one  another. 
And  so  our  view  of  time  explains  the  possibility  of 

»  I  have  conveyed  here  both  forms  of  the  parenthesis  found  in  the 
two  editions.     Kant's  "parts"  and  "parts  of  composition"  give  pause, 
especially  in  the  number  3  of  Space.     This  very  parenthesis  (even  in  its 
two  forms),  however,  is,  perhaps,  decisive.     Comparison  and  reflection 
seem  to  me  undeniably  to  demonstrate  that  Kant  had  no  idea  but  that  of 
contrasting  perceptive  parts  with  notional  parts,  and  that  even  by  the 
words  "Bestandtheile"  and  "Zusammensetzung"  ^§  2,  No.  3)  he  meant 
only  subnotions  and  generalization.     The  words  themselves  are  unhappy, 
however  ;  and  much  is  inexact  throughout  these  sections.     Consider  the 
confusion,  gi-ammatical  and  other,  of  the  sentence  to  which  this  is  note. 
Literally  translated,  it  would  run  thus  :— "  Whereof,  however,  the  parts 
themselves,  and  every  magnitude  of  an  object,  can  be  conceived  deter- 
mmed  only  through  limitations,  there  the  whole  cognition  must  not 
be  given  through  notions  (for  these  contain  only  part-cognitions),  but 
there  must  underlie  them  immediate  perception."    The  "whereof,"  the 
"  every  magnitude  of  an  object,"  the  "  whole  cognition,"  the  "  them,"  all 
most  obliquely  put,  refer,  however  helplessly,   to  the  one  subject  or 
object  which  is  aluue  spoken  of.     In  Rosenkranz  aU  is  even  worse. 


i 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


151 


] 


as  much  synthetic  cognition  a  priori  vl^  is  demonstrated 
by  the  general  theory  of  motion,  which  is  not  a  little 
fruitful. 

§  6.  Inferences  from  these  Ideas. 

a.  Were  abstraction  made  from  all  subjective  con- 
ditions of  perception,  time  would  not  be  found  to 
remain,  whether  as  something  self-subsistent  and  on 
its  own  account,  or  as  an  objective  quality  inherent 
in  things  themselves.  For,  in  the  first  case,  it  would 
be  something  which,  without  actual  object,  were, 
nevertheless,  itself  actual.  And,  in  the  second  case^ 
it  would  be  impossible  for  it,  as  a  quality  or  order 
belonging  to  things,  to  precede  these  things,  as  their 
very  condition  indeed,  and  be,  through  synthetic  pro- 
positions, a  priori  cognised  and  perceived.  This  latter 
circumstance  is  very  intelligibly  possible,  should  time 
be  the  subjective  condition  only  under  which  all  per- 
ceptions in  us  can  take  place.  For  in  that  case  this 
form  of  inner  perception  is  in  consciousness  before 
the  objects,  and,  consequently,  a  j.riori, 

b.  Time  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  internal  sense, 
that  is  of  the  perception  of  our  own  self  and  of  our 
own  inner  state.  For  time  results  not  from  any 
deterniination  of  outer  objects ;  it  is  not  referred  to 
anything  that  has  bodily  shape  or  place,  etc. ;  on  the 
contrary,  it  is  time  that,  for  all  presentations  in  our 
inner  consciousness,  determines  their  relation.  And 
just  because  this  inner  perception  offers  no  shape,  we 
seek  to  supply  its  place  by  analogies.  We  picture 
time-succession  as  a  line  that  proceeds  into  infinitude, 
the  complex  of  parts  in  which,  moreover,  constitutes 
a  series  which  is  only  of  one  dimension.  From  the 
qualities  of  this  line,  too,  we  conclude  to  all  the 
qualities  of  time,  except  this  single  one  that,  while  in 


V«. 


the  line  all  the  parts  are  at  once  and  together,  those 
in  time  are  always  successive  or  after  one  another. 
From  this  it  is  evident  that  time  is  a  perception ;  for 
all  its  relations  are  capable  of  being  expressed  in 
external  perception. 

c.  Time   is   the  formal   condition   a  priori  of  all 
sense-perceptions.     Space,    as  the  pure  form  of  all 
outer  perception,  is  limited,  in  its  function  of  a  jmori 
condition,  merely  to  external  objects.     On  the  other 
hand,  because  all  cognitions,  whether  due  to  external 
things  or  not  so  due,  do,  so  far  as  they  themselves 
are  concerned  (in  that  they  are  affections  of  mind), 
belong  to  our  inner  state— further,  because  this  inner 
state  must  come  under  the  formal  condition  of  inner 
perception  which  is  time— it  follows  that  time  is  an 
a  priori  condition  of  all  sense-perception,  immediately 
of  internal  (the  soul)  and  mediately  (i.e.,  through  it) 
of  external  perception.     As,  in  the  external  reference, 
I  can  say.  All  external  perceptions  are  in  space  and 
a  priori  determined  according   to   the   relations   of 
space;  so,  in  the  internal  reference,   I  can  equally 
say,  All  perceptions  whatever  (all  objects  of  the  senses) 
are  in  time,  and  fall  necessarily  under  relations  of  time. 
If,  from  our  mode  of  internally  perceiving  ourselves 
and  accordingly  disposing  in  consciousness  all  exter- 
nal perceptions,  we  abstract,  and,  consequently,  take 
objects  as  they  may  be  supposed  to  be  in  themselves, 
then  time  is  nothing.     It  is  only  of  objective  validity 
in  regard  to  perceptions,  because  we  recognise  these 
as  objects  of  our  senses;  but  such  validity  disappears 
directly  we  abstract  from  what  mode  of  consciousness 
is  peculiar  to  us  (which  is  that  of  a  perception  only 
through  sense)— directly  we  speak,  namely,  of  things 
as  suck     Time,  therefore,  is  solely  a  subjective  con- 
dition of  our  (human)  perception  (which  is  in  every 


■i 


iift 


«r>.  ^      ^  JL  .  V 


=:,  / 


152 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


case  sensuous,  objects  being  conceived  to  act  on  us) ; 
and,  in  itself^  apart  from  the  subject,  nothing.  In 
regard  of  all  perceptions,  however,  consequently  of 
all  things  which  may  appear  in  experience,  time  is 
no  less  necessarily  objective.  We  cannot  say.  All 
things  are  in  time ;  for  such  expression  bears  to  con- 
sider things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  and  apart  from 
the  mode  and  conditions  of  the  perception  of  them ; 
whereas  it  is  precisely  the  mode  and  conditions  of 
perception  from  which  it  follows  that  time  adds  itself 
to  all  objects  in  consciousness.  But  subjoin  now 
the  mode  to  the  proposition,  and  say,  All  things  are,  as 
objects  of  sense-perception,  in  time;  then  the  judg- 
ment has  its  own  good  objective  truth  and  universality 
a  priori. 

Our  doctrine  asserts,  then,  the  empirical  reality  of 
time ;  that  is,  its  objective  validity  in  regard  of  all 
objects  which  may,  on  any  occasion,  be  offered  to  our 
senses.  And  as  our  perception  is  at  all  times  one  of 
sense,  there  never  can  be  given  us  an  object  in  expe- 
rience which  is  not  submitted  to  the  condition  of 
time.  But,  again,  we  deny  time  all  claim  to  absolute 
reality,  if  regarded  as  intrinsic  condition  inherent  in 
things  themselves,  irrespective  of  the  form  of  our 
sensuous  perception.  Such  attributes  as  belong  to 
things  in  themselves  can  never  be  made  known  to  us 
by  the  senses.  In  this,  then,  consists  the  transcen- 
dental ideality  of  time  ;  which,  abstraction  being  made 
from  the  subjective  conditions  of  sensuous  perception, 
is  absolutely  nothing;  and  cannot  be  attributed  to 
objects  in  themselves  (or  apart  their  relation  to  our 
perception),  whether  as  subsistent  or  as  inherent. 
But  this  ideality  is  just  as  little  as  that  of  space  to  be 
put  upon  a  par  with  the  subreptions  of  sensation  ;  in 
whose  despite,  thece  k  attributed  to  the  subject  of 


X 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


153 


such  predicates  an  objective  reality,  which  is  with- 
out place  here  (for  time  or  space),  unless  in  so  far  as 
such  reality  were  regarded  as  merely  empirical  or 
attributed  to  the  object  (time  or  space)  only  as  a 
perception  of  sense:  on  the  distinction  in  question, 
however,  see  §  3,  6,  two  last  paragraphs. 

§  7.  Further  Explanations. 

Against  this  theory,  which  grants  empirical  but 
denies  absolute  or  transcendental  reality  to  time,  I 
have  heard  an  objection  so  common  on  the  part  of 
intelligent  men,  that  I  infer  it  must  occur  naturally 
to  every  reader,  to  whom  such  speculations  are  un- 
usual. It  runs  thus :  Changes  are  actual,  as  is  demon- 
strated by  the  vicissitude  of  our  own  mental  states, 
even  should  we  leave  out  of  view  all  external  percep- 
tions (together  with  their  changes).  But  changes  are 
only  possible  in  time.  Therefore  time  is  something 
actual.  The  reply  has  no  difficulty.  I  grant  the 
entire  argument.  Time  is  undoubtedly  something 
actual;  it  is  the  actual  form,  namely,  of  internal 
perception.  It  has  therefore  subjective  reality  in 
regard  of  inner  experience ;  i.e.,  I  have  actually  the 
consciousness  of  time,  and  of  my  determinations  in 
time.  It  is  actual,  consequently,  not  as  an  object, 
but  as  the  mode  of  my  perception  of  myself  as  an 
object.  But  if  I  (or  another)  could  perceive  myself 
without  this  condition  of  sense,  the  same  states,  which 
we  now  call  changes,  would  yield  a  cognition  into 
which  no  idea  of  time,  or  consequently  of  change, 
would  at  all  enter.  There  remains  to  it,  therefore, 
its  empirical  reality  as  condition  of  all  our  experiences. 
Only  absolute  reality,  in  accordance  with  what  has 
been  said,  cannot  be  allowed  it.     It  is  nothing  but 


jj 


"^  w- 


I 


154 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


TUE  KKITIK  OF  PUKE  REASON. 


155 


I 


( 


ll 


the  form  of  our  inner  perception.^  If  we  withdraw 
from  it  the  peculiar  condition  of  our  sensibility,  its 
very  idea  disappears;  for  time  is  not  inherent  in 
things  themselves,  but  simply  in  the  subject  perceiving 
them. 

But  the  reason  why  this  objection  is  so  universal, 
and  on  the  part  of  those,  too,  who  have  nothing 
decided  to  advance  against  the  doctrine  of  the  ideality 
of  space,  is  this.  The  absolute  reality  of  space  they 
could  not  hope  apodictically  to  demonstrate  in  view 
of  zdealismj  according  to  which  the  actuality  of  ex- 
ternal things  is  incapable  of  rigorous  proof  Whereas 
the  actuality  of  the  object  of  our  internal  senses  (my 
own  self,  my  own  state)  is  immediately  clear  in  con- 
sciousness. The  former  may,  possibly,  be  a  mere 
show,  while  the  latter  is,  in  their  opinion,  something 
undeniably  actual.  They  do  not  consider  that  both, 
without  our  presuming  to  deny  their  actuality  in 
consciousness,  are,  nevertheless,  only  appearances  to 
sense,  which  has  always  two  sides.  There  is  one 
side,  for  example,  in  regard  to  which  the  object  is 
viewed  as  in  itself  (apart  from  the  mode  of  its  percep- 
tion, in  which  respect  its  nature  is  always  problema- 
tical). And  there  is  another  side  where  the  form  of 
the  perception  is  considered ;  which  form  must  not  be 
sought  for  in  the  object  as  in  itself,  but  in  the  subject 
to  which  it  appears ;  at  the  same  time  that  said  form 
belongs,  nevertheless,  actually  and  necessarily,  to  the 
appearance  of  the  object. 

Time  and  space,  accordingly,  are  two  sources  of 
cognition,   from   which,    a  priori,  various  synthetic 

'  I  can,  indeed,  say,  my  states  follow  one  another ;  but  that  means  no 
more  than  that  we  are  conscious  of  them  in  a  sequence  of  time,  i.e.,  ac- 
cording to  the  form  of  inner  sense.  Time  is  not  by  any  means,  there- 
fore, something  in  itself,  nor  yet  any  attribute  objectively  inherent  in 
things. — K. 


^■ 


r 


1 


f 


propositions  may  be  derived,  as  is  especially  exem- 
plified in  pure  mathematic  with  regard  to  space  and 
the  relations  of  space.  Taken  together,  namely,  they 
are  both  pure  forms  of  all  sense-perception,  and  thereby 
render  synthetic  propositions  a  priori  possible.  But 
these  cognitive  sources  a  priori  determine  their  own 
limits  just  by  this  reference  to  their  being  conditions 
(forms)  of  sense :  they  concern  objects,  that  is,  only 
so  far  as  objects  are  considered  perceptions  of  sense, 
and  not  things  in  themselves.  Valid  only  for  the 
former,  they  at  once  cease  to  have  objective  application 
directly  we  go  beyond  them.  Such  reality  of  space 
and  time  leaves,  for  the  rest,  the  certainty  of  our 
empirical  knowledge  unaffected ;  for  in  its  regard  we 
have  an  equal  certainty,  whether  these  forms  are  of 
things  in  themselves,  or  only  of  our  perception. 
Whereas  they  who  maintain  the  absolute  reality  of 
space  and  time  must,  whether  they  assume  subsistence 
or  only  inherence,  be  at  variance  with  the  principles 
of  experience  itself  For,  say  they  assume  the  former, 
as  the  mathematical  inquirers  mostly  do,  then  they 
have  before  them  two  eternal,  infinite,  and  self-sub- 
sistent  non-entities  (space  and  time)  which,  without 
being  themselves  anything  actual,  are  there,  for  all 
that,  for  no  other  purpose  than  just  to  embrace  all 
that  is  actual!  Or  say  they  assume  the  latter  (in- 
herence), as  is,  in  effect,  the  case  with  certain  meta- 
physical dogmatists,  then,  inasmuch  as  space  and  time 
are  for  them  relations  of  things  (the  beside  one  another, 
the  after  one  another)  derived  from  experience,  but 
necessarily  only  confusedly  so,  they  (these  dogmatists) 
must  impugn  the  validity,  or  at  least  the  apodictic 
certainty,  of  any  mathematical  assignments  a  priori  in 
regard  of  actual  things  {e.g.,  in  space).  For  such 
certainty  is  not  possibly  to  be  obtained  from  expe- 


\\ 


m 


\ 


I 


I* 


I 


I' 


156 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


rience;  and  any  aj^nm  notions  of  space  and  time  can, 
under  such  suppositions,  be  no  more  than  creations  of 
imagination.  That  is,  their  source  must  actually  be 
sought  for  in  experience  so  far  as  imagination,  out  of 
the  relations  abstracted  from  experience,  has  made  a 
certain  universal  of  these,  but  a  universal,  neverthe- 
less, still  under  the  restrictions  imposed  by  nature 
upon  the  relations  from  which  it  derives.  ^  The  party 
for  the  former  opinion  have  the  advantage  that,  for 
their  mathematical  allegations,  they  leave  the  field  of 
the  experiences  of  sense  free.  But  then  they  very 
much  perplex  themselves  by  these  very  conditions, 
when  the  understanding  Avould  go  beyond  this  field. 
The  party  for  the  latter  opinion,  again,  have  the 
advantage  that  space  and  time  are  not  difficulties  to 
them,  when  they  would  judge  of  objects,  not  as  per- 
ceptions of  sense,  but  only  in  relation  to  the  under- 
standing. But  they  are  unable  either  to  explain  the 
possibility  of  mathematical  cognitions  a  priori  (for 
any  true  and  objectively  valid  perception  a  priori 
does  not  exist  for  them),  or  to  bring  the  findings  of 
experience  into  necessary  agreement  with  these  cog- 
nitions. In  our  theory  of  the  true  nature  of  these 
two  primitive  forms  of  sense,  both  difficulties  are 
removed. 

Lastly,  that  the  transcendental  a3sthetic  cannot 
include  more  than  these  two  elements,  is  evident  from 
this,  that  all  other  notions  which  hold  of  sense  (even 

»  Were  all  Kant's  sentences  like  the  above,  De  Qiiincey's  ridicule 
would  be  very  mucli  in  place.  I  Lave  broken  it  up,  and  done  my  best 
with  it,  but  I  fear  its  import  must  be  still  obscure.  What  is  said  of  the 
mathematicians  seems  plain  enough  ;  and  as  regards  the  metaphysicians, 
all  that  I  take  to  be  intimated  is,  that,  all  being  a  posteriori  with  them,' 
they  must  find  themselves  at  a  non-plus  in  face  of  the  a  priori;  while, 
further,  their  universal  of  time  and  space,  derived  only  from  the  action 
of  the  imagination  on  the  contributions  of  sense,  must  submit  themselves 
to  the  restrictions  of  that,  their  empirical  source. 


If 


4 


^^ 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


157 


motion,  which  is  a  union  of  both)  presuppose  something 
empirical  (as  subjects  or  objects  of  them).  Motion, 
for  example,  presupposes  perception  of  something  that 
is  movable.  In  space,  however,  taken  by  itself,  there 
is  not  anything  that  is  movable.  Therefore  what  is 
movable  must  be  something  that  is  only  found  in 
space  by  experience,  or  that  is  only  an  empirical 
datum.  For  the  same  reason^  also,  the  transcendental 
aesthetic  cannot  count  among  its  a  jmori  data  the 
notion  of  change ;  for  time  itself  undergoes  no  change  ; 
only  what  is  in  time  undergoes  change.  For  that 
notion  there  is  required,  therefore,  the  observation  of 
some  actual  existence  and  of  the  succession  of  its 
states,  i.e.,  of  experience. 

§  8.  General  Remarks  on  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic. 

I.  First  it  will  be  necessary  to  explain  as  clearly  as 
possible  what,  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  sense-cogni- 
tion, our  opinion  is,  in  order  to  preclude  all  misunder- 
standing in  that  respect. 

It  has  been  our  wish  to  say,  then,  that  all  our 
perception  is  nothing  but  the  impression  of  sense  (the 
state  of  mind  due  to  sense-presentation) ;  that  the 
things  we  perceive  are  not  in  themselves  as  we  per- 
ceive them ;  that  this  holds  good  of  their  relations  as 
^yell ;  and  that,  were  our  subject  abstracted  from,  or 
simply  the  subjective  constitution  of  our  senses,  all 
the  qualities  and  all  the  relations  of  objects  in  space 
and  time —nay,  space  and  time  themselves— would 
disappear :  for  all  of  these  are,  as  mere  appearances 
to  sense,  incapable  of  existing  in  themselves,  but  only 
in  us.  How  it  may  be  situated  with  the  objects  in 
themselves,  and  apart  from  our  receptivity  of  sense, 
remains  wholly  unknown  to  us.     We  know  nothino« 


\\ 


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1  " 
J 


1 


ill 


but  our  manner  of  perceiving  them,  which,  as  peculiar 
to  us,  is  necessary  to  us,  but  not  therefore  necessary 
to  every  other  intelligence.  But  it  is  with  the  per- 
ception peculiar  to  ourselves  that  we  have  alone  to  do. 
Time  and  space  are  its  pure  forms,  and  sensation  its 
matter.  Only  the  former  can  we  cognise  a  priori^  or 
before  actual  perception  of  sense,  and  for  that  reason 
we  name  them  pure  perception.  The  latter,  again, 
as  that  in  our  cognition  which  is  only  a  j'Osteriori,  we 
name  empirical  perception.  The  former  belong  to 
our  sensibility  absolutely  necessarily,  let  our  sensa- 
tions be  as  they  may ;  and  very  various  they  may  be. 
Though  we  should  bring  our  perception  to  never  so 
high  a  degree  of  keenness,  we  should  not,  for  all  that, 
be  a  bit  nearer  the  nature  of  objects  in  themselves. 
For,  in  every  event,  we  should  only  be  present  to  our 
own  mode  of  perception,  to  our  own  sensibility — only 
to  this  sensibility,  moreover,  as  under  the  originally- 
inherent,  subjective  conditions  of  space  and  time. 
What  the  objects  may  be  in  themselves  can  never 
possibly  be  known  to  us  by  even  the  most  luminous 
cognition  of  their  appearance  to  sense,  and  it  is  that 
appearance  which  is  alone  given  us. 

Wherefore,  that  our  whole  complex  of  sense  is 
nothing  but  a  confused  cognition  of  things,  possessed, 
indeed,  of  what  belongs  to  them  in  themselves,  but 
only  in  the  midst  of  such  heaping  together  of 
characters  and  part-perceptions  as  renders  it  impos- 
sible for  us  consciouslv  to  distinoruish  them  —  this 
is  such  a  falsification  of  the  very  idea  of  sense  or 
of  object  of  sense,  that  it  reduces  the  whole  theory 
of  these  to  vanity  and  inanity.  The  difference  of 
an  indistinct  from  a  distinct  consciousness  is  simply 
logical,  and  does  not  refer  to  the  contained  matter  as 
the  contained  matter.     There  is  no  doubt  that  the 


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notion  Right  (Recht),  for  example,  even  as  used  by  the 
ordinary  understanding,  involves  all  that  the  subtlest 
speculation  can  develop  from  it ;  differing  from  the 
latter  only  in  this,  indeed,  that  it  is  without  con- 
sciousness of  the  many  details  of  the  thought.  But 
all  this  gives  us  no  reason  to  say  that  the  common 
notion  is  only  one  of  sense  or  appearance  to  sense ; 
for  Right  cannot  by  any  possibility  come  before  sense 
at  all.  Right  is  a  notion,  its  seat  is  in  the  under- 
standing; and  it  is  a  (moral)  quality  of  actions 
which  belongs  to  these  in  themselves.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  idea  of  a  body  in  perception  contains 
nothing  at  all  that  were  capable  of  belonging  to  an 
object  in  itself  We  have  in  it  only  appearance  to 
sense,  or  the  manner  in  which  we  are  thereby 
affected  ;  and  this  receptivity  of  our  cognitive  faculty 
is  called  sense  or  sensibility,  and  remains,  from  a 
cognition  which  should  concern  an  object  in  itself, 
even  if  the  sense-appearance  were  seen  to  the  very 
bottom,  nevertheless  diametrically  different. 

The  Leibnitz- Wolfian  philosophy  has,  therefore,  to 
all  investigations  into  the  nature  and  origin  of  our 
knowledge,  assigned  quite  a  wrong  point  of  view. 
To  it,  namely,  the  difference  of  sense  and  intellect 
was  wholly  logical,  whereas,  in  effect,  it  is  mani- 
festly transcendental.  It  is  not  the  form  of  dis- 
tinctness or  indistinctness  that  is  concerned  in  this 
difference,  but  the  origin  and  nature  of  our  knowledge. 
From  which  it  results  that,  through  sense  we  know 
the  nature  of  things  in  themselves,  not  indistinctly 
only,  but  absolutely  not  at  all.  So  soon,  indeed, 
as  we  leave  out  of  view  our  own  subjective  conforma- 
tion, the  qualities  of  the  object  (as  attached  to  it  by 
sense)  and  the  perceived  object  itself  are  nowhere 
to    be  found  ;    for  it  is  just  this   subjective    confor- 


K\ 


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mation  which  determines  the  form  of  the  object  as 
an  appearance  to  sense. 

We  do  usually,  it  is  true,  distinguish  in  objects 
what  is  substantial  in  the  perception  of  them,  what  in 
them  is  valid  for  every  human  consciousness,  from 
what,  again,  is  only  contingent  in  them.  The  latter, 
namely,  unlike  the  former,  is  not  referred  to  sentiency 
as  such,  but  only  depends  on  a  special  situation  or 
organization  of  this  or  the  other  sense.  Or  the 
former  is  considered  such  a  cognition  as  perceives  the 
object  in  itself;  the  latter,  again,  only  such  as 
perceives  the  object  in  its  appearance  to  sense. 
But  even  this  distinction  is,  after  all,  only  empirical. 
If  we  remain  by  no  more  than  this  (as  is  commonly 
the  case),  and  fail  to  regard  (as  we  ought)  such 
empirical  perception  as  itself  again  but  mere  sense- 
appearance,  in  such  wise,  namely,  that  there  is 
nothing  at  all  to  be  found  in  it  that  concerns  any- 
thing whatever  in  itself,  then  our  transcendental 
distinction  is  all  lost.  For,  so,  we  believe  that  we 
perceive  things  in  themselves ;  whereas,  nowhere  in 
the  world  of  sense,  let  us  search  into  its  objects  as 
deeply  as  we  may,  have  we  ever  anything  to  do  but 
with  sense-appearance.  Thus  it  is  that,  in  the  case  of 
a  sun-shower,  we  call  the  rainbow  a  mere  appearance 
of  sense ;  at  the  same  time  that  we  take  the  rain  to 
be  the  thing  in  itself.  Nor  is  this  incorrect,  in  so  far 
as  we  regard  the  rain  only  physically,  as  what,  in 
experience  generally,  under  whatever  position  to 
sense,  is,  in  perception,  always  thus  and  not  other- 
wise determined.  Should  we  take,  however,  the 
empirical  phenomenon  all  together,  and  ask,  without 
any  reference  to  the  distinction  of  agreement  or  not 
with  every  human  sentiency,  whether  this  pheno- 
menon as  a  whole  indicates  an  object  in  itself  (not 


I 


indicates  the  rain-drops  as  such  object,  for  they  are 
themselves  empirical  objects),  then  the  question  of  the 
relation  of  the  perception  to  the  object  is  transcen- 
dental. For  not  only  these  drops  are  appearances  of 
sense ;  but  their  rounded  form,  nay,  the  very  space 
in  which  they  fall,  are  nothing  in  themselves  unless 
mere  modifications  of  our  senses  (the  colours,  etc.),  or 
groundworks  of  our  sense-perception  generally  (space, 
etc.)  ;  while  the  transcendental  object,  for  its  part, 
again,  remains  wholly  unknown  to  us.^ 

A  second  important  characteristic  of  our  tran- 
scendental aesthetic  that  demands  notice  is  this.  It  is 
not  something  that  should  gain  some  favour  merely 
as  a  plausible  hypothesis.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  as 
certain,  and  as  free  from  doubt,  as  can  ever  be 
required  of  any  theory  that  shall  act  as  an  organon. 
In  order  to  make  this  certainty  fully  conspicuous,  we 
shall  take  a  case,  the  evidence  of  which  may  prove 
irresistible  as  well  as  throw  additional  light,  perhaps, 
on  what  has  been  said  in  §  3. 

Suppose,  then,  you  take  space  and  time  to  be  in 
themselves  objective,  or  to  be  conditions  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  things  in  themselves.  In  that  case  this  fact 
courts  notice,  that  a  great  number  of  a  priori  apodictic 
and  synthetic  propositions  presents  itself  from  both, 
but  more  especially  from  space,  which,  therefore,  we 
shall  preferably  refer  to  in  example.  Now,  I  ask  you, 
as  the  propositions  of  geometry  are  known  synthetic- 
ally a  priori  and  with  apodictic  certainty,  whence  do 
you  derive  these  propositions,  and  on  what  does  under- 

*  As  we  never  at  all  know  the  object  in  itself,  we  may  be  apt  to  think 
that  Kant  onght  to  have  called  it,  not  transcendental,  but  transcendent. 
The  Ideas,  however,  though  transcendent  as  cognitions,  are  regulatively 
transcendental  in  experience.  In  the  same  way,  the  object  in  itself,  as 
necessary  to  and  in  experience,  is,  though  transcendent  in  cognition,  a 
constitutively  transcendental  element. 


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standing  support  itself  in  dealing  with  them  ?  Source 
or  support  there  can  be  none,  but  either  in  notions 
or  perceptions ;  and  from  both  of  these,  again,  either 
only  as  a  priori  or  else  as  a  posteriori.  But  empirical 
notions  or  empirical  perceptions  are  only  adequate  to 
what  is  itself,  again,  only  empirical.  They  are  incap- 
able of  the  necessity  and  absolute  universality  that  are 
characteristic  of  the  propositions  in  geometry.  Even 
a  piori  notions  we  are  called  upon  to  eliminate  here  ; 
for  it  is  clear  that,  from  mere  notions,  there  cannot 
be  got  any  synthetic,  but  only  an  analytic  cognition. 
Take  the  proposition,  for  instance.  Two  straight  lines 
cannot  inclose  a  space  or  construct  a  figure,  and  try 
to  deduce  it  from  the  notion  of  straight  lines  and  the 
number  two;  or  say  even  that  a  figure  is  possible 
with  three  straight  lines,  and  try  this  with  mere 
notions.  All  your  trying  is  in  vain,  and,  like 
geometry  itself,  you  find  you  are  compelled  to  have 
recourse  to  perception.  You  take  an  object  in  percep- 
tion, then  ;  but  your  perception  here  must,  as  already 
shown,  be  fm  a  priori  and  not  an  empirical  perception. 
You  must  feel,  in  answer  to  our  question,  consequently, 
that  the  source  and  the  sui)port  required  in  geometry 
are  a  priori  perception.  Were  there  not  within  you  a 
faculty  of  perception  a  priori;  were  this  subjective 
condition  not  at  the  same  time,  in  form,  the  uni- 
versal condition  a  ji>r«(>n  under  which  alone  the  object 
of  this  (external)  perception  is  itself  possible ;  were 
the  object  (triangle)  something  in  itself  irre- 
spective of  your  subject :  how  could  you  say,  that 
what  for  construction  of  a  triangle  lies  necessary  in 
your  subjective  conditions,  must  necessarily  be  found 
also  in  the  triangle  itself?  It  was  impossible  for  you, 
confined  to  notions  (of  three  lines),  to  add  to  them 
something  new   (the  figure),  which,  therefore,  must 


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163 


necessarily  be  conveyed  by  the  object,  inasmuch  as 
this  object  is  a  datum  before  your  cognition  (of  the  pro- 
position in  question),  and  not  through  that  cognition. 
Were  not  space,  consequently,  a  mere  form  of  your 
perception,  involving  conditions  ajmori,  under  which 
alone  things  can  be  for  you  external  objects,  as  without 
them  they  were  nothing,  you  would  be  quite  unable 
to  determine  anything  synthetically  and  a  priori  in 
respect  of  external  objects.     It  is  therefore  indubitably 
certain,  and  not  merely  possible  or  probable,  that  space 
and  time,  as  th\3  necessary  conditions  of  all  (outer  and 
inner)  expedience,  are  mere  subjective  conditions  of  all 
our  perception.     In  relation  to  these  conditions,  conse- 
quently, all  objects  are  mere  sense-appearances  and  not 
things  on  their  own  account.      It  is  just  because  of 
these  a  jmori  sense-conditions,  too,  that  much  as  re- 
gards  form  may  be  ajmori  said  of  sense-objects,  though 
never  the  smallest  word  of  the  things  in  themselves 
that  may  possibly  underlie  these  sense-objects. 

II.  In  confirmation  of  this  theory  of  the  ideality  as 
well  of  external  as  internal  sense,  and,  consequently, 
of  all  objects  of  sense  as  mere  sense-appearances,  it 
may  prove  signally  serviceable  to  remark  :  That  what- 
ever belongs  to  our  external  perception,  involves 
nothing  but  mere  relations,  as  of  places  in  a  percep- 
tion (extension),  change  of  places  (motion),  and  laws 
determinative  of  such  change  (motive  forces).  But, 
further,  what  is  in  the  places,  or  what  apart  from  the 
local  change  acts  in  the  things  themselves,  is  not  at 
all  made  known  thereby.  Now,  through  mere  rela- 
tions, there  is  not  anything  in  itself  given.  It  is  easy 
to  judge,  consequently,  that,  external  sense  yielding 
us  nothing  but  intimations  of  relation,  said  sense  is 
competent  to  convey  the  relation  of  an  object  to  the 
subject  in  perception  of  it,  but  not  the  inner  consti- 


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165 


tution  that  belongs  to  the  object  in  itself.  With 
internal  perception  the  case  is  the  same.  Leaving 
out  of  view  that  even  there  the  contributions  of  ex- 
ternal sense  constitute  the  material  proper  with  which 
we  furnish  our  minds,  it  is  to  be  said  that  time,  in 
which  we  place  these  contributions, — which  itself  pre- 
cedes consciousness  of  these  in  experience,  and  is  pre- 
supposed as  underlying  formal  condition  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  we  place  them  in  the  mind, — that  time 
already  prescribes,  I  say,  relations  of  succession,  of 
co-existence,  and  of  what  is  implied  with  succession 
(a  substrate  that  persists).  Now,  what,  as  a  cognition, 
can  precede  all  action  to  think  any  thing,  is  perception, 
and,  if  it  convey  nothing  but  relations,  only  the  form 
of  perception.  But,  as  this  form  of  perception  is  only 
operative  so  far  as  the  mind  has  an  object  in  it 
(contents),  it  can  be  nothing  else  than  the  mode  in 
which  the  mind,  through  its  own  action  (i\\Q  placing 
of  contents),  is  affected — the  mode,  then,  in  which 
the  mind  is  affected  by  its  own  self.|  This,  plainly, 
amounts  to  an  inner  sense,  or  to  an  inner  sense  at 
least  on  the  side  of  the  form.  All  that  is  perceived 
by  sense  is  always,  so  far,  sense-appearance.  An 
internal  sense,  therefore,  would  either  require  not  at 
all  to  be  admitted,  or,  if  admitted,  it  would  require 
to  be  seen  that  the  subject,  which  is  the  object  of 
such  sense,  could  be  perceived  by  it  only  as  sense- 
appearance,  and  not  as  it  would  be  judged  to  be  by 
its  own  self,  were  its  perception  intellectual,  or  pro- 
duct of  its  own  spontaneity.  All  difficulty  here  con- 
cerns the  question  alone  of  how  a  subject  can  in- 
ternally perceive  its  own  self;  but  this  difficulty  is 
common  to  every  theory.  Consciousness  of  one's  self 
(apperception)  is  the  simple  cognition  Ego i\  and  were, 
there]i>y  alone,  all  complex  of  elements  constitutive  of 


the  subject  sjmitaneously  given — in  that  case  the 
internal  perception  would  be  intellectual.  In  man 
consciousness  requires  internal  sense-perception  of 
the  complex  that  is  given  in  the  subject;  and  the 
manner  in  which,  without  spontaneous  action  of  the 
mind,  this  complex  is  presented  to  the  mind,  must, 
for  the  sake  of  the  distinction  implied,  be  called 
sense.  If  consciousness  is  to  take  up  (apprehend) 
what  is  in  the  mind,  it  must  afifect  it;  and  is  only 
able  in  this  way  to  effect  a  perception  of  itself.  The 
form  of  this  perception,  however,  already  in  the  mind, 
determines  as  in  time  how  the  complex  is  collocated  in 
the  mind.  In  a  word,  consciousness  perceives  itself, 
not  as  it  would  perceive  itself  were  it  immediately 
self-active  in  perception,  but  according  to  the  way  in 
which  it  is  internally  affected;  consequently,  as  it 
sensuously  appears  to  itself,  not  as  it  is. 

III.  When  I  say  the  object  of  perception,  whether 
external  or  internal,  is  exhibited  in  space  and  time 
only  as  it  affects  our  senses,  or  as  it  appears,  I  do  not 
mean  by  that,  that  said  object  is  a  mere  deception. 
For,  in  sense,  the  objects,  nay,  even  the  qualities  we 
attribute  to  them,  are  always  regarded  as  something 
actually  given.  Only,  the  particular  subject's  par- 
ticular mode  of  perception  being  considered,  a  dis- 
tinction is  made  between  the  object  viewed  as  appear- 
ance to  sense,  and  again  as  a  thing  in  itself.  So  to 
speak,  the  single  object  of  consciousness  is,  as  pheno- 
menon, or  mere  appearance  before  sense,  distinguished 
from  its  own  self  as  noumenon  or  thing  in  itself 
before  reason.  When  I  maintain,  therefore,  that  the 
quality  of  space  and  time,  in  measure  of  which 
quality,  as  condition  of  their  very  being,  both 
external  and  internal  object  must  set  themselves — 
when  I  maintain  that  this,  the  quality  of  space  and 


■iaiiiii»!iiiiiiiB»niiiw^^^^^^ 


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time,  lies  in  me,  in  my  mode  of  perception,  and  not 
in  said  objects  in  themselves,  I  by  no  means  say  that 
the  one  object  (the  things  without)  merely  decep- 
tively seems  outside  of  me,  or  that  the  other  object 
(my  own  soul)  merely  deceptively  seems  given  in  my 
self-consciousness.  It  would  be  my  own  fault,  if  I 
made  a  deception  of  what  was  an  object  of  sense 
proper — if  I  made  Schein  of  what  was  an  Erschein- 
ung.^ Such  a  blunder  is  no  result  of  our  principle, 
however — of  the  ideality,  that  is,  of  all  our  percep- 
tions of  sense.  Rather,  were  objective  reality  attri- 
buted to  our  said  sense-forms,  the  result  then  would 
be  the  unavoidable  transformation  of  all  and  every- 
thing into  a  mere  mock-show.  For,  were  space  and 
time  regarded  as  entities  such  that,  in  their  very 
possibility,  they  were  necessarily  found  in  things  in 
themselves,  then  we  should  have  before  us  two  infinite 
things  which,  though  not  substances,  nor  even  any- 

*  Jw  relation  to  sensCy  the  predicates  of  sense  may  be  allowably  attri- 
buted to  the  object  (Erscheinung),  as  redness  or  fragrance  to  the  rose. 
But  illusion,  false  show  (Schein),  can  never  be  attributed  as  predicate  to 
the  object.  And  the  reason  is  that,  in  the  case  of  illusion,  we  attribute 
to  the  object  in  itself  what  belongs  to  it  only  in  relation  to  sense,  or 
indeed  to  a  subject  generally  ;  as,  e.g.,  the  "  two  handles"  were  attributed 
at  first  to  Saturn.  What  is  not  at  all  to  be  found  in  the  object  in  itself, 
but  always  in  its  relation  to  the  subject,  and  is  insepiirable  from  the  per- 
ception of  the  former,  is  sense-appearance ;  and  the  predicates  of  space 
and  time,  consequently,  are  rightly  attributed  to  the  objects  of  the  senses 
as  such.  That  is  sense-appeamnce  (Erscheinung),  and  not  sense-illusion 
(Schein).  On  the  other  hand,  let  me  attril)ute  the  redness  to  the  rose  in 
itself,  the  "handles"  (as  existent  fact)  to  Saturn,  or  extension  to  all  outer 
objects  in  themselves,  without  consideration  of  the  particular  relation  of 
the  object  to  the  subject  in  each  of  these  cases,  and  without  accordant 
limitation  of  my  judgment — then  I  have  involved  myself  in,  or  given 
rise  to,  illusion. — K. 

The  ring  of  Saturn,  when  first  seen  by  Galileo,  looked  like  "  two 
handles."  TJjis  was  in  1612.  In  1655,  again,  Huyghens  explained  the 
"handles"  by  reference  to  the  ring.  And  in  1715  Cassini  discovered 
that  the  ring  was  double.  Since  1850  a  third  ring  has  been  added,  and 
what  is  now  talked  of  is  Saturn's  "  series  "  or  "  system  "  of  rings. 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


1G7 


i 


thing  actually  inherent  in  substances,  were  yet  some- 
thing existent,  nay,  the  necessary  conditions  of  the 
existence  of  all  things ;  and  which  would  continue  to 
exist  were  all  other  things  put  an  end  to.  We  have 
only  to  reflect  on  the  absurdities  in  which  this  sup- 
position would  involve  us,  to  find  it  very  pardonable 
on  the  part  of  the  good  Berkeley  that  he  reduced  all 
things  into  a  mere  illusion.  Why,  even  our  own 
existence,  were  it  conceived  dependent  in  such  fashion 
on  the  self-subsistent  reality  of  a  nonentity  like  time, 
would,  with  time  itself,  be  necessarily  transformed 
into  a  mere  show, — an  absurdity  for  which  no  man 
as  yet  has  made  himself  responsible. 

IV.  In  natural  theology  where  what  is  thought  is 
not  only  for  us  no  object  of  perception,  but  never 
can  be  even  to  its  own  self  an  object  of  sensuous  per- 
ception, we  are  careful  to  remove  the  conditions  of 
time  and  space  from  all  perception  on  the  part  of 
such  object  (for  cognition  in  such  a  case  must  be 
perception,  and  not  thought,  which  always  shows 
limits).  But  with  what  right  should  we  do  this,  if 
we  have  first  of  all  assumed  both  time  and  space  as 
forms  of  things  in  themselves,  and  such  as  would 
continue  to  be  a  priori  conditions  of  things,  even  if 
these  things  themselves  were  once  for  all  annihilated ; 
for,  as  conditions  of  existence  as  a  whole,  they  must 
necessarily  be  conditions  of  the  existence  of  God? 
But  if  we  are  not  to  make  them  objective  forms  of  all 
things,  then  there  is  nothing  left  us  but  to  make  them 
subjective  forms  of  our  own  mode  of  perception, 
whether  outer  or  inner  —  a  mode  of  perception, 
further,  which  is  to  be  recognised  as  sensuous  for  the 
reason  that  it  is  not  oinginal.  An  original  perception, 
namely,  is  such  that  through  it  the  very  being  of  its 
object  is  given  ;  and  this  is  a  perception  which,  so 


\ 


168 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


far  as  we  see,  can  only  belong  to  God.  A  sense-per- 
ception, such  as  ours,  on  the  contrary,  is  dependent 
on,  and  subservient  to,  the  object,  and  is  conse- 
quently only  possible  by  this,  that  the  perceptivity  of 
the  subject  is  by  said  object  aflPected. 

It  is  not  necessary,  either,  that  we  should  con- 
fine a  perception  in  space  and  time  to  the  sensibility 
of  man.     It  may  be  that  all  finite  thinking  beings 
must,  in  that  respect,  necessarily  be  identical  with 
us  (though  we  cannot  decide  as  much)  ;  but  it  would 
not  follow,  from  this  universality,  that  such  a  mode 
of  perception  were  not  still  sense.     It  would  still  be 
a    derivative    perception    {mtuitus    derivativus),    and 
not  original  (intuiius  originarius) .     That  is,  it  would 
not  be  an  intellectual  perception,  such  as,  for  the 
reason  alleged,  appears  to  belong  to  God  only,  and 
never   to  a   being  that  is  dependent  as  well  in  its 
existence  as  in  its  perception   (which  is  determina- 
tive of  its  existent  states  in  regard  to  given  objects). 
But  this  latter  remark  is  only  in  place  here  in  our 
ajsthetic  theory  as  an  illustration,  and  must  not  be 
accounted  a  ground  of  proof 

Conclusion  of  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic. 

In  resolution  of  the  general  problem  of  our  tran- 
scendental philosophy  (How  are  synthetic  propositions 
a  priori  possible?),  we  now  possess  here  one  of  the 
required  resources.  We  have  now,  namely,  pure 
a  jmori  perception,  as  such  resource,  the  forms  of 
which  are  space  and  time.  In  these,  when,  in  an 
a  priori  judgment,  we  would  go  beyond  a  given 
notion,  we  have  the  means  of  finding  what  can  be 
a  priori  discovered  (not,  indeed,  in  the  notion,  but  ' 
very  certainly  in  the  perception  correspondent  to  it), 


\ 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


169 


and  may  be  synthetically  united  with  it  (the  notion). 
That,  however,  amounts  to  certain  judgments;  which 
judgments  can,  at  the  same  time,  never  extend  further 
than  to  objects  of  the  senses,  nor  possess  validity  for 
any  others  than  those  of  possible  experience. 


Transcendental  Logic. 

I.  Of  Logic  in  General. 

Our  cognition  has,  on  the  part  of  the  mind,  two 
sources.     Of  these  the  first  is  the  receptivity  of  im- 
pressions, and  the  second  the  spontaneity  of  notions. 
Or  the  first  receives  the  crude  appearances  of  sense, 
and  the  second  works  them  up  into  the  finished  per- 
ception of  an  object.     An  object,  consequently,  is  by 
the  first  given^  but  by  the  second  thought — thought, 
that  is,  in  relation  to  the  sense-impression,  the  sense- 
appearance,  which,  for  its  part,  and  solely  as  such,  is 
merely  afiection  of  the  sensory.     Crude  sense-percep- 
tion and  notions,  therefore,  constitute  the  elements  of 
all  our  perfected  perception,  or  perception  as  ordi- 
narily understood.     Neither  notions  without  sense-ele- 
ments in  some  way  correspondent  to  them,  nor  sense- 
elements  without  notions,  are  capable  of  furnishing  a 
finished  perception.     Both,  again,  are  either  pure,  or 
else  empirical — empirical^  when  involving  special  sen- 
sation (which  presupposes  the  actual  presence  of  an 
object);  and  pure,  when,  in  the  intimation  to  con- 
sciousness,  there  is   no  admixture  whatever  of  any 
element  of  sensation  as  such.     This  element,  indeed, 
sensation  as  such,  may  be  named  the  matter  of  sense- 
cognition.     Pure  perception,  again  (that  is,  perception 


M 


-'ifiiiti"ii i-''iiii'iliiiBiiiiiiiiiiiiiiyiiiyiii    . 


■JlWk 


I 


170 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


171 


as  perception  properly  and  strictly  so  called,  and  pure 
as  being  yet  free  from  either  sensation  or  notion),  is 
tantamount  to  the  form  (space  and  time)  under 
which  the  perception  of  anything  actual  can,  in 
general,  take  place;  while  pure  notions,  for  their 
part,  constitute  the  form  (rather  forms)  under  which 
an  object  in  general  must  be  thought — in  order  to  be 
perceived,  namely.  Pure  perceptions  or  pure  notions 
are  alone  possible  a  j^^oi'i;  empirical  ones  only 
a  /josieriori. 

If  we  name  the  susceptivity  of  mind  to  receive  ele- 
ments, so  far  as  it  is  in  some  certain  way  affected, 
sensibility^  then  the  power,  on  the  other  hand,  to  p'o- 
dtice  elements,  or  the  spontaneity  of  notions  (towards 
perception,  namely),  is  the  understanding  A  Our  con- 
stitution is  such  that  what  we  distinctively  mean  by 
perception  as  an  element  or  form,  must  always  be  of 
the  nature  of  sense  (though  not  necessarily  a  special 
sensation) ;  that  is,  perception,  as  perception  proper, 
applies  to  the  manner  in  which  (sensation  as  sensation 
conceived  apart)  we  are  affected  by  objects.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  faculty  that,  to  the  sense-perceptive 
elements  in  the  case  of  an  object,  adds  the  required 
thought- perceptive  elements,  is  the  understanding. 
Neither  of  these  elements  is  to  be  preferred  to  the 
other.  Without  sensibility  there  were  no  object  per- 
ceptively given,  and  without  understanding  there 
were   no    object    perceptively    thought.      Thoughts, 

*  Kant's  language  here  will  never  be  understood,  if  to  such  words  as 
notion^  cogniiim,  spontaneity,  wider  standing,  etc.,  there  be  given  no  refer- 
ence but  the  usual  intellectual  one  of  thought  proper  as  opposed  to  sense. 
They  must  all  of  them  take  on,  in  addition,  a  direction  to  perception. 
Pure  perception  is  time  and  space.  Crude  perception  is  these  inspissated, 
by  special  sensations,  into  ErscJieinungen,  which  are  objects,  but  as  yet 
without  the  foci  of  the  categories.  Complete  or  finished  perception, 
lastly,  is,  by  addition  of  action  from  the  categories,  the  ordinary  percep- 
tion of  experience  proper. 


S^ 


without  a  content  of  perception,  are  void ;  perceptions, 
without  the  focus  of  notions,  are  blind.  It  is  just  as 
necessary,  consequently,  to  add  perceptions  to  one's 
notions,  as  to  add  notions  to  one's  (crude)  perceptions. 
Neither  faculty  can  exchange  functions  with  the 
other.  The  understanding  does  not  perceive;  nor 
the  senses  think.  Only  in  their  union  is  there  what 
cognition  we  name  finished  or  perfected  objective 
perception,  the  perception  of  experience.  But  we 
must  not  on  that  account  confound  their  shares  in 
the  resultant  act;  on  the  contrary,  we  must  carefully 
separate  and  distinguish  them.  Accordingly,  we  ex- 
pressly distinguish  the  Science  of  the  Rules  of  the  Sen- 
sibility as  such  (Esthetic),  from  the  Science  of  the 
Rules  of  the  Understanding  (Logic). 

Now  logic,  again,  can  be  understood  in  two  ways : 
either  as  logic  general,  or  as  logic  special,  and  in  both 
cases,  of  course,  with  reference  to  the  employment 
of  the  understanding.  The  former  will  contain  the 
absolutely  necessary  rules  of  thought,  or  those  rules 
without  which  there  can  simply  be  no  employment 
of  the  understanding  at  all ;  it  relates  to  the  under- 
standing without  respect  of  the  different  objects  to 
which  it  may  be  directed.  The  latter  will  apply  to 
the  rules  rightly  to  think  some  certain  class  of  objects. 
We  may  name  the  one  elemental  logic,  the  other  an 
organon  of  this  or  that  particular  science.  The  latter 
is  frequently  premised  in  the  schools  as  propaedeutic 
of  the  sciences,  although  it  is  what  is  reached  latest 
in  the  progress  of  reason — reached,  indeed,  only  when 
the  science  itself  has  long  been  ended,  and  requires 
only  the  last  touch  for  its  due  adjustment  and  final 
completion.  For  objects  must  themselves  be  under- 
stood in  a  pretty  high  degree,  if  we  are  to  assign  the 
rules  by  which  a  science  of  them  is  to  be  realized. 


i  \ 


I 


tjfliiir"*«y«»=''"i'-  ■-■■■■   .^ 


1 


172 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


Ipt 


V 


As  for  general  logic,  it  is  either  pure  or  applied. 
In  the  former  we  abstract  from  all  empirical  con- 
ditions under  which  our  understanding  is  exercised. 
We  abstract  in  it,  for  example,  from  the  influence  of 
the  senses,  the  sport  of  fancy,  the  laws  of  memory, 
the  power  of  habit,  inclination,  etc.  We  abstract, 
consequently,  also,  in  it,  from  the  sources  of  prejudice, 
nay,  in  general,  from  all  causes  whence  special  cogni- 
tions arise  to  us  or  are  interpolated,  inasmuch  as  they 
merely  concern  the  understanding  under  special  cir- 
cumstances of  Its  application,  and  to  know  these 
experience  is  required.  A  general  but  pure  logic  has 
to  do,  therefore,  with  mere  principles  a  priori,  and  is 
a  canon  of  the  understanding  and  reason,  but  only  as 
regards  the  formal  element  in  their  use,  the  matter,  on 
its  part,  again,  being  what  it  may  (empirical  or  tran- 
scendental). A  general  logic,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
then  called  applied  when  it  is  directed  to  the  rules  of 
the  exercise  of  understanding  under  the  empirical 
subjective  conditions  which  are  taught  us  by  psycho- 
logy. This  logic,  therefore,  is  possessed  of  empirical 
principles,  although  it  is  in  so  far  general  as  it  con- 
cerns the  exercise  of  understanding  without  distinction 
of  objects.  It  is  for  this  reason  also  that  this  logic  is 
neither  a  canon  of  the  understanding  generally,  nor 
an  organon  of  special  sciences,  but  solely  a  catharticon 
of  the  common  or  ordinary  understanding. 

In  general  logic,  there  must  be  an  entire  separation 
between  the  pure  and  the  applied  parts.  The  former 
part  alone  is  properly  science,  though  brief  and  dry, 
and  such  as  an  academical  statement  requires  on  the 
part  of  an  elemental  logic.  Here,  therefore,  logicians 
must  have  always  two  rules  in  their  eye. 

1.  As  general  logic,  it  abstracts  from  all  diversity 
of  objects  in  cognition,  and  from  these  themselves  ; 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


J 


173 


it  has  to   do  with  nothing  but  the  mere  form  in 
thinking. 

2.  As  pure,  it  has  no  empirical  principles,  and, 
consequently,  does  not  (as  has  been  sometimes  sup- 
posed) take  anything  from  psychology,  which,  in 
reality,  has  no  influence  upon  a  canon  of  the  under- 
standing. It  is  a  demonstrated  doctrine,  and  every- 
thing in  it  must  be  quite  a  priori  certain. 

What  (contrary  to  the  common  use  of  the  word 
which  relates  to  certain  exercitia  on  the  rules  of  pure 
logic)  I  name  apjdied  logic,  is  an  exposition  of  the 
understanding  and  of  the  rules  of  its  necessary  exer- 
cise in  concreto,  namely,  under  the  contingent  condi- 
tions  of  the   subject,    which,    as   such,    may    either 
obstruct  or  promote  said  exercise,  and  which  collec- 
tively can  only  empirically  be  given.     It  treats  of 
attention,  its  obstacles  and  advantages,  the  sources  of 
error,  the  state  of  doubt,  hesitation,  persuasion,  etc. 
Pure   general  logic   bears  the  same   relation  to  it, 
therefore,  that  a  pure  ethic  (which  contains  only  the 
necessary  moral  laws  of  free-will  as  such)  bears  to  the 
special  doctrine  of  oflices,  which  treats  of  those  laws 
as  under  the  hindrances  of  the  feelings,  desires,  and 
passions,  to  which  mankind  are  more  or  less  prone. 
Such  doctrine  evidently  resembles  the  applied  loo-ic, 
as  standing  in  need,  like  it,  of  empirical  and  psycho- 
logical principles,  and  is  consequently  inadequate  to 
a  true  and  demonstrated  science. 


II.  Of  Transcendental  Logic. 


General  logic  abstracts,  as  we  have  shown,  wholly 
from  the  matter  of  cognition,  that  is,  from  any  refer- 
ence of  cognition  to  an  object  of  it;  and  regards 
alone  the  logical  form  in  the  relation  of  the  cognitions 


174 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THK  KRITIK  OF  TÜRE  REASON. 


175 


the  one  to  the  other,  or  the  form  of  thouglit  quite 
generally.  Inasmuch,  now,  as  there  are  (according  to 
the  transcendental  aesthetic)  as  well  pure  as  empirical 
perceptions,  it  is  possible  that  a  like  difference  may 
be  found  between  the  pure  and  the  empirical  thinking 
of  objects.  In  that  case  we  should  have  the  possibility 
of  a  lomc  in  which  abstraction  from  all  matter  of 

o 

cognition  would  not  be  necessary.  For  there  might 
be  a  logic,  excluding,  indeed,  empirical  matter,  but 
admitting  all  that  could  be  a  priori  cognised  (through 
perceptions  or  notions)  in  reference  to  objects  even 
as  experienced  in  actual  fact.  Such  logic  would 
relate,  consequently,  to  the  origin  of  our  actual  per- 
ception and  other  cognition  of  objects  of  experience, 
so  far  as  that  origin  did  not,  or  could  not,  lie  in  these 
objects  themselves.  It  is  otherwise,  of  course,  with 
general  logic,  which,  for  its  part,  has  nothing  to  do 
with  any  such  origin  of  the  actual  perception  and 
cognition  of  objects.  On  the  contrary,  it  considers 
only  the  laws  followed  by  the  understanding  in  its 
process  of  thought  as  concerns  objects  in  their  mutual 
relations  generally,  without  distinction  either  of  these 
objects  themselves  or  of  their  origin,  whether  ajmori 
or  empirical.  General  logic,  indeed,  treats  only  of 
what  forms  of  the  understanding  ideas  must  accept, 
let  them  originate  or  be  as  they  may. 

And  here  I  place  a  remark  which,  as  influencing 
all  our  subsequent  proceedings,  must  be  carefully  kept 
in  view.  The  designation  transcendental,  namely 
(which  means  the  possibility  of  such  perceptive  a 
priori  knowledge,  and  the  rationale  of  its  application 
in  actual  fact),  is  not  to  be  extended  to  every  a  ]}rion 
element,  but  only  to  those  which  enable  us  to  recog- 
nise the  fact  thatj  and  the  mode  hoio^  certain  states  of 
conaciansöeas  (perceplioiis  oi  »ötioiis)  are  wholly  and 


solely  of  a  priori  possibility  and  of  a  priori  action. 
Hence  we  must  neither  call  space,  nor  any  a  j^riori 
determination  of  space,  as  in  forms  of  geometry, 
transcendental.  What  alone  is  transcendental  is,  as 
well  the  perception  that  these  things  (space,  etc.)  are 
not  of  empirical  origin,  as  also  the  possibility  that 
and  how,  nevertheless,  they  may  even  a  priori  con- 
join themselves  to  actual  objects  of  experience.  ^  In 
like  manner,  the  relation  of  space  to  objects  generally 
is  transcendental;  but,  restricted  (with  reference  to 
the  result)  to  objects  of  the  senses,  it  is  empirical. 
The  distinction,  therefore,  between  what  is  transcen- 
dental and  what  empirical  has  place  only  in  the 
critique  of  the  cognitions,  and  does  not  concern  the 
conjunction  of  these  with  their  objects. 

In  the  expectation,  tlien,  that  there  are  possibly 
notions,  a7>nm  entrant  into  objects,  not  in  the  manner 
of  perceptions,  indeed,  whether  pure  or  sensible,  but 
merely  as  pure  thought-functions  —  notions,  conse- 
quently, which  are  in  origin  neither  empirical  nor 
a?sthetic — we  prefigure  the  idea  of  a  science  of  pure 
cognition  which,  though  exclusively  holding  of  under- 
standing and  reason,  will  enable  us  to  think  facts  of 
actual  experience  even  wholly  a  priori  A  science 
determinative  of  the  origin,  limits,  and  objective 
actuality  of  such  cognitions,  would  necessarily  take 
the  name  of  Transcendental  Logic,  It  would  have  to 
do,  namely,  only  with  the  laws  of  understanding  and 
reason,  and  this  expressly  in  an  objective  application  a 
priori;  and  not  indifferently,  like  general  logic,  in 
reference  to  interests  whether  empirical  or  pure. 

^  In  the  above  sentence  the  word  "könne"  should  evidently  be  in 
the  plural.  Otherwise  the  only  possible  nominative  to  this  verb  would 
be  "  Erkenntniss/'  which  makes  tautological  nonsense  of  the  sentence, 
analyze  it  grammatically  as  one  may. 


i 


I 


y 


176  TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 

III.  Of  the  Division  of  General  Logic  into  Analytic  and 

Dialectic. 

The  old  and  well-known  question,  with  which 
logicians  were  supposed  to  be  put  to  straits  and  com- 
pelled either  to  have  recourse  to  a  miserable  dialexis  ^ 
or  to  admit  their  ignorance  and,  consequently,  the 
nullity  of  their  entire  business,  is  this,  What  is  truth? 
The  nominal  definition  of  truth,  that  it  is  the  anrree- 
ment  of  cognition  with  its  object,  is  here  admitted 
and  presupposed.  But  the  question  we  suppose  really 
to  be  asked,  is.  What  is  the  universal  and  certain 
criterion  of  the  truth  of  all  and  every  cognition  ? 

It  is  already  no  small  but  an  indispensable  proof 
of  sagacity  and  penetration  to  know  what  it  were 
rationally  proper  to  ask.  For,  the  question  itself 
being  absurd  and  only  calculated  to  elicit  useless 
answers,  it  has,  besides  shaming  the  questioner,  some- 
times the  further  disadvantaoje  of  misleading:  the 
unwary  hearer  into  absurd  replies,  and  suggesting 
the  ludicrous  spectacle  of  one  man  (as  the  ancients 
said)  milking  the  he-goat,  while  the  other  holds  up  a 
sieve. 

If  truth  consists  in  the  a;?reement  of  a  coraition 
with  its  object,  then  this  object  must  be  thereby 
distinguished  from  others ;  for  a  cognition  is  false,  if 
disagreeing  with  its  object,  though  possessing  some- 
thing that  may  well  be  true  of  other  objects.  Now, 
a  universal  criterion  of  truth  would  be  such  as  holds 
good  of  all  cognitions,  without  distinction  of  their 
objects.  It  is  plain,  however,  that,  as,  in  the  case  of 
such  a  criterion,  there  is  abstraction  from  every 
matter  of  cognition  (reference  to  its  object),  and 
truth  precisely  concerns  this  matter,  it  is  quite  im- 

»  Kosenkranz  has  "  Diulele  "  instead  of  Diakxe, 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


177 


{ 


possible  and  absurd  to  ask  still  after  a  criterion  of 
the  truth  of  this  matter  of  the  cognitions ;  and  that, 
therefore,  it  is  impossible  also  to  assign  any  adequate 
criterion  of  truth  that  shall  at  the  same  time  be 
universal.  What  is  to  be  said  here,  then,  is,  that  of 
the  truth  of  cognition  as  regards  matter  there  is  no 
universal  criterion  to  be  required,  for  any  such  were 
a  contradiction  in  itself. 

But  it  is  equally  plain,  as  regards  cognition  in 
mere  form  (all  matter  apart),  that  a  logic,  confined 
to  the  universal  and  necessary  rules  of  the  under- 
standing, must  furnish,  just  in  these  rules,  criteria 
of  the  truth.  For  whatever  contradicts  these  is  false, 
inasmuch  as  the  understanding  would  then  contra- 
dict its  own  universal  rules  of  thought,  and  conse- 
quently its  own  self  These  criteria,  however,  con- 
cern only  the  form  of  truth  or  of  thought  generally, 
and  are  so  far  quite  correct,  but  not  all-sufficient. 
For  though  a  cognition  were  in  full  agreement  with 
the  logical  form,  and  consequently  did  not  contradict 
itself,  it  might  still,  nevertheless,  contradict  the  ob- 
ject. The  merely  logical  criterion  of  truth,  therefore, 
agreement  of  a  cognition,  namely,  with  the  universal 
and  formal  laws  of  the  understanding  and  reason,  is 
certainly  the  conditio  sine  qua  non  or  the  negative 
condition  of  all  truth.  Further,  however,  logic  can- 
not  go ;  and  the  error  which  concerns,  not  the  form, 
but  the  matter,  is  not  to  be  detected  by  any  touch- 
stone of  logic. 

Now,  general  logic  resolves  the  whole  formal 
business  of  understanding  and  reason  into  its  elements, 
and  exhibits  these  as  the  principles  of  all  logical  judg- 
ment in  cognition.  This  part  of  logic  may  be  called 
an  Analytic^  therefore,  and  is,  at  least,  the  negative 
touchstone  of  truth ;  for  by  these  rules  must,  first  of 

M 


t 


178 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT: 


all,  every  cognition,  in  form,  be  gauged  and  tried, 
before  looking  to  its  matter  in  order  to  determine 
whether,   with   reference  to  the  object,   it  possesses 
positive  truth.     But  the  mere  form  of  cognition,  how- 
ever much  it  may  agree  with  logical  laws,  falls  still 
far  short  of  constituting,  as  such,  material  or  objective 
truth.     In  respect  of  objects,  no  one  with  mere  logic 
can  venture   to  pronounce,   or  maintain   anything; 
but,  having  first  of  all  thoroughly  inquired  into  them, 
logic  apart,  only  afterwards  one  merely  tries  the  using 
and  connecting  of  them  in  a  coherent  whole  on  logical 
laws,  or,  better  still,  submits  them  solely  to  the  test  of 
these.      Nevertheless,   however  poorly  off,   or   quite 
void,  we  may  be  as  regards  matter,  the  possession  of 
such  plausible  art  to  bestow  on  all  our  cognitions  the 
form  of  the  understanding  proves  so  seductive  that 
said  general  logic,  though  a  simple  canon  in  judging, 
has,  at  least  for  the  mere  blind  show  of  objective 
affirmations,  been  used,  or,  in  effect,  misused,  as  an 
organon  of  actual  production.     Now,  general  logic, 
as  such  supposititious   organon,    is   what  we   name 
Dialectic, 

However  variously  in  meaning   the   ancients  ap- 
plied  this  appellation   of  a  science  or  art,   we  can 
always  confidently  gather  from  their  actual  use  of  it 
that  they  intended  by  it  only  the  logic  of  {fake)  shoio, 
A  sophistical  art  to  give  ignorance,  nay,  intentional 
trickery,  the  colour  of  truth,  it  imitated  the  rigour  of 
logic,    and   applied  its  topic  in   concealment'' of  all 
manner  of  empty  pretexts.     Now,  we  may  regard  as  a 
safe  and  serviceable  warning  the  fact  that  general 
logic,  when  used  as  an  organon,  is  always  dialectical, 
or  a  logic  of  show.     For,  as  it  tells  us  nothing  of  the 
matter  of  cognition,  but  only  the  formal  conditions 
of  agreement  with  the  understanding,  which,  of  course. 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


179 


) 


^r 


in  respect  of  objects,  are  quite  indifferent,  we  must 
regard  the  idea  of  using  it  as  a  means  (organon)  of 
extending  and  enlarging,  at  least  in  pretension,  our 
knowledge— we  must  regard  this  as  eventuating  in 
nothing  but  an  empty  verbiage  of  affirming,  or  at  will 
denying,  with  some  show  of  truth,  whatever  we  please. 
^  Such  teaching  as  this  is  altogether  beneath  the 
dignity  of  philosophy.  For  this  reason  dialectic  has 
been  included  in  logic  rather  as  a  critique  of  dialectical 
show,  and  it  is  as  such  we  would  have  it  understood 
here. 

IV.  Of  the  Division  of  Transcendental  Logic  into  the 
Transcendental  Analytic  and  Dialectic. 

In  a  transcendental  logic,  we  isolate  the  under- 
standing, as  already,  in  the  oesthetic,  sense,  and  make 
prominent  merely  the  share  of  thought  in  our  per- 
ceptive experience,   which  is   alone  derived  thence. 
The  necessary  condition  for  action  of  such  principles 
is,  that  objects  be  given  us  in  sense-perception,  to 
which  then  they  may  be  applied.     For  without  such 
perception,  experience,  as  wanting  objects,   remains 
altogether  void.     That  part  of  transcendental  logic, 
therefore,    which   propounds   the   elements   of  pure 
understanding  in  experience,  and  the  principles  with- 
out which  no  object  can  anywhere  be  thought  into 
perception,  is  the  transcendental  analytic,  and  at  the 
sanie  time  a  logic  of  truth.     For  no  cognition  in  ex- 
perience   can    contradict  it,   without  losing   at   the 
same  time  all  its  matter,  that  is,  all  its  conjunction 
into  an  object,  and  consequently  its  truth.      It  is, 
however,  very  tempting  and  misleading  to  make  use 
of  these   pure   principles   by   themselves,    and   even 
beyond   the  limits  of  experience,   which   can   alone 
furnish  the  matter  or  objects  whereon  to  apply  them. 


180 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


In  this  way,  consequently,  understanding  runs  risk  of 
making,  through  mere  cobwebs  of  reason,  a  material 
use  of  its  own  simply /önna/ principles,  and  without 
discrimination  judging  of  objects  which  are  neither 
given  us,  nor  in  any  way,  perhaps,  cayi  be  given  us. 
Specially  calculated  to  yield  only  a  canon  of  judgment 
in  experience,  they  are  merely  misused,  when,  apply- 
ing them  universally  and  without  restriction,  we  ven- 
ture, in  respect  of  objects  generally,  with  pure  under- 
standing alone,  synthetically  to  judge^  pronounce,  and 
decide.     Such  use  of  pure  understanding  were  dia- 
lecticaL      The   second   part   of  transcendental  logic, 
therefore,  must  consist  of  a  critique  of  this  dialectical 
show,  and  be  named  Transcendental  Dialectic.     We  are 
not  to  expect  in  it,  however,  an  art  dogmatically  to 
produce  such  show,  which,  alas !  is  a  very  current  art 
of  manifold  metaphysical  juggleries.      Quite  on  the 
contrary,  it  shall  be  a  critique  of  understanding  and 
reason  in  their  hyperphysical  use,  in  order  to  detect 
the  false  show  of  their  groundless  pretensions.     Their 
supposed  claims,  therefore,  to  discovery  and  extension 
through  mere  transcendental  principles,  it  will  be  the 
business  of  this  critique  to  reduce  to  a  simple  estimate 
of  the  pure  understanding  and  the  preservation  of  it 
from  sophistical  deceits. 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


181 


be  pure,  and  not  empirical.     2.  They  must  belong, 
not  to  perception  proper  and  sense,  but  to  thought 
and  understanding.      3.  They  must   be  elementary 
and    primitive,    not   compound    or   derivative.      4. 
Their  table  must  be  complete,  so  that  they  shall  cover 
the  entire  field  of  pure  understanding.     But  now  this 
completeness,  as  of  a  single  science,  cannot  be  expected 
from  any  mere  rough  calculation  of  some  aggregate 
that  owes  its  existence  to  a  venture.     It  is  only  pos- 
sible through  the  idea,  rather,  of  a  whole  of  the  a  priori 
of  experience  that  belongs  to  the  understanding,  and 
a   whole,    too,    duly  distributed  into   its   constituent 
notions ;  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  it  is  only  possible 
through  the  connexion  of  these  notions  in  a  system. 
Pure  understanding,   then,  is,   as  such,   neither  em- 
pirical nor  sensuous.     Separated  thus,  it  constitutes  a 
self-subsistent  and  self-complete  unity,  that  is  not  to 
be  supplemented  or  improved  by  any  addition  from 
without.     The  sum  of  its  elements  will  constitute  a 
system  to  be  comprehended  and  determined  under  a 
single  idea,  and  so  that  its  completeness  and  articu- 
lation shall  furnish,  at  the  same  time,  a  touchstone  of 
the  purity  and  truth  of  every  article  of  cognition  that 
is  to  be  fitted  and  united  into  it.     This  part  of  tran- 
scendental logic  will  consist  of  two  books,  the  one 
appropriated  to  the  Jiotions  of  pure  understanding,  as 
the  other  to  its  judgments. 


Transcendental  Analytic. 

This  analytic  is  the  resolution  into  its  elements  of 
what  a  priori  cognition  in  experience  holds  of  the 
understanding.  And  here  the  following  points  require 
to  be  looked  to:— 1.  The  constituent  notions  must 


Book  I. — The  Analytic  of  Notions. 

I  understand  by  analytic  of  notions  not  the  analysis 
of  these,  or  the  usual  resort  in  philosophical  inquiries 
to  the  resolution  and  explication  of  occurrent  ideas, 


f 


182 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT 


but,  what  hitherto  has  been  little  attempted,  the  re- 
solution of  the  faculty  itself,  in  order  to  discover  the 
possibility  of  a  priori  notions,  and  in  this  way,  that 
we  look  for  them  in  the  understanding  alone  as  their 
place  of  birth,  whose  pure  function  we  analyze  as 
sucli.  That  is  what  operation  is  peculiar  to  a  tran- 
scendental philosophy ;  what  is  usual  else  is  but  the 
logical  discussion  of  notions  in  philosophy  generally. 
We  shall  pursue,  therefore,  pure  notions  into  their 
first  germs  and  principles  in  understanding ;  in  which 
germs  and  principles  we  are  to  suppose  they  lie  ready 
waiting,  till,  at  length  developed  by  occasion  of  ex- 
perience, and  by  the  same  understanding  freed  from 
adherent  empirical  conditions,  they  stand  forward  in 
their  perfection. 

Chapter  I.— Of  a  Clew  to  all  Pure  Notions  of  the 

Undekstandlng. 

When  we  set  a  faculty  into  action,  conformably  to 
the  various  occasions  various  notions  appear,  which 
express  the  faculty,  and  may  be  collected  in  a  more 
or  less  completed  sum,  according  as  the  attendant 
observation  has  been  longer  or  shorter,  closer  or 
slacker.  Where,  in  such,  so  to  speak,  mechanical 
proceeding,  any  such  inquest  is  to  be  regarded  as 
complete,  is  never  with  certainty  determined.  Neither 
do  the  notions,  thus  only  casually  discovered,  unravel 
themselves  in  any  order  or  systematic  unity,  but  are 
at  last  only  sorted  according  to  likeness,  and,  from 
the  simpler  to  the  more  complex,  ranged  according  to 
contents  in  series  which  are  nothing  less  than  sys- 
tematic, though  brought  about  by  method  of  a  sort. 

Transcendental  philosophy  has  the  advantage,  but 
the  obligation  too,  to  find  its  notions  in  conformity 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


183 


with  a  principle,  for  this  reason,  that  they  must  issue 
from  the  understanding  in  its  absolute  unity,  pure 
and  unadulterated ;  and  so  must  cohere  among  them- 
selves under  a  one  notion  or  idea.  But  such  sys- 
tematic articulation  offers  a  rule,  in  accordance  with 
which  there  may  be  a  priori  assigned  to  every  pure 
notion  its  place  and  to  all  together  their  rounded 
completeness ;  and  all  this  would,  any  other  wise,  be 
a  matter  of  chance,  or  of  one's  own  arbitrary  choice. 

Section  1.  Of  Understanding  in  its  Logical  Function  Generally. 

The  understanding  has  been  already  merely  nega- 
tively described  as  a  non-sensuous  intellectual  faculty. 
Now,  apart  from  sense,  we  are  insusceptible  of  any 
perception  proper.  The  understanding,  consequently, 
is  no  faculty  of  perception  proper.  But,  perception 
apart,  there  is  no  cognition  but  that  through  notions. 
Cognition  of  all,  more  especially  human,  understand- 
ing, is,  as  through  notions,  not  intuitive,  but  discur- 
sive. All  perceptions,  as  of  sense,  rest  on  affections  ; 
notions,  therefore,  on  functions.  But  by  function  I 
understand  that  unity  of  act  whereby  the  various 
units  in  a  cognition  are  ordered  into  a  single  common 
one.  Notions  found,  therefore,  on  the  spontaneity 
(self-action)  of  thought ;  as  sense-perceptions  on  the 
receptivity  of  impressions.  Notions,  now,  can  be 
used  by  understanding  only  in  so  far  as  it  judges  by 
them.  But  no  cognition  referring  directly  to  its  object 
unless  perception,  a  notion  will  be  necessarily  referred 
to  its  object  only  mediately,  that  is,  through  some  other 
intimation  of  it  (whether  perception  or  notion).  Judg- 
ment^ therefore,  is  the  mediate  cognition  of  an  object, 
and  consequently  the  cognition  of  a  cognition  of  it. 
In  every  judgment  there  is  a  notion  whicli,  compre- 


- 1 


184 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT 


hending  several,  is  applied  to  a  given  one ;  and  this 
latter  is  directly  referred  then  to  the  object.     Thus  in 
the  judgment,  All  bodies  are  divisible,  the  notion  of 
divisibility,  as  referable  to  several  others,  is  specially 
applied  to  one  among  these,  body ;  and  that,  again, 
to   certain  actual  objects  of  sense.     These   objects, 
therefore,  are  only  mediately  cognised  throu^^h  the 
notion    of  divisibility.     All  judgments   are,  accord- 
ingly, functions  of  unity  to  the  varietv  in  a  cognition  • 
in  the  cognition  of  an  object,  name'ly,  there  is  em- 
ployed m  judgment,  not  an  immediate  element   (of 
consciousness),  but  a  higher  one  comprehending  im- 
mediate elements  under  it ;  and  in  this  manner  several 
possible  units  of  cognition  are  combined  into  a  single 
one.     But  all  acts  of  understanding  may  be  reduced 
to  judgments,   and   understanding  itself,    therefore 
may  be  defined  a  fax:ulty  to  judge.     For,   as   above 
shown.  It  is  a  faculty  to  think.     Then  to  think  is  to 
cognise   through   notions.     And   notions,   again,   as 
predicates  of  possible  judgments,  conjoin  themselves 
into  the  conception  or  perception  of  some  (till  then) 
indefinite  object.      Thus  the  notion  body  refers  to 
something,  which  something  (a  metal,  say)  can  be 
cognised  through  said  notion.     Body,  then,  is  only  a 
notion  by  this,  that  other  elements  of  cognition  are 
contained  under  it,  through  which  it  gets  referred 
into  actual  objects.     Or  it  is  a  predicate  to  a  possible 
judgment,  as  that  every  metal  is  a  body.     The  func- 
tions of  the  understanding,  accordingly,  will  be  cap- 
able of  being  exhaustively  discovered,  if  we  can  but 
exhaustively  enumerate   the   functions   of  unity   in 
judgments.     But  that  this  is  very  easy  of  accomplish- 
ment,  the  following  section  will  show. 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


185 


A 


¥ 


J 


i 


Section  2  (§  9).  Of  the  Logical  Function  of  Understanding  in 

Judging. 

If  we  abstract  from  all  matter  of  a  judgment,  and 
consider  only  the  precise  form  of  the  understanding 
that  is  manifested  in  it,  we  readily  find  that  the 
functions  of  thought,  in  any  such,  may  be  reduced  to 
four  titles,  with  three  moments  under  each.  This  may, 
not  inaptly,  be  exhibited  in  the  following  table  :— 

1.  Quantity  of  Judgments:  Universal,  Particular, 

Singular. 

2.  Quality:  Affirmative,  Negative,  Infinite. 

3.  Relation:    Categorical,    Hypothetical,    Disjunc- 

tive. 

4.  Modality :  Problematic,  Assertoric,  Apodictic. 

Inasmuch,  now,  as  this  classification  seems,  in  some, 
though   inessential,    particulars,    to   differ   from    the 
usual  one  in  technical  logic,  the  following  premoni- 
tory explanations,  as  against  possible  misunderstand- 
ing, may  prove  not  unnecessary. 
^  1.  Logicians  say  rightly  that,  in  a  syllogism,  the 
singular  proposition  may  be  regarded  as  a  universal 
one.  ^  For  just  because  singulars  have  no  extension, 
is  it  impossible  that  the  predicate  in  such  should  be 
partly  affirmed  and  partly  denied  of  the  correspondent 
subject.     The  former  holds  good  of  the  latter,  there- 
fore,   without   exception,  just  as  though  this  latter 
were  a  universal  notion  to  which,  in  the  entire  import 
of  its  extension,  the  predicate  applied.     On  the  other 
hand,  again,  should  we  compare  a  singular  with  a 
universal  proposition  merely  as  a  cognition  and  in 
regard  of  its  magnitude,  then  the  former  stands  to  the 
latter  as  unity  to  infinif  ide,   and   in   itself,   conse- 
quently, essentially  differs  from  it.    When  I  consider, 


186 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


k\ 


therefore,  a  singular  proposition,  not  merely  in  its 
inner  validity,  but  also,  as  simply  a  cognition,  in  the 
magnitude  which  it  possesses  as  compared  with  others, 
then  certainly  it  is  different  from  universal  proposi- 
tions, and  deserves  a  place  of  its  own  in  a  complete 
table  of  the  moments  of  thought  as  such  (though  not, 
naturally,  in  a  logic  that  is  merely  addressed'to  the 
functions  of  judgments  in  their  mutual  relations). 

2.  Just  in  the  same  way,  infinite  propositions  must, 
in  a  transcendental  logic,  be  distinguished  from  affir- 
mative ones,  though,  in  general  logic,  they  are  rightly 
reckoned  with  these,  and  constitute  no  special  member 
of  distribution.     General  logic,  namely,  abstracts  from 
all  matter  of  the  predicate  (though  merely  negative), 
and  considers  only  whether  it  is  attributed  to  the 
subject  or  opposed  to  it.    Transcendental  logic,  again, 
considers  the  judgment  in  the  value  or  matter  of 
logical  affirmation  even  through  a  negative  predicate, 
and  what  gain  such  affirmation  procures  cognition  as 
a  whole.     Suppose  I  had  said  of  the  soul,  it  is  not 
mortal,  I  should,  by  means  of  a  negative  judgment, 
have  at  least  warded  off  error.     But  now,  logically,' 
I  have  here  really  affirmed,  seeing  that  I  have'iDlaced 
the  soul  in  the  unrestricted  sphere  of  the  non-mortal 
beings.      As  now,  of  the  whole  sphere  of  possible 
beings,  the  mortal  occupy  one  part,  and  the  immortal 
the  other,  there  is  nothing  else  said  in  my  proposition 
than  that  the  soul  is  one  of  the  infinite  number  of 
things  which  still  persist  when  I  suppress  the  mortal. 
But  here  the  infinite  sphere  of  relative  possibility  is 
limited  only  in  so  far  as  what  is  mortal  is  removed 
from  it,  and  the  soul  placed  in  the  remaining  amount 
of  its   extension.      This  amount  remains,   however, 
after  this  removal,  still  infinite ;  and  it  is  still  possible 
to  remove  other  parts  of  it,  without  the  notion  of  the 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


187 


/   P 


soul  being  thereby  in  the  least  increased  and  affirma- 
tively determined.  These  infinite  judgments  in  re- 
gard of  the  logical  extension,  therefore,  are  really 
merely  limitative  in  regard  of  the  matter  (compre- 
hension) of  cognition ;  and  must,  so  far,  not  be 
neglected  in  a  transcendental  table  of  all  moments  of 
thought  in  judgments,  inasmuch  as  the  function  of 
understanding  here  in  play  may,  possibly,  be  of  im- 
portance in  the  field  of  its  pure  a  priori  cognition. 

3.  All  the  relations  of  thought  in  judgments  are 
these :  a,  of  the  predicate  to  the  subject ;  6,  of  the 
antecedent  to  the  consequent ;  c,  of  a  disjunctive 
cognition  and  its  members  mutually.  Of  these,  there 
are  considered,  in  the  first,  two  notions,  in  the  second, 
two  judgments,  and  in  the  third,  several  judgments 
relatively  the  one  to  the  other.  The  hypothetical 
proposition.  If  perfect  justice  exists,  the  hardened 
criminal  will  be  punished,  involves  properly  the  rela- 
tion of  two  propositions,  namely,  that  perfect  justice 
exists,  and  that  the  hardened  criminal  gets  punished. 
Whether  both  of  these  propositions  be  in  themselves 
true,  remains  undetermined.  What  is  thousfht  in 
such  a  form  of  judgment  is  alone  the  consequence 
(between  the  members  of  it,  not  the  truth  of  tliese). 
Finally  the  disjunctive  judgment  considers  also  a 
relation  of  two  or  more  propositions  mutually — not 
that  of  the  consequence,  however,  but  that,  rather,  of 
logical  contraposition.  That  is,  it  considers  such  pro- 
positions so  far  as  the  sphere  of  the  one  excludes  the 
sphere  of  the  other,  and  yet  so  that  both,  or  all 
together,  constitute  in  common  the  whole  sphere  of 
the  special  cognition  in  question.  The  relation  in 
point,  therefore,  is  one  that  concerns  the  parts  of  the 
sphere  of  a  cognition,  where  the  sphere  of  the  one 
part  is  (towards  the   whole)   complementary  of  the 


188 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


Other  or  others.  We  say,  for  example,  The  world 
exists  either  through  blind  chance,  or  internal 
necessity,  or  an  external  cause.  Now,  here,  each  of 
these  propositions  represents  a  part,  and  all  together 
the  whole,  of  the  sphere  of  all  possible  cognition  in 
reference  to  the  existence  of  the  world.  To  exclude 
the  truth  from  any  one  of  these  spheres  is  to  place  it 
in  one  of  the  others ;  while  to  place  it  in  any  one  of 
these  latter  is  to  exclude  it  from  all  the  rest.  There 
is,  therefore,  in  a  disjunctive  judgment  a  certain  com- 
munity of  the  terms  of  the  cognition  involved.  This 
community  consists  in  the  fact  that  said  terms  recipro- 
cally exclude  each  other,  at  the  same  time  that  they 
determine  the  truth  as  a  whole,  inasmuch  as  collec- 
tively they  constitute  the  entire  import  of  the  single 
given  position.  And  this  is  what,  merely  for  the 
sake  of  the  sequel,  I  find  it  necessary  to  remark  here. 
4.  Modality  in  judgments  is  quite  a  special  function 
of  these.  What  distinguishes  it  is,  that  it  contributes 
nothing  to  the  matter  of  the  judgment  (for  besides 
quantity,  quality,  and  relation,  there  are  no  other 
constituents  of  the  matter  of  a  judgment),  but  only 
concerns  the  value  of  the  copula  in  relation  to 
thought  as  such.  Problematic  judgments  are  those 
where  we  assume  the  affirmation  or  negation  as 
merely  possible  (we  may  take  either  as  we  please). 
Assertoric  are  those  where  we  consider  the  one  or  the 
other  alternative  as  actual  (true).  Apodictic,  lastly, 
are  those  where  the  alternative  is  regarded  as  neces- 
sary.^ Thus  the  antecedent  and  consequent  of  an 
hypothetical  judgment,  as  well  as  the  members  of  a 
disjunctive  one,  are  all  problematic.     In  the  above 

»  Just  as  though,  in  the  first  case,  thought  were  a  function  of  the 
understanding  ;  in  the  second,  of  judgment;  and  in  the  third,  of  reason: 
a  remark  which  remains  la  le  explained  in  the  sequel.— K. 


4 

I 


THE    KRITIK    OF    PU1 

example,  the  proposition,  A  perfect  justice  exists, 
is  not  assertorically  spoken,  but  only  thought  as  a 
discretionary  judgment,  which  it  is  only  possible  that 
some  one  may  adopt :  only  the  consequence  is  asser- 
toric. Hence  such  judgments  may  be  manifestly 
false,  and  yet  constitute,  when  problematically  taken, 
conditions  of  knowledge  of  the  truth.  In  the  same 
way,  in  the  disjunctive  judgment,  the  proposition. 
The  world  exists  through  blind  chance,  is  only  of  a 
problematic  value.  It  is  possible,  namely,  that  it 
should  be  only  temporarily  assumed ;  and  yet,  in  its 
place,  it  serves  for  discovery  of  the  truth  (just  like 
indication  of  the  wrong  way  among  those  possible). 
The  problematic  proposition,  therefore,  is  such  as  ex- 
presses only  logical  (not  objective)  possibility  ;  and 
this  possibility  amounts  only  to  a  free  choice  in  the 
admission  of  such  a  proposition,  or  to  a  merely  dis- 
cretionary assumption  of  it  into  the  understanding. 
The  assertoric  proposition  expresses  only  logical 
actuality  or  truth.  Thus,  for  example,  in  an  hypo- 
thetical syllogism,  the  antecedent,  while  problematical 
in  the  major,  is  assertoric  in  the  minor.  In  such 
proposition  it  is  seen,  however,  that  it  is  united  to  the 
understanding  according  to  its  laws.  The  apodictic 
proposition  thinks  an  assertoric  one  as  determined  by 
these  very  laws  of  the  understanding  itself,  and  as 
a  'priori^  therefore,  in  the  assertion  it  makes ;  it  ex- 
presses in  this  way  logical  necessity.  Here,  now, 
inasmuch  as  all  is  incorporated  into  the  understand- 
ing in  grades— as  of  something  first  judged  prob- 
lematic, then  assertorically  assumed  true,  and  finally 
affirmed  to  be  inseparably  united  with  the  under- 
standing, or  apodictically  necessary — we  may  evi- 
dently name  these  three  functions  of  modality  quite 
as  well  so  many  moments  of  thought  as  such. 


EOOK   TO   KANT: 


Section  3  (§  10).  Of  the  Pure  Notions  of  the  Understanding 

(the  Categories). 

General  logic,  as  frequently  said  already,  abstracts 
from  all  matter  of  knowledge,  and  looks  for  percep- 
tions to  be  given  to  it  from  elsewhere,  in  order  to 
convert  these  into  notions ;  and  this  process  proceeds 
analytically.  Transcendental  logic,  on  the  other 
hand,  already  has  the  matter  offered  it  by  the  tran- 
scendental aesthetic  (the  composites,  namely,  of  time 
and  space  in  a  priori  sensibility),  as  a  material  for  the 
notions  a  priori  in  understanding;  and  without  it, 
plainly,  these  would  be  devoid  of  all  contents  and, 
consequently,  altogether  blank/  Or  space  and  time, 
as  conditions  of  our  receptivity,  under  which  alone 
objects  can  be  received  by  us  (and  which  conditions, 
therefore,  necessarily  affect  the  notion  of  an  object), 
possess  in  themselves  a  complex  or  composite  of  pure 
a  jjriori  perception  (or  pure  a  priori  objectivity). 
But  the  native  energy  (spontaneity)  of  our  thought 
demands  that  this  a  priori  perceptive  or  objective 
matter  (laid  into  imagination)  should,  first  of  all,  be 
run  over,  taken  up,  and  conjoined,  in  order  that  a 
cognition  (or,  so  far,  a  perception)  should  be  made  of 
it.  This  process  (of  imagination),  now,  I  term  syn- 
thesis. 

By  synthesis,  in  its  most  general  sense,  I  under- 
stand the  uniting  of  the  various  units  in  a  conscious- 
ness the  one  to  the  other,  and  the  combining  of  their 
complex  into  a  single  cognition  (perception).  Such 
synthesis  is  pure  when  the  materials  in  it  are  fur- 
nished for  it,  not  empirically,  but  a  priori  (as  those 

*  To  refer  the  "  sie  "  (as  an  it)  to  "  transcendental  logic  "  makes  a  poor 
sense.  This  "sie,"  then,  is  better  referred  to  the  "notions."  The 
"  würde  "  of  the  text,  consequently,  is  an  error  for  würden. 


^ 


f 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PUl 

that  are  furnished  by  time  and  space).  Before  all 
analysis  of  any  of  our  cognitions  these  cognitions 
must,  first  of  all,  evidently,  be  given ;  and  no  notions, 
so  far  as  matter  (not  form)  is  concerned,  can  analyti- 
cally originate.  It  is  synthesis  (let  its  matter  be 
empirical  or  a  priori)  which  first  makes  a  cognition 
(perception)  of  that  matter.  Said  cognition  or  per- 
ception may,  of  course,  in  the  first  instance,  be  crude 
and  confused,  and  require  analysis ;  but  it  is  the  syn- 
thesis which  specially  collects  the  units  (towards  per- 
ceptions), and  unites  them  all  into  a  single  sub- 
stantiality or  object.  Synthesis,  therefore,  is  what 
first  claims  our  attention,  when  we  would  inquire 
into  the  origin  and  nature  of  our  cognition  of 
objects. 

Synthesis  as  such  (this  is  made  clearer  again)  is  the 
mere  act  of  imagination,  a  blind,  but  indispensable, 
function  of  the  soul,  of  which,  indeed,  we  are  seldom 
ever  once  conscious,  but  without  which  we  should 
have  no  cognition  at  all.  But  again,  now,  to  bring 
this  first  synthesis  of  imagination  under  the  action  of 
notions,  that  is  a  function  of  U7iderstanding ;  and 
thereby,  first  of  all,  is  there  realized  for  us  the  cog- 
nition (perception)  of  experience,  in  its  proper  si«*- 
nification. 

Pure  synthesis,  quite  generally  conceived,  is  to  be 
further  understood  as  implied  in,  or  exemplified  by, 
each  of  the  pure  or  a  ^nm  notions  of  the  understand- 
ing.^    I  understand  by  this  (pure)  synthesis,  a  syn- 

»  The  original  runs,  "  Pure  synthesis,  generally  conceived^  gives  now  the 
pure  notion  of  understanding."  The  meaning,  even  in  this  way,  is  not 
too  oblique  tobe  understood,  if  for  "gives"  we  say  constitutes,  which 
really  is  the  force  of  the  German.  It  is  quite  possible,  however,  that  the 
"  den  "  shoukl  be  der,  which  would  reverse  the  positions  of  subject  and 
object,  but  only  place  them  as,  evidently,  they  naturally  should  be 
placed.     It  is  so  I  have  translated  the  sentence,  substituting  also  the 


Took  to  kant: 

thesis  that  rests  on  a  ground  of  synthetic  unity 
a  priori.  Thus  our  system  of  arithmetic  (as  observ- 
able more  especially  in  Ian  ar  numbers)  is  a  synthesis 
on  notions^  because  it  depends  on  a  common  ground  of 
unity  {e.g,^  the  decade).  But  in  such  a  case,  the  unity 
in  the  synthesis  of  the  constituent  complex  is  neces- 
sary. 

Analytically,  a  variety  of  objects  are  brought  under 
a  single  common  notion  ;  and  this  is  a  business  which 
belongs  to  general  logic.  But  not  to  bring  objects, 
rather  only  the  pure  or  a  priori  synthesis  implied  in 
objects,  under  the  scope  of  notions — this  is  a  process 
that  is  treated  by  transcendental  logic.  The  first 
element  that  must  be  given  for  the  a  priori  cognition 
of  objects  is  the  multiple  or  complex  of  pure  percep- 
tion (pure  objectivity— time  and  space).  The  second 
is  the  synthesis  of  this  complex  on  the  part  of  ima- 
gination ;  and  so  far  there  is  not  yet  a  cognition.  The 
third  element  towards  perception  of  an  object  on 
presentation  of  itself  is  constituted  by  the  notions 
which  introduce  further  unity  and  unities  into  this 
pure  synthesis,  and  which  consist,  indeed,  solely  in  the 
consciousness  of  this  synthetic  unity,  or  these  synthetic 
unities :  these  notions  belong  to  the  understanding. 

The  same  functions  which  variously  give  unity  to 

actual  plurals  which  the  generalizing  singular  is  really  meant  to  repre- 
sent. In  short,  what  is  to  be  understood  here  is  this.  A  category,  as  a 
notion,  implies  a  meaning  ;  and  that  is  a  unity  of  some  certain  complex 
or  multiple  (of  relation,  say).  A  multiple  so  placed  or  suspended  in  sucli 
a  unity  may  be  called  a  synthesis.  And  this  synthesis,  as  held  by  one 
of  the  a  pnori  notions  (or  categories)  in  the  system  of  such,  may  very 
intelligibly  be  spoken  of  as  "  imre  synthesis,  quite  generally  conceived." 
Each  category  is  such.  Or  each  category  is  a  unity,  but  a  unity  neces- 
sarily of  something.  That  is,  each  category,  in  the  system  of  such  (and  that 
system  is  tantamount  to  the  system  of  functions  wliich  constitute  self- 
consciousness),  as  a  concrete,  is  the  intellectual  unity  of  an  intellectual 
multiple.  (It  is  true,  too,  that  pure  synthesis  purely  cognised  just  is  the 
pure  notion :  der  for  "  den  "  involves  reine  for  "  reinen"). 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


193 


\ 


III 


the  several  terms  in  judgments,  extend  a  various  unity 
also  to  the  mere  syntheses  of  the  different  units  in 
perceptions.  These  latter  unities,  or  sources  of  unity, 
are  the  a  priori  notions  of  the  understanding  (the 
categories).  The  same  functions  of  understanding, 
therefore,  which,  by  means  of  the  analytic  unity, 
brought  about  the  logical  form  of  a  judgment  in 
notions,  do  also,  by  means  of  the  synthetic  unity 
(which  they  likewise  involve),  bring  about  a  transcen- 
dental objectivity  (of  union)  in  the  complexions  of 
perception.  These  functions,  in  this  latter  applica- 
tion, may,  consequently,  be  intelligibly  named  pure 
notions  of  the  understanding  (categories) :  they  have, 
intelligibly  also,  said  a  priori  action  on  objects;  and 
that,  plainly,  is  not  an  affair  of  general  logic.  ^ 

Now,  just  in  this  way  we  may  conceive  to  arise 
exactly  as  many  pure  notions  of  understanding 
(with  necessary  a  priori  action  on  the  objects  of  per- 
ception) as  there  are  logical  functions  of  all  possible 
judgments  in  the  preceding  table.  For,  through  said 
functions,  the  understanding  as  understanding  is  com- 
pletely exhausted,  and  its  powers  as  a  faculty  duly 
gauged.  We  call  these  notions  categories,  as  follow- 
ing Aristotle,  seeing  that  our  intention  with  them  is 
originally  the  same  as  his,  however  widely  different 
it  will  be  found  in  the  carrying  of  it  out. 

Table  of  the  Categories. 

1.  Quantity:  Unity,  Plurality,  Totality. 

2.  Quality :  Reality,  Negation,  Limitation. 

»  This  is  one  of  Kant's  very  worst  paragraphs,  and  I  have  been 
obliged  considerably  to  help  it.  I  shall  be  found  elsewhere  to  agree  with 
Rosenkranz  as  to  the  style  of  Kant,  and  to  defend  it  against  De  Quincey. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  to  be  admitted  in  the  end  that  no  author  writes  more 
contentedly  than  Kant  what  simply  comes  first  to  hand.  Hence  his 
many  confused,  over-claused,  and  cross-claused  sentences. 

N 


u . 


194 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


3.  Relation  :  Inherence  and  Subsistence  (Substance 

and  Accident),  Causality  and  Dependence 
(Cause  and  Effect),  Communion  (Reciprocity 
of  Action  and  Passion). 

4.  Modality :  Possibility — Impossibility,  Existence 

(Actuality) — ^Non-existence,  Necessity — Con- 
tingency. 

This,  now,  is  the  catalogue  of  all  the  primitive  pure 
notions  of  synthesis  which  understanding  a  jmori 
possesses,  and  only  by  reason  of  which,  too,  it  is  a 
pure  understanding,  seeing  that  it  is  by  them  alone 
that  it  can  understand  something  on  occasion  of  a 
complex  of  perception,  that  is,  think  an  object  of  per- 
ception (or,  simply,  perceive).  The  classification  is 
systematically  constructed  in  obedience  to  a  common 
principle,  namely,  the  faculty  to  judge  (which  just 
means  the  faculty  to  think).  It  is  no  product,  there- 
fore, merely  rhapsodical,  of  a  search  after  pure  ideas 
on  chance,  the  completeness  of  which  then  can  never 
be  relied  on ;  for,  being  realized  only  by  induction, 
it  is  impossible  to  understand  in  that  way  how  pre- 
cisely these  and  not  other  notions  should  constitute  a 
pure  understanding.  To  ask  after  such  primitive 
notions  was,  on  the  part  of  Aristotle,  an  idea  worthy 
of  an  acute-minded  man.  As  he  had  no  ffuidinff 
principle,  however,  he  could  only  pick  them  up  as 
they  came  in  his  way.  In  this  manner  he  got  to- 
gether at  first  ten  of  them,  and  these  he  called  cate- 
gories (predicaments).  In  the  end,  however,  he  be- 
lieved himself  to  have  discovered  other  five,  which  were 
consequently  named  post-predicaments.  Neverthe- 
less his  table  still  remained  defective  and  incomplete. 
Thus  some  of  its  articles  (quando,  ubi,  situs,  pius,  simul) 
are  iimli  of  sense,  as  another  {motus)  is  empirical,  and 


THE   KRITIK   OF  PURE   REASON. 


195 


these  ought  to  have  no  place  in  a  genealogical  tree  of 
pure  understanding.  Others,  again,  are  mere  deriva- 
tives (actio,  2.assio\  while  of  the  primitives  themselves 
there  are  several  wantinsr. 

In  the  last  reference,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  the 
categories,  as  the  true  root-notions  of  pure  under- 
standing, have  their  equally  pure  derivative  notions 
which,  in  a  complete  system  of  transcendental  philo- 
sophy, cannot  by  any  means  be  omitted.  At  present, 
however,  in  a  mere  critical  preliminary  inquiry,  I 
may  content  myself  with  only  mentioning  them. 

Let  me  beg  leave  to  call  these  pure  but  derivative 
notions  the  Predicables  of  pure  understanding  (as  in 
contrast  to  the  predicaments).      Once  we  have  the 
original  and   primitive  notions,  the  derivative  and 
subordinate  ones  may  be  readily  added,  with  the  re- 
sult of  completely  depicting  the  whole  tree  of  the  pure 
understanding.     As  I  have  to  do  here,  however,  not 
with  the  completion  of  the  system,  but  only  with  the 
principles  towards  it,  I  reserve  this  for  the  business  of 
another  work.     Still  as  much  as  this  may  be  pretty 
well  attained,  if,   with  guidance  of  the  ontological 
text-books,  we  range  under  the  category  of  causality 
the  predicables  of  force,  action,  passion ;  under  that 
of  reciprocity,  those  of  presence,  resistance;  under 
that  of  modality,  those  of  origin,  decease,  alteration, 
etc.     The  categories  being  combined  with  each  other, 
or  with  the  modi  of  pure  sense,  furnish  a  large  num- 
ber of  a  jjriori  derivative  notions.     To  note  these, 
and,  if  possible,  fully  specify  them,  would  be  a  profit- 
able and  pleasant  task,  but  one  that  mav  be  dispensed 
with  here. 

I  intentionally  omit  the  definitions  of  these  latter 
(derivative)  categories  in  the  present  work,  though, 
possibly,  in  possession  of  them ;  and  I  shall  not  con- 


196 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


sider  these  notions  themselves,  in  the  sequel,  any 
further  than  may  be  necessary  for  my  theory  of 
method.  In  a  system  of  pure  reason,  they  would 
rightly  enough  be  required  from  me ;  but  here  they 
would  only  cause  us  to  lose  sight  of  the  chief  interest 
in  question,  by  suggesting  doubts  and  provoking 
attacks  which,  without  any  loss,  we  might  very  well 
reserve  for  consideration  elsewhere.  It  is  clear 
enough,  just  from  the  little  I  have  said,  however,  that 
a  complete  relative  vocabulary,  with  all  needful  ex- 
planations, were  not  only  possible,  but  even  easy 
to  effect.  The  lines  are  once  for  all  there ;  it  is  only 
necessary  to  fill  them  up;  and  a  systematic  topic 
like  this  does  not  easily  allow  us  either  to  mistake 
hci  or  to  overlook  those  that  are  still  empty. 


§11- 

In  regard  to  this  table  of  the  categories  some  nice 
remarks  suggest  themselves,  which  may  not  be  with- 
out an  important  bearing  on  the  scientific  form  of  all 
general  interests  of  reason.  For  that,  in  the  theo- 
retical part  of  philosophy,  this  table  is  uncommonly 
serviceable,  nay,  indispensable,  in  assisting  us  com- 
pletely to  lay  out  the  plan  to  the  whole  of  a  science, 
so  far  as  it  rests  on  a  priori  notions,  and  mathemati- 
cally distribute  it  on  fixed  jmnciples^  is  already  evident 
of  itself  Said  table,  namely,  contains,  in  complete- 
ness, all  the  elementary  notions  of  the  understanding, 
nay,  even  the  form  of  a  system  of  such  in  the  human 
mind,  and  directs  us,  consequently,  to  all  the  moments 
of  any  projected  speculative  science,  not  omitting  its 
very  order ;  and  of  this  I  have  given  an  example  else- 
where {Metaph.  Prim,  of  Nat  Phil)  Here,  now,  are 
a  few  of  these  remarks. 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


197 


(I 

I 

r 


'li 


1.  The  four  classes  in  our  table  may  be  thrown  into 
two  divisions :  one  directed  to  objects  of  perception 
(no  matter  whether  pure  or  empirical),  and  the  other 
to  the  existence  of  these  objects  (so  far  as  they  are 
referred  to  the  understanding,  or  the  one  to  the 
other). 

1  would  call  the  classes  in  the  first  division  mathe- 
matical, and  those  in  the  second  dynamical  categories. 
Ihe  latter  alone  have  correlates,  the  former  have 
none;  and  this  difference  must,  presumably,  have 
Its  sufficient  reason  in  the  nature  of  the  under- 
standmof. 

2  Each  of  the  four  classes  of  categories  has  under 
It  three  subclasses;  and  this  gives  to  think,  the 
rather,  indeed,  that  all  other  division  a  i.riori  throu-h 
notions  IS  necessarily  a  dichotomy.  Again,  under  each 
class,  the  third  category  owes  its  origin  to  the  union 
ot  the  second  with  the  first. 

Thus  totality  is  nothing  else  than  plurality  regarded 
as  unity;  hmitation  is  realUy  in  union  with  mgatian; 
reciproay  is  substances  exchangeably  causal;  and  ,iece^. 
«y  lastly,  IS  ac«y  given,  as  it  were,  by  possibility 
Itself  For  all  that,  the  third  category  must  not  be 
considered  derivative  only,  and  notf  in  reality,  primi! 
tive.  In  fact,  the  union  in  question  for  the  result  in 
question  involves  a  special  act  of  understanding, 
which  IS  not  the  same  with  that  exercised  in  the  case 
of   he  first  and  second.      For  example,  the  notion 

fn^L-rf"  -"^T  '^'''  ^'•^  th«««  of  plurality 
Zih  I  ^''  '"  *^'  conception  of  the  infinite), 
^ether  from  my  uniting  the  notions  of  substance 
and  cazise  is  it  at  once  possible  to  understand  in- 
ßuence,  or  how  one  substance  can  be  cause  of  some- 
thing ,n  another  (and  v.  v.)  It  is  clear  that  a  special  act 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


199 


of  understanding  is  required  in  such  cases;  and  so 
of  the  rest. 

3.  In  the  instance  of  a  single  category,  that  of 
reciprocity,  is  its  analogy  with  the  correspondent 
logical  form  of  the  disjunctive  judgment,  not  so  strik- 
ing, perhaps,  as,  similarly,  in  that  of  the  others. 

But  for  conviction  here  it  is  to  be  observed  that,  in 
all  disjunctive  judgments,  the  sphere  (the  amount  of 
what  is  contained  under  each)^  is  conceived  as  a  whole 
divided  into  parts  (the  sub-notions).  And,  further, 
these  parts,  as  not  contained  the  one  under  the  other, 
are  not  thought  as  subordinated  the  one  to  the  other, 
but  as  co-ordinated  the  one  with  the  other ;  and  so 
that  they  do  not  affect  one  another  one-sidedly,  as  in 
a  series,  but  reciprocally,  as  in  an  aggregate :  one 
term  being  assumed,  all  the  rest  are  excluded,  and  v,  v. 

Now,  there  is  a  like  connexion  thought  in  a  wJiole 
of  things,  where  the  one  is  not  subordinated  as  effect 
to  the  other  as  cause  (of  its  existence),  but,  on  the 
contrary,  co-ordinated  as  again  and  reciprocally  cause 
(of  affections)  in  precisely  this  same  other's  regard 
(e.g.,  in  what  is  called  a  body,  where  the  parts  mutually 
attract,  but  also  mutually  exclude  each  other).  And 
this  is  quite  a  different  kind  of  connexion  from  what 
obtains  in  the  mere  relation  of  cause  and  effect  (<xround 
and  consequence),  where  the  result  does  not  again 
reciprocally  determine  the  antecedent,  and  (like  the 
Creator  with  the  creation)  does  not,  therefore,  con- 
stitute with  it  a  whole.  What  process  of  understand- 
ing refers  to  the  sphere  of  a  distributed  notion,  that 
same  process  we  observe  in  thinking  a  thing  as  divis- 
ible ;  and,  as  the  members  of  distribution  mutually 
exclude  each  other  in  the  fonner,  and  yet  together 
constitute  a  single  sphere,  so,  in  the  latter,  the  parts 

»  "  Each,"  for  "  ilun,"  here  remedies  a  granmiatical  oversight. 


are  conceived  as  such  that  existence  accrues  to  each 
(as  a  substance)  in  exclusion  of  the  rest,  but  yet  that 
all  are  bound  together  in  a  single  whole. 


§12. 

There  are  to  be  found,  however,  in  the  transcen- 
dental philosophy  of  the  ancients,  certain  pure  notions 
of  understanding,  which  are  put  forward  by  them  as 
a  priori  notions  of  objects.     These  do  not  make  part 
of  our  categories,  and,  if  to  be  admitted,  would  increase 
their  number ;  which,  on  our  principles,  is  manifestly 
impossible.     They  occur  in  that  well-known  proposi- 
tion of  the  scholastics,  Quodlibet  ens  est  unum,  verum, 
honum.     The  use  of  this  principle,  indeed,  as  issuing 
in  mere  tautologies,  proved  so  unsatisfactory  that,  in 
modern  times,   any  mention  of  it  in  metaphysic  is 
pretty  well  only  honorary.     Nevertheless,  how  empty 
soever,  a  thought  that  has  persisted  so  long  merits 
always  some  inquiry  into  its  origin,  as  well  as  justifies 
the  supposition  that  it  has  its  source  in  some  rule  of 
the  understanding,  which,  as  is  often  the  case,  has 
only  been  wrongly  interpreted.    These  supposed  tran- 
scendental predicates  of  things  are  nothing  else,  in 
truth,  than  logical  requirements  and  criteria  of  all 
cognition  of  things  in  general.     In  fact,  they  only 
subject  it  to  the  categories  of  quantity — to  unity, 
plurality,  and  totality.     These,  however,  which  ought, 
properly,  to  be  only  materially  taken,  as  concerned 
with  the  possibility  of  things  themselves,  the  ancients 
applied  only  in  a  formal  sense  as  bearing  on  logical 
requirement  in  every  cognition,  and  yet,  at  the  same 
time,   inconsiderately  regarded   them,  though   mere 
criteria  of  thought,  as  characteristics  of  things  in  their 
own  selves.     In  every  cognition  of  an  object,  namely, 


t^ 


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there  is  unity  of  the  notion ;  and  this  unity  may  be 
named  a  qtmlitative  unity,  in  so  far  as  there  is  thought 
under  it  only  the  unity  of  the  embraced  many  of 
units  in  the  cognition,  as  the  unity  of  plot  in  a  play, 
speech,  story.     The  second  requirement,  truth,  is  truth 
in  regard  to  the  constitutive  relations.     The  more 
true  relations  we  Jiave  as  depending  on  a  given  notion, 
the  more  signs  we  have  of  its  objective  reality.     This 
we  may  name  the  qualitative  number  of  characters  in- 
herent in  a  notion  as  their  common  ground  (but  not 
thought  in  it  as  quantity).     The  third  requisite  of 
cornpJeieness  applies  thus :  the  many,  namely,  are  con- 
versely brought  back  into  the  unity  of  the  notion, 
and  with  this  notion,  and  no  other,  they  must  fully 
coincide.     Now  this  may  be  termed  qualitative  com- 
pleteness  (totality).     From  all  this  it  is  evident  that 
these  logical  criteria  of  cognition  in  general  apply 
here  the  three  categories  of  quantity  (in  which,  as 
such,  the  quantitative   unity  implied  must  be  con- 
ceived to  be  thoroughly  homogeneous),  to  connect  as 
well  heterogeneous  elements  in  consciousness,  and  this 
through  the  quality  of  a  cognition  as  principle.     Thus 
the  criterion  of  the  possibility  of  a  notion  (not  of  an 
object)  is  the  definition,  in  which  the  unity  of  the 
notion,  the  truth  of  its  consequences,  and  the  complete- 
ness of  its  relations,  constitute  what  for  reintegration 
of  the  whole  notion  is  the  requisite  on  the  part  of 
itself.     Or  it  is  thus  also  that  the  criterion  of  an 
hypothesis  is  constituted  by,  first,  the  intelligibleness 
of  the  principle  adopted  in  explanation,  or  its  unity 
(as  without  supplementary  hypotheses) ;  second,  the 
truth  (agreement  with  themselves  and  with  experience) 
of  the  consequent  relations;  and,  third,  the  complete- 
ness of  the  principle  adopted  in  regard  of  these  rela- 
tions;  which  relati<|iii  ßöHtaiii  äo  more  and  no  less 


THE   KKITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


201 


than  was  assumed  in  the  hypothesis,  and  only  present 
again  a  posteriori  and  analytically  what  was  previously 
thought  a  priori  and  synthetically,  at  the  same  time 
that  they  are  in  entire  harmony  therewith.  The 
notions,  consequently,  of  unity,  truth,  and  complete- 
ness, do  not  at  all  supplement  the  transcendental 
table  of  the  categories,  as  though  it  were  incomplete ; 
but  the  application  of  these  latter  is  (their  reference  to 
objects  entirely  overlooked)  brought  under  general 
logical  rules  of  the  agreement  of  a  cognition  with  its 
own  self. 

Chapter  IL— Deduction  of  the  Categories. 

Section  1  (§  13),  Principles  of  a  Transcendental  Deduction 

in  General. 

Writers  on  jurisprudence,  when  discussing  rights 
and  their  violations,  distinguish,  in  an  action  at  law, 
the  question  of  law  (quid  juris)  from  the  question  of 
fact   (quid  facti) ;    and,   in  requiring  proof  in  both 
respects,  they  name  the  former,  which  is  to  make 
good  the  title  (the  right),  the  deduction.     We  com- 
monly employ  a  number  of  empirical  notions,  with- 
out any  one  thinking  to  question  them,  and  assume 
ourselves    authorized,    even   without    deduction,    to 
impute  to  them  a  certain  meaning,  because  we  have 
always  experience  to  fall  back  upon  in  proof  of  their 
objective  reality.     There  are  also  usurped  notions,  as 
Fortune,  Fate,  which  pass  current  with  almost  uni- 
versal assent,  but  are  at  times  called  upon  for  an 
answer  to  the  quid  juris ;  and  then  the  deduction  of 
them  proves  a  matter  of  no  small  difficulty,  for  neither 
from  experience  nor  reason  can  any  clear  title  be 
produced  for  them. 

But  among  the  many  notions  which  constitute  the 


I» 


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u 


very  mingled  web  of  human   cognition,    there   are 
some  which  are  destined  to  serve  a  purely  a  priori 
purpose  (entirely  independent  of  all  experience)  ;  and 
these  always  require  for  their  title  a  deduction.     For 
proofs  from  experience  are  incompetent  in  such  a 
case,  and  yet  we  would  understand  hoio  these  notions 
can  enter  into  and  refer  themselves  to  objects,  for 
the  idea  of  which  objects  they  (these  notions)  owe 
nothmg  to  experience.     I  call  the  explanation,  then, 
of  how  a  jmori  notions  can  have  this  application  to 
objects  of  experience  the  transcendental  deduction ;  and 
distinguish  it  from  the  empirical  deduction  which  for 
the  origin  of  an  idea  appeals  to  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion, and,  in  this  way,  involves  not  the  right  of  use, 
but  the  fact  of  existence. 

We  have  now  found  two  quite  diverse  elements, 
which,  however,  agree  in  being  both  a  jjriori  consti' 
tuents  of  objects  of  experience ;  namely,  on  the  one 
hand,  space  and  time  as  forms  of  sense,  and,  on  the 
other,  the  categories  as  forms  of  intellect.  To  require 
an  empirical  deduction  of  these  would  be  a  futile 
want ;  for  what  is  distinctive  of  their  nature  lies  pre- 
cisely in  this,  that  they  connect  themselves  with 
objects  without  owing  anything  to  experience  for  the 
idea  of  these  objects.  If,  then,  a  deduction  at  all  is 
required  for  these,  that  deduction,  plainly,  must 
be  always  transcendental. 

At  the  same  time,  in  the  case  of  these  notions,  as 
in  that  of  all  cognitions,  we  can  rightly  enouo-h 
inquire,  not  for  the  principle  of  their  possibility,  but 
for  the  occasions  of  their  appearance  in  experience. 
It  is  certainly  the  impressions  of  the  senses  which 
give  the  first  stir  to  the  production  of  experience 
and  the  movement  of  cognition  in  every  reference! 
Still,  experience,  or  cognition  generally,  includes  in 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PUEE   REASON. 


203 


itself  two  very  dissimilar  factors,  namely,  a  matter 
derived  from  the  senses  (sensation),   and  a  certain 
form  (for  the  ordering  and  arranging  of  this  matter) 
which  is  due  to  the  inner  source  of  understanding 
and  2^ure  perception.     Now,  it  is  on  occasion  of  the 
former  element  (sensation)  that  the   latter  faculties 
of  form  are  moved  to  bring  forward  and  introduce 
their  a  jmori  contributions.     An   inquiry  into  the 
earliest  struggles  of  our  faculties  in  order  to  ascend 
from  particular  perceptions  to  general  ideas,  has  un- 
doubtedly its  own  great  use ;  and  we  have  to  thank 
the  illustrious  Locke  for  having  first  opened  the  way 
to  this.     But  then  a  deduction  of  what  is  a  priori  can 
never  possibly  be  brought  about  in  that  way.     What 
is  a  imori  lies  quite  in  another  region ;  and  must 
produce,  for  its  license  of  use  in  the  future  (inquiries 
beyond  limit  of  experience),  quite  another  certificate 
of  birth  than  that  furnished  by  the  senses.     The  at- 
tempted   physiological   derivation,    therefore,    which 
concerns  only  a  question  of  fact,  and  can  never  be 
properly  called  deduction,   I   shall   denominate   the 
proof  of  our  possession  of  elements,  which  elements 
may  still  be  a  priori.     But  it  is  clear  that  of  such 
elements  it  is  a  transcendental,  and  not  an  empirical, 
deduction  that  is  required.     The  latter,  indeed,  in  an  a 
2mori  reference,  must  prove  always  a  vain  attempt,  on 
which  only  he  will  venture  who  completely  mistakes 
the  quite  peculiar  nature  of  the  interest  in  hand. 

Although,  however,  it  be  granted  that  the  only 
possible  deduction  of  what  is  a  priori  must  be  tran- 
scendental, it  does  not  immediately  follow  therefrom 
that  such  deduction  is  unavoidably  necessary.  We 
have  now,  by  means  of  a  transcendental  deduction, 
traced  space  and  time  to  their  sources,  and  we  have 
demonstrated  and  made  good  their  a  priori  objective 


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validity     Nevertheless,  geometry  goes  its  own  sure 
way  with  mere  a  priori  elements,  without  any  call  to 
exact  of  philosophy  a  letter  of  credit  in  respect  of  the 
pure  and  legitimate  origin  of  its  basal  notion,  space, 
üut  the  use  of  that  notion  in  this  science  applies  plainly 
to  the  external  world  of  sense,  of  the  perception  of 
which  space  is  the  pure  form,  and  in  which,  therefore, 
every  geometrical  cognition,  as  founding  on  a  prioii 
perception,  has  its  immediate  evidence.     The  co<rni. 
tion  Itself  here,  in  fact,  assumes  its  objects  as  (in  form) 
ai>nm  given  in  perception.     On  the  other  hand, 
there  arises  with  the  categories  an  absolute  necessity 
to  call  for  their  transcendental  deduction;  and  not 
for  theirs  only,  but  for  that  of  space  also.     The  cate- 
gories, namely,  do  not  in  themselves  act  upon  objects 
through  predicates  of  perception  and  sense,  but  of 
pure  a  priori  intellect :  they  refer  to  objects  generally 
without  all  conditions  of  sense.     They  neither  brin^ 
their  title  from  experience,  nor  can  they  foreshadow  in 
a  p,ton  perception  objects  on  which  before  all  expe- 
rience they  might  found  their  synthesis.     The  conse- 
quence is  that  they  raise  doubts  not  only  as  regards 
the  objective  validity  and  limits  of  their  own  use^  but 
even  make  equivocal  the  notion  of  space.     For  space 
objectively,  is  applied  by  them  beyond  the  powers 
of  sensuous  perception.      Hence    the   necessity  of 
a  transcendental  deduction,  as  above,  for  space  as 
well.       Ihe  reader,  then,  must  convince  himself  of 
the   indispensable   necessity   of  such   transcendental 
deduction,  before  he  has  taken  a  single  step  in  the 

reasoning  is  that,  though  geometry  is  of  an  a  priori  nature  an,I  Zl 
ca^ls  for  no  aeduction,  the  case  is  not  the  same  «-ith  the  cätt^^L    Thev 
require  to  be  deduced,  and  not  only  they,  but  the  space  wh!cT  hev  u,T 
and  must  use,  for  any  possible  application  on  their  Jart  to  ob  ec     at  aU 
pure  or  empmcal.    It  is  the  introduction  of  spacT  into  thi  s  „ten  "' 


THE   KRITIK   OF  PURE  KEASOK. 


205 


U 


I 


field  of  pure  reason.  Otherwise  he  will  proceed 
only  blindly,  and  will  find  himself,  after  many  wander- 
ings, obliged  to  return  to  the  ignorance  from  which 
he  had  set  out.  He  must,  however,  make  the  inevi- 
table difficulties  clear  to  himself  beforehand ;  in  order 
that  he  may  not  object  obscurity  when  it  is  the  matter 
is  deep,  or  be  too  soon  disheartened  when  hindrances 
obstruct.  For  it  comes  to  this,  either  to  give  up  all 
claim  to  discoveries  of  pure  reason,  and  in  that  her 
dearest  field  beyond  the  bounds  of  all  possible  expe- 
rience, or  else  to  complete  the  present  critical  inquiry. 

We  have,  with  little  difficulty,  made  intelligible 
above  how  space  and  time,  though  cognitions  a  ^^nm, 
join  themselves,  nevertheless,  necessarily  to  objects, 
and  render,  in  independence  of  all  experience,  a  syn- 
thetic cognition  or  perception  of  objects  possible. 
For,  inasmuch  as  only  through  such  pure  forms  of 
sense  an  object  can  appear  to  us  (that  is,  before  it  can 
be  an  object  of  empirical  perception),  space  and  time 
are  pure  perceptive  forms  (a  priori  objects),  which 
are  a  priori  conditions  of  objects  of  experience,  and 
synthesis  in  them  is  of  an  objective  validity. 

The  categories  of  understanding,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  nothing  to  do  with  conditions  of  perception  (in 
the  strict  sense),  and  there  certainly  may  very  well  be 
presentations  of  objects  so  far  as  sense  is  concerned, 
without  there  being  any  necessity  to  refer  them  to 
functions  of  the  understanding  at  all.  Understanding, 
so  far,  need  not  involve,  in  formation  of  objects,  any 
a  priori  influence  whatever.     In  this  relation,  indeed, 

particularly,  which,  as  it  were,  throws  all  the  measures  across.  I  am 
disposed,  also,  to  see  verbal  errors  here  :  "  redet"  should  be  reden,  and  I 
would  even  altogether  expunge  the  "die"  after  the  "und."  Kant's 
thought  is.  Categories,  not  being,  directly  or  properly,  perceptive,  show  ^ 
difficulty  and  a  need  of  deduction  (the  latter,  too,  for  the  space  theV  ^^" 
not  shown  at  first  hand  by  geometry,  etc.  .^ae    and 


I 


/ 


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TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


there  shows  a  difficulty  which  we  did  not  find  when 
employed  on  sense.     How,  namely,  can  subjective 
condrtions   of   thought  conceivably  at  all   exert  an 
elective  function-that  is,  how  can  they  furnish  con- 
ditions of  the  very  possibility  of  all  perception  and 
experience   of  objects?      For,   surely,  presentations 
may  be  given  in  sense,  pure  or  empirical,  without 
caUmg  in  any  function  of  the  understanding.    I  take 
for  example,  the  notion  of  cause,  which  implies  a  par- 
ticular sort  of  synthesis,  where  on  something,  A,  there 
ensues,  by  necessity  of  a  law,  a  something  else,  B,  that 
IS  quite  different  from  A.     Now,  it  is  useless  to  refer 
to  experience  in  proof  of  any  such  notion,  which,  as 
containing  necessity,  can  be  proved  objectively  valid 
only  aiyriori     It  is,  in  the  first  instance,  difficult  to 
understand,  then,  how  sense-presentations  should  ex- 
hibit any  such  virtue ;  and  we  may  at  first  very  much 
doubt  whether  any  such  claim,  any  such  idea,  be  not 
altogether  void,   and  without  correspondent  object 
anywhere  among  the  presentations  in  sense.    For  that 
objects  of  sensuous  perception  must  obey  what  formal 
conditions  of  sense  in  general  lie  a  priori  in  the  mind. 
IS  clear  from  this,  that,  on  other  terms,  they  would  not 
be  objects  for  us.     It  is  not  so  easy  to  see,  however, 
that  they  must  also  obey  conditions  required  bv  the 
understanding  for  synthetic  perception  on  the  part  of 
the  intellect.     For  presentations  in  sense  might  very 
well  be  of  such  a  nature  that  the  understanding  would 
not  find  them  at  all  accordant  to  the  conditions  of  its 
unity    but,  on  the  contrary,  all  in  such  confusion, 
that,  for  example,  ,n  the  succession  of  presentations 
there  were  nothing  to  be  found  capable  of  affording  a 
^rule  of  synthesis,  and  correspondent,  therefore,  to  The 
and^on  of  cause  and  effect ;  which  notion,  consequently 
pure  or  emjll  and  void,  and  without  sense.    Presentations 


THE   KRITIK  OF   PÜBE   REASON. 


207 


I 


t 


in  sense  would  not  the  less  for  that  furnish  us  with 
objects  so  far  perceptive;   for  perception,   so  far  as 
strictly  sensuous,  stands  nowise  in  need  of  the  func- 
tions of  the  intellect- 
Did  we  think  to  rid  ourselves  of  the  difficulty  of 
such  inquiries  by  saying,  Experience  affords  continual 
examples  of  such  submission  to  law  in  the  objects  of 
sense,  which  examples  furnish  abundant  occasion  for 
abstracting  the  notion,  cause,  and  thereby  ratifying 
at  the  same  time  the  objective  validity  of  such  a 
notion,  then  we  forget  to  observe  that  the  notion, 
cause,  cannot  arise  in  this  way,  but  that  it  must  either 
be  based  completely  a  priori  in  the  understanding, 
or  else  utterly  abandoned  as  a  mere  chimera.     For 
this  notion  demands  absolutely  that  something.  A,  be 
of  such  a  nature  that  something  else,  B,  ensues  from  it, 
necessarily,  and  by  virtue  of  an  unconditionally  universal 
law.     Sense  certainly,  however,  gives  examples  from 
which  we  may  infer  a  rule  of  what  usually  happens, 
but  never  of  what  necessarily  happens.     Hence  there 
belongs  to  the  synthesis  of  cause  and  effect  a  dignity 
which  can  never  be  empirically  expressed ;  namely, 
that  the  effect  not  merely  comes  after  the  cause,  but 
is  given  by  it,  and   ensues  from  it.     The  rigorous 
universality  of  the  rule,  too,  is  not  at  all  a  possession 
of  empirical  rules  which,  as  through  induction,  can 
have  no  more  than  comparative  universality,  that  is, 
a  certain  extended  application.     The  validity  of  the 
categories  would  be  completely  changed,  then,  were 
we  to  regard  them  as  merely  empirical  products. 

§  14.  Transition  to  the  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories. 

There  are  only  two  cases  possible,  in  which  syn- 
thetic perception  and  its  objects  can  coincide  and 


(J 


208 


f ' 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


necessarily  refer  to  one  another.  Either  the  object 
makes  the  perception,  or  the  perception  the  object, 
alone  possible.  In  the  first  case  the  circumstances 
are  only  empirical,  and  the  perception  is  not  possibly 
a  priori.  This  case  is  that  of  presentation  in  sense, 
and,  specially,  of  what  belongs  to  sensation  in  them. 
In  the  second  case,  again,  no  mere  mental  act  (for 
there  is  no  question  here  of  the  causality  of  will) 
being  competent  to  produce  an  existent  object,  a  per- 
ception can  only  then  be  a  priori  operative  in  regard 
of  an  object,  when  through  it  alone  it  is  possible  for 
us  to  perceive  something  as  an  object  (cognise  it  as  a 
factor  in  actual  experience).  Only  under  two  condi- 
tions, however,  is  such  cognition  of  an  object  possible. 
There  is,  first,  perception  proper,  by  which  the  object 
is  given,  but,  so  far,  only  as  intimation  to  sense.  There 
is,  second,  notion,  by  which,  in  correspondence  with 
the  elements  of  sense,  an  object  is  fairly  thinkingly 
perceived  in  experience.  It  is  clear,  however,  from 
what  has  been  said  further  back,  that  the  first  condi- 
tion, that,  namely,  under  which  alone  objects  can  be 
(taking  the  word  strictly)  perceived^  must,  in  effect,  be 
presupposed  for,  and  basally  underlie,  objects,  so  far 
as  form  is  concerned,  a  priori  in  the  mind.^  With 
this  condition  of  sense,  therefore,  all  objects  neces- 
sarily agree;  for  only  through  it  is  it  possible  for 
them  to  show  in  sense,  or  to  be  empirically  given  and 
perceived.  Now  the  question  is,  whether  there  are 
not  also  precedent  notions  a  priori^  as  conditions 
under  which  alone  anything  is,  though  not  sensu- 
ously, yet  cognitively,  perceived  as  an  object  (as  such) ; 
for,  in  that  case,  all  empirical  cognition  of  objects 
(formed  perception  of  them  as  in  experience)  is 
necessarily  subjected  to,  or  in  conformity  with,  such 

•  After  "  liegen  "  I  add  a  muss  here,  which  seems  neceßsary. 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


209 


I 


notions,  inasmuch  as  without  presupposition  of  them 
nothing  whatever  is  possible  as  an  object  of  ea;perience. 
But,  now,  every  perceptive  experience  involves,  be- 
sides the  elements  of  sense,  by  which  something  is 
given,  still  further  a  notion  of  an  object,  or  a  notion 
uniting  the  sense-elements  into  a  one  object,  which 
one  object  appears  then  as   given    in   cognitive  or 
formed  perception.     On  that  understanding,  conse- 
quently,  there   are   notions,   bearing   on    objects   as 
objects,  a  priori  presupposed  as  conditions  that  basally 
underlie  all  cognition  or  perception  of  experience. 
And  the  objective  application  of  the  categories,  there- 
fore, as  a  priori  notions,  is  based  on  this,  that  through 
them  alone  is  experience  (so  far  as  relates  to  the  form 
of  thought— the  involved  function  of  intellect)  at  all 
possible.      For  then  they  have  a   necessary  and   a 
jmori  bearing  on  objects  of  experience,  inasmuch  as 
only  through  them  as  universal  condition  can  any 
object  whatever   of   experience    be    cognitively  per- 
ceived. 

The  transcendental  deduction  of  all  a  priori  ele- 
ments has,  therefore,  a  principle  directive  of  the 
whole  inquiry,  this,  namely,  that  they  must  be  re- 
cognised to  be  a  iwiori  conditions  of  the  possibility 
of  experience  (whether  as  of  sense  or  of  understand- 
ing).  Elements  which  furnish  the  objective  ground 
of  the  possibility  of  experience  are  for  that  very 
reason  necessary.  An  analysis,  however,  of  the  experi- 
ences  in  which  they  occur,  would  not  constitute  their 
deduction,  but,  as  in  that  way  they  would  still 
remain  contingent,  only  their  illustration.^     Without 

>  In  the  above  three  sentences  I  translate  as  though  a  plural  Erfah- 
rungen and  a  singular  Erfahrung  had  changed  places  as  regards  the  first 
and  last  of  them.  The  plural  in  the  first  sentence  seems  proved  wrong 
by  a  singular  "  ihr  "  which  follows  and,  as  I  think,  in  its  reference. 


s 


210 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


this  primary  reference  to  possible  experience,  which 
holds  of  all  objects  in  perception,  the  application  of 
these  a  priori  elements  to  any  object  could  not  be 
possibly  understood. 

The  celebrated  Locke,  for  want  of  such  considera- 
tion, and  because  he  found  in  experience  pure  notions 
of  the  understanding,  actually  derived  such  notions 
from  experience,  and  proceeded  so  inconsequently 
that,  simply  in  trust  of  them,  he  ventured  on  cogni- 
tions that  far  transcended  all  limits  of  experience. 
David  Hume  saw  that,  for  this  to  be  possible,  it  was 
necessary  that  said  notions  should  be  possessed  of  an 
a  jmori  origin.  As,  however,  he  could  not  at  all 
explain  to  himself  how  the  understanding,  in  the  case 
of  elements  of  experience  that  were  not  to  it  ifi  them- 
selves connected,  did  yet  feel  forced  to  think  them 
necessarily  connected  in  objective  experience ;  and  as, 
in  view  of  this  inability,  it  did  not  occur  to  him  to 
reflect  that  perhaps  the  understanding  was  itself,  and 
through  these  very  elements,  the  actual  originator  of 
that  precise  experience  in  which  the  objects  showed 
— in  such  circumstances  he  believed  himself  under  a 
necessity  to  derive  them  only  from  experience.  He 
attributed  them,  namely,  to  a  subjective  necessity  due 
to  repeated  associations  in  experience  (custom),  which 
subjective  necessity  was,  in  this  way,  at  last,  taken  to 
be  objective,  but  erroneously  so.  His  resultant  con- 
elusion,  however,  was  perfectly  consequent :  he  de- 
clared it  to  be  impossible  to  transcend  experience  with 
any  such  principles.  The  empirical  derivation,  never- 
theless, which  is  all  we  have  in  either,  cannot  possibly 
be  reconciled  with  the  actuality  of  those  scientific  a 
jyriori  cognitions  which  we  have  in  pure  mathematics 
and  pure  physics,  and  is,  therefore,  refuted  by  the 
factum. 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


211 


The  first  of  these  celebrated  men  opened  a  wide 
door  to  fanaticism ;  for  reason,  if  once  with  any  title 
on  its  side,  is  no  longer  to  be  kept  in  bounds  by  any 
mere  vague  exaltations  of  prudence  and  moderation. 
The  second,  again,  quite  abandoned  himself  to  scep- 
ticism, in  the  conviction  that  he  had  once  for  all  dis- 
covered, on  the  part  of  our  faculties,  a  mere  deception 
that  was  universally  held  to  be  reason.  We  are  now 
on  the  threshold  of  the  inquiry  whether  it  be  not 
possible  to  steer  human  reason  between  both  rocks, 
assign  it  its  definite  limits,  and  yet  keep  open  for  it 
the  entire  field  of  its  legitimate  action. 

I  begin  with  the  definition  of  the  categories.  They 
are  notions  of  objects  generally,  by  which  the  sense- 
elements  of  these  objects  are  conceived  to  be  deter- 
mined in  respect  of  one  or  more  of  the  various  logical 
functions  of  judgment.  Thus  the  function  of  the 
categorical  judgment  is  that  of  the  relation  of  the 
subject  to  the  predicate,  as,  All  bodies  are  divisible. 
But  here,  so  far  as  concerns  the  mere  logical  use  of 
the  understanding,  it  remains  undetermined  to  which 
of  the  two  notions  the  function  of  subject,  and  to 
which  that  of  predicate,  accrues.  For  we  might 
quite  as  well  have  said.  Certain  divisibles  are  bodies. 
But  by  the  category  of  substance,  now,  it  is  deter- 
mined of  the  notion  body,  when  subjected  to  it,  that 
its  empirical  perception  in  experience  must  be  always 
regarded  only  as  subject,  and  never  as  predicate.  And 
so  of  all  the  other  categories. 


212 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


Section  2.  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories. 
§  15.  Of  the  Possibility  of  a  Conjunction  in  General. 

The  constitutive  units  may  be  given  in  a  perception 
which  is  merely  sensuous,  or  nothing  but  receptivity, 
and  the  form  of  this  perception  may  lie  a  priori  in 
our  faculty,  without  being  anything  else,  however, 
than  how  the  subject  is  passively  affected.  But  the 
conjunction  of  these  or  any  units  is  not  possibly  an 
affair  of  sensCy  and  can,  therefore,  not  be  found  as  an 
element  or  action  involved  even  in  the  pure  form  of 
sense-perception  (space,  etc.)  For  it  is  an  actus  of 
the  mind  s  own  faculty,  and  as  in  contradistinction  to 
sense  we  must  name  this  faculty  understanding,  it 
follows  that  all  conjunction,  conscious  or  unconscious, 
in  perceptions  or  in  notions,  in  elements  pure  or  in 
elements  empirical,  is  an  act  of  the  understanding  to 
which  we  would  give  the  general  appellation  of 
synthesis}  We  use  this  term,  namely,  to  signalize 
the  fact,  as  well  that  we  cannot  be  aware  of  any- 
thing conjoined  in  the  object  which  we  have  not 
previously  conjoined  in  understanding,  as  of  conjunc- 
tion being,  among  all  perceptions,  the  only  one  which 
cannot  be  given  by  objects,  but  must  be  effected  only 
by  the  subject's  own  self,  because  it  is  an  actus  of 
self-action  or  spontaneity.  It  is  easy  to  be  under- 
stood here  that  this  actv^  must  be  originally  monome 
(strictly  one)^  and  of  force  for  all  conjunction,  as 
also  that  the  resolution  {analysis)  which  seems  to  be 
opposed  to  it,  does  yet,  for  all  that,  always  presup- 
pose it;  for  where  understanding   has  not   already 

>  The  words  "  sinnlichen  oder  nicht  sinnlichen  Anschauung,"  if  cer- 
tainly Kant's,  must  be  held  to  have  meant  for  him,  in  the  one  case, 
special,  and,  in  the  other,  pure  sense.  The  latter  of  them  is  specially  mis- 
leading, as  literally  contradictory  of  the  most  current  expressions. 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


213 


conjoined,  neither  can  it  disjoin,  inasmuch  as  only 
through  it  can  anything,  as  conjoined,  be  offered  to 
our  perception. 

But  the  notion  of  conjunction  carries  with  it, 
besides  those  of  the  complex  of  sense-units  and  their 
synthesis,  that  of  their  unity  as  well.  Conjunction  is 
synthetic  unity  of  a  complex.^  The  cognition  of  this 
unity  can,  therefore,  not  arise  from  the  conjunction; 
rather,  by  adding  itself  to  the  cognition  of  the  com- 
plex, it  first  makes  the  notion  itself  of  conjunction 
possible.  This  unity,  which  precedes  a  pinori  all 
notions  of  conjunction,  is  not  possibly  said  category 
of  unity  (§  10) ;  for  all  categories  found  on  logical 
functions  of  judgments,  in  which  conjunction  is 
already  thought,  and,  consequently,  unity  of  given 
notions.  The  categories,  therefore,  already  (in  their 
own  selves)  presuppose  conjunction.  We  must, 
therefore,  seek  this  unity  (as  qualitative,  §  12)  still 
further  back;  we  must  seek  it,  namely,  in  what  is 
the  ground  of  that  unity  in  the  judgments  themselves, 
or  in  what,  consequently,  is  the  ground  of  the  under- 
standing itself  in  its  very  logical  function. 


§  16.   Of  the  Original  or  Primary  Synthetic  Unity  of 

Apperception. 

The  /  tldnJc  must  be  capable  of  accompanying  all 
my  perceptions ;  for  otherwise  there  would  be  some- 
thing placed  in  my  consciousness  which  could  not  be 
thought ;  and  that  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  the  per- 
ception   itself  would  either    be  impossible   or  else 

*  Whether  the  cognitions  themselves  are  identical,  and  the  one,  there- 
fore, can  be  thought,  analytically,  through  the  other,  is  not  in  considera- 
tion here.  The  consciousness  of  the  one,  so  far  as  the  complexis  in  ques- 
tion, is  always  to  be  distinguished  from  that  of  the  other,  and  it  is  only  the 
synthesis  of  this  latter  (possible)  consciousness  that  is  here  concerned. — K. 


214 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


nothing  for  me.  That  form  of  apprehension  which 
precedes  thinking  is  called  perception.  All  the  units, 
therefore,  of  a  perceptive  complex  is  necessarily  con- 
joined with  the  /  think  of  the  subject  holding  them. 
This,  however,  is  an  act  of  spontaneity,  and  cannot  be 
thought  as  due  to  sense.  I  call  this  the  Pure  Apper- 
ception, to  distinguish  it  from  the  empirical.  It  may 
be  named  also  the  Original  (Primary)  x\pperception, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  that  self-consciousness  which,  while 
it  produces  the  all-attendant  and  ever-identical  con- 
sciousness /  think,  cannot  be  accompanied  by  any 
further  one.  I  call  also  the  unity  in  it  the  transcen- 
dental unity  of  self-consciousness,  in  consideration 
(or  indication)  of  its  being  a  source  of  possible 
cognition  a  priori.  For  the  units  in  any  perception 
would  not  be  collectively  my  perceptive  units,  did 
they  not  collectively  belong  to  a  single  self-conscious- 
ness. Or  these  units  as  mine  (though  consciousness 
may  not  be  specially  awake  to  them  as  such)  must  be 
necessarily  submitted  to  the  condition  under  w^iich 
alone  it  is  possible  for  them  to  stand  together  in  a 
single  self-consciousness,  for  otherwise  they  would  not, 
one  with  the  other,  belong  to  me.  Now  from  this 
original  synthesis  there  follows  much. 

This  pervading  identity  of  apperception,  namely, 
throughout  the  units  of  a  perception,  necessarily 
implies  a  synthesis  of  these,  and  is  possible,  at  the 
same  time,  only  through  consciousness  of  this 
synthesis.  For  what  empirical  consciousness  accom- 
panies our  bare  sense-intimations  or  sense-feelings  is 
naturally  loose,  and,  as  regards  the  identity  of  the 
subject,  inconsiderate  or  inadvertent.  Synthesis  into 
this  identity,  indeed,  docs  not  straightway  result 
from  this,  that  I  accompany  each  of  the  units  with 
consciousness:  I  must,  further,  actually  add  the  units 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PUKE    REASON. 


215 


the  one  to  the  other,  and  become  conscious  of  this, 
their  resultant  synthesis.     Only  by  this,  therefore, 
that  I  can  conjoin  the  units  of  given  intimations  m  a 
single  consciousness,  is  it  possible  for  me  to  conceive 
the  identity  of  consciousness  in  these  intimations  them- 
selves.    The  analytic  unity  of  apperception  is  only 
possible  under  presupposition  of  a  certain   synthetic 
one.^     The  thought,  These  units  given  in  perception 
are  collectively  mine,  is,  accordingly,  as  much  as  to  say, 
I  unite  them,  or  at  least  can  unite  them,  in  a  single 
consciousness ;  and  though  this  thought  is  not  yet 
itself  the  consciousness  of  the  synthesis  of  the  units, 
it  yet  presupposes  the  possibility  of  this.     That  is, 
only  by  comprehending  the  complex  of  units  in  a 
single  consciousness,  do  I  make  them  singly  and  col- 
lectively mine.     Otherwise  I  should  have  as  many- 
coloured  and  diverse  a  self  as  I  have  units  in  con- 
sciousness.    Synthetic  unity  of  the  complex  of  per- 
ceptions as  given  a  priori,  is  the  ground,  therefore, 
of  that  identity  of  apperception  itself  which  a  priori 
precedes  any  definite  act  of  thinking   on    my  part. 
Synthesis,  however,  is  not  in  the  objects,  and  cannot 
possibly  be  borrowed  from  them,  or  only  first  of  all 
taken  up  into  consciousness,  through  perception  :  it  is 

1  The  analytic  unity  of  consciousness  attaches  to  all  common  notions 
as  such.     For  example,  when  I  think  red,  I  think  something  which  may 
be  fount!  as  element  in  something  else,  that  is,  something  which  is  con- 
joined with  others.      Only,  therefore,  through  a  preconceived  (a  pre- 
viously thought)  possible  synthetic  unity  can  I  conceive  the  analytic  one. 
A  unit  of  consciousness,  which  is  to  be  thought  as  common  to  several,  is 
regarded  as  belonging  to  such  as,  besides  it,  have  something  else  in  them  ; 
it  must,  consequently,  be  already  thought  in  synthetic  unity  with  others 
(though  these  may  be  only  possible),  before  I  can  think  by  it  of  the 
analytic  unity  of  consciousness  which  makes  a  conceytus  communis  of 
it.     And  thus  the  synthetic  unity  of  apperception  is  the  ultimate  point 
on  which  we  must  base  all  intellect,  even  the  whole  of  logic,  and  with 
logic,  transcendental  philosophy  ;    nay,    apperception    is    tlie    under- 
standing, the  intellect  itself. — K. 


216 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


an  act  of  understanding  alone,  which  itself,  indeed,  is 
nothing  but  the  faculty  whose  single  function  it  is,  a 
priori  to  conjoin,  and  to  bring  the  complex  of  given 
perceptions  under  the  unity  of  apperception.  This 
principle  is  the   ultimate    principle  in   all    human 


cognition. 


This  proposition,  of  the  necessary  unity  of  apper- 
ception, is  certainly,  now,  itself,  identical,  and  there- 
fore analytic.  Nevertheless  it  involves  a  synthesis  of 
any  given  perceptive  complex  as  necessary.  And 
without  this  synthesis,  said  pervading  identity  of 
self-consciousness  cannot  possibly  be  thought.  For 
in  Ego,  as  a  simple  thought,  there  is  nothing  of  a 
complex  given.  In  the  empirical  feeling,  which  is 
different  from  the  mere  thought,  is  it  alone  that  the 
relative  complex  can  be  given,  and  through  synthesis 
in  a  single  consciousness,  as  it  were,  perceived.  An 
understanding  in  which  the  involved  complex  were 
at  once  given  by  self  consciousness,  would  perceive, 
would  be  intuitive.  Our  understanding  can  think 
only,  and  must  have  recourse  to  the  senses  for  per- 
ceptive or  intuitive  matter.  I  am  conscious,  then,  of 
my  identical  self  in  regard  of  the  units  in  any  given 
perception,  because  I  name  these  units  singly  and 
collectively  mine  ;  and  collectively  they  constitute  a 
single  perception.  That,  however,  is  as  much  as  to 
say  that  I  am  conscious  of  a  necessary  synthesis  a 
priori^  which  is  called  the  original  synthetic  unity  of 
apperception :  that  all  units  of  perception  given  me 
stand  individually  under  it,  but  that  they  must  be 
brought  collectively,  as  well,  or  through  a  synthesis, 
under  it. 


TUE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


217 


§  17.  The  Axiom  of  the  Synthetic  Unity  of  Apperception  is  the 
Ultimate  Principle  of  the  Understanding. 

The  ultimate  principle  of  the  possibility  of  all 
perception  in  relation  to  sense^  was,  according  to  the 
transcendental  aesthetic,  this.  That  the  units  of  every 
such  complex  must  stand  under  the  formal  conditions 
of  space  and  time.  The  ultimate  principle  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  all  perception,  in  relation  to  the  understanding^ 
is.  That  the  units  of  every  perceptive  complex  must 
stand  under  conditions  of  the  original-synthetic  unity 
of  apperception.^  All  units  of  perception  stand  under 
the  former,  so  far  as  they  are  given  to  us ;  and  under 
the  latter,  so  far  as  they  must  be  capable  of  being 
conjoined  in  a  single  consciousness.  For  without 
such  conjunction  there  would  be  nothing  thinkingly 
cognised  or  recognised  (as  in  experience),  inasmuch 
as  the  units  given  by  sense  would  not  have  the  actus 
of  apperception,  /  think^  in  common,  and  would  not  be 
brought  together  thereby  into  a  single  consciousness. 
Understanding  is,  to  speak  generally,  the  faculty 
oi  perceptive  cognitions  (or  recognitions).  These  consist 
in  the  definite  conjunction  of  given  units — their  con- 
junct reference — into  an  object.  Object^  again,  is 
that  in  the  notion  of  which  the  units  of  the  percep- 
tive complex  are  united^  are  made  one.  But  all  such 
union  demands  unity  of  consciousness  in  its  very 
synthesis.     The  unity  of  consciousness,  therefore,  is 

>  Space  and  time,  and  all  the  parts  of  either,  are  perceptions,  and  one, 
consequently,  with  the  many  of  their  constituent  complex  (s.  Trans. 
iEsth.)  They  are  not  mere  notions,  then,  which,  as  such,  are  each  a  one 
and  the  same  consciousness  in  a  plurality  of  individuals.  On  the  contrary, 
they  are,  each  of  them,  a  plurality  of  parts  in  a  single  consciousness 
(that,  in  fact,  of  them).  These  parts,  then,  being  set  together  in  that 
consciousness,  there  is  plainly  involved  a  unity  of  consciousness  which  is 
sjnithetic  and  also  original  or  primary.  This  singleness  of  conscious- 
ness is  important  in  application  (s.  §  25.) — K. 


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alone  what  constitutes  this  conjunction  of  units  into 
an  object,  or  the  objective  realization  of  these,  or 
the  fact  that  they  are  objectively  perceived  in  experi- 
ence. It  is  on  the  unity  of  consciousness,  conse- 
quently, that  the  possibility  of  the  understanding 
itself  rests. 

The  first  pure  fact  of  understanding,  therefore 
(towards  formed  perception),  which  conditions  its 
whole  further  action,  and  which,  at  the  same  time, 
moreover,  is  apart  from  any  condition  of  sense- 
perception,  is  the  principle  of  the  original  synthetic 
unity  of  apperception.  Thus  the  mere  form  of 
external  sense-perception,  space,  is  not  yet  a  finished 
perception :  so  far,  it  only  supplies  the  a  pinori  per- 
ceptive complex  towards  a  possible  finished  percep- 
tion. But  actually  to  discern  something  in  space,  a 
line,  I  must  draw  it.  That  is,  I  must  synthetically 
effect  a  certain  particular  conjunction  of  the  space- 
units  (as  yet  only  given),  and  in  such  manner  that 
the  unity  of  this  act  is  at  the  same  time  the  unity  of 
consciousness  (in  the  idea  of  a  line.)  Only  in  this 
way,  plainly,  is  it  first  of  all  possible  for  an  object 
(a  marked  off  space)  to  be  discerned.  The  synthetic 
unity  of  consciousness,  therefore,  is  an  objective  con- 
dition of  all  formed  or  finished  perception  in  experi- 
ence. Not  only  is  it  necessary  to  enable  me  to 
perceive  an  object ;  but  just  to  he  object  every  sense- 
perception  must  stand  under  it.  In  any  other  way, 
or  without  this  synthesis,  the  units  of  the  perceptive 
complex  would  not  unite  themselves  together  in  a 
single  consciousness. 

This  last  proposition  is,  as  said,  at  the  same  time 
analytic,  even  while  source  of  the  synthetic  unity  as 
condition  of  all  possible  intellection.  For  it  says  only 
that  all  my  units  of  perception  in  any  given    case 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


219 


must  stand  under  the  condition  under  which  alone  it 
is  possible  for  me  to  reckon  them  as  mine  into  my 
identical  self,  and  therefore  to  comprehend  them, 
through  the  all- present  expression,  I  tUnh^  as  syn- 
thetically  conjoined  in  a  single  apperception. 

This  principle,  however,  is  not  such  as  to  cohere 
with   every    possible  understanding  as  such.      It   is 
proper  only  where  the  I  am  of  pure  apperception 
brings  with  it  no  complex,  or  breadth,  as  of  units 
in   c'onsciousness.       An   understanding,    where   self- 
consciousness  brought  at  once  its  own   constituent 
discernible   many,    or   an   understanding,   in   whose 
subjective  act  its  objects  at  once  were,— such  under- 
standino-  would  not  stand  in  any  need  of  a  special  act 
of  synthesis  in  a  complex  in  order  to  attain  to  a  unity 
of  consciousness.     Such  special  act  is  the  necessity  of 
the  human  understanding  which,  as  an  understanding, 
thinks  merely  and  does  not  perceive.^    For  the  human 
understanding,  however,  this  act  is  the  indispensable 
first  principle.      So  much  is  this  the  case  that  our 
understanding,  in  fact,  is  unable  to  form  to  itself  the 
least    idea    of    any   other    possible    understanding, 
whether  such  as  were  itself  perceptive,  or  such  as, 
though   only   perceptive   through    sense,    were    yet 
otherwise  perceptive  than  through  forms  of  space  and 
time. 


§  18.  What  Objective  Unity  of  Self- Consciousness  is. 

The  transcendental  unity  of  apperception  is  that 
imity  through  which  all  the  complex  units  given  in 
a  perception  are  united  into  a  notion  of  the  object 

»  In  the  above,  there  is  an  awkward  use  of  both  cases  at  once  which 
beclürfen  may  govern.  In  these,  too,  the  genitive  «  deren  "  really  refers 
to  the  accusative  "  Actus,"  and,  conseciuently,  were  better  dessen. 


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constituted  by  them.      For  that  reason  this  unity  is 
called  objective,  and  must  be  distinguished  from  the 
subjective  unity  of  consciousness.     This  latter  is  only 
the  inner  affection  of  sense   whereby  a   perceptive 
complex    is    (for    such    union)    empirically    given. 
Whether  I  shall  be  empirically  conscious  of  the  units 
in  the  complex  as  given  together,  or  as  given  the  one 
in  succession  to  the  other,  depends  on  circumstances^ 
or  empirical  conditions.     Hence  the  empirical  unity 
of  consciousness  (through  association  of  the  units)  is 
itself  a  sense-appearance,  and  quite  contingent.     On 
the  other  hand,  the  pure  form  of  perception  in  time, 
merely    as  such    perception,  and   involving,    conse- 
quently, a  given  complex  of  units,  stands  under  the 
original  unity  of  consciousness,  solely  in  consequence 
of  the  necessary  conjunction  of  the  units  of  percep- 
tion into  the  one  single  /  think  (or,  it  is  I  that  am 
thinking).      That   is,    it   so    stands,  solely  in    conse- 
quence of  the  pure  synthesis  of  understanding,  which 
synthesis  (as  relating  only  to  an  a  priori  complex),  is 
evidently    presupposed    a   priori    to   underlie    any 
empirical    synthesis.       The  former   unity    is    alone 
objectively  valid  (the  same,  and  in  the  same   way 
binding,    for  every  one).      The  empirical  unity  of 
apperception    (which    is    not    considered    here,    but 
which,  under  given  circumstances  m  concreto,  only 
results    from    the   other),   has   merely  a  subjective 
validity.     One  man,  for  example,  unites  the  hearing 
of  a  certain  word  with  one  thing,  and  another  with 
another.     Thus,  evidently,  the  unity  of  consciousness, 
when  bearing  on  what  is  empirical,  is  not  necessarily 
and  universally  valid  in  regard  of  anything  so  given. 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


221 


§  19.  The  Logical  Form  of  all  Judgments  consists  in  tlie  Objective 

Unity  of  the  Notions  they  contain. 

I  have  never  been  able  to  feel  satisfied  with  the 
definition  which  logicians  give  of  a  judgment.  It  is, 
they  say,  the  statement  of  a  relation  between  two 
notions.  Now  here,  without  objecting  to  the  defini- 
tion that  it  applies  only  to  categorical,  and  not  to 
hypothetical  or  disjunctive  propositions  (where  the 
relation  is  not  between  notions  but  judgments),  I 
remark  only  (not  but  that  the  oversight  has  been 
detrimental  to  logic),  that,  in  the  definition,  there  is 
no  declaration  of  what  the  relation  consists  in.^ 

If,  however,  I  more  accurately  examine  the  nexus  of 
the  given  ideas  in  every  judgment,  and  distinguish 
it  as  due  to  the  understanding,  from  the  relation 
that  depends  on  laws  of  reproductive  imagination 
(which  relation  possesses  only  a  subjective  validity),  I 
find  that  a  judgment  is  nothing  else  than  the  method 
of  bringing  given  ideas  into  the  objective  unity  of 
apperception.  It  is  the  very  business  of  the  little 
word  is  in  them  to  distinguish  the  objective  unity  of 
given  ideas  from  the  subjective  one.  For  this  word 
designates  the  reduction  of  these  ideas  into  the  original 
apperception,  and  their  necessary  unity,  even  although 
the  judgment  be  only  an  empirical  one  and,  conse- 
quently, contingent;  as,  for  example,  Bodies  are 
heavy.  Here,  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  these  ideas 
belong  in  the  empirical  perception  necessarily  the  one 

»  The  whole  long  doctrine  of  the  four  syllogistic  figures  concerns 
only  categoricals,  and  though  it  is  nothing  more  than  an  art,  through 
concealment  of  immediate  inferences  (consequentioe  immediatce)  under  the 
premises  of  a  pure  syllogism,  to  produce  the  false  show  of  more  kinds  of 
syllogisms  than  are  contained  in  the  first  figure,  it  would  not  have  par- 
ticularly succeeded  in  this,  had  it  not  contrived  to  call  attention  exclu- 
sively to  categoricals  as  those  propositions  to  w^hich  all  the  others  must 
be  reduced  ;  which,  however  (§  9),  is  not  the  case.— K. 


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to  the  other,  but  that  they  belong  the  one  to  the 
Other  by  virtue  of  the  necessary  unity  of  apperception 
in  the  synthesis  of  sense-perceptions.  That  is,  they 
belong  the  one  to  the  other  according  to  principles 
of  the  objective  determination  of  all  cognitive  ele*- 
ments,  so  far  as  they  are  competent  to  yield  an 
objective  perception;  which  principles  derive  all  of 
them  from  that  of  the  transcendental  unity  of  apper- 
ception. So  only  there  is  made  of  said  relation  a 
judgment — a  relation  that  is  objectively  realized,  and 
easily  distinguishable  from  the  relation  of  the  very 
same  elements  when  it  is  only  subjective,  as  being 
referred,  for  example,  only  to  the  laws  of  association. 
In  the  latter  reference,  I  should  only  be  able  to  say. 
If  I  lift  a  body,  I  feel  a  sense  of  weight ;  but  not,  The 
body  is  heavy.  This  last  proposition  imports  that 
the  two  ideas  or  elements  are  conjoined  in  the  object 
(without  consideration  of  the  mere  state  of  me,  the 
subject),  and  not  simply  beside  each  other  in  the 
sense- affection,  let  it  be  repeated  as  often  as  it  may. 


§  20.  All  Perceptions  of  Sense  stand  under  the  Categories,  as  Con- 
ditions under  which  alone  the  Units  of  their  Complex  can 
unite  together  and  coalesce  into  a  single  Consciousness. 

The  complex  of  units  given  in  a  perception  of  sense, 
falls  necessarily  under  the  original  synthetic  unity  of 
apperception,  inasmuch  as  through  this  unity  alone  is 
the  unity  of  the  perception  possible  (§  17).  But  that 
act  of  the  understanding  through  which  the  units  of 
a  complex  (whether  perceptive  or  notional)  becomes 
reduced  into  a  single  apperception,  is  the  logical 
function  of  the  technical  judgments  (§  19).  Every 
complex,  therefore,  so  far  as  it  is  given  in  a  single 
empirical  perception,  has  been  determined  by  one  of 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


223 


the  logical  functions  of  judgment,  or  by  this  function 
of  judgment  it  has  been  brought  into  a  single  con- 
sciousness. But  now  the  categories  are  nothing  else 
than  precisely  these  functions  to  judge,  so  far  as  some 
given  complex  of  perception  comes  to  be  determined  of 
them  (§13).  Hence  all  given  perceptive  complexions 
stand  necessarily  under  categories. 


§  21.  Remark. 

A  complex,  which  is  contained  in  a  perception  that 
I  call  mine,  gets  reduced  into  the  necessary  unity  of 
self-consciousness  through  synthesis  of  the  under- 
standing, by  the  categories.^  This  synthesis  implies 
that  the  empirical  consciousness  concerned  with  a 
given  complex  of  a  one  perception,  stands  as  well 
under  a  pure  a  priori  self-consciousness,  as  empirical 
perception  stands  under  one  of  pure  sense  which  is 
likewise  a  priori.  In  the  above  proposition  (§  20), 
then,  is  there  a  commencement  made  of  a  deduction 
of  the  categories.  In  this  deduction,  said  categories 
being  independent  of  sense  and  wholly  in  the  under- 
standing, I  must  still  as  yet  abstract  from  the  manner 
in  which  the  perceptive  complex  gets  given,  in  order 
to  direct  attention  only  to  the  unity  which  the  under- 
standing by  means  of  its  categories  produces  in  the 
perception.  In  the  sequel  (§  26),  it  will  be  shown, 
from  the  mode  in  which  the  empirical  perception  is 
given  in  sense,  that  the  unity  in  this  perception  is  no 
other  than  what  (§  20)  the  categories  determine  in  a 
given  perceptive  complex.     And  by  this,  then,  that 

»  The  proof  rests  on  the  assumed  unity  of  perception  through  which 
there  is  an  object.  Said  unity  always  implies  synthesis  of  the  perceptive 
many,  and  the  reduction  of  this  latter  into  the  unity  of  apperception. 
— K. 


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the  a  priori  application  of  the  categories  is  demon- 
strated as  in  regard  of  all  the  objects  of  our  senses, 
will  the  design  of  our  deduction  be  at  length  fully 

realized. 

But  in  the  above  proof  I  could  not  abstract  from 
one  element;  from  this,  namely,  that  the  complex 
must  be  given  for  the  perception  before,  and  in  inde- 
pendence of,  the  synthesis  of  the  understanding ;  but 
in  what  manner  we  do  not  here  pronounce.  For,  did 
I  assume  an  understanding  which  (as  such)  perceived 
(as  a  divine  understanding  which,  possibly,  produces 
its  objects  in  its  perception,  and  has  them  not  given 
only  to  it),  the  categories  would  be  without  applica- 
tion in  regard  of  such  cognition.  They  are  only  rules 
for  an  understanding  whose  whole  faculty  (as  an  un- 
derstanding) consists  in  thinking;  that  is,  in  the 
process  to  bring  into  the  unity  of  apperception,  the 
synthesis  of  what  perceptive  complex  may  be  given  it 
from  elsewhere.  Such  an  understanding  of  itself 
perceives  nothing  whatever;  but  only  conjoins  and 
orderly  disposes  the  matter,  the  sense-elements,  of 
perception,  which  are  given  it  by  the  object.  Of  the 
peculiarity  of  our  understanding,  however,  only 
through  categories,  and  only  through  that  kind  and 
number  of  them,  to  bring  about  a  priori  unity  of 
apperception,  we  can  as  little  assign  a  reason  as  we 
can  explain  why  we  have  precisely  these  and  no  other 
functions  of  judgment,  or  why  time  and  space  are  the 
sole  forms  of  our  possible  perception. 

§  22.  The  Categories  have  no  other  Application  In  Cognition  than 

to  Objects  of  Experience. 

To  think  an  object,  and  to  perceive  an  object,  are 
not  one  and  the  same  thiiig.    There  are,  namely,  in 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


225 


perception  two  factors.     There  is,   first,   the  notion 
(category)  whereby  an  object  is  thinkingly  perceived ; 
and  there  is,  second,  the  sense-elements  whereby  it  is 
given.     For  if  to  the  notion  no  corresponding  sense- 
presentation  could  be  given,  the  former  would  be  only 
a  formal   thought   without   an   object,    and,    conse- 
quently, not  possibly  capable  of  affording  perceptive 
recognition  of  anything  whatever.     There  might  be, 
indeed,  so  far  as  1  could  know,  not  anything,  not  even 
possibly  anything,  whereto  my  thought  might  apply. 
Now,  all  perception  possible  for  us  is  sensuous  (-/Es- 
thetic) ;  the  thinking  of  an  object,  therefore,  by  means 
of  a  category,  can  only  become  for  us  a  perceptive 
recognition  in  so  far  as  this  category  is  brought  to 
bear  on  objects  of  the  senses.     Perception  of  sense  is 
either  pure  (space  and  time),  or  empirical  (what  is 
perceived,  through  sensation,    as  directly  actual  in 
space   and   time).      Through   determination    of  the 
former,  we  obtain  (in  mathematic)  a  priori  percep- 
tions of  objects,  but  only  in  their  form  as  presenta- 
tions to  sense ;  whether  there  are  possibly  also  actual 
things   which   are   to    be    perceived   in   such   form, 
remains,  so  far,  still  undetermined.     Consequently  no 
mathematical  notion  is  in   itself  perception,  unless 
there  be  presupposed  things,  also,  which  are  capable 
of  being  realized  by  us  only  as  in  accordance  with  the 
form  of  said  pure  sensuous  perception.     Things  in 
space  and  time,   however,    are   only   realized   by  us 
through  empirical  perception,  or  so  far  as  they  are 
sense-perceptions,  perceptions  accompanied  by  sensa- 
tion.    The  categories,  consequently,  even  in  applica- 
tion to  a  priori  perceptions  (as  in  mathematic),  afford 
perceptive  cognition  or  recognition,  strictly,  only  so 
far  as  these  a  priori  perceptions,  and  consequently 
also  through  them  the  categories,  are  capable  of  being 


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TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


applied  to  empirical  objects.  The  categories,  con- 
sequently, even  with  pure  perception,  yield  us  no 
knowledge  of  things,  unless  as  in  reference  to  their 
possible  application  empirically ;  that  is,  they  serve 
only  for  the  possibility  of  empirical  perception  and 
cognition.  But  that  is  experience.  Consequently  the 
categories  have  a  share  in  the  cognising  of  things, 
only  in  so  far  as  these  things  actually  arc,  or  arc 
taken  to  be,  empirical. 


§23. 

The  above  proposition  is  of  the  greatest  importance; 
for  it  just  as  much  determines  the  limits  of  the  share 
of  the  categories  in  objects,  as  the  Esthetic  similarly 
determined  in  regard  to  the  pure  form  of  our  sense- 
perception.     Space  and  time  function,  as  conditions 
of  the  possibility  of  how  objects  can  be  given  us,  no 
further  than  as  regards  objects  of  sense,  or  no  further 
than   as  regards  experience.      Beyond  these  limits 
they  stand  for  nothing;    for  they  are  only  in  the 
senses  and  have  no  reality  apart  from  them.    The 
categories  are  free  from  this  restriction,  and  apply  to 
objects  of  perception  as  such,  if  only  sensuous  and 
not  intellectual,  let  it  be  like  to  ours  or  not  like. 
This  extension  beyond  our  sense  helps  us,  however, 
as  on  their  part,  to  nothing.     For  they  are  then  void 
notions  of  objects,  of  which  objects,  whether  they  are 
even  possible  or  impossible,  these  notions  themselves 
cannot   possibly    enable    us    to   judge.      They  arc 
mere  thought-forms  without  objective  reality,  for  we 
are  without  a  perception  on  which  to  apply  the  syn- 
thetic unity  of  apperception  involved  in  them,  and 
so  render  them  themselves  available  in  the  relative 
objective  determination.    Our  sensuous  and  empirical 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


227 


perception    can   alone   procure  for  them  sense   and 


meaning.  ^ 


Let  us  suppose  ourselves  to  assume,  for  example, 
an  object  that  is  an  object  of  a  perception  which  is 
non-sensuous.     Such  an  object  we  may  determine,  of 
course,  by  all  the  predicates  which  the  assumption 
itself  involves — the  assumption  that  it  Ikzs  nothing  of  a 
sense-perception  in  it.     It  is  not,  therefore,  extended  or 
in  space ;  its  duration  is  not  a  time ;  there  is  no  time- 
succession  of  modi,  no  such  thing  as  change,  in  it, 
etc.    But  that  is  not  an  objective  cognition  proper,  in 
regard  to  which  I  only  name  how  the  perception  of 
the  object  is  not^  and  remain  unable  to  say  anything 
that  it  positively  is.     I  have  not  then  done  anything 
to  indicate  the  possibility  of  an  object  for  my  cate- 
gory ;  or  I  have  not  been  able  to  assign  a  perception 
which   should   correspond  to  it.     I  have  only  been 
able  to  say,  rather,  that  our  perception  is,  as  regards 
any  such  object,  without  a  bearing.     Nay,  the  most 
important  distinction  here  yet  is  this:   that  to  any 
such  supposed  object,  there  cannot  be  applied  even 
any  one  single  category.     How  apply  that  of  sub- 
stance, for  instance,  or  the  notion  of  something,  such 
that  it  can  exist  as  subject,  but  never  as  mere  predi- 
cate, and  in  regard  to  which  I  do  not  at  all  know 
whether  anything  whatever  can  possibly  exist  as  cor- 
respondent to  the  thought — nor  can   know,  unless 
empirical  perception  provide  me  in  an  actual  case 
that  is  actually  applicable  ?     But  of  this  again. 


§  24.  Of  the  Application  of  the  Categories  to  the  Objects  of  Sense. 

The  categories  bear,  through  the  mere  understand - 

*  Rosenkranz  has  an  "  alien "  here  which,  very  evidently,  should  be 
allein. 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


229 


ing,  on  objects  of  perception  as  perception,  if  only- 
sensuous,   no  matter  ours  or  another;  but  are,  for 
that  very  reason,  mere  thought-forms^  through  which 
(as  such)  there  is  not  any  actual  object  cognised. 
The  synthesis  or  conjunction  of  the  units   in  their 
(intellectual)    complex  held   only   of  the    unity   of 
apperception,  and  was  through  it  the  ground  of  the 
possibility  of  perceptive  cognition  a  jmori,  so  far  as 
such  cognition  depends  on  the  understanding,  and  is, 
consequently,  not  only  transcendental,  but  also  merely 
pure-intellectual.     There  is  basally  presupposed  in  us, 
however,  a  certain  form  of  sense-perception  a  jjriori 
which  rests  on  the  receptivity  or  susceptivity  of  im- 
pressions (a  sensibility  as  such).     Now,  understanding, 
as  spontaneity,  is  to  be  conceived  capable  of  deter- 
minatively  acting  on  the  units  of  complex  in  inner 
sense,  under  and  in  accordance  with  the   synthetic 
unity  of  apperception.     That  is,  understanding  may 
be  conceived  to  think  synthetic  unity  of  the  apper- 
ception of  the  complex  ^  of  a  priori  seme  perception^  as 
the  condition  under  which  all  objects  of  our  (human) 
perception  must   necessarily   stand.      In   this   wise, 
then,  it  is  that  the  categories,  though  mere  thought- 
forms,    get   objective  reality^    or    actual    presence    as 
factors  in  objects  which  may  be  given  us  in  sense. 
These    objects,    too,    must    be    understood   as   only 
appearances  to,  or  presentations  in,  sense  while  as  yet 
only  sense-given ;   for  only  in  regard  to  objects  of 
such  a  nature  are  we  capable  of  a  perception  a  priori 
or  of  a  jiriori  perceptive  forms. 

The  sense-synthesis,  a  priori  possible  and  necessary, 
may  be  named  the  synthesis  speciosa  or  ßgural  one,  in 

»  It  is  possible  to  give  a  sense,  and  so  reconcile  one's  self  to  the  phrase 
"apperception  of  .the  complex."  Certainly,  however,  "apperception" 
ought  to  be  apprehension. 


1 


I 


contradistinction  to  that  which,  with  a  bearing  only 
on  perception  as  such  (on  any  perception  whatever) 
were  a  matter  simply  of  thought  in  the  category,  and 
accordingly  to  be  named  synthesis  in  understanding, 
or  synthesis  intellectualis.  Both  syntheses — that  of 
a  priori  sense  (time  and  space)  and  that  of  the  cate- 
gories— are  transcendental.  They  are  transcendental, 
too,  not  simply  because  they  a  priori  precede  other 
constituents  of  objective  knowledge,  but  because  also 
they  are  grounds  a  priori  of  the  very  possibility  of 
that  knowledge. 

But,  again,  the  figural  synthesis  must,  when  con- 
sidered as  bearing  on  the  original  synthetic  unity  of 
apperception,  or  on  the  transcendental  unity,  that  is, 
which  functions  in  the  categories,  be  named,  as  in 
contradistinction  to  the  merely  intellectual  conjunc- 
tion, the  transcendental  synthesis  of  imagination.  Ima- 
gination is  the  faculty  or  power  to  exhibit  an  object 
in  perception,  even  without  the  presence  of  that  object. 
Inasmuch,  now,  as  all  our  perception  is  sensuous, 
imagination,  too,  must  hold  of  sense,  so  far  as  con- 
cerns the  subjective  condition  under  which  alone  it 
can  offer  to  the  categories  a  correspondent  percep- 
tion. So  far,  again,  as  its  synthesis  is  an  action  of 
spontaneity,  which  is  determinant,  and  not,  like 
sense,  merely  determinable — so  far,  that  is,  as  it  can, 
under  and  in  accordance  with  the  unity  of  appercep- 
tion, a  priori  determine  sense  in  its  form — imagination 
is  a  faculty  which  a  priori  acts  upon  sense.  Accord- 
ingly, its  synthesis  of  perceptions,  under  the  cate- 
gories, must  be  named  the  transcendental  synthesis 
of  imagination.  This  synthesis  is  the  result  of  an 
action  of  understanding  on  sense,  and  is  the  first 
application  of  the  former  (ground,  too,  of  all  its  other 
applications)  in  the  direction  of  objects  of  what  per- 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  TÜRE  REASON. 


231 


ception  is  possible  to  us.  As  figurate  or  figural,  this 
synthesis  is  distinguished  from  the  intellectual  syn- 
thesis that,  without  imagination,  is  to  be  conceived  to 
lie  wholly  in  the  understanding.  So  far  as  imagina- 
tion is  possessed  of  spontaneity,  I  sometimes  name  it 
jjrodudive  imagination,  and  distinguish  it  thus  from 
the  reproductive.  Synthesis  with  the  latter  depends 
solely  on  empirical  laws,  those,  namely,  of  associa- 
tion ;  consequently,  it  cannot  contribute  anything  in 
explanation  of  the  possibility  of  a  prmri  principles  of 
objective  perception,  and,  accordingly,  being  without 
position  in  transcendental  philosophy,  is  relegated  to 

psychology. 

•  •  •  •  • 

Here  now  is  the  place  to  explain  the  paradox 
which,  in  the  exposition  of  the  form  of  inner  sense 
(§  6),  must  have  struck  every  reader :  namely,  how 
this  sense  can  exhibit  to  consciousness  even  our  own 
selves,  not  as  we  are  in  ourselves,  but  only  as  we 
appear  to  ourselves ;  and  for  the  reason  that  we  only 
perceive  ourselves  as  we  are  internally  affected^  which 
seems  a  contradiction,  seeing  that  in  that  case  we 
should  have  to  relate  ourselves  to  our  own  selves 
passively  (that  is,  be  acted  on  by  our  own  selves). 
Hence  we  find  it  usual,  in  the  current  systems  of 
psychology,  to  regard  inner  sense  and  the  faculty  of 
apperception  as  identical :  we,  for  our  own  part,  how- 
ever, desire  carefully  to  distinguish  them. 

What  acts  upon  the  inner  sense  is  the  native 
function  of  understanding  to  unite  a  perceptive  com- 
plex, or  to  bring  such  under  an  apperception  (as  that 
on  which  its  very  possibility  depends).  As  now,  in  us 
men,  understanding  is  no  faculty  of  perception  proper, 
and  perception  itself,  grant  it  even  to  be  actual  so  far 
as  depends  on  sensation,  cannot,  within  or  of  itself, 


I 


apprehend^  so  as  to  unite  and  connect,  as  it  were,  the 
manifold  of  its  own  self,  it  follows  that  the  synthesis 
of  understanding,  considered  apart  and  by  itself,  is 
nothing  else  than  that  unity  of  act  (at  once,  as  such 
and  without  need  of  sense,  known  to  understanding) 
by  which  understanding  is  able  internally  to  affect 
any  sense-complex  that  may  be  given  to  it — subject, 
of  course,  to  the  general  perceptive  form.  Said  act, 
therefore,  under  the  designation  of  a  transcendental 
synthesis  of  imagination^  is  exerted  by  understanding 
on  the  passive  subject  of  which  it  is  a  faculty ;  and  so 
we  rightly  say  that  the  inner  sense  is  by  these  means 
affected.  Apperception  (with  its  synthetic  unity)  is 
so  far  from  being  identical  with  internal  sense,  that, 
rather,  as  source  of  all  synthesis,  it  acts  (under  the 
name  of  the  categories)  on  the  complex  of  percep- 
tions generally  (and  so  on  objects  generally),  in  an- 
tecedence of  all  sense-perception  whatever.  While 
inner  sense,  again,  is  the  mere  form  of  perception, 
but  without  power  of  conjoining  the  particulars  given 
in  it,  and  still,  consequently,  without  anything  that 
can  be  called  a  certain  actual  definite  perception. 
That,  something  that  is  a  perception  and  distinct,  is 
only  possible  through  the  consciousness  of  the  deter- 
mination of  inner  sense  by  the  transcendental  action 
of  the  imagination  (the  synthetic  action  of  under- 
standing on  inner  sense),  which  I  have  called  the 
figural  synthesis. 

This  we  see,  too,  always  in  our  own  selves.  We 
cannot  think  a  line  without  in  thought  drawing  it,  or 
a  circle  without  so  describing  it,  or  the  three  dimen- 
sions of  space  without  conceiving  three  lines  perpen- 
dicularly to  meet  each  other  in  the  same  point,  or 
time  itself  without  having  regard,  in  that  we  similarly 
draw  a  straight  line  (which   shall  be   the  external 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


233 


figurate  representation  of  time),  merely  to  the  act  of 
synthesis  in  the  complex,  whereby  we  successively 
determine  inner  sense,  and  whereby  also  we  observe 
the  succession  of  this  determination  in  sense.  Motion, 
as  act  of  the  subject  (not  as  determination  of  an 
object),*  consequently  the  synthesis  of  the  complex  in 
space  when  we  abstract  from  space  itself  and  regard 
only  the  act  whereby  we  affect  the  inner  sense,  but 
still  as  in  accordance  with  its  form,  is  what  gives  rise 
to  the  very  notion  of  succession.  Understanding, 
therefore,  does  not  just  find  in  inner  sense  such  syn- 
thesis of  the  complex  implied,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
produces  synthesis  by  affecting  sense.  But  how  the 
ego  that  thinks  itself  can,  as  regards  the  ego  that 
perceives  itself,  be  different  from  it  (for  an  under- 
standing that  should  at  once  perceive  itself,  is  con- 
ceivably possible),  and  yet,  at  the  same  time  also,  as 
being  the  same  subject,  all  one  with  it — how,  there- 
fore, I  can  say,  I,  as  intelligence  and  thinking  subject, 
cognise  myself  as  thought  object  so  far  as,  in  addition 
to  thought,  I  am  given  in  jjercej.tion,  only,  like  other 
phenomena,  not  as  I  am  before  understanding,  but  as 
before  sense  I  aj^pear  to  myself — all  this  has  no  more 
and  no  less  difficulty  than  how  I  can  be  to  myself  an 
object  at  all,  an  object,  that  is,  of  perception  and 
inner  sense-consciousness.  But  that  it  actually  must 
be  so  may  (space  being  assumed  as  merely  pure  form 
of  the  appearances  of  outer  sense)  be  made  clear  by 
considering  that,  time  being  no  object  of  external 

*  Motion  of  an  olject  in  space  is  no  consideration  of  any  pure  science, 
and,  consequently,  not  even  of  geometry  ;  for  that  something  moves  can 
only  be  known  from  experience,  and  not  a  priori.  But  motion,  as 
described  in  space,  is  a  pure  act  of  the  successive  synthesis  of  the  complex 
in  outer  perception,  through  instrumentality  of  productive  imagination, 
and  belongs,  therefore,  not  only  to  geometry,  but  even  to  transcendental 
philosophy. — K. 


perception,  we  cannot  otherwise  represent  it  to  our- 
selves than  by  the  image  of  a  line,  and  that,  too,  only 
so  far  as  in  thought  we  draw  it;  for  without  this 
expedient  we  should  be  unable  to  conceive  the  unity 
of  the  dimension  of  time.  Evidence  to  the  like  effect 
is  this,  that,  as  regards  duration  in  time,  or  relative 
position  in  time,  we  must,  for  realization  of  concep- 
tion in  such  cases,  have  recourse  to  the  fact  of  change 
in  external  things.  Of  all  the  conclusion,  therefore, 
is  that  we  must  order  the  determinations  of  inner 
sense  as  sense-presentations  in  time,  in  precisely  the 
same  way  in  which  we  order  those  of  external  sense 
in  space ;  and  that,  consequently,  if  of  the  latter  we 
admit  that  through  them  we  know  objects  only  so 
far  as  we  are  externally  affected,  we  must  no  less 
admit  of  inner  sense  that  through  it  we  perceive  our 
own  selves  only  as  we  are  by  our  own  selves  internally 
affected.  That  is,  we  must  admit  that,  so  far  as  con- 
cerns internal  perception,  we  cognise  our  own  subject 
only  as  sense-appearance,  and  not  according  to  what 
it  is  in  itself.^ 

*  I  do  not  see  how  there  should  be  so  much  difficulty  in  conceiving 
that  inner  sense  may  be  affected  by  our  own  selves.  Every  act  of  atten- 
tion is  an  example  of  the  fact.  In  it  understanding  always  determines 
the  inner  sense  (in  accoi"dance  with  the  combination  that  is  the  subject 
thought)  into  that  inner  perception  which  corresponds  to  the  complex  in 
the  synthesis  of  the  understanding.  How  much  the  mind  is  commonly 
affected  in  this,  every  one  will  be  able  to  perceive  in  himself. — K. 

I  cannot  help  remarking  here  that,  in  the  above  (text)  Kant  has  dis- 
tinguished by  stars  one  of  the  most  signal  examples  possible  of  his  very 
worst  writing.  Not  only  do  the  two  last  sentences  occupy  fully  a  whole 
page  with  the  most  spider  like  sprawl  of  helplessly-intricate  clauses,  but 
what  precedes  them  is  even  disfigured  by  actual  errors,  both  verbal  and 
syntactical.  One  is  apt  to  surmise  that  Kant  never  stopped  for  comple- 
tion of  his  thought  before  he  put  his  pen  to  paper  ;  but  that  he  thought 
as  he  wrote.  So  it  was  that  factor  after  factor  and  bearing  after  bearing 
interposed  only  by  the  way;  suggesting  thus  modification  after  modifica- 
tion, condition  after  condition,  and,  consequently,  clause  after  clause.  To 
think,  too,  that  what  is  wanted  to  be  said  is  so  simple  that  a  single  sen- 


,1 


234 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


§  25. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  transcendental  synthesis 
of  mere  mental  consciousness  as  such  (that  is,  in  the 
original  synthetic  unity  of  apperception),  I  am  aware 
of  myself,  not  as  I  appear  to  myself,  nor  yet  as  I  am 
in  myself,  but  only  as  that  I  am.  This  cognition  is  a 
thoughty  not  a  j^ercejition.  But,  now,  for  an  objective  re- 
cognition of  myself,  there  is  required,  besides  the  act 
of  thought  necessary  for  the  reduction  of  any  possible 
perceptive  complex  to  the  unity  of  apperception,  a 
particular  mode  of  perception,  as  well,  in  supply  of  a 
complex.  Thus,  then,  my  own  being  is  not  mere 
appearance  (and  still  less  mere  blind  show).  This, 
my  being,  however,  can  be  determined  only  as  in 
regard  of  the  particular  manner  in  which  the  com- 
plex presented  for  my  synthesis  is  given  in  inner  per- 
ception, and  always,  at  the  same  time,  as  in  accord- 
ance with  the  native  form  of  inner  sense.^     In  this 

tence— but  see  Commentary.  Kant  himself  refers  to  §  6  ;  a  much  better 
reference  wouM  be  §  8,  II. 

The  errors  are  these.  Under  the  stars,  second  paragraph,  fourth  sen- 
tence, there  is  an  omission,  or  the  punctuation  and  an  "  auf  "  are  wrong. 
Third  paragraph,  second  period,  the  writer's  ear  has  put  a  terminal  clause, 
an  "  Acht  haben,"  which  properly  refers  half  way  up  ;  or  the  references  of 
«ohne,"  and  "indem,"  and  "Acht  haben"  are  aU  wrong.  By-and-by, 
Rosenkranz  has  a  "Wahrnehmungen  "  which  were  better  singular. 

^  The  I  think  expresses  the  act  to  determine  my  being.  The  fact  of  my 
"being  is  thereby,  therefore,  already  given  ;  but  how  I  shall  determine 
what  it  is,  or  how  I  shall  realize  in  myself  the  constituent  complex  of 
cognisable  units  that  is  peculiar  to  it— this  is  not  therel)y  given.  To 
that  there  belongs  seU'percq>tion,  and  perception  basally  implies  an  a 
priori  given  form  (time),  which  is  sensuous  and  attaches  to  the  receptivity 
of  my  sentiency.  Should  I  not  have,  now,  further,  another  self-percep- 
tion by  which  what  is  determinant  in  me  (of  whose  spontaneity  as  such 
I  am  only  as  yet  supposed  to  be  conscious)  is  given  before  the  act  of  de- 
termining, in  the  same  way  as  what  is  determinable  (sentient)  is  given  by 
time — in  that  case  I  cannot  determine  my  existent  nature  (as  that  of  a 
self-active  being) :  I  only  perceive  the  spontaneity  of  my  thinking,  that 
is,  of  the  determining ;  and  my  constituent  existential  nature  remains 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


235 


way,  consequently,  I  have  no  objective  perception  of 
myself  as  I  am,  but  only  as  I,  through  sense,  appear 
to  myself.     The  consciousness  of  one's  self  is  still, 
therefore,  far  from  being  an  objective  recognition  of 
one's  self,  notwithstanding  presence  of  all  the  cate- 
gories which  compose  the  thinking  of  an  object  (as 
such)   through  synthesis  of  some   given    perceptive 
complex  in  an  apperception.     For  perceptive  cogni- 
tion of  an  object  different  from  myself,  I  require,  be- 
sides the  general  thinking  of  an  object  in  the  cate- 
gories, a  perception  as  well,  whereby  to  determine,  or 
give  filling  to,  said  general  notion  (in  the  categories). 
In  the  same  way,  for  objective  recognition  of  myself, 
I  require,  besides  consciousness,  or  besides  the  fact 
that  I  think  myself,  as  well  a  perception  of  the  com- 
plex in  me  whereby  to  determine,  or  give  filling  to, 
that  bare  thought.   I  exist,  therefore,  as  an  intelligence 
which  is  only  conscious  to  itself  of  its  bare  synthetic 
function,  but,  for  a  complex  to  act  on,  is  subjected  to 
a  limiting  condition,^  named  inner  sense.    So  situated, 
such  an  intelligence  can  realize  said  synthetic  function 
on  or  in  a  perception,  only  in  accordance  with  rela- 
tions of  time,  relations,  consequently,  which  lie  quite 
outside  of  the  notions  proper  of  understanding;  and 
can,  therefore,  objectively  recognise  itself  only  as,  in 
regard  of  a  perception  which  cannot  be  intellectual 
and  given  by  the  understanding,  it  merely  seems  to 
itself,  and  not  as  it  would  perceive  itself,  were  its  per- 
ception intellectual. 

always  only  sensuous,  or  determinable  as  that  of  a  sense-aj»peainnce.  It 
is  the  spontaneity,  all  the  same,  that  empowers  me  to  name  myself  an 
Intelligence. — K . 

^  "  Verbindung"  here  is  a  mistake  for  Bedingung. 


236 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


§  26.  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  general  possible  empirical 

Action  of  the  Categories. 

In  the  metaphysical  deduction,  the  a  priori  origin  of 
the  categories  was  substantiated  by  their  complete 
agreement  witli  the  general  logical  functions  of 
thought  (§  10).  In  the  transcendental  deduction, 
again  (§§  20,  21),  there  was  established  the  possi- 
bility of  these  categories  as  a  priori  cognitive  elements 
in  objects  of  perception  as  perception  (perception 
proper,  general,  not  yet  special).  What  is  now,  then, 
to  be  explained,  is  the  possibility  of  an  a  jriori  cog- 
nition (through  categories)  of  actual  objects  of  special 
sense,  and  not  as  concerns  their  mere  general  percep- 
tive form  (the  successions  of  time  and  space),  but  in 
reference  to  the  laws  of  their  synthesis.  Such  a  priori 
synthesis  were,  as  it  were,  a  prescribing  of  law  to 
nature,  and  even  a  making  of  it  possible ;  for,  other- 
wise, it  were  inexplicable  how  everything  whatever 
that  is  an  object  of  our  very  senses  must  stand  under 
laws,  which  have  their  source  only  a  priori  in  the 
understanding  itself. 

I  remark,  first,  that  by  synthesis  of  apprehension  I 
understand  the  setting  together  of  the  various  ele- 
ments in  an  empirical  perception,  whereby  empirical 
consciousness  of  such  perception  (still  as  sensible 
appearance)  is  made  possible. 

A  puriori  we  have  forms  of  external  as  well  as  in- 
ternal sensuous  perception  (in  space  and  time),  and 
the  synthesis  of  apprehension  must  always  conform 
to  these,  for  it  can  be  realized  only  in  that  form. 
But  space  and  time  are  conceived  to  be  perceived  not 
merely  as  forms  of  sensuous  perception,  but  as  them- 
selves perceptions  (objects  implying  a  complex),  and, 
consequently,  as  already  a  priori  possessed  of  the  de- 


THE   KRITIK   OF  PURE   REASON. 


237 


termination  of  unity  of  complex  (see  Trans.  Ästhet.)  ^ 
There  is,  therefore,  unity  of  synthesis  of  the  complex 
(whether  as  external  to  us  or  internal)— that  is,  a 
conjunction,  to  which  all  that  can  be  perceived  as  de- 
termined in  space  or  time  must  submit — already 
a  priori  given  (as  synthetic  condition  of  all  appre- 
hension), at  the  same  time  with  (not  merely  in)  these 
perceptive  forms  or  perceptive  objects.  This  synthetic 
unity,  however,  can  be  no  other  than  that  of  the 
union  of  the  manifold  of  an  inherently  given  percep- 
tion (the  a  priori  general  one),  in  an  original  con- 
sciousness,  conform  to  the  categories,  and  only  applied 
to  our  sensuous  perception.  All  synthesis,  conse- 
quentl}^,  whereby  even  sense-perception  becomes 
possible  stands  under  the  categories ;  and  as  experience 
is  a  cognition  through  connected  sense-perceptions, 
the  categories  are  conditions  of  the  possibility  of 
experience,  and  have,  consequently,  an  a  priori  ap- 
plication  to  all  objects  of  experience. 

•  •  *  ♦  # 

Suppose,  for  example,  I  observe  the  empirical  per- 
ception of  a  house  (the  object,  house)  by  apprehen- 
sion of  its  complex,  there  is  presuj^posed  under  it 

»  Space,  as  an  object  (an  actual  requirement  of  geometry),  involves 
more  than  a  mere  perceptional  form ;  synthesis  of  complex,  namely,  in 
obedience  to  the  form  of  sense,  and  into  a  perceivable  cognition,  in  such 
wise  that  the  perceptive  form  presents  merely  the  complex,  while  the 
formal  perception,  on  the  other  hand,  presents  the  unity.  This  unity  I 
had  accounted  in  the  Esthetic  merely  to  sense  in  order  only  to  signalize 
that  it  precedes  any  notion,  not  but  that  it  presupposes  a  syntliesü^vfhioh 
does  not  belong  to  the  senses,  but  which  at  the  same  time  conditions  the 
very  possibility  of  notions  as  in  application  to  space  and  time.  For  as 
'  through  it  (understanding  so  determining  sense),  space  and  time  are  as 
perceptive  objects  originally  just  given,  so  the  unity  of  perception  implied 
belongs  a  priori  to  space  and  time  themselves,  and  not  to  any  notion  (as 
category)  of  the  understanding  (§  24).— K. 

This  unity,  which  precedes  any  individual  notion,  is,  of  course,  that  of 
i\iQ  first  synthesis. 


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TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


the  necessar)'  unity  of  space  and  of  outer  sense  gener- 
ally, and  I  picture,  as  it  were,  its  shape,  in  accordance 
with  this  synthetic  unity  of  the  complex  in  space. 
But,  leaving  out  of  view  the  form  of  space,  precisely 
the  same  synthetic  unity  is  to  be  found  in  the  under- 
standing as  the  category  of  homogeneous  synthesis  in 
perception  generally  (the  category  of  quantity),  to 
which,  therefore,  said  synthesis  of  apprehension  (the 
thing  seen)  must  completely  conform.^ 

Or  suppose  I  observe  the  freezing  of  water,  what  I 
apprehend  are  two  states  (liquid,  solid)  such  that  they 
stand  towards  each  other  in  a  relation  of  time.  But 
I  picture  necessary  synthetic  unity  of  the  sense-com- 
plex in  the  general  underlying  element  of  time,  and 
without  this  synthetic  unity  said  relation  (of  ruled 
place  in  time)  would  not  be  given  as  a  single  deter- 
minate perception.  But  now,  leaving  time  out  of 
view,  this  synthetic  unity,  as  a  priori  condition  under 
which  I  interconnect  generally  the  complex  of  per- 
ception, is  the  category  of  cause — a  category  by  means 
of  which,  when  applied  to  contributions  of  sense,  I 
determine  all  that  happens  into  the  form  of  a  ruled 
relation  in  time.  And  therefore  apprehension  in  the 
case  of  any  such  occurrence,  consequently  this  (occur- 
rence) itself,  as  regards  possible  perception,  stands 
under  the  notion  of  the  relation  of  effects  and  causes^  and 

so  in  all  the  other  cases. 

«  •  #  #  • 

*  It  is  proved  in  this  way  that  the  synthesis  of  apprehension,  which 
is  empirical,  must  accord  with  the  synthesis  of  apperception,  which  is 
intellectual  and  represented  by  the  a  priori  category.  It  is  one  and  the 
same  mental  spontaneity  which,  there  as  imagination,  and  here  as  under- 
standing, effects  synthesis  in  the  complex  that  may  be  before  percep- 
tion.— K. 

In  the  second  line  of  the  above  paragraph,  Rosenkranz  has,  for  appre- 
hension, the  misprint  "Apperception,"  an  error  which  we  saw  before 
in  §24. 


THE    KRITIK   OF  PURE   REASON. 


239 


Categories  are  notions  which  a  priori  prescribe  laws 
to  sense-appearances,  and  consequently  to  nature  as  the 
totality  of  such  {natura  matericditer  spectata) ;  and  the 
question  is,  as  they  cannot  be  derived  from  nature 
nor  subject  themselves  to  it  as  their  pattern  (for  then 
they  would  be  merely  empirical) — the  question  is, 
how  are  we  to  understand  this,  that  nature  must 
subject  itself  to  them.  In  a  word,  How  can  cate- 
gories a  priori  determine  the  actual  syntheses  of 
objects  in  nature — instead,  rather,  of  being  derived 
therefrom  ?     Here  is  the  solution  of  this  enigma : 

It  is  not  at  alP  more  surprising  how  laws  of  objects 
in  nature  should  of  necessity  agree  with  the  under- 
standing and  its  a  priori  forms  (its  functions,  namely, 
of  synthesis  in  the  varieties  of  the  sense-complex), 
than  how  these  objects  themselves  should  of  necessity 
agree  with  the  a  priori  form  of  sense-perception.     For 
laws  just  as  little  exist  in  the  objects  (mere  affections  of 
sense),  unless  only  relatively  to  the  subject  (in  which 
these  inhere)  so  far  as  said  subject  has  an  understand- 
ing,— just  as  little  as  objects  exist  in  themselves^  and 
not  relatively  only  to  the  subject  so  far  as  the  subject 
has  senses.     Rule  would  necessarily  accrue  to  things 
in  themselves  from  themselves,  and  independently  of 
any  understanding  that  might  cognise  them.     But 
our  objects,  being  only  sense-appearances,  represent 
merely  such  things  as,  for  what  they  are  in  them- 
selves, are  wholly  unknown.     And,  as  such,  plainly, 
neither  can  their  connexions  stand  under  any  law 
but  that  which  the  connecting  understanding  pre- 
scribes for  them.     But  what  connects  any  complex 
in  sense-perception  is  imagination ;  and  imagination, 
depending  on  sense  for  the  complex  of  apprehension,  is 
equally  dependent  on  understanding  for  the  unity  of 

*  Instead  of  ww,  Rosenkranz  has  here  the  misprint  "  nun.^* 


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TEXT-BOOK    TO   KANT  : 


its  own  intellectual  synthesis.  Inasmuch,  now,  as  all 
possible  perception  depends  on  the  synthesis  of  appre- 
hension^ which  (empirical)  synthesis  itself,  for  its  part, 
depends  on  the  transcendental  synthesis,  and  con- 
sequently on  the  categories,  so  all  possible  perceptions, 
consequently  all  that  can  ever  come  to  be  a  constitu- 
ent of  empirical  consciousness — and  that  is  all  objects 
of  sense  in  nature  so  far  as  their  connexion  is  in 
regard — must  stand  under  the  categories.  Nature 
(merely  as  such)  depends,  for  its  necessary  subjection 
to  law  and  order,  on  the  categories  as  the  original 
source  and  ground  ofthat  law  and  order,  in  reference 
to  which  latter  nature  is  as  natwa  formaliter  spectata. 
But  to  more  laws  than  those  on  which  a  nature  in 
general  (as  law  and  order  of  sense-appearances  in 
space  and  time)  rests,  the  competence  of  even  the 
purest  understanding  does  not  extend  as  regards 
prescription  a  priori  of  laws  to  such  objects  through 
mere  categories.  Special  laws,  as  concerning  only 
what  is  empirically  determined,  cannot  be  completely 
derived  from  the  categories,  though  standing  in  a 
body  under  them.  Experience  must,  in  addition,  be 
applied  to  in  regard  of  such.  But  of  experience  as 
experience,  and  of  what  can  be  known  as  an  object 
of  it,  said  a  priori  laws  alone  (the  categories)  supply 
instruction. 


§  27.  Eesult  of  this  Deduction  of  the  Categones. 

We  cannot  think  an  object  without  categories ;  we 
cannot  cognise  any  object  thought,  unless  through 
perceptions  which  correspond  to  these  notions.  Now 
all  our  perceptions  are  in  sense,  and  such  cognition, 
so  far  as  the  object  of  it  is  given^  is  empirical.  But 
empirical  cognition   (or  recognition — perception)   is 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


241 


experience.  Consequently  there  is  no  objective  cog- 
nition a  priori  possible  to  us,  but  one  solely  of  objects 
of  possible  experience.  ^ 

But   such   cognition,  though   confined   merely  to 
objects  of  experience,   is   not   therefor  all  borrowed 
from  experience.     On  the  contrary,  even  such  cog- 
nition has  elements  which  originate  a  prioii  within 
ourselves;   firstly,   the   pure   perceptions    (time   and 
space),  namely,  and,  secondly,   the  pure  notions  of 
understanding  (the  categories).     Now,  there  are  only 
two  ways  in  which  we  can  think  a  necessary  agree- 
ment of  experience  with  notions  of  objects  in  it : 
either  experience  makes  these  notions,  or  these  notions 
make  experience,   possible.     The  one  alternative   is 
not  true  of  the  categories  {pure  perception  apart)  ;  for 
they  are   a  priori  notions,    and   consequently  inde- 
pendent of  experience  (the  assertion  of  an  empirical 
origin  would  be  a  sort  of  generatio  cequivoca).     There 
remains,  therefore,  only  the  second  alternative  (as  it 
were  a  system  of  the  Epigenesis  of  pure  reason) :  that 
the   categories,    on   the   part   of  the  understanding, 
namely,  possess  the  grounds  of  the  possibility  of  all 
our  experience.    How,  however,  they  make  experience 
possible,  and  what  principles  of  this  possibility  they 
furnish  in  their  application  to  the  intimations  of  sense, 

»  In  order  to  preclude  possible  premature  objection  of  questionable 
consequences  to  be  apprehended  from  this  proposition,  I  will  only  remark 
that,  %n  thinking,  the  categories  are  not  necessarily  under  restriction  of 
the  conditions  of  our  sense-perception,  but  possess,  so  far,  a  quite  un- 
limited field.  It  is  only  the  perception  of  what  we  think,  the  determina- 
tion of  It  as  an  object,  that  requires  elements  of  perceptive  sense.  Even 
without  this  latter  the  mere  thought  of  some  certain  object  may  have 
always  its  own  results  of  true  and  authentic  application  in  the  reasonings 
of  the  subject.  Such  application,  however,  as  it  is  not  always  directed 
to  actual  determination  of  the  object,  to  actual  objective  cognition,  but 
rather  to  determination  of  the  subject  and  its  volition,  is  here  not  yet  in 
l^lace  to  be  discussed. — K. 


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TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


will  be  further  explained  in  what  follows  on  the  tran- 
scendental function  of  judgment. 

Between  the  two  ways  named,  one  might  con- 
ceivably propose  a  middle-way:  namely,  that  the 
categories  are  neither  spontaneously-thought  first 
principles  a  prion  of  our  objective  cognition,  nor, 
again,  that  they  are  borrowed  from  experience,  but 
that,  implanted  in  us  with  our  very  existence,  they 
are  subjective  germinal  elements,  or  pre-capacities 
for  thinking,  which  have  been  so  fashioned  by  our 
Maker  as  in  their  function  accurately  to  harmonize 
with  the  laws  of  nature  which  obtain  in  experience 
(a  sort  of  preformation-system  of  pure  reason).  But, 
besides  that  in  such  an  hypothesis  it  is  impossible  to 
see  any  end  to  presuppositions  of  pre-established 
potentialities  of  future  judgments,  this,  as  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  said  middle-way,  would  be  decisive: 
namely,  that  the  categories,  in  such  a  case,  would 
want  that  necessity  which  essentially  belongs  to  their 
very  notion.  For  the  notion  cause,  for  example, 
which  affirms,  under  a  presupposed  condition,  the 
necessity  of  a  certain  result,  would  be  false,  if  it  were 
founded  only  on  an  arbitrarily  implanted  subjective 
necessity  in  the  connecting  of  certain  empirical  facts 
conformably  with  such  rule  of  relation.  I  should  not 
be  able  to  say,  The  effect  is  united  in  the  object  (that 
is,  necessarily)  to  the  cause,  but  only,  I  am  so  made 
that  I  cannot  otherwise  think  these  facts  than  as  so 
and  so  connected.  But  that  is  just  what  the  sceptic 
especially  wants.  For  then  all  our  knowledge, 
through  any  supposed  objective  validity  in  our  judg- 
ments, would  be  mere  illusion.  Neither,  in  that 
case,  would  there  be  wanting  those  who  would  not 
admit  for  themselves  said  subjective  necessity  (matter 
oi  feeling  as  it  must  be).     There  could  be  no  dispute 


THE   KRITIK   OF  PURE   REASON. 


243 


at  least  with  any  one  as  regards  what  would  merely 
depend  on  how  he  was  subjectively  organized. 

A  Brief  Idea  of  this  Deduction. 

It  is  the  exposition  of  the  pure  notions  of  the 
understanding  (and  with  them  of  all  a  priori  theo- 
retical objective  cognition)  as  principles  of  the  possi- 
bility of  experience, — of  these,  again,  as  determination 
of  sense-appearances  in  space  and  time  generally^ — of 
these,  lastly,  from  the  principle  of  the  original  syn- 
thetic unity  of  apperception  as  form  of  the  under- 
standing in  a  connecting  reference  to  space  and  time, 

and  to  them,  for  their  parts,  as  original  forms  of  sense. 
•  •  •  *  • 

Thus  far  I  have  considered  it  necessary  to  proceed 
by  paragraphs,  inasmuch  as  we  have  been  hitherto 
occupied  only  with  the  elementary  notions.  Now, 
however,  that  it  is  their  application  which  is  to  be 
made  conceivable,  our  exposition  shall,  without  para- 
graphs, be  in  continuous  connexion.^ 


Book  II. — The  Analytic  of  Judgments. 

General  Logic  is  built  on  a  frame  which  quite 
accurately  coincides  with  the  classified  table  in  distri- 
bution of  the  higher  cognitive  faculties  :  Understand- 
ing, Judgment,  Reason.  Its  analytic  treats,  there- 
fore, of  Notions,  Propositions,  and  Syllogisms,  in 
exact  accordance  with  the  order  and  functions  of  the 
intellectual  powers  named ;  of  which  it  is  further  to 

'  Beginning  of  §  27,  "Anschauung"  should  be  Anschauungen;  next 
paragraph,  the  last  parenthetic  hook  (after  "  Vernunft ")  is  wanting ;  last 
sentence,  a  "  da  "  omitted  (in  edn.  Rosenkranz). 


244 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


245 


be  remarked,  indeed,  that  they  are  usually  collec- 
tively comprehended,  in  a  wide  sense,  under  the 
common  designation  of  the  understanding  simply. 

This  merely  formal  logic,  now,  abstracting  from  all 
matter  of  cognition  (whether  pure  or  empirical),  and 
occupying  itself  simply  with  the  form  of  thinking 
(the  form  of  discursive  cognition),  will  be  manifestly 
competent  to  supply,  in  its  analytic,  a  canon  for 
reason  as  well.  For  the  form  of  reason  must  have  its 
own  fixed  prescript  which,  without  consideration  of 
the  contained  matters  specially  concerned,  will  be 
capable  of  being  a  priori  recognised  through  merely 
analyzing  the  processes  of  reason  into  their  con- 
stituent moments. 

Transcendental  Logic,  again,  involving  a  certain 
contained  matter  (in  its  pure  a  priori  cognitions),  to 
which  matter  it  is  restricted,  cannot  follow  the  same 
rule.  Nay,  it  will  be  found  that  the  transcendental 
application  of  reason  is  not  in  any  respect  objectively 
valid,  and  consequently  that  it  does  not  belong  to  a 
logic  of  truth  (an  analytic)  at  all,  but  that,  under  the 
name  of  transcendental  dialectic,  it  takes  the  place  of  a 
special  division  in  the  ordinary  formulary  of  the 
schools  only  as  a  logic  of  false  show. 

Understanding  and  judgment,  accordingly,  have, 
for  their  parts,  each  its  own  canon  of  objectively 
available  use  in  transcendental  logic,  and  are  conse- 
quently comprehended  in  the  analytic.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  reason,  for  its  part,  in  any  attempts  it 
makes  to  decide  something  a  2)riori  of  objects,  and  so 
extend  our  knowledge  beyond  the  limits  of  possible 
experience,  becomes,  it  will  be  found,  utterly  dia- 
lectical :  its  mere  mock  determinations,  therefore,  were 
altogether  out  of  place  in  a  canon,  and  only  a  canon 
has  place  in  an  analytic. 


The  analytic  of  judgments  (or  propositions),  there- 
fore,  will  only  provide  a  canon  for  the  judgino- 
faculty.  This  canon,  again,  will  instruct  the  faculty 
how  to  apply  to  sense-matter  the  categories  in  their 
quality  as  possessing  the  condition  (or  principle) 
towards  a  p>riori  rules.  1  shall  avail  myself,  there- 
fore, in  prosecuting  an  analysis  of  the  propositions 
proper  of  the  understanding,  of  the  designation  doc- 
trine of  judgment,  whereby  the  business  involved  will 
be  more  exactly  indicated. 

Intkoduction.— Of  Transcendental  Judgment  Generally. 

If  understanding  be  considered  the  faculty  of  rules, 
judgment  will  be  the  faculty  that  subsumes  under 
rules,  the  faculty  that  distinguishes  whether  some- 
thing stand  {casus  datce  legis)  under  a  given  rule  or 
not.  General  logic  neither  has,  nor  can  have,  any 
prescripts  for  judgment.  For,  abstracting  from  all 
matter  of  cognition,  there  can  remain  to  it  no  business 
but  the  setting  out  analytically  of  the  mere  form  of 
cognition  in  terms,  propositions,  and  syllogisms,  and 
the  production,  consequently,  of  rules  in  the  general 
use  of  the  understanding  that  are  simply  formal. 
Evidently,  then,  if  logic  sought,  in  such  circum- 
stances, to  prescribe  how  we  should  subsume,  hoio  we 
should  discern  whether  something  stood  under  its 
rules  or  not,  it  could  only  do  so  through  yet  another 
rule.  But  this  rule,  again,  and  just  because  it  is  a 
rule,  demands  anew  an  instructing  of  judgment,  and 
hence  it  appears  that,  for  its  part,  the  understanding 
is  capable  of  being  instructed  and  qualified  by  rules, 
whereas  judgment,  again,  is  but  a  special  talent  that 
may  indeed  be  exercised  but  not  taught.  Judgment, 
in  point  of  fact,  constitutes  what  is  specific  in  so- 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


24T 


called  mother-wit,  the  want  of  which  cannot  be 
supplied  by  any  schooling ;  for  let  schooling  amply 
offer,  or  even  cram  a  limited  understanding  with 
rules  borrowed  from  another,  still  the  ability  rightly 
to  apply  them  must  be  the  pupil's  own.  No  rule 
whatever  that  might  be  supplied  him  with  this 
intention  would,  in  default  of  the  natural  gift,  be  safe 
from  misuse.^  A  physician,  therefore,  a  judge,  or  a 
statesman  may  have  in  his  head  many  fine  patho- 
logical,  jurisprudential,  or  political  rules — may  have 
them  in  his  head  to  such  a  degree,  indeed,  as  to  be 
actually  a  profound  teacher  of  them,  and  yet  he  shall 
easily  blunder  in  the  application  of  them,  either 
because  he  wants  natural  judgment  (not  understand- 
ing as  faculty  of  rules),  and,  though  he  can  very 
well  understand  the  universal  in  abstracto,  he  is 
unable  to  decide  of  the  particular  in  concreto  as  a  case 
in  point,  or  because,  it  may  be  also,  he  has  not 
been  sufficiently  exercised  in  examples  or  inured  to 
actual  practice,  for  the  formation  of  such  a  judgment. 
For  this,  in  that  reference,  is  precisely  the  one  sole 
and  great  use  of  examples :  they  sharpen  the  judg- 
ment. As  regards  precision  and  exactitude  of 
understanding  J  they  are  commonly,  rather,  preju- 
dicial to  it,  inasmuch  as  it  is  only  rarely  that  (as 
casus  in  temiinis)  they  adequately  answer  the  con- 
dition of  the  rule,  and  because  also  they  frequently 
weaken  the  effort  of  the  understanding  to  see  into 

»  Want  of  judgment  is  what  is  properly  called  dulness  or  stupidity, 
and  for  such  an  ailment  there  is  no  cure.  An  obtuse  or  restricted 
capacity,  wanting  nothing  but  the  due  degree  of  understanding  and  the 
notions  proper  to  it,  may  very  well  be  educated — educated  even  up  to 
learnedness  ;  but  the  want  (that  of  the  Secunda  Petri)  will  still  be  there. 
And  thus  it  is  that  it  is  not  at  all  unusual  to  meet  very  learned  men 
who,  even  in  their  very  learning,  not  infrequently  betray  said  irre- 
mediable failing.— K. 


I 


rules  according  to  their  sufficiency  in  general  and 
independently  of  the  particular  circumstances  of  ex- 
perience— inducing  in  this  way  a  habit  at  last  of 
using  universal  rules  rather  as  formulae  than  as 
principles.  So  it  is  that  examples  are  the  go-cart  of 
the  judgment  which  he  who  wants  the  natural  talent 
of  it  can  never  let  go. 

But,  though  general  logic  has  no  prescripts  for 
judgment,  transcendental  logic  is  quite  otherwise. 
Nay,  it  would  seem  the  precise  business  of  the  latter 
just,  through  rules,  to  guide  and  safe-guard  judgment 
in  its  intromissions  with  the  pure  understanding. 
For  philosophy  appears  not  at  all  required  for  ex- 
tension of  understanding  in  pure  cognition,  or  as 
doctrine,  but  rather  misplaced ;  for,  despite  all  attempts 
hitherto,  little  or  no  ground  has  been  won  with  it  so ; 
but  as  critique  or  criticism^  in  order  to  preclude  the 
errors  of  judgment  {lapsus  judicii)  in  regard  of  the 
few  pure  notions  of  the  understanding  possessed  by 
us — in  that  capacity  (though  the  gain  is  but  nega- 
tive) philosophy,  and  with  all  its  sharp-sightedness 
and  power  of  proof,  is  specially  in  request. 

Now  this  is  the  peculiarity  of  the  transcendental 
philosophy,  that,  besides  the  rule  (or  rather  the  univer- 
sal condition  to  rules)  which  the  category  represents, 
said  philosophy  can  at  the  same  time  a  priori  notify  the 
case  on  which  the  rule  is  to  be  applied.  The  reason  of 
this  advantage  over  all  the  other  theoretical  sciences 
(mathematics  alone  excepted)  lies  in  this,  that  the 
notions  on  which  transcendental  philosophy  is  engaged 
are  such  as  to  connect  themselves  a 2)riori  with,  objects. 
It  is  not  a  posteriori,  then,  that  such  notions  can  have 
their  objective  applicability  proved ;  for  they  possess 
a  dignity  beyond  that  standard.  In  their  case,  rather, 
there  must  be  given  along  with  themselves  (at  least  in 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


249 


general  but  adequate  characterization)  the  actual  con- 
ditions under  which  objects  are  to  be  offered  them ;  or 
else  they  would  be  without  matter^  consequently  bare 
logical /ör7?i5,  and  not  pure  notions  of  understanding. 
This  transcendental  doctrine  of  judgment,  now,  will 
comprise  two  chapters :  the  first  treating  of  the  sense- 
conditions  under  which  the  categories  can  be  alone 
applied  (of  the  schematism,  therefore,  of  pure  under- 
standing) ;  and  the  second  of  the  synthetic  proposi- 
tions (judgments)  which  a  jmori  result  from  the  cate- 
gories under  these  conditions  and  underlie  all  other 
a  priori  cognitions ;  that  is,  of  the  ground-proposi- 
tions of  the  pure  understanding. 

Chapter  T. — The  Schematism  of  the  Categories. 

In  every  subsumption  of  an  object  under  a  notion 
the  former  must  be  homogeneous  with  the  latter ;  that 
is,  the  notion  must  be  what  is  represented  in  the  ob- 
ject which  is  to  be  subsumed  under  it ;  for  the  very 
expression,  an  object  is  subsumed  under  a  notion, 
means  that.  Thus  the  empirical  notion  of  a  plate  is 
homogeneous  with  the  pure  geometrical  notion  of  a 
circle,  seeing  that  the  roundness  which  is  implied  in 
the  former  is  in  the  latter  visible  (objective). 

But,  now,  the  pure  notions  in  comparison  with 
empirical  perceptions  (or  say,  rather,  perceptions  of 
sense)  are  quite  heterogeneous,  and  (the  word  being 
used  strictly)  cannot  be  possibly  perceived.  How, 
now,  is  the  subsumption  of  these  under  those — how 
is  application  of  categories  to  mere  affections  of  sense 
possible  ?  for  nobody  will  say  that  the  categories  (e.g., 
causality)  can  be  sensuously  seen  or  felt  and  are  in- 
cluded in  the  sense- affection.  This  so  natural  and 
important  question  is  precisely  the  reason  now,  which 


I 


makes  a  transcendental  doctrine  of  judgment  neces- 
sary— to  demonstrate  the  possibility,  namely,  of  intro- 
ducing categories  of  the  understanding  into  the  affec- 
tions of  sense.  In  all  the  other  sciences,  because  in 
them  the  notions  through  which  the  object  is  thought 
are  not  so  heterogeneous,  not  so  different  from  those 
which  attend  said  object  as  given  in  concreto,  it  is 
unnecessary  to  resort  to  any  special  exposition  of  the 
relative  application. 

In  this  reference,  now,  it  is  evident  that  what  is 
wanted  is  a  tertium  quid,  which,  homogeneous  on 
this  side  with  the  category  and  on  the  other  with 
sense,  will  mediate  the  connexion  of  the  one  with 
the  other.  This  mediating  agent,  in  a  word,  while 
wholly  pure  or  non-empirical,  must,  on  one  side, 
be  intellectual,  and,  on  the  other,  sensuous.  Such 
an  agent  we  shall  name  transcendental  schema. 

The  category  is  a  principle  of  the  pure  synthetic 
unity  of  a  complex,  no  matter  what.  Time,  as  formal 
condition  of  any  complex  in  internal  sense,  and  con- 
sequently of  all  connexions  in  consciousness,  implies, 
represents,  or  is  an  a  priori  complex  of  pure  or  non- 
empirical  perception.  A  transcendental  determination 
of  time,  then,  is,  with  regard  to  the  category  which 
may  be  supposed  to  act  in  determination  of  its  unity, 
so  far  homogeneous :  like  the  latter,  namely,  it  is  uni- 
versal and  depends  on  an  a  jmori  law.  But,  on  the 
other  side,  again,  it  is  so  far  homogeneous  with  sense,  as 
time  is  an  element  in  every  actual  empirical  complex. 
Application  of  category  to  ingredients  of  sense,  there- 
fore, will  be  possible  through  that  transcendental 
determination  of  time  which,  as  schema  of  category, 
mediates  the  subsumption  of  the  latter  under  the 
former. 

After  what  has  been  shown  in  the  deduction  of  the 


250 


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categories,  is  is  to  be  hoped  that  no  one  will  have  any 
difficulty  with  the  question,  whether  the  categories 
are  of  merely  empirical  or  whether  they  are  also  of 
a  transcendental  value ;  that  is,  whether  they  are  of  a 
prim  application  to  sense  solely  as  conditions  of  a 
possible  experience,  or  whether,  as  conditions  of  the 
possibility  of  things  at  all,  they  may  have  their 
application  extended  to  objects  in  themselves  (without 
any  restriction  to  our  sensibility).  For  we  saw  there 
that  notions  are  quite  impossible  and  meaningless 
unless  an  object  be  given  either  to  them  themselves 
or  at  least  to  the  elements  of  which  they  consist,  and 
consequently  that  they  do  not  apply  to  things  in 
themselves  (without  respect  of  whether  or  how  they 
may  be  given  us).  We  saw,  further,  too,  that  the 
only  way  in  which  objects  are  given  us  is  by  modifi- 
cation of  our  sensibility.  Lastly,  we  saw  also  that 
pure  a  priori  notions  must  presuppose,  besides  the 
function  of  understanding  in  the  category,  formal 
conditions  of  sense  as  well  (particularly  inner  sense), 
which  conditions  constitute  the  universal  proviso 
under  which  alone  it  is  possible  to  apply  a  category 
to  any  object.  We  name  this  formal  and  pure  con- 
dition of  sense,  to  which  in  its  action  the  category  is 
restricted,  the  schema  of  this  category,  and  the  pro- 
cedure of  understanding  with  these  schemata  the 
schematism  of  pure  understanding. 

The  schema  is  always  in  itself  only  a  product  of 
imagination ;  but,  as  the  synthesis  of  the  latter  then 
has  not  in  view  any  single  perception,  but  only  the 
unity  of  a  general  process  in  determination  of  sense, 
the  schema  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  i\i^  figure  or 
image.  If  I  set  down  five  points  the  one  after  the 
other  thus, ,  what  I  have  is  a  picture  or  repre- 
sentation (figure,  image)  of  the  number  five.     But  if 


THE   KRITIK   OF  PURE   REASON. 


251 


I  think  just  a  number,  any  number  at  all,  let  it  be 
five  or  let  it  be  a  hundred,  then  this  thinking  is  rather 
the  conception  of  a  method  towards  the  picture  of 
some  sum  under  a  certain  notion  than  this  picture 
itself,  which  picture,  in  this  latter  case,  it  would  hardly 
be  possible  to  realize  and  compare  with  the  notion. 
This  idea  now  of  a  general  process  of  imagination  for 
providing  a  notion  with  its  correspondent  picture  or 
image,  I  call  the  schema  to  this  notion. 

In  effect  there  underlie  our  pure  sense-notions  not 
pictures  of  the   objects,  but   schemata.     There  can 
never  be  an  adequate  picture  for  the  notion  of  a 
triangle  in  general.     For  it  would  never  attain  to  that 
generality  which  enables  the  notion  to  hold  good  of 
any  triangle,  right-angled,  oblique-angled,  etc.,  but 
would   be  limited  always  to  a  part  of  this  sphere. 
The  schema  of  the  triangle  can  never  exist  anywhere 
but  in  thought,  and  signifies  a  rule  of  the  synthesis  of 
imagination  in  regard  of  certain  pure  figures  in  space. 
But  still  less  does  any  object  of  experience,  or  picture 
of  it,   come  up  to  the  notion.      This  last,  rather, 
directly  refers  to  the  schema  of  imagination  as  a  rule 
for  the  determination  of  our  sense-perception  in  agree- 
ment with  a  certain  general  idea.     The  notion,  dog, 
signifies  a  rule  in  accordance  with  which  my  ima- 
gination can  figure  to  itself  generally  the  form  of  a 
certain  four-footed  animal,  without  being  restricted 
to  any  single  individual  shape  as  offered  me  in  ex- 
perience, or  even  to  whatever  possible  image  I  may 
construct  in  concreto.     This  schematism  of  our  under- 
standing, in  regard  of  objects  of  sense  and  their  mere 
form,  is  a  hidden  art  in  the  deeps  of  the  human  soul, 
the  veritable  trick  of  which  we  shall  hardly  ever  come 
to  detect  in  nature  and  openly  display.    We  can  only 
say  this  much  ;  the  picture  (figure,  image)  is  a  pro- 


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TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


duct  of  the  empirical  faculty  of  productive  imagina- 
tion ;  while  the  schema  (of  sense-notions,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, of  the  figures  in  space)  is  a  product  and,  as 
it  were,  a  monogram  of  pure  imagination  a  priori^  by 
and  according  to  which  pictures  become  first  of  all 
possible,  which  pictures,  however,  must  be  conjoined 
with  the  notion  only  through  the  schema  producing 
them,  and  with  which  in  themselves  they  never 
wholly  agree.  The  schema  of  a  category,  again,  is 
something  that  cannot  be  brought  into  any  image, 
but  is  only  the  pure  synthesis,  in  agreement  with  a 
rule  of  unity  through  notions  generally  (which  notions 
are  expressed  in  the  categories),  and  is  a  transcen- 
dental product  of  imagination,  which  concerns  the 
determination  of  inner  sense  generally  according  to 
conditions  of  its  form  (time)  in  regard  of  all  cogni- 
tions, so  far  as  these,  under  the  unity  of  appercep- 
tion, are  supposed  a  priori  to  cohere  in  a  one  notion. 

Not  to  stop  now  for  the  long  and  tedious  analysis 
of  what  is  required  for  transcendental  schemata  of 
categories  in  general,  we  shall  rather  simply  set  them 
down  in  the  order  of,  and  in  agreement  with,  these 
categories. 

The  pure  picture  of  all  magnitudes  (quantorum)  in 
outer  sense  is  space ;  but  that  of  all  objects  of  sense 
generally,  time.  The  pure  schema  of  magnitude  {quan- 
titatis)j  as  notion  of  the  understanding,  again,  is  num- 
ber;  and  number  is  a  cognition  which  represents  the 
successive  addition  of  homogeneous  unit  to  homo- 
geneous unit.  Number,  then,  is  nothing  else  than 
unity  of  synthesis  in  a  complex  of  homogeneous  per- 
ception in  general — by  this,  namely,  that  I  generate 
time  itself  in  the  apprehension  of  the  perception. 

Reality  in  the  category  is  what  corresponds  to  sen- 
sation ;  any  sensation,  as  such :  that,  then,  the  notion 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


253 


of  which  in  itself  indicates  a  beingness  or  fact  of  some 
kind  or  other  in  time.  Negation  is  that  the  notion  of 
which  represents  a  non-being  in  time.  The  distinc- 
tion of  the  one  from  the  other,  therefore,  lies  in  the 
difierence  of  a  time  filled  from  the  same  time  void. 
As  time  is  oiAy  form  of  perception,  or  of  objects  as 
affections  of  sense,  what  in  these,  consequently,  corre- 
sponds to  the  sensation  may  be  called  the  transcen- 
dental matter  (reality)  of  all  objects  conceived  as 
things  on  their  own  account.  Now  every  sensation 
has  a  degree  or  magnitude,  whereby  it  fills  more  or 
less  the  same  time  (that  is,  inner  sense  in  regard  of 
one  and  the  same  perception  of  an  object),  till  it 
disappears  in  nullity  (nothing,  or  negation).  There 
is,  therefore,  a  relation  or  connexion  between  reality 
and  negation,  or  a  transition,  rather,  from  the  one  to 
the  other,  which  transition  exhibits  every  reality  as  a 
quantum.  Accordingly,  the  schema  of  reality  (as 
quantity  of  something  so  far  as  it  fills  time)  is  just 
this  same  continuous  and  uniform  generation  of  filling 
in  time,  whether  we  suppose  a  certain  degree  of  sen- 
sation progressively  to  ascend  from  nothing  in  time 
or  regressively  to  descend  to  it. 

The  schema  of  substance  is  the  persistence  of  the 
reale  in  time ;  that  is,  the  conception  of  this  reale  as 
a  substratum  of  empirical  determination  in  time  taken 
quite  generally,  which  substratum  persists,  therefore, 
while  all  else  changes.  (Time  itself  does  not  fade  away 
and  vanish,  but  only  the  existence  of  the  mutable  that 
is  in  time.  To  time,  therefore,  as  itself  immutable 
and  permanent,  there  corresponds  in  the  presentation 
to  sense  the  immutabile  of  existence,  that  is,  substance  : 
only  as  referred  to  it  can  succession  and  co-existence 
of  sense-presentation  be  determined  in  regard  of  time.) 

The  schema  of  cause  and  the  causality  of  anything 


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generally  is  the  reale  on  which,  whenever  it  is,  some- 
thing else  always  ensues.  It  consists,  therefore,  in 
the  succession  of  the  elements  in  the  complex,  so  far 
as  this  succession  is  subjected  to  a  rule. 

The  schema  of  community  (reciprocity),  or  of  the 
mutual  causality  of  substances  in  regard  of  their 
accidents,  is  the  co-existence  of  the  determinations  of 
the  one  with  those  of  the  other  according  to  a  uni- 
versal rule. 

The  schema  of  possibility  is  the  agreement  of  the 
synthesis  of  several  ideas  with  the  conditions  of  time 
generally  (as,  for  example,  in  the  reference  that  a 
thing  and  its  reverse,  or  contrary,  cannot  both  be  at 
one  and  the  same  time)  :  it  is  the  determination  of  a 
thing  as  conceivable  at  any  time. 

The  schema  of  actuality  is  existence  in  a  deter- 
minate time. 

The  schema  of  necessity  is  the  existence  of  an 
object  at  all  times. 

We  see  here,  then,  that  the  schema  of  every  cate- 
gory refers  to  time:  as  that  of  quantity  to  the 
bringing  to  pass  synthesis  of  time  itself  in  the  succes- 
sive apprehension  of  an  object ;  that  of  quality  to  the 
synthesis  of  sensation  (sense-perception)  with  the  con- 
ception of  time,  or  to  the  filling  of  time ;  that  of 
relation  to  the  connexions  of  the  sense-units  in  each 
other's  regard  at  any  time  (that  is,  as  in  accordance 
with  a  rule  of  the  determination  in  time)  ;  and,  lastly, 
those  of  the  three  modalities,  to  time  itself,  in  regard 
of  whether  and  how  an  object  belongs  to  it.  The 
schemata,  therefore,  are  nothing  but  a  priori  time- 
determinations  on  rules :  these,  in  the  order  of  the 
categories,  successively  refer  to  time-range,  time- 
filling,  time-order,  and  time-complexion,  as  in  regard 
of  all  possible  objects. 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


255 


From  this  it  is  clear  that  the  schematism  of  the 
understanding  as  produced  by  the  transcendental 
synthesis  of  the  imagination  has  no  other  end  than 
the  unity  of  every  complex  of  perception  in  the  inner 
sense,  and,  in  this  way,  indirectly,  consequently,  the 
unity  of  apperception  as  function  correspondent  to 
inner  sense  (which,  for  its  part,  is  receptivity  or  affec- 
tion). The  schemata  of  the  categories,  therefore,  are 
the  true  and  only  conditions  for  providing  these  with 
an  application  to  objects,  and,  consequently,  with 
meaning ;  and  the  categories  are  in  the  end,  therefore, 
of  no  other  use  than  a  possible  empirical  one :  they 
serve  merely  for  this,  namely.  To  subject,  through 
grounds  of  an  a  priori  necessary  unity  (towards  the 
necessary  conjunction  of  every  consciousness  in  an 
original  apperception),  presentations  of  sense  to  uni- 
versal rules  of  synthesis,  and  thereby  fitly  exhibit 
them  in  the  complete  interconnexion  of  an  expe- 
rience. 

All  our  objective  cognitions,  however,  are  only  to 
be  found  within  the  sphere  of  possible  experience; 
and  it  is  in  the  universal  application  to  possible  ex- 
perience that  transcendental  truth  consists — the  tran- 
scendental truth  which  precedes,  and  only  makes 
possible,  all  empirical  truth. 

It  is  self-evident,  however,  that,  if  the  schemata  of 
our  sensibility  first  of  all  realize  the  categories,  they, 
at  the  same  time,  also,  restrict  them — to  conditions, 
namely,  which,  as  in  sense,  are  outside  of  the  under- 
standing. So  it  is,  therefore,  that  the  schema  is  only 
the  j)henome?tony  or  the  sensuous  notion,  of  an  object, 
in  agreement  with  the  category.  {Numerus  is  quantitas 
2)h€enomenon ;  sensatio  is  realitas  phcenomenon ;  constans 
et  perdurahile  rerum  is  substantia  phcenomenon ;  and  the 
schemata  of  modality  are,  in  the  same  way,  possibilitas, 


256 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


257 


necessitaSy  etc.,  phcenomena,)  Now,  if  we  omit  a  re- 
stricting condition,  we  certainly  appear  to  amplify 
what  notion  was  subjected  to  the  restriction ;  and  the 
categories,  it  is  true,  may,  in  this  way,  be  applied, 
without  conditions  of  sense,  and  in  their  own  pure 
import  alone,  to  things  as  they  are,  whereas  the 
schemata  of  the  categories  foreshadow  things  only  as 
to  sense  they  appear.  That  is,  the  categories  may 
have  a  significance  bestowed  upon  them  that  is  in 
independence  of  all  schemata  and  of  much  wider 
reach.  In  efiect,  the  categories  certainly  do  possess, 
even  with  removal  of  every  condition  of  sense,  a  cer- 
tain function  (only  logical,  however)  of  mere  unity  in 
ideas,  but  for  which  ideas  there  is  no  object,  and 
neither,  consequently,  any  application  capable  of 
furnishing  a  notion  that  has  any  objective  bearing. 
Thus,  for  example,  substance,  with  omission  of  the 
reference  to  something  sensuously  permanent,  would 
not  signify  anything  else  than  a  something  that  may 
be  thought  as  subject,  and  not  possibly  as  at  the  same 
time  predicate.  But  of  such  conception  I  can  make 
nothing  more  than  that:  it  does  not  enable  me  to 
know  what  actual  properties  that  thing  shall  have 
which  is  to  be  such  ultimate  subject.  Without 
schemata,  therefore,  categories  only  function  notions 
for  the  understanding,  but  exhibit  no  object.  IViat 
(an  object)  comes  to  them  from  sense  which  realizes 
understanding  in  so  restricting  it. 


Chapter  XL— System  of  the  Ground-Judgments  of  Pure 

Understanding. 

We  have  considered,  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
transcendental  judgment  only  as  in  respect  of  the 
general  conditions  (schemata  of  sense)  under  which 


I 


11 


alone  it  is  competent  for  it  to  apply  the  categories  in 
production  of  synthetic  propositions.  Our  business 
now  is  to  exhibit,  in  systematic  connexion,  Avhat  judg- 
ments understanding,  under  such  critical  proviso, 
actually  a  priori  creates ;  and  hereto,  without  doubt, 
our  categorical  table  will  supply  the  natural  and  sure 
clew.  For  it  is  precisely  the  action  of  the  categories, 
as  on  possible  experience,  that  must  effect  all  pure, 
or  a  priori,  objective  cognition ;  and  it  is  precisely 
their  relation  to  sense  that  is  motive  to  the  complete 
and  systematic  exposition  of  all  the  transcendental 
ground-j  udgmen  ts. 

Ground -judgments  a  priori  appropriate  this  name 
not  merely  because  they  are  the  grounds  of  other 
judgments,  but  because  they  themselves  have  no 
further  or  more  general  grounds.  This  circumstance, 
for  all  that,  does  not  exempt  them  from  the  obliga- 
tion of  proof.  For  although,  in  their  case,  it  were 
impossible  to  carry  any  proof  objectively  further,  seeing 
that  they  themselves,  rather,  are  to  their  own  objects 
the  ultimate  grounds  of  cognition,  still  this  is  no  pre- 
judice to  the  possibility  of  a  proof  from  the  subjective 
pre-conditions  of  objective  cognition  generally.  Nay, 
such  proof  as  this  latter  is  even  indispensably  neces- 
sary, as  without  it  our  position  would  bring  with  it 
the  greatest  suspicion  of  a  mere  surreptitious  asser- 
tion. ^ 

Secondly,  we  shall  restrict  ourselves  to  those 
ground-judgments  alone  which  immediately  spring 
from  the  categories.     The  principles  of  the  transcen- 

»  There  are  grammatical  slips  in  the  middle  of  the  above  paragraph 
and  the  end  of  the  preceding  one.  I  think  I  have  remedied  both  accord- 
ing to  the  author's  intention.  Rosenkranz  makes  an  aller  "  alle  "  in  the 
one  case,  and  inserts  a  " man"  in  the  other.  The  "  man  "  does  not  quite 
cure  the  sense,  and  I  do  not  think  it  right ;  but  the  "  alle  "  leads  to  non- 
sense. 

B 


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TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


dental  aesthetic,  bearing  as  they  do  on  space  and 
time  as  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  things : — in  that 
they  are  affections  of  sense ;  the  restriction  of  said 
ground-judgments  themselves,  in  that  they  are,  namely, 
not  to  be  applied  to  things  in  themselves : — these  are 
considerations  already  behind  us  and  apart  from  our 
immediate  special  inquiry.  Neither  do  mathematical 
propositions  belong  here,  for  they  depend  on  percep- 
tion and  not  on  any  pure  notion  of  understanding. 
Still,  a  consideration  of  the  possibility  of  these  will 
necessarily  have  place  here,  because  they  constitute 
withal  synthetic  judgments  a  priori — not,  indeed,  to 
prove  their  correctness  and  apodictic  certainty,  which 
is  no  requisite  for  them,  but  only  to  deduce  and  make 
conceivable  the  possibility  of  such  evidently  a  imori 
cognitions. 

We  shall  have  to  speak  at  the  same  time  of  the 
principle  of  analytic  judgments,  and  as  in  contrast  to 
our  theme  proper,  the  synthetic  ones,  because  pre- 
cisely this  contrast  will  free  the  theory  of  the  latter 
from  all  misunderstanding,  and  distinctly  exhibit 
them  in  their  peculiar  nature. 

Section  1.  Of  the  Ultimate  Principle  of  all  Analytic  Judgments. 

Of  whatever  import  our  cognition  may  be,  and 
whatever  bearing  it  may  have  on  its  object,  the  uni- 
versal, though  but  negative,  condition  of  all  our 
judgments  is  this,  That  they  do  not  contradict  them- 
selves ;  or  else,  in  themselves,  and  without  considera- 
tion of  the  object,  they  are  null.  Still,  even  should 
there  be  no  contradiction  in  our  judgment,  it  is  quite 
possible  for  ideas  to  be  united  in  it  which  are  not  in 
the  object,  or  that  there  should  be  in  support  of  it  no 
ground  given  whether  a  priori  or  a  posteriori     A 


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259 


judgment,  therefore,  that  is  itself  quite  free  from  any 
inner  contradiction,  may  still  be  groundless  or  false. 

This,  then.  That  there  cannot  be  joined  with  any- 
thing a  predicate  which  contradicts  it,  is  known  as 
the  projosition  of  contradiction.  It  is  a  universal,  but 
only  negative  criterion  of  truth.  It  has  its  place, 
however,  only  in  logic,  inasmuch  as  it  applies  to 
cognitions  merely  as  cognitions  (their  matter  apart), 
and  declares  only,  contradiction  altogether  destroys 
and  subverts  them. 

A  positive  use,  however,  is  still  possible  for  it.  It 
is  not  necessary,  that  is,  to  regard  it  as  only  negative 
of  (self  contradictory)  falsehood  and  error  ;^  it  may 
really  be  applied  as  affirmative  of  truth.  For,  in  the 
case  of  a  judgment  that  is  analytic^  let  it  be  negative  or 
let  it  be  affirmative,  its  truth  is  always  sufficiently 
within  the  determination  of  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction. What,  namely,  in  the  cognition  of  the  object 
lies  as  notion,  and  is  thought  there — of  that  the  con- 
tradictory is  at  all  times  legitimately  denied ;  whereas 
the  notion  itself  must  be  necessarily  affirmed  of  the 
object,  and  just  because  its  contradictory  would  con- 
tradict the  object. 

Hence  it  is  that  we  must  recognise  the  projosition 
of  contradiction  as  the  universal  and  perfectly  adequate 
principle  of  every  analytic  cognition.  Further,  how- 
ever, it  is,  as  a  criterion  of  truth,  neither  considerable 
nor  applicable.  For  that  no  cognition  can  neglect  it 
without  self-destruction,  in  that  regard  it  is  certainly 
a  conditio  sine  qua  non^  but  not,  nevertheless,  a  deter- 
minative ground  of  truth.  In  prosecuting,  therefore, 
our  business  proper,  which  concerns  only  the  synthetic 
part  of  cognition,  we  shall  always  be  on  the  watch 
not  to  offend  against  this  inviolable  principle;  but 

'  The  "  er"  here,  in  Rosenkranz  ("  so  feme  er"),  were  better  es. 


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261 


not  to  expect  from  it,  at  the  same  time,  any  light  on 
what  cognition  concerns  us. 

There  is,  however,  a  version  of  this  noted  proposi- 
tion, devoid,  as  it  is,  of  all  material  content  and 
merely  formal,  in  which,  without  consideration  and 
quite  unnecessarily,  a  synthesis  has  been  really  mixed 
up.  It  runs  thus :  It  is  impossible  for  anything,  at 
one  and  the  same  time,  to  be  and  not  to  be.  This 
proposition,  besides  that  the  apodictic  certainty  in  it 
(which  should  be  evident  of  itself)  is,  in  the  word 
imjjossibky  superfluously  appended  to  it,  manifests 
itself  as  under  a  condition  of  time.  Its  import  is 
this,  namely:  A  thing  =  A,  which  is  something  =  B, 
cannot,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  be  non-B.  But  it 
can  very  well  be  both  (B  as  well  as  non-B),  one  after 
the  other.  For  example,  a  man  that  is  young  cannot 
at  the  same  time  be  old,  but  he  can  quite  easily  be 
young  at  one  time,  and  not-young,  or  old,  at  another. 
Now,  seeing  that  it  is  logical  only,  the  proposition  of 
contradiction  must  not  have  its  decisions  submitted 
to  considerations  of  time.  Said  version,  therefore,  is 
quite  opposed  to  the  scope  of  the  proposition  itself. 
The  misconstruction  is  this.  First  of  all  we  isolate, 
in  the  case  of  something,  a  predicate  of  it  from  the 
notion  of  it,  and  then,  this  very  predicate  we  immedi- 
ately conjoin  with  the  opposite  of  the  thing  in  question. 
The  resulting  contradiction,  all  the  same,  is  not  with 
the  subject,  but  only  with  the  predicate  of  it  (as  now 
synthetically  conjoined  with  its  opposite),  and  only 
then,  moreover,  when  both  predicates  are  applied  at 
one  and  the  same  time.  If  I  say  that  a  man,  who  is 
unlearned,  is  not  learned,  I  must  add  the  condition 
of  time,  for  he  that  is  unlearned  at  one  time  can  very 
well  be  learned  at  another.  But  if  I  say  again,  no 
unlearned  man  is  learned,  the  proposition  is  analytic, 


< 


1' 


for  the  quality  (the  unlearnedness)  constitutes,  once 
for  all,  so  far,  the  notion  of  the  subject,  and  the  nega- 
tion enunciated  is  seen  to  be  valid  from  the  simple 
proposition  of  contradiction,  without  any  necessity  to 
add  a  condition  of  time.  This  too  is  the  reason  why 
I  have  (above)  so  manipulated  the  version  of  the 
proposition  that  the  nature  of  an  analytical  judgment 
is  clearly  expressed  thereby. 

Section  2.  Of  the  Ultimate  Principle  of  all  Synthetic  Judgments. 

To  explain  the  possibility  of  synthetic  judgments 
is  no  business  of  general  logic,  to  which  the  very 
name  need  not  be  known.  It  is,  however,  what  is  of 
most  importance  in  transcendental  logic;  nay,  it  is 
the  sole  interest  of  this  latter,  when  the  question  is  of 
a  priori  synthetic  judgments,  their  conditions  and 
extent  of  validity.  For  so  it  is  that  such  logic  reaches 
its  object — determination,  namely,  of  the  extent  and 
limits  of  pure  understanding. 

In  an  analytic  judgment,  I  remain  by  the  notion 
to  reach  the  result.  If  affirmative,  I  only  attribute 
to  the  notion  what  is  already  thought  in  it,  and  if 
negative,  I  only  exclude  from  the  notion  what  con- 
tradicts it.  In  synthetic  judgments,  again,  it  is  re- 
quired of  me  to  turn  from  and  leave  the  given  notion 
in  order  to  find,  in  relation  with  it,  something  quite 
else  than  was  thought  in  it.  Now,  the  relation  here 
is  not  one  of  identity  or  contradiction;  not  such, 
therefore,  that,  in  regard  of  it  alone,  the  judgment 
itself,  simply  as  it  stands,  can  be  seen  into  as  true 
or  false. 

Assuming  the  case,  then,  that,  if  we  would  syntlieti- 
cally  conjoin  a  certain  notion  with  some  other  notion, 
it  is  necessary  for  us  not  to  remain  by  the  former, 


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but  to  leave  it,  and  look  about  us  elsewhere,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  what  we  must  find  is  a  tertium  quid,  which 
shall  effect  the  required  synthesis  of  the  two  notiona 
What  now,  then,  can  possibly  be  this  tertium  quid 
that  shall  be  medium  for  all  a  jriori  syntlietic  judg- 
ments? There  is  only  one  common  element  within 
which  all  our  ideas  are  to  be  found,  and  that  is 
internal  sense,  of  which  time  (and  a  priori)  is  its 
form.  The  process  of  synthesis  in  our  ideas,  again, 
is  the  work  of  the  imagination.  And  lastly,  unity  in 
synthesis  of  the  ideas,  synthetic  unity,  without  w^hich 
unity  there  cannot  be  a  judgment,  depends  on  func- 
tions of  unity  in  the  unity  of  apperception.  The 
possibility  of  synthetic  judgments,  therefore,  and  of 
pure  synthetic  judgments  (for  all  three  are  sources  of 
a  priori  cognition),  will  require  to  be  sought  in  these. 
Nay,  such  judgments  will  necessarily  issue  from  these 
sources,  if  there  is  at  all  to  be  a  cognition  of  objects 
which  shall  solely  depend  upon  a  synthesis  of  mental 
elements. 

If  a  cognition  is  to  have  objective  reality,  that  is, 
if  it  is  to  bear  on  an  object,  and  have  sense  and  mean- 
ing in  it,  the  object  itself  must,  in  one  way  or  other, 
be  capable  of  being  given.  Without  such  object  the 
notions  are  void;  for,  though  we  have  thought 
through  them,  we  have,  in  effect,  through  this  thinking 
cognised  or  recognised  nothing:  we  have  only  played 
with  ideas.  To  give  an  object,  again,  when  such 
object  is  not  merely  to  be  mediately  supposed,  but 
immediately  placed  before  us  in  perception,  is  nothing 
else  than  to  realize  its  idea  in  experience,  either  as 
actual  or  as  possible.  Even  space  and  time,  pure 
and  non-empirical  as  these  cognitions  are,  and  certain 
as  it  is  that  they  are  set  up  absolutely  a  priori  in  the 
mind  within,  would,  nevertheless,  be  devoid  of  objec- 


i 


tivc  truth,  and  sense,  and  meaning,  were  their  appli- 
cation and  necessity  not  actually  demonstrated  as  in 
reference  to  the  objects  of  experience.  The  very  idea 
in  consciousness  of  them  is  a  mere  schema,  that  refers 
itself  ever  to  reproductive  imagination,  whose  busi- 
ness it  is  to  call  up  the  objects  of  experience,  without 
which  objects  they  themselves  (space  and  time)  would 
have  no  meaning.  And,  without  distinction,  all 
notions  are  similarly  situated. 

The  jmsibility  of  ewperience,  therefore,  is  what  gives 
objective  reality  to  all  our  a  priori  cognitions.  But 
experience  rests  on  the  synthetic  unity  of  the  sense- 
elements  (the  impressions,  etc.),  that  is,  on  a  syn- 
thesis according  to  notions  of  an  object  generally  in 
elements  of  sense.  Without  this  synthesis  notionally 
towards  an  object,  the  contributions  of  sense  w^ould 
not  even  be  perceptive  cognition,  but  only  a  rhapsody 
of  sense-impressions  w^hich  would  not  cohere  in  any 
ruled  context  of  a  one  thoroughly  connected  (possible) 
consciousness,  nor,  consequently,  as  assimilated  into 
the  transcendental  and  necessary  unity  of  appercep- 
tion. Experience,  therefore,  has  principles  for  its 
form  which  underlie  it  as  a  priori  ground.  These, 
namely,  are,  for  the  impressions  of  sense,  universal 
rules  of  synthesis,  of  which,  as  necessary  conditions, 
the  objective  reality  can  always  be  proved  in  ex- 
perience, nay,  as  in  regard  of  the  very  possibility  of 
it  Without  such  application,  a  priori  synthetic 
judgments  were  completely  impossible;  for  in  that 
case  they  would  be  without  a  tertium  quid — they 
could  have  no  pure  object,  on  which  tried,  the  syn- 
thetic unity  of  their  notions  might  exhibit  objective 
reality. 

Although,  therefore,  of  space  and  of  possible  con- 
figurations in  space  on  the  part  of  productive  ima- 


/ 


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265 


gination,  we  really  do  a  priori  know  so  much  in 
synthetic  judgments,  and  without  appeal  to  actual 
experience,  yet  such  knowledge  would  be  occupation 
with  what  were  chimerical  only,  did  we  fail  to  regard 
space  as  simply  condition  to  the  elements  of  sense, 
which  elements  shall  constitute  the  stuff  and  material 
of  external  experience.  Said  pure  synthetic  judg- 
ments, consequently,  do,  though  only  mediately, 
refer  to  possible  experience,  or  rather  to  just  this 
possibility  of  it,  and  on  it  alone  they  ground  the 
objective  truth  of  their  synthesis. 

Experience,  as  empirical  synthesis,  is  thus,  in  its 
possibility,  that  single  knowledge  which  extends 
realization  to  all  other  syntheses;  and  this  latter, 
again,  as  a  cognition  a  priori^  gets  truth  (agreement 
with  an  object),  only  by  this,  that  it  has  no  interest 
but  what  is  necessary  for  the  synthetic  unity  of 
experience  as  such. 

The  ultimate  principle  of  all  synthetic  judgments, 
therefore,  is :  Every  object  stands  under  the  necessary 
conditions  of  the  synthetic  unity  of  the  complex  of 
perception  in  a  possible  experience. 

Synthetic  judgments  are  a  priori  possible,  then,  if, 
to  the  formal  conditions  of  a  priori  perception,  the 
synthesis  of  imagination,  and  the  necessary  unity  of 
it  in  a  transcendental  apperception— if  to  this  tran- 
scendental machinery  we  give  the  general  direction 
towards  a  possible  empirical  cognition,  and  say  :  The 
conditions  of  the  possibility  of  experience  in  general  are 
conditions  as  well  of  the  possibility  of  the  objects  of 
experience,  and  possess  thereby  objective  reality  in  a 
necessary  synthetic  judgment. 


i 


Section  3.  Systematic  Idea  of  all  Synthetic  Ground-Propositions  of 

the  Understanding. 

That  there  are  such  propositions  at  all,  is  to  be 
solely  ascribed  to  pure  understanding.  And  pure 
understanding  is  not  only  the  faculty  of  the  rules  that 
bear  on  the  connexions  of  experience,  but  is  source  as 
well  of  those  propositions  through  which  it  is  that 
whatever  is  only  capable  of  becoming  an  object  for 
us  stands  necessarily  under  rules ;  for  without  such 
rules  there  could  never  accrue  to  the  sense-impres- 
sions cognition  of  an  object  corresponding  to  them. 
Even  the  laws  of  nature,  considered  as  principles 
of  the  empirical  use  of  understanding,  bring  with 
them  an  expression  of  necessity,  and,  consequently, 
at  least  the  presumption  of  being  determined  by 
grounds  which  must  be  valid  a  priori  and  before 
all  experience.  But  all  laws  of  nature,  without  ex- 
ception, stand  under  higher  principles  of  the  under- 
standing, inasmuch  as  they  only  apply  these  to  special 
cases  of  experience.  These  principles  alone,  there- 
fore, furnish  the  notion,  which  constitutes  the  con- 
dition and,  as  it  were,  the  exponent  towards  pro- 
duction of  a  rule;  while  experience,  for  its  part, 
again,  supplies  the  case  which  is  to  come  under  the 
rule. 

There  is  little  danger  that  empirical  principles 
should  be  mistaken  for  those  of  pure  understanding, 
or  vice  versa ;  for  the  necessity  on  notions  in  the  one 
case,  and  in  the  other  the  want  of  it  (so  easily  seen, 
however  generally  the  proposition  may  hold),  readily 
preclude  confusion.  There  are,  however,  certain 
pure  a  p^riori  propositions  which  I  should  not  attri- 
bute to  pure  understanding.  These,  namely,  are  not 
derived  from  pure  notions,  but  from  pure  perceptiions 


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(though  through  understanding),  and  it  is  of  notions 
that  understanding  is  the  faculty.  Such  propositions 
are  found  in  mathematics.  As  said,  they  are  percep- 
tive in  their  nature,  but,  nevertheless,  the  deduction 
of  them — what  concerns  their  authority  in  experi- 
ence, their  objective  truth,  nay,  the  possibility  of  the 
a  priori  synthetic  cognition  they  involve — depends 
still  on  pure  understanding. 

Under  my  own  principles,  then,  if  I  exclude  from 
them  the  ^röpö5/^/(?/?5  of  mathematics,  I  shall  certainly 
include  those  on  which  these  rest  for  their  very 
possibility  and  a  priori  objective  truth.  Of  said  pro- 
positions these,  therefore,  shall  constitute  the  prin- 
ciples proper — not  originating  from  perception  for 
notions,  but  from  notions  for  perception. 

In  the  application  of  the  categories,  again,  to 
possible  experience,  these,  in  exercising  their  syn- 
thesis, will,  as  formerly  classed,  be  either  mathe- 
matical or  dynamical.  The  former,  that  is,  will 
address  their  synthesis  to  the  perception  (the  very 
being),  the  latter  to  the  relative  existence  (the  simple 
connexions),  of  objects  of  sense.^  The  a  j'riori  con- 
ditions of  perception  are,  in  regard  of  a  possible  ex- 
perience, out  and  out  necessary ;  while  those,  again, 
of  the  relative  existence  of  the  objects  of  a  possible 
empirical  perception  are  in  themselves  only  con- 
tingent. Hence  the  propositions  that  arise  in  the 
mathematical    application    will   be    unconditionally 

*  I  have  translated  above  tlie  single  word  "Daseyn"  by  the  two 
wortls  "  relative  existence ; "  and  that  is  exactly  what  Kant  means  by 
it.  He  has  not  a  thought  of  bringing  into  existence  in  his  mind  :  he  only 
thinks  of  objects  relatively  the  one  to  the  other  in  regard  of  connexion, 
once  their  existence  has  been  provided  for  from  elsewhere.  It  is  of 
their  myn  as  relatively  da  he  thinks,  and  not  at  all  of  their  existence  as 
such.  Erscheinung  I  sometimes  translate  simply  object  of  sense,  when 
legitimate  occasion  olfers. 


1 


necessary,  that  is,  apodictic ;  while  those  that  are  of 
dynamical  name  will  bring  with  them  the  character, 
indeed,  of  an  a  p)riori  necessity,  but  only  under  the 
condition  of  the  empirical  thinking  that  shall  be 
found  in  an  experience.  These  latter,  then,  will 
exhibit  this  character  only  mediately  and  indirectly: 
and,  consequently  (without  prejudice  to  the  universal 
certainty  introduced  by  them  into  experience),  they 
will  not  possess  the  same  immediate  evidence  which  is 
proper  and  peculiar  to  the  others.  But  this  will  be 
better  seen  in  the  sequel. 

The  table  of  the  categories  guides  us  quite  natur- 
ally to  that  of  the  ground-propositions :  these,  namely, 
are  nothing  but  rules  of  the  objective  application 
of  those.  Accordingly  all  the  ground-propositions 
of  pure  understanding  are — 

1.  Axioms  of  Pure  Perception. 

2.  Anticipations  of  Sense-Perception. 

3.  Analogies  of  Experience. 

4.  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thinking  in  General. 

I  have  chosen  these  designations  purposely,  in 
order  that  the  differences  of  evidence  and  use  on  the 
part  of  those  propositions  should  not  pass  unob- 
served. It  will  be  directly  perceived,  however,  that, 
as  regards  as  well  the  evidence  as  the  a  priori  action 
on  objects  which  is  connected  with  the  categories  of 
quantity  and  quality  (in  respect  of  this  latter  form 
alone  being  considered),  the  relative  propositions  are, 
in  both  references,  conspicuously  different  from  the 
other  two :  the  force  or  import  on  both  sides  being 
equally  that  of  complete  certainty,  it  is  only  discur- 
sive in  the  latter,  while  it  is  intuitive  in  the  former. 
These,  therefore,  I  shall  call  the  mathematical^  and 
those  the  dynamical^  ground-propositions.^     It  is  to 

*  All  conjunction  is  either  comioosition  or  connexion.     The  former  is  a 


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be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  I  have  in  my  eye 
here  just  as  little  the  propositions  of  mathematics  in 
the  one  case,  as  those  of  (physical)  dynamics  in  the 
other,  but  only  those  of  pure  understanding  when  it 
is  related  to  inner,  a  priori  sense  (without  reference, 
that  is,  to  the  elements  themselves  afterwards  given  by 
special  sense).  Nevertheless,  it  is  on  these  last  pro- 
positions that  the  former  (the  mathematical,  etc.)  are 
dependent  for  their  very  possibility.  The  designations 
I  give  said  ground-propositions,  therefore,  are  due  to 
considerations  rather  of  their  application  than  of 
their  own  contents.  But  I  proceed  now  to  the  dis- 
cussion of  them,  and  in  the  order  in  which  they 
appear  in  the  table. 


1.  Axioms  of  Pure  Perception. 

The  principle  of  these  is :  All  perceptions  are  ex- 
tensive magnitudes. 

Proof, 

All  objects  involve  in  form  a  perception  in  space 
and  time;   and  this  influence  of  space  and  time  is 

sjmtliesis  of  elements,  not  necessarily  belonging  the  one  to  the  other. 
For  instance,  the  two  triangles  into  which  the  diagonal  divides  a  square 
do  not,  taken  as  individuals,  necessarily  belong  the  one  to  the  other.  Of 
this  nature,  now,  is  the  homogeneous  synthesis  in  whatever  can  be  mathe- 
matically  looked  at ;  and  it  is  capable  of  being  distinguished  either  into 
that  of  aggregation,  in  extensive,  or  into  that  of  coalition,  in  intensive ^ 
magnitudes.  The  latter  conjunction  (that  of  connexion,  namely)  is  a 
synthesis  of  elements  that  do  necessarily  belong  the  one  to  the  other. 
Substance  and  accident,  cause  and  effect,  for  example,  are  regarded  as 
constituting  a  priori  (necessary)  connexions.  The  connected  elements  at 
the  same  time  are  heterogenecms.  As  of  elements  relatively  existent  the 
one  to  the  other,  I  call  this  synthesis  dynamical;  which  on  its  side, 
again,  is  capable  of  distinction  as  physical  (of  objects  mutually)  or 
metaphysical  (of  objects  considered  on  the  question  of  their  evidence  to 
the  mind). — K.     The  last  "  können  "  here  were  better  kann  ? 


M 


((■ 


% 


i 


presupposed  as  a  priori  universal  condition  that  pre- 
cedes and  underlies  all  objects.  These,  therefore, 
cannot  be  otherwise  apprehended  (taken  up,  that  is, 
into  empirical  consciousness)  than  through  synthesis 
of  the  complex  of  constitutive  units,  by  which  syn- 
thesis there  are  brought  about  perceptions  of  a  deter- 
minate space  or  a  determinate  time.  This  synthesis, 
then,  is  a  putting  together  of  homogeneous  elements, 
and  results  in  a  consciousness  of  the  synthetic  unity 
of  just  such  complex.  Now  consciousness  of  any 
homogeneous  complex  in  perception,  so  far  as  it  is 
conceived  necessary  for  rendering  possible  the  idea  of 
an  object,  is  the  notion  of  magnitude  (quantum). 
Consequently  even  the  perception  of  an  object,  as 
phenomenon  in  our  sense,  is  only  possible  through 
the  same  synthetic  unity  of  the  given  sensuously 
perceptive  complex,  by  means  of  which  the  unity  of 
homogeneous  synthesis  is,  in  the  notion  of  quantity, 
thought  That  is,  the  phenomena  of  our  sense  are  all 
quantities — all  extensive  magnitudes^  indeed — because, 
as  perceptions  in  space  and  time,  they  must  come 
before  us  in  or  through  precisely  the  same  synthesis 
as  is  determinative  of  space  and  time  themselves. 

I  call  that  magnitude  an  extensive  magnitude, 
where  the  cognition  of  the  parts  renders  possible  the 
cognition  of  the  whole  (and,  consequently,  necessarily 
precedes  it).  I  cannot  picture  to  myself  a  line,  how 
small  soever,  without  in  thought  drawing  it ;  and  to 
draw  a  line  is,  from  a  certain  point,  to  generate  all 
the  parts  of  it,  one  after  the  other,  and  so  mark  out 
the  object  itself.  And  this  is  equally  the  case  with 
all  the  parts,  however  infinitesimal,  of  time.  I  figure 
to  myself  in  it  only  the  successive  progression  from 
moment  to  moment,  and  in  such  manner  that  at  last, 
through  all  these  parts  of  time  and  the  synthesis  of 


270 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


271 


them,  there  is  generated  a  certain  definite  and  deter- 
minate time-magnitude.  But  the  element  of  percep- 
tion pure  and  proper  in  all  objects  of  our  sense,  being 
either  space  or  time,  every  such  object  must,  as  per- 
ception^ be  an  extensive  magnitude :  it  can  be  recog- 
nised in  apprehension,  namely,  only  through  successive 
synthesis  (of  part  to  part).  All  objects  of  sense, 
therefore,  are  perceived  as  aggregates  (collections  of 
parts  previously  given) ;  and  this,  be  it  observed,  is 
not  the  case  in  regard  of  every  kind  of  magnitude, 
but  only  of  that  kind  where  the  magnitudes  are 
apprehended  and  cognised  as,  strictly  and  properly, 
extensive. 

It  is  on  this  successive  synthesis  of  productive 
imagination  in  the  generation  of  figures  that  the 
mathematic  of  extension  (geometry)  founds.  Its 
axioms  express  the  a  priori  conditions  of  sense-per- 
ception ;  and  under  these  conditions  only  is  a  schema 
possible  of  any  pure  notion  of  external  perception  : 
as,  for  example,  between  any  two  points  only  one 
straight  line  is  possible,  two  straight  lines  cannot  in- 
clude a  space,  etc.  These  are  axioms  which  apply 
properly  to  magnitudes  {quanta)  as  such. 

But  as  regards  quantity  (quantitas),  that  is,  the 
answer  to  the  question,  how  much  or  great  something 
is,  there  are  in  that  respect  not  any  axioms ;  at  the 
same  time  that  in  the  general  reference  there  are 
various  synthetic  and  immediately  certain  proposi- 
tions (indemonstrabilia).  For  that,  if  equals  be  added 
to  equals,  the  wholes  are  equal,  or  if  equals  be  taken 
from  equals,  the  remainders  are  equal — these  are 
analytic  propositions,  seeing  that  I  am  directly  con- 
scious of  the  identity  of  the  one  amount  with  the 
other,  whereas  axioms  are  synthetic  a  priori  proposi- 
tions.    And,  again,  the  evident  propositions  in  the 


I 


I 


I 


relations  of  numbers,  though  synthetic  certainly,  are 
not  universal  like  those  of  geometry,  and  consequently 
not  axioms.  They  may  be  named  numerical  formula?. 
The  proposition  7  +  5=12  is  not  analytic.  For 
neither  in  the  7,  nor  the  5,  nor  the  conjunction  of 
both,  do  I  think  the  number  12  (that  I  do  think  it 
in  the  addition  of  the  two,  that  is  not  the  question 
here;  for,  in  an  analytic  proposition,  the  question 
only  is,  whether  I  actually  think  the  predicate  in  the 
notion  of  the  subject).  But  though  synthetic,  it  is 
only  a  particular  proposition.  So  far  as  the  synthesis 
of  the  units  simply  is  considered  here,  that  synthesis 
can  be  accomplished  only  in  one  certain  particular 
way,  at  the  same  time,  certainly,  that  the  application 
of  these  numbers  is  afterwards  universal.  When  I 
say,  it  is  possible  to  construct  a  triangle  by  means  of 
three  lines,  of  which  any  two  are  together  greater 
than  the  third,  I  am  present  to  the  mere  function  of 
productive  imagination  which  draws  the  lines  smaller 
or  greater,  and  allows  them  to  meet  in  all  manner  of 
angles  at  will.  Whereas  the  number  7  is  only  possible 
in  one  single  way,  as  is  the  case  also  with  the  12  which 
results  from  the  synthesis  of  the  former  with  5.  Such 
propositions,  therefore,  we  may  call  numerical  forinulce, 
but  not  axioms.  We  should  otherwise  have  quite  an 
infinitude  of  the  latter. 

This  transcendental  ground-proposition  of  the 
mathematics  of  sense  greatly  enlarges  our  a  priori 
knowledge.  For  it,  and  it  alone,  renders  pure  mathe- 
matic applicable  in  its  complete  precision  to  objects  of 
experience.  And  this  latter  fact  without  it,  indeed,  is 
so  far  from  being  of  itself  evident,  that  it  has  given  rise 
to  much  controversy.  Perceptions  of  sense  are  not 
things  in  themselves.  Empirical  perception  is  only 
possible  through  pure  (space  and  time).  What  geometry 


272 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


says  of  the  latter,  therefore,  is  necessarily  true  of  the 
former;    and  such  allegations  in  resistance  as  that 
objects  of  sense  need  not  be  submitted  to  the  laws  of 
construction  in  snace  (the  infinite  divisibility  of  lines 
and  angles,  for  example),  must  sink  of  themselves.  ^ 
For  objective  truth  were  thereby  denied  to  space,  and 
along  with  it  to  all  mathematics,  so  that  it  would  be 
impossible  for  us  any  longer  to  know  why  and  how 
far  the  latter  were  to  be  held  applicable  of  the  objects 
of  sense.     The  synthesis  of  spaces  and  times  it  is, 
that,  as  synthesis  of  the  essential  form  of  all  percep- 
tion, is  what  renders  possible  at  the  same  time  em- 
pirical apprehension,  and  consequently  all  external 
experience  and  all  perception  of  any  of  its  objects ; 
and  what  holds  of  mathematics  in  application  to  the 
former  synthesis  is  necessarily  true  also  of  this  latter. 
All  objections  to  this  are  mere  chicanes  of  an  ill- 
advised  reasoning,  which  would  erroneously  free  the 
objects  of  sense  from  the  formal  conditions  of  our 
sensibility,  and  represent  them  as  objects  in  them- 
selves and  addressed  so  to  the  understanding — the 
truth  being  that  they  are  mere  affections  of,  or  ap- 
pearances to,   our  senses.     In  fact,  were  they  such 
objects  and  so  given  to  the  understanding,  then  truly 
there  could  be  synthetically  known  nothing  whatever 
a  priori  of  them,  and  consequently  nothing  whatever 
also  of  space  through  pure  notions ;   nay,  the  very 
science  which  is  determinative  of  space  (geometry), 
would  itself  be  impossible. 

»  The  "dürfe"  and  "muss"  here  ought  surely  to  be  dürfen  and 


i 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PUEE   BEASON. 


2.  Anticipations  of  Sense. 


273 


The  principle  of  these  is.  In  all  perceptions  of  sense, 
the  reale  that  is  matter  of  sensation  has  intensive 
magnitude — that  is,  degree. 

Proof, 

Sense-perception  is  empirical  consciousness,  or  such 
that  it  has  at  the  same  time  sensation  in  it.     Sense- 
affections,  as  objects  of  sense-perception,  are  not  pure 
(merely   formal)    perceptions,    like    space   and   time 
(which,  for  their  parts,  can,  in  themselves,   not  be 
perceived  of  sense).     They  contain,  therefore,  over 
and    above    the    element    of   pure   perception,    the 
material  elements  towards  an  object  (that  element  or 
those  elements  whereby  sornething  is  cognised  as  ex- 
istent in  space  or  time).     These  material  elements  are 
constituted  by  the  reale  of  sensation,  as  mere  subjective 
feeling  of  which  there  can  only  be  the  consciousness 
that  the  subject  is  so  affected,  and  which  is  then 
referred   to   some   object.     Now,  from  empirical  to 
pure  consciousness  there  is  a  gradual  transition  pos- 
sible, in  the  course  of  which  the  reale  that  is  present 
in  it  at  first  may,  in  the  end,  completely  disappear, 
and  there  will  remain  at  last  a  merely  formal  con- 
sciousness (now  a  priori)  of  the  complex  proper  to 
space  and  time  alone.     Contrariwise,   consequently, 
there  is  the  possibility  of  a  syfithesis  in  the  amount  of 
a  sensation,  up  from  its  beginning,  as  nothing  in  pure 
perception,  until  it  reaches  any  conceivable  magni- 
tude  of  feeling  in  consciousness.      Sensation,  now, 
being  in  itself  not  an  objective  consciousness,  and  in- 
volving, as  such,  neither  the  perception  of  space  nor 
of  time,   is  incapable   of  constituting   an  extensive 
magnitude.     Still  it  is  a  magnitude,  and  a  magnitude 

s 


274 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


such  that,  in  the  apprehension  of  it,  empirical  con- 
sciousness increases,  from  the  nothing  of  it  in  a  cer- 
tain time,  up  to  the  given  actual  amount.  This,  then, 
is  intensive  magnitude ;  and  such  magnitude,  degree, 
that  is,  of  influence  on  sense,  must  be  correspond- 
ingly attributed  to  all  perceptive  objects  so  far  as 
they  involve  sensation. 

Whatever  cognition  enables  us  to  know  and  deter- 
mine a  priori,  or  beforehand,  some  actual  ingredient  of 
empirical  perception,  that  cognition  we  may  name  an 
anticipation ;  and  beyond  a  doubt  that  is  the  sense  in 
which  Epicurus  used  his  term  7rpoXi;V^i9.  Inasmuch, 
however,  as  there  is  something  in  the  perceptions  of 
sense  which  can  never  be  known  a  7>mn,  and  which, 
therefore,  constitutes  the  element  specially  distinctive 
of  empirical  cognition  as  compared  with  cognition 
a  irriorij  sensation,  namely  (as  the  matter  of  the  per- 
ception of  sense),  it  follows  that  it  is  precisely  and 
specially  that  which  cannot  possibly  be  anticipated. 
On  the  other  hand, we  may  very  well  name  any  pure 
determinations  in  space  and  time,  whether  of  shape 
or  size,  anticipations  of  the  objects  of  sense,  because 
they  a  priori  present  to  us  a  constant  constituent  of 
whatever  may  be  actually  a  posteriori  given  to  us. 
Suppose,  however,  that,  in  mere  sensation  as  sensation, 
sensation  as  such  (not  referring  to  any  particular 
given  sensation),  it  were  possible  a  priori  to  know 
something,  such  something  would,  certainly,  very 
specially  deserve  to  be  named  an  anticipation.  For 
it  could  not  but  prove  surprising  to  forestall  experi- 
ence even  in  what  was  peculiar  to  it — its  matter, 
namely,  which  as  matter  it  is  to  be  supposed  we 
could  only  procure /mm  experience.  Now,  such  is  the 
actual  state  of  the  case  in  point  of  fact  before  us. 

The  appcfihension  aC  lÄßi e  sensation  occupies  only 


THE    KRITIK    OF   PURE    REASON. 


275 


a  moment  (of  course  not  referring  to  succession  of 
different  sensations).  So  far,  as  there  is  in  appre- 
hension no  successive  synthesis  (of  part  after  part  into 
a  whole),  there  is  no  question  here  of  an  extensive 
magnitude :  the  ceasing  of  sensation  in  the  moment 
it  occupies  would  exhibit  this  moment  as  void,  con- 
sequently =  0.  What  in  the  empirical  perception, 
now,  corresponds  to  the  mere  sensation  is  reality 
{realitas  phcenomenon) ;  as  what  answers  to  the  want 
of  it  is  negation,  which  is  =  0.  But,  again,  every 
sensation  is  capable  of  a  diminution,  in  such  manner 
that  it  may  gradually  grow  faint  and  disappear. 
There  is  between  reality  and  negation  in  the  sense- 
consciousness,  then,  a  continued  series  of  many  pos- 
sible intervening  sensations,  differing  the  one  from 
the  other  always  by  a  less  difference  than  that  be- 
tween the  full  given  amount  and  the  zero  or  complete 
negation.  That  is,  the  reale  in  the  sense-presentation 
has  always  a  magnitude,  but  a  magnitude  that  does 
not  appear  in  apprehension  as  a  magnitude,  seeing 
that  said  apprehension  takes  place  in  a  moment 
through  the  mere  sensation,  and  not  through  a  suc- 
cessive synthesis  of  several  sensations — not,  therefore, 
of  part  after  part  into  a  whole.  This  reale  of  any  sense- 
presentation,  consequently,  has  a  magnitude,  but  not 
of  the  kind  that  is  named  extensive. 

A  magnitude,  now,  which  is  apprehended  only  as 
a  one,  a  unit,  and  in  which  a  many  (plurality)  is  only 
conceivable  as  that  of  an  approach  to  negation  =  0 
— this  I  call  an  intensive  magnitude.  The  reality  of 
any  object  possesses,  then,  intensive  magnitude,  or 
degree.  Were  this  reality  looked  at  in  the  point  of 
view  of  a  cause  (of  the  sensation,  or  of  any  other  ele- 
ment in  some  cognition,  say  of  a  change,  for  example), 
then  the  degree  in  it  were  to  be  named  moment  {e.g., 


I 


276 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


moment  of  gravity),  and  for  the  reason  that  degree 
betokens  a  magnitude,  the  apprehension  of  which  is 
not  successive,  but  instantaneous.  I  remark  this, 
however,  only  in  passing ;  for  with  causality  I  have 
nothing  as  yet  to  do. 

Every  sensation,  and  consequently  every  reality  in 
the  object  or  perception  of  sense,  let  each  be  as  small 
as  it  may,  have,  according  to  this,  a  degree — an  in- 
tensive magnitude,  which,  as  such,  is  always  capable 
of  becoming  less  and  less,  and  so  that,  between  reality 
and  negation  in  it,  there  is  an  unbroken  continuity  of 
possible  smaller  realities,  and  possible  smaller  percep- 
tions. A  colour,  a  red,  for  example,  has  a  degree 
which,  let  it  be  ever  so  small,  is  never  the  smallest ; 
and  it  is  situated  precisely  in  the  same  way  with  heat, 
gravity,  etc. 

That  property  of  magnitudes,  whereby  no  one  part 
in  them  is  the  smallest  possible  (no  part  is  simple), 
we  name  the  continuity  of  these.  Space  and  time  are 
quanta  continua :  no  part  can  be  taken  in  them  with- 
out including  it  between  limits  (points  and  moments) ; 
only  in  such  manner,  consequently,  that  the  part 
itself  is  again  a  space  or  a  time.  Space,  therefore, 
consists  only  of  spaces,  time  of  times.  Points  and 
moments  (instants)  are  only  limits,  that  is,  mere  loci 
of  limitation  in  them.  Lod  of  limitation  always  pre- 
suppose, however,  the  objects  which  they  are  to  limit 
or  determine;  and  out  of  such  mere  loci  as  con- 
stituents which  shall  be  capable  of  being  given  before 
space  or  time  themselves,  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other  can  be  made  up.  Magnitudes  of  this  kind  may 
be  termed  fluent^  seeing  that  the  synthesis  (of  pro- 
ductive imagination)  in  their  genesis  is  a  progression 
in  time,  the  continuity  of  which  we  usually  charac- 
terize by  the  expression  ^t^  ovßoitnng. 


THE    KEITIK   OP   PURE    REASON. 


277 


All  objects  of  sense,  accordingly,  are  continuous 
magnitudes ;  as  well  in  perception  proper,  where  they 
are  extensive,  as  in  sensation  proper,  where  they 
are  intensive,  magnitudes.  If  the  synthesis  of  the 
sense-complex  be  interrupted,  then  we  have  an  aggre- 
gate of  several  sense-units,  and  not  properly  a  single 
sense-cognition  as  a  quantum ;  for  a  quantum  is  gener- 
ated, not  by  the  mere  progression  of  a  productive  syn- 
thesis of  some  kind,  but  by  the  repetition  of  a  syn- 
thesis that  is  as  well  perpetually  ceasing.  If  I  call 
13  dollars  a  money-quantum,  I  am  right  so  far  as  I 
understand  by  the  expression  the  amount  of  a  mark 
in  fine  silver ;  such  mark  being  undoubtedly  a  con- 
tin  uous  magnitude  in  which  no  one  part  is  the 
smallest  possible,  but  each  part  is  capable  of  consti- 
tuting a  bit  of  coin,  with  the  possibility  in  it  of  sup- 
plying matter  for  still  smaller  bits,  and  so  on.  If, 
however,  I  understand  by  the  expression  13  round 
dollars,  just  so  many  coins  (their  actual  silver  amount 
being  what  it  may),  then  I  name  it  improperly 
quantum;  rather,  as  a  number  of  separate  silver 
pieces,  I  must  call  it  an  aggregate.  Still,  number, 
nevertheless,  always  implying  the  principle  of  unity, 
the  conjoint  cognition  is  as  unity  a  quantum,  and  as 
a  quantum  always  also  a  continuum. 

All  objects,  now,  whether  as  extensive  or  intensive, 
being  continuous  magnitudes,  the  proposition  that  all 
mutation  also  (transition  of  something  from  one 
state  into  another)  is  continuous,  might  be  very  easily 
proved  here,  and  with  mathematical  evidence,  did  not 
the  causality  of  a  mutation  at  all  lie  quite  without  the 
bounds  of  a  transcendental  philosophy,  and  presup- 
pose empirical  principles.  For  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  a  cause  possible — something,  that  is,  capable 
of  changing  the  condition  of  things,  or  even  determin- 


278 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


ing  in  them  the  contrary  of  some  given  state — of 
that  there  is  not  a  hint  given  us  in  understanding  a 
priori.  And  this,  not  only  because  there  is  no  possible 
understanding  of  such  a  thing  (for  we  are  similarly 
situated  with  other  a  priori  cognitions),  but  because 
mutability  concerns  certain  determinations  of  objects 
which  we  can  only  learn  from  experience ;  not  but 
that  what  is  called  cause  in  a  mutation  must  be  soudit 
in  principles  which  are  beyond  mutation.  Here,  how- 
ever, we  have  nothing  available  before  us  but  the  pure 
primitive  notions  of  all  possible  experience,  which 
must  be  free  from  everything  empirical;  and  it  is 
impossible  for  us,  therefore,  prematurely  to  approach 
the  subject  of  a  jhysica  pura,  built,  as  it  is,  on  certain 
fundamental  facts  of  experience  itself,  without  injury 
to  the  unity  of  the  system. 

We  do  not  suffer  under  any  scarcity  of  proofs,  how- 
ever, of  the  great  influence  which  our  principle  here 
possesses  in  anticipation  of  perceptions,  and  even  in 
supplement  so  far  of  any  want  of  them,  that  it  shuts 
the  door  in  the  face  of  all  erroneous  inferences  that 
might  be  drawn  thence. 

For  if  all  reality  of  perception  has  a  degree,  between 
which  and  negation  there  is  the  possibility  of  an  in- 
finite series  of  ever-lessening  degrees,  and  if,  more- 
over, each  sense  must  possess  only  a  certain  degree 
in  its  receptivity  of  sensation,  it  is  evident  that  no 
perception  or  experience  can  possibly  prove,  mediately 
or  immediately,  or  by  whatever  expedient  we  may 
conceive,  an  entire  want  of  reality  before  sense.  There 
can  be  drawn  from  experience,  that  is,  never  any 
proof  of  either  a  void  space  or  a  void  time.  For  the 
total  want  of  reality  in  the  perception  of  sense  can 
itself,  firstly,  not  be  perceived ;  and,  secondly,  from 
no  single  cognition  of  sense  and  the  difference  in  the 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


279 


degree  of  its  reality,  is  it  possible  for  it  to  be  inferred, 
or  ought  it  even  for  explanation  of  it  (the  reality)  to 
be  at  any  time  assumed.  For,  though  the  entire 
perception  of  a  certain  definite  space  or  time  be  out 
and  out  real  (no  part  of  it,  that  is,  void),  still,  because 
every  reality  has  its  degree,  which,  independently  of 
any  change  in  the  extensive  magnitude  of  the  rela- 
tive object,  may  decrease  infinitely  even  to  nothing 
(the  void),  there  must  be  infinitely  different  degrees 
in  the  filling  of  space  or  time ;  so  that  in  different 
objects  the  intensive  magnitudes  may  be  greater  or 
less,  at  the  same  time  that  their  extensive  magnitudes 
are  equal. 

We  shall  exemplify  this.  Almost  all  teachers  of 
natural  philosophy,  inasmuch  as  they  observe,  on  the 
part  of  different  kinds  of  matter,  great  differences 
of  quantity  under  equal  bulk  (partly  through  the 
moment  of  gravity  or  weight,  partly  through  that  of 
resistance  to  other  bodies  in  motion),  unanimously 
infer  from  this  that  volume  (bulk,  extensive  magni- 
tude) must,  in  all  bodies,  be  more  or  less  empty.  But 
who  would  ever  suppose  it  possible  of  these  mostly 
mathematical  and  mechanical  inquirers  that  they 
rested  this  their  inference  solely  on — what  they  pre- 
tended so  carefully  to  avoid — a  metaphysical  presup- 
position ?  A  presupposition  of  this  kind  they  make 
plainly  here,  however,  in  that  they  assume  the  reale 
in  space  (not  to  call  it  here  impenetrability  or  weight, 
which  are  empirical  ideas)  to  be  everywhere  alike,  and 
to  differ  only  in  extensive  magnitude  or  quantitative 
amount.  To  this  presupposition,  for  which  they  could 
have  no  grounds  in  experience,  I  oppose  a  transcen- 
dental rationale.  I  do  not  pretend  to  explain  thereby 
differences  in  the  filling  of  space,  but  only  to  negate 
said  presupposition  in  the  necessity  it  assumes  that 


'\ 


280 


TUXT-BOOK   to    KANT  : 


such  differences  can  be  explained  not  otherwise  than 
by  the  hypothesis  of  empty  spaces  (pores).  This 
rationale  will  have  at  least  the  merit  to  set  under- 
standing free  to  think  differently  for  itself  the  differ- 
ence in  question,  if  an  hypothesis  at  all  is  to  be  held 
necessary  here  for  the  explanation  of  the  natural  fact. 
We  see  from  what  has  been  said,  namely,  that,  though 
two  equal  spaces  may  be  completely  filled  with  dif- 
ferent matter,  and  even  in  such  a  manner  that  in 
neither  of  them  a  point  can  be  found  in  w^hich  matter 
is  not  present,  still  every  reale  has,  with  the  same 
quality,  its  own  degree  (of  resistance  or  weight)  which, 
without  diminution  of  its  extensive  magnitude,  may 
become  infinitely  less  and  less,  before  actually  passing 
over  into  vacancy  and  disappearing.  Thus,  an  ex- 
pansible element  which  occupies  a  certain  space,  say 
heat,  and  in  like  manner  every  other  reality  (to 
sense),  may,  without  in  the  least  leaving  any  smallest 
part  of  the  space  void,  infinitely  diminish  in  its  de- 
grees, and  nevertheless  quite  as  well  fill  the  space  with 
these  smaller  degrees,  as  some  other  object  with 
greater  ones.  I  do  not  at  all  mean  to  maintain  here 
that,  with  the  diversity  of  matters,  and  in  the  ratio  of 
their  specific  weights,  this  is  actually  the  case,  but 
only  to  demonstrate,  from  a  proposition  of  pure 
understanding,  that  the  nature  of  our  sense-percep- 
tions makes  such  a  mode  of  explanation  possible. 
But,  that  being  so,  it  must  be  erroneously  assumed 
and,  through  an  alleged  a  2?^2m  principle  of  the  under- 
standing, erroneously  maintained,  that  the  reale  of 
objects  is  always  equal  in  degree,  and  only  different 
in  aggregation  and  extensive  magnitude. 

Nevertheless  this  anticipation  of  perception  has  for 
an  inquirer  who  is  transcendentally  trained,  and  ac- 
qiitoiiaed,  there&ie,  to  be  on  his  guard,  always  some- 


TIIB    KRITIK   OF    PURE    REASON. 


281 


thing  that  surprises  and  arrests  attention.  It  excites 
doubt  and  reflection  that  the  understanding  should 
be  capable  of  anticipating  a  synthetic  proposition 
such  as  that  about  the  degree  of  all  reality  in  objects, 
and  about  the  possibility,  consequently,  of  an  inner 
difference  in  the  sensation  itself,  abstracting,  that  is, 
from  the  empirical  quality  (as  so  and  so)  of  the 
objects  themselves.  It  is  a  question,  therefore,  well 
worth  answering.  How  it  is  that  the  understanding 
is  able  synthetically  to  pronounce  a  priori  upon 
objects,  and  even  to  anticipate  these  in  what  is  pro- 
perly and  purely  empirical — what,  namely,  concerns 
sensation. 

The  quality  of  the  sensation — colour,  savour,  etc. — 
is  always  merely  empirical,  and  cannot  be  a  priori 
realized.  But  the  reale  that  corresponds  to  the  sensa- 
tions taken  quite  generally,  and  as  in  contrast  to  the 
negation  =  0,  represents  only  something,  the  notion 
of  which  implies  being,  and  means  the  synthesis  in 
empirical  consciousness  generally.  In  inner  sense, 
namely,  the  empirical  consciousness  may  be  raised 
from  0  up  to  any  possible  greater  degree ;  and  thus 
the  very  same  extensive  magnitude  (an  illuminated 
surface,  say)  may  excite  quite  as  much  sensation  as 
an  aggregate  of  several  (less  illuminated)  others  at 
once.  The  extensive  magnitude  of  the  object,  then, 
may  be  completely  abstracted  from ;  and  yet  we  may 
perfectly  well  conceive,  in  a  single  moment  of  mere 
sensation,  a  synthesis  of  uniform  successive  rise  from 
0  up  to  the  given  empirical  consciousness.  All  sensa- 
tions, therefore,  are,  as  such,  only  a  posteriori  given 
but  the  property  in  them,  that  they  possess  degree, 
may  be  recognised  a  priori  It  is  remarkable  that,  of 
quantity  generally,  we  can  a  priori  know  only  a  single 
quality  (continuity),  and  of  quality  generally  only  a 


282 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


single  quantity  (intension,  degree) :  anything  further 
is  left  for  experience. 

3.  Analogies  of  Experience. 

The  principle  of  these  is,  That  experience  is  only 
possible  through  consciousness  of  a  necessary  con- 
nexion in  the  perceptions  (objects)  of  sense. 

Proof, 

Experience  is  empirical  cognition,  i.e.^  cognition 
that,  through  perceptions  of  sense,  determines  an 
object.  Experience,  therefore,  is  synthesis  of  said 
perceptions,  a  synthesis  that  is  not  given  by  percep- 
tion, but  that  rather  gives  to  its  implied  sense-complex, 
the  synthetic  unity  of  a  certain  single  act  of  con- 
sciousness. This  synthetic  unity  constitutes  what  is 
essential  to  a  perceptive  recognition  of  objects,  Le,^ 
to  experience  (not,  that  is,  to  mere  subjective  sensa- 
tion or  perception).  Perceptions,  now,  at  first  hand, 
come  together  only  contingently ;  ^  there  neither  ap- 
pears, nor  can  appear,  any  necessity  of  connexion  in 
them  so  far,  any  necessity  brought  by  themselves. 
Apprehension,  as  yet,  is  only  a  taking  up,  one  with 
the  other,  of  the  units  of  the  perception.  In  these 
units,  so  far,  consequently,  there  is  not  to  be  found 
any  hint  of  the  necessity  which  shall  effect  for  them 
connexion  of  existence  as  objects  in  space  and  time. 

•  Kant  adds  liere  "  in  experience ;"  and  he  means  by  the  latter  word, 
not  the  completed  process  of  experience  when  raised  into  olyectivity 
and  necessity  by  categories,  bnt  only  its  first  stage  of  subjective  affection, 
the  empirical  apprehension  of  mere  units  of  sensation.  As,  however, 
the  word  immediately  both  precedes  and  follows  in  its  other  and  full 
sense,  I  omit  it  here  where  it  is  not  necessary.  Kant  using  it,  almost  at 
the  same  moment,  in  this  double  way,  excellently  illustrates  for  us  his 
habitual  manner  of  writing.  Perhaps  it  was  "  apprehension  "  he  had  in 
mind. 


I 


TUE    KUITIK   OF  PURE   REASON. 


283 


Experience,  now,  is  a  completed  cognition  and  recog- 
nition of  objects  through  perceptions  of  sense.  It  is 
on  sense-perception  becoming  experience,  therefore, 
that  there  is  effected  a  relation  of  the  units  of  the 
complex  in  regard  of  their  existence  mutually.  The 
complex  is  regarded  now,  that  is,  not  as  it  merely 
presents  itself  at  first  hand  in  time,  but  as  at  last  it  is 
experienced  objectively  in  time.  But  time,  again,  is 
not  itself  perceived;  the  ultimate  determination  of 
existential  objects  in  time,  then,  is  no  product  of  time 
itself,  but  must  result  from  the  synthesis  in  time.  But 
such  synthesis,  so  placed,  can  only  take  place  through 
a  priori  notions  of  connexion.  These  notions,  now, 
for  their  part,  lastly,  must,  as  such,  or  being  a  priori^ 
bring  always  necessity  along  with  them.  Experience^ 
then,  can  only  possibly  result  from  a  recognition 
of  necessary  connexion  in  our  various  perceptions.^ 

The  three  modi  of  time  are  persistence^  sequence  or 
succession^  and  simultaneity.  Hence  three  laws  of  all 
relations  of  objects  in  time  will  precede  experience, 
and  as  conditions,  indeed,  of  its  very  possibility. 
These  laws  will  determine  for  every  object  its  relative 
existential  place  in  regard  of  unity  (connexion)  al- 
ways or  at  any  time  (A  being,  B  will  be,  etc.) 

The  general  principle  of  all  three  analogies  depends 
on  the  necessary  unity  of  apperception  as  regards 
every  possible  empirical  consciousness  (perception) 
at  any  and  every  time,  and,  consequently,  said  unity 

*  Apprehension,  already  possessed  of  the  a  priori  spectra  si)ace  and 
time,  receives  into  these  the  units  of  sensation  special,  but  as  yet  only 
confusedly  and  fortuitously  together.  Experience  does  more :  it  hinds, 
and  into  a  context  of  objects  in  space  and  time.  This  binding  is,  evidently, 
not  possibly  due  either  to  unperceivable  time  or  the  sensations  them- 
selves as  such.  It  can  only  result  from  the  categories,  as  a  priori  func- 
tions of  synthesis  into  the  unity  of  self-consciousness.  Then  imagination 
is  the  one  common  faculty  of  apprehension  that  actuates  all. 


284 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


being  a  priori  implied,  on  the  synthetic  unity  (con- 
nexion) of  all  objects  in  respect  of  their  relation  in 
time.  For  original  apperception  refers  itself  to  inner 
sense  (the  recipient  of  all  cognitions) — refers  itself  a 
priori  to  the  form  of  inner  sense,  i.e.^  to  the  relation  of 
the  units  of  the  complex  empirical  consciousness,  the 
one  to  the  other,  as  in  the  form  of  time.  Said  com- 
plex, again,  is,  as  a  whole,  to  be  united,  but  in  accord- 
ance with  its  time-relations,  into  original  appercep- 
tion ;  for  that  is  just  what  the  transcendental  unity 
of  apperception  a  jmori  prescribes,  inasmuch  as  under 
this  unity  there  must  stand  everything  that  is  to  be 
a  cognition  of  mine,  specially  mm^— everything,  con- 
sequently, that  can  be  for  me  an  object.  This  syn- 
thetic unity  in  the  time-relation  of  the  perceptions, 
a  2>riori  determined,  is  therefore  the  law.  That  every 
empirical  determination  in  time  must  stand  under 
rules  of  general  time-determination,  and  the  analogies 
of  experience  (which  we  proceed  to  treat)  must  con- 
stitute these  rules. 

These  analogies  have  this  peculiarity,  that  they  do 
not  have  in  regard  the  objects  or  the  synthesis  of  their 
empirical  perception  as  it  is  in  space,  but  merely  their 
existence,  or  rather  their  relation  mutually  in  regard 
of  their  existence.  Now  how  something  comes  to  be 
apprehended  as  perception  (as  construction  in  space) 
can  be  a  priori  determined  in  this  way,  that  the  rule 
of  its  synthesis  can  at  the  same  time,  so  far,  a  priori 
give  the  perception  (general  form  of  the  construction 
in  space),  as  will  be  necessarily  exemplified  in  every 
occurrent  empirical  case — that,  in  fact,  said  rule  of 
synthesis  can  realize  said  perception  {perception  being 
quite  generally  understood  as  construction  in  space). ^ 

'  In  the  above  sentence  "Erscheinung"  means  only,  and  probably 
should  be,  Anschauung, 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


285 


But  the  existence  of  objects  (not  their  mere  percep- 
tive form  as  due  a  priori  to  that  of  space)  cannot  be 
determined  or  cannot  come  to  be  known  a  p^riori; 
and,  though  we  might  in  this  way  {a  priori)  be  able 
to  reason  or  infer  in  regard  to  some  certain  existence, 
we  should  be  quite  unable,  nevertheless,  literally  to 
cognise  or  perceive  that  existence.  We  should  be 
quite  unable,  that  is,  to  anticipate  that  whereby,  as 
an  actual  empirical  object,  said  existence  were  dis- 
tinguishable from  others. 

The  two  previous  ground-propositions,  which  I  called 
the  mathematical  ones  (as,  in  effect,  it  is  they  entitle 
mathematics  to  be  empirically  applied),  related  to 
objects  in  their  mere  possibility  as  objects  (indi- 
vidually), and  instructed  us  how  these  objects,  as  well 
in  their  perceptive  form  (extension)  as  in  the  reale  of 
their  sense-matter  (intension,  degree),  might,  accord- 
ing to  rules  of  a  mathematical  synthesis,  come  to  be 
constructed.  Hence,  in  regard  of  both  of  them, 
numbers  may  be  used,  and  with  these  an  object  as  a 
magnitude  determined.  Thus,  for  example,  I  might 
make  up  the  degree  of  the  sensations  of  sunlight  by 
means,  say,  of  200,000  illuminations  of  the  moon — I 
might,  in  this  way,  a  priori^  determinately  give  it, 
that  is,  construct  it.  Hence  we  may  name  these  two 
(previous)  ground-propositions  constitutive. 

But  it  must  be  quite  diflFerently  situated  with  those 
which  have  to  bring  under  a  priori  rules  the  existence 
of  objects.  For,  that  (existence)  being  incapable  of 
a  priori  construction,  the  propositions  concerned  will 
only  refer  to  relation  of  existence^  and  avail  to  con- 
tribute, consequently,  only  regulative  principles.  In 
their  case,  therefore,  there  will  be  no  question  of  either 
axioms  or  anticipations.  But,  one  perception  of  sense, 
in  a  certain  relation  of  time  to  an  other  (for  its  part,  not 


286 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


necessarily  determined),  being  given  us,  they  (these 
propositions)  will  authorize  us  a  jmori  to  say  how^  in 
said  modus  of  time,  the  latter  object  or  perception  is 
necessarily  connected  with  the  former  object  or  per- 
ception  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  existence 
mutually,  but  not  what^  from  the  point  of  view  of 
extension  or  intension  (quantity  and  quality)  said 
latter  perception  actually  is.  Analogies  in  philosophy 
have  not  the  same  meaning  as  in  mathematical  usage. 
In  the  latter  reference  they  are  formula?  which  pro- 
nounce the  equality  of  two  ratios,  always  constitu- 
tively,  and  so  that  three  terms  being  given,  the  fourth 
is  thereby  also  given,  or  can  be  constructed.  An 
analogy  in  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  the 
equality  of  two  quantitative,  but  of  two  qualitative 
relations,  where,  from  three  given  terms,  I  can  a  priori 
discover  and  assign,  not  the  fourth  term  itself,  but 
only  a  certain  relation  to  this  fourth  term.  Never- 
theless, I  have  certainly  in  this  way  a  rule  whereby 
to  look  for  it  in  experience,  and  a  mark  whereby  to 
recognise  it  there  when  found.  An  analogy  of  expe- 
rience, therefore,  will  be  no  more  than  a  rule  or  law, 
by  virtue  of  which  the  perceptions  of  sense  shall  be 
raised  into  the  unity  of  experience.  But  in  the  pro- 
duction of  these  perceptions  as  empirical  perceptions 
it  has  no  power  or  part  whatever:  it  is  a  primary 
proposition  or  principle  that  holds  of  objects  (as  mere 
phenomena  of  sense)  not  constitutively,  but  only  regu- 
latively.  Nor  shall  we  be  able  to  say  more  than  this 
for  the  postulates  of  empirical  reflection.  These  pos- 
tulates consider  only  the  synthesis  of  j^ure  perception 
(the  form  of  a  presentation  to  sense) ;  the  synthesis 
of  5^5^-perception  (the  matter  in  the  presentation  to 
sense);  and,  lastly,  the  synthesis  of  experience  (the 
relation  or  connexion  in  the  presentations  to  sense). 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


287 


They  are  only  regulative  principles,  then,  and  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  mathematical  ones  (which  are 
constitutive),  not  in  the  certainty — a  quality  that 
stands  fast  a  priori  in  both — but  still  in  the  kind  of 
their  evidence.  That  is,  their  evidence  is  not  intui- 
tive (and,  consequently,  not  demonstrative),  like  that 
of  the  mathematical  primary  propositions. 

What  we  remarked,  however,  in  regard  to  all  the 
synthetic  primary  principles,  and  have  specially  to 
accentuate  here,  is  this,  that,  not  as  principles  of  the 
transcendental,  but  only  of  the  empirical  exercise  of 
understanding,  is  it,  that  these  analogies  possess,  and 
can  be  proved  to  possess,  their  entire  significance  and 
validity  in  use;  and  that  objects,  consequently  (re- 
garded always  as  mere  phenomena  of  sense),  must 
not  be  subsumed  directly  under  the  categories,  but 
only  under  the  schemata.  For,  were  the  objects,  to 
which  these  principles  are  to  be  applied,  things  in 
themselves,  it  were  simply  impossible,  a  priori  and 
synthetically,  to  make  anything  out  in  their  regard. 
On  the  contrary,  however,  these  objects  are  only 
phenomena  of  sense,  presentations  to  sense,  appear- 
ances in  sense,  and  a  complete  knowledge  of  them 
can  only  come  from  possible  experience.  All  a  priori 
principles  must  at  last,  therefore,  refer  to  that  know- 
ledge. They  can  have  in  view,  consequently,  only 
the  conditions  of  the  unity  of  empirical  cognition  in 
the  synthesis  of  the  objects.  This  synthesis  (so  con- 
ditioned) is  only  thought  in  the  schema  of  the  cate- 
gory. The  category,  indeed,  is  what  functions  unity 
to  this  synthesis  as  a  synthesis,  and  that  without 
restriction  of  any  condition  of  sense.  We  shall  be 
authorized,  therefore,  by  these  ground-propositions, 
to  put  objects  together  only  as  in  analogy  with  the 
logical  and  universal  unity  of  the  notions  (categories) ; 


288 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


and,  in  the  primary  proposition  itself,  we  shall  avail 
ourselves,  consequently,  of  the  category,  but,  in  the 
execution  (the  application  to  objects),  set,  in  place  of 
the  primary  proposition,  the  schema  of  the  category 
as  the  key  to  its  (the  category's)  use,  or  rather  place 
the  schema  beside  the  category,  as  restricting  con- 
dition under  the  name  of  a  formula  of  the  primary 
proposition. 

A.  First  Analogy. 
Primary  Proposition  of  the  Permanence  of  Substance. 

In  all  mutation  of  the  obiecls  of  sense,  substance 
remains  (is  permanent),  and  the  quantum  of  these 
objects  is,  in  nature,  neither  increased  nor  lessened. 

Proof. 

All  object  of  sense  are  in  time,  in  which,  as  sub- 
strate  (permanent  form  of  inner  sense) ,  simultaneity  as 
well  as  sequence  can  alone  be  conceived  or  represented. 
Time,  therefore,  in  which  all  vicissitude  of  objects  is 
to  be  thought,  remains  and  does  not  itself  alter, 
because  it  is  that  in  which  succession  or  simultaneity 
can  be  conceived  or  represented  only  as  determina- 
tions  of  itself.  Time,  now,  can,  per  se,  not  be  per- 
ceived— strictly  and  properly  perceived  as  though  it 
were  an  object  j)er  se.  Consequently,  in  the  elements 
of  sense  must  lie  that  substrate  which  is  to  relieve 
(exhibit)  time,  and  by  reference  to  which,  through 
the  relation  of  objects  to  it,  all  alternation  or  all 
simultaneity  can  be  recognised.  But  substance,  now, 
is  the  substrate  of  all  that,  as  real,  constitutes  the 
existence  of  things,  and  in  such  manner  that  whatever 
takes  place  in  existence,  or  comes  to  exist,  can  only 
be  thought  as  a  determination  of  it.     That  permanent 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


289 


element,  consequently,  in  relation  to  which  all  time- 
relations  of  objects  can  alone  be  determined,  is  the 
substance  in  all  the  shows  of  sense ;  it  is  that  reale  of 
these  which,  as  substrate  of  all  alteration,  ever  Re- 
mains the  same.  Inasmuch,  therefore,  as  substance 
enters  not  into  the  alteration  of  existence,  neither 
can  the  quantum  of  it  in  nature  be  either  lessened  or 

increased. 

Our  apprehension  of  any  sensible  complex  is  always 
successive,  and,  consequently,  always  in  alteration. 
We  can  never  determine  in  this  way  alone,  then, 
whether  this  complex  (that  is,  the  units  in  it),  as 
object  of  experience,  exhibits  a  case  of  co-existence  or 
of  sequence.  For  that  there  must  be  presupposed 
to  lie  under  the  all  of  things,  something  that  always 
is,  something  permanent  and  persistent,  in  regard  of 
which  all  alteration  and  all  simultaneity  are  but  so 
many  modes  (time-modes)  in  which  it  itself— this 
that  is  always  permanent  and  persistent — exists. 
Only  in  this  permanent  element,  therefore,  are  time- 
relations  possible  (for  simultaneity  and  succession 
constitute  all  the  relations  in  time);  i.e.,  this  per- 
manent element  is  the  substratum  of  the  empirical 
perception  of  time  itself,  and  only  by  reference  to  it 
is  any  determination  as  in  time  at  all  possible.  As  the 
constant  correlate  of  all  states  of  objects,  whether  those 
of  alteration  or  of  co-existence,  time  itself  expresses 
permanence.  For  alteration  does  not  affect  time  itself, 
but  only  the  things  in  time  (and  similarly,  in  effect, 
co-existence  is  not  a  modus  of  time  itself,  not  any 
one  part  of  which  is  at  once  with  another,  but  each 
is  after  the  other).  Did  we  wish  to  conceive  time 
itself  as  an  object  such  that  all  its  parts  were  sequent 
the  one  to  the  other,  we  should,  for  the  realization  of 
this,  require  to  call  in  another  time,  in  which  the 


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sequence  were  possible.  By  reason  of  a  permanent 
element  alone  does  existence,  necessarily  in  different 
and  only  successive  parts  of  time,  acquire,  never- 
theless, a  magnitude^  which  we  name  duration.  For 
in  the  mere  succession  existence  is  always  only  going 
and  coming,  and  cannot  be  said  to  possess  even  the 
smallest  magnitude.  Without  this  permanent  ele- 
ment, therefore,  there  is  not  any  relation  of  time. 
Now  time  cannot  in  itself  be  perceived.  This  per- 
manent element,  consequently,  is,  for  the  objects  of 
sense,  the  substrate  of  all  their  determinations  in 
time.  This  substrate,  further,  therefore,  is  the  con- 
dition of  the  possibility  of  all  synthetic  unity  in  our 
perceptions,  i.e.^  in  experience ;  and,  by  reference  to 
this  permanent  element,  all  co-existence  or  alteration 
in  time  can  be  regarded  as  mere  modus  of  the  exist- 
ence of  that  which  remains  and  persists.  The  per- 
manent  element  in  all  intimations  to  sense  is  thus  the 
object  itself,  i.e,^  substance  (phaenomenon) ;  while  all 
that  alters  or  can  alter  holds  only  of  the  mode  in 
which  this  substance  or  these  substances  exist,  only, 
consequently,  of  their  mere  determinations. 

I  find  that,  in  every  age,  not  only  the  philosopher, 
but  even  men  of  ordinary  understanding,  have  as- 
sumed this  permanence  as  substrate  of  all  the  changes 
of  things.  I  presume  also  that  this  will  be  always 
so;  only,  the  philosopher  will  continue  to  express 
himself  more  exactly  thus :  In  all  alterations  in  the 
world,  substance  persists,  and  only  the  accidents 
change.  I  find  nowhere,  however,  even  any  attempt 
to  prove  this  synthetic  proposition.  Nay,  it  only 
rarely  gets  the  place  that  belongs  to  it,  at  the  head  of 
the  pure  and  completely  a  priori  valid  laws  of  nature. 
The  proposition  that  substance  is  permanent  is  in 
effect  tautological.     For  it  is  just  because  of  this  per- 


manence that  we  apply  the  category  of  substance  to 
objects,  and  it  ought  to  have  been  proved  that  there 
is  something  permanent  in  objects,  in  reference  to 
which  what  changes  is  but  determination  of  its 
existence.  Being  synthetic  and  a  priori^  there  can  be 
no  proof  of  this  proposition  dogmatically,  or  from 
notions.  Neither  has  it  been  consequently  thought 
that  such  propositions  are  only  valid  for  possible 
experience,  and  can  be  proved,  therefore,  only  by  a 
deduction  of  such  possibility.  It  is  no  wonder,  then, 
that,  though  assumed  for  all  experience  (because  its 
necessity  for  empirical  cognition  was  felt),  it  has 
never  been  proved. 

A  philosopher  was  asked,  How  much  does  smoke 
weigh?  He  answered:  Deduct  from  the  weiojht  of 
the  wood  that  was  burned,  the  weight  of  the  ash  that 
is  left,  and  you  have  the  weight  of  the  smoke.  He 
assumed  as  undeniable,  therefore,  that  matter  (sub- 
stance) does  not  perish  even  in  fire,  but  only  under- 
goes an  alteration  in  form.  Just  in  the  same  way 
the  proposition.  From  nothing  comes  nothing,  was 
another  inference  from  the  principle  of  permanence, 
or  rather  of  the  constant  existence  of  the  subject 
proper  in  objects.  For  what  we  call  substance  being 
that  in  nature  that  is  to  be  the  special  subject  of  all 
determinations  in  time,  all  existence,  as  well  past  as 
future,  must  be  determined  wholly  and  solely  in 
reference  to  it  Hence  we  can  give  an  object  the 
name  of  substance  only  because  we  presuppose  its 
existence  for  all  time;  and  the  word  durableness 
does  not  well  express  this,  the  reference  it  implies 
looking  rather  to  the  future.  Nevertheless  the  inner 
necessity  to  endure  (continue  permanent,  persist)  is 
inseparably  connected  with  the  necessity  to  have 
always  been,  and  our  expressions  may  stand.     Gigni 


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de  nihilo  7iihil,  in  nihilum  nil  posse  reveiii,  were  two 
propositions  which  the  ancients  invariably  conjoined, 
and  which  we  now  sometimes  mistakenly  disjoin, 
because  we  suppose  that  they  concern  things  in  them- 
selves, and  the  former  might  seem  to  controvert  the 
dependence  of  the  world  (even  in  its  substance)  on  a 
First  Cause.  The  fear  is  unnecessary,  however ;  for 
.  what  is  spoken  of  are  only  objects  of  sense  in  the 
field  of  experience,  and  their  unity  would  be  im- 
possible if  (in  substance)  w^e  assumed  the  origination 
of  new  things.  Then,  namely,  that  would  fail  which 
can  alone  represent  the  unity  of  time — the  identity  of 
the  substrate,  which  alone  guarantees  abiding  unity 
throughout  all  change.  This  permanency  is,  at  the 
same  time,  nothing  but  the  mode  in  which  (though 
knowing  only  affection)  we  represent  to  ourselves 
things. 

The  determinations  of  a  substance  which  are 
nothing  else  than  its  particular  modes  to  exist,  are 
called  accidents.  They  are  in  every  case  real,  for  they 
concern  the  existence  of  the  substance  (negations  are 
only  determinations  expressive  of  the  non-being  of 
something  in  the  substance).  If  we  attribute  to  this 
reale  in  respect  of  substance  a  particular  kind  of 
existence  {e.g.,  motion  as  an  accident  of  matter),  we 
call  it  inherence,  in  contradistinction  to  subsistence  in 
the  case  of  substance.  But  this  leads  to  many  mis- 
takes, and  our  expression  will  be  more  correct  and 
exact  if  we  describe  the  accident  only  as  the  mode  in 
which  the  existence  of  a  substance  is  positively  deter- 
mined. At  the  same  time,  however,  it  is  unavoidable 
because  of  the  conditions  of  the  logical  exercise  of 
understanding,  as  it  w-ere,  to  separate  what  is  suscep- 
tible of  mutation  in  the  existence  of  a  substance  (the 
substance  itself  enduring),  and  to  consider  it  in  rela- 


i 


I 


tion  to  what  is  specially  permanent  and  radical. 
Hence  this  category,  then,  will  come  under  the  head 
of  relations,  rather  as  condition  of  these,  than  as  itself 
containing  a  relation. 

On  this  permanency  depends  now  the  legitimation 
of  the  notion  of  change.  Origin  and  decease  are  not 
changes  of  w^hat  originates  or  deceases.  Change  is  a 
mode  in  which  to  exist,  which  mode  ensues  on 
another  mode  to  exist  on  the  part  of  the  same  object. 
All  that  changes,  therefore,  persists,  and  only  its  state 
alters.  Change,  then,  only  concerning  such  deter- 
minations as  may  cease  or  begin,  it  is  possible  for  us 
to  use  an  apparently  paradox  expression,  and  say. 
Only  what  is  permanent  (substance)  alters ;  what  is 
changeable  suffers  no  change,  but  only  an  exchange, 
certain  determinations  ceasing  and  others  beginning.^ 

Change  is  capable  of  being  observed,  then,  only  in 
regard  of  substances.  Origin  or  decease  absolutely, 
that  is,  not  being  mere  determination  of  something 
permanent,  cannot  possibly  be  witnessed.  It  is  pre- 
cisely this  element  of  permanency,  namely,  which 
makes  it  possible  for  us  to  perceive  or  conceive  tran- 
sition from  one  state  to  another,  and  from  non-being 
to  being.  These  states,  therefore,  are  only  to  be  em- 
pirically recognised  as  alternating  determinations  of 
what  is  permanent.  Assume  something  absolutely 
to  begin  to  be ;  you  necessarily  assume  also  a  point 
of  time  in  which  it  was  not.  To  what,  now,  would 
you  attach  this  point,  if  not  to  what  already  is  ?  For 
an  empty  time  which  might  precede,  is  no  object 
of  perception.  But,  were  the  thing  assumed  to  begin 
joined  on  to  things  which  previously  were  and  have 

»  It  misleads  to  take  Kant's  use  of  "Wechsel "  here  as  of  universal  or 
exclusive  application.  On  the  contrary,  as  we  have  seen  a  score  of 
times  already,  Kant  usually  means  by  the  word  only  change  as  such. 


Mvik 


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295 


continued  till  this,  then  what  begins  is  only  a  deter- 
mination of  what  has  continued.  And  it  is  not 
otherwise  with  decease ;  for  it  necessitates  assumption 
of  the  empirical  perception  of  a  time  no  longer  con- 
taining anything.' 

Substances  (in  nature  as  show  of  sense)  are  the 
substrates  of  all  determinations  in  time.  The  ori^jin 
of  some  of  them,  and  the  decease  of  others,  w^ould 
even  destroy  the  single  indispensable  condition  of  the 
empirical  unity  of  time,  and  objects  then  might  be  in 
two  sorts  of  time  at  once,  and  in  these,  two  existences 
would  necessarily  flow  side  by  side,  which  is  absurd. 
For  there  is  only  a  one  time,  in  which  the  dififerent 
times  are,  of  necessity,  not  simultaneous  but  sequent. 

Permanency,  then,  is  a  necessary  condition  under 
which  alone  affections  of  sense  are  determinable  as 
things  or  objects  in  a  possible  experience.  But  what 
is  the  empirical  criterion  of  this  necessary  perma- 
nency, and  with  it  of  the  substantiality  of  our  per- 
ceptions,— on  this  the  following  articles  will  give  us 
occasion  to  say  what  is  required. 


B.  Second  Analogy. 
Primary  Proposition  of  Time- Sequence  on  tLc  Law  of  Causality. 

All  changes  follow  from  the  law  of  the  connexion 
of  cause  and  effect. 

Proof. 

(That  all  manifestations  properly  sequential  in  time 
are  changes,  or  a  successive  being  and  non-being  of 
the  determinations  of  substance,  which  itself  persists, 
and  consequently,  that  a  being  following  on  a  non- 
being,  or  a  non  being  on  a  being,  in  other  words,  a 


coming  to  be  or  a  ceasing  to  be,  is,  on  the  part  of  sub- 
stance, only  impossible, — this  has  been  demonstrated 
under  the  proposition  which  immediately  precedes. 
The  same  proposition  might  have  been  expressed 
thus :  All  vicissitude  (succession)  in  the  perceptions  of 
sense  is  only  change  ;  for  a  coming  to  be  or  a  ceasing 
to  be  on  the  part  of  substance  were  not  a  change  of 
it,  inasmuch  as  the  notion  of  change  presupposes 
the  same  subject  as  existing,  and  consequently  as 
persisting,  with  two  opposed  determinations. — This 
being  premised,  we  proceed  to  the  proof.) 

I  perceive  that  perceptions  of  sense  follow  one  an- 
other, i.e.^  that  there  is  a  state  of  things  at  one  time, 
the  opposite  of  which  preceded.  I  connect,  properly, 
therefore,  two  perceptions  in  time.  Connexion,  now, 
is  no  deed  of  sense  or  the  perception  (general)  of  sense, 
but  is  the  product  of  a  synthetic  act  of  imagination 
in  that  it  determines  inner-sense  in  regard  of  the 
time-relation.  But  imagination  can  connect  said  two 
states  in  two  ways,  either  as  that  this  shall  precede 
that,  or  that  this ;  for  time  cannot  itself  be  perceived, 
or  so,  therefore,  that,  in  its  reference,  as  it  were  em- 
pirically, what  precedes  and  what  follows  may,  i7i  the 
object,  be  determined.  I  am  thus  only  conscious 
that  my  imagination  puts  the  one  first  and  the  other 
second,  not  that  in  the  object  the  one  precedes  and  the 
other  follows.  In  other  words,  the  mere  perception 
of  sense  leaves  the  objective  relation  of  the  consecutive 
affections  of  sense  undetermined.  In  order,  now,  that 
this  relation  should  be  perceived  as  determined,  the  re- 
lation between  the  two  states  must  be  so  thought  that 
it  necessarily  determines  which  state  shall  be  neces- 
sarily set  first,and  w^hich  second ;  and  not  reverse-wise. 
What  notion,  however,  brings  with  it  a  necessity  of 
synthetic  unity  can  only  be  a  category,  and  a  category 


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is  no  element  of  the  perception  of  sense  as  such* 
That  here,  now,  is  the  notion  of  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect,  in  which  the  former  determines  the  latter 
in  time  as  its  consequent,  and  not  as  something  that 
in  imagination  merely  might  precede  (or  even,  indeed, 
not  at  all  be).  Only  by  this,  therefore,  that  we  sub- 
ject the  sequence  of  perceptions  (and  consequently 
all  change)  to  the  law  of  causality,  is  experience 
itself  (empirical  recognition  of  these  perceptions) 
possible.  These  perceptions  are  themselves,  then, 
only  possible  as  objects  of  experience  by  virtue  of  this 
very  law.  ^ 

The  apprehension  of  the  sensible  complex  is  always 
successive.  The  perceptions  of  the  parts  of  it  follow 
on  one  another.  Whether  they  also  follow  each  other 
as  in  the  object  is  a  second  point  in  the  consideration 
which  is  not  contained  in  the  former.  Of  course  we 
may  name  everything — every  part-perception  as  well, 
so  far  as  it  is  an  item  of  consciousness — object ;  but 
what  this  word  shall  mean  in  the  case  of  the  intima- 
tions to  sense,  not  so  far  as  they  are  objects  in  respect 
of  each  being  such  mere  intimation,  but  so  far  as  they 
represent  an  object,  that  is  a  matter  of  deeper  con- 
sideration. So  far  as  they  are  objects  of  conscious- 
ness only  in  that  they  are  the  mere  intimations  to 
sense  (the  jjart  perceptions),  there  is  no  distinguishing 
them  from  the  apprehension  of  them,  that  is,  from  the 
mere  susception  of  them  in  the  synthesis  of  imagina- 
tion. So  far,  it  must  be  said,  then,  the  sensible  com- 
plex is,  as  in  consciousness,  always  successively  pro- 
duced. Were  objects  things  in  themselves,  no  man 
would  be  able  to  decide,  from  the  succession  of  the 
part-perceptions  of  their  complex,  how  it  was  situated 

'  In  the  third  sentence  of  the  above  paragraph,  Rosenkranz  has  an 
"  einerlei "  that  obviously  ought  to  be  a  zweierlei. 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


297 


with  the  synthesis  of  this  complex  in  the  object.  For 
always  we  have  only  to  do  with  our  own  units  of 
sense ;  and  how  things  may  be  in  themselves  (apart 
from  the  units  of  sense  whereby  they  successively 
affect  us),  is  wholly  beyond  the  sphere  of  our  cog- 
nition. Now,  although  objects  to  us  are  not  things 
in  themselves,  and  yet  all  that  we  can  have  given  us 
to  perceive,  it  is  still  necessary  for  me  to  demonstrate 
what  that  co-existent  synthesis  is  that  actually  does 
infuse  itself  into  the  sensible  complex  of  our  con- 
sciousness, at  the  same  time  that  this  consciousness 
of  said  complex  in  apprehension  is  in  all  cases  suc- 
cessive. Thus,  for  example,  the  apprehension  of  the 
sensible  complex  in  the  case  of  a  house  standing  there 
before  me  is  successive.  Now,  the  question  is,  whether 
there  is  a  succession  of  the  complex  of  this  house  itself 
and  in  itself.  No  one  will  admit  this.  But,  now,  so 
soon  as  I  consider  what  an  object  is  to  me  in  its  tran- 
scendental meaning,  then  the  house  is  not  at  all  a 
thing  in  itself,  but  only  an  appearance  in  the  affection 
of  sense — a  consciousness,  therefore,  of  which  the 
transcendental  object  is  unknown.  And  the  interest 
is  to  know.  What  do  I  mean  by  the  question  as  to 
how  it  is  situated  with  the  synthesis  of  the  complex 
in  the  object  itself  (which,  of  course,  transcendentally, 
is  still  not  a  thing  in  itself)  ?  Here  that  which  lies 
in  successive  apprehension  is  considered  an  affair  of 
mere  consciousnesses,  while  that,  again,  which  appears 
as  the  result  that  is  given  to  me,  although  it  is,  in 
reality,  nothing  more  than  a  sum  of  these  conscious- 
nesses, is  considered  the  object  of  or  before  these  con- 
sciousnesses, and  with  which  my  notion  (my  notion 
derived  from  the  contents  of  apprehension)  must 
agree.  It  is  readily  seen,  now,  that  since  truth  is  the 
agreement  of  cognition  with  its  object,  we  can  only 


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299 


ask,  in  such  a  case,  after  the  formal  conditions  of 
empirical  truth ;  and  that  what  ajrpears  as  the  result 
which  is  given  to  me,  must,  as  compared  with  the  succes- 
sive units  in  apprehension  themselves,  only  then  be 
capable  of  being  distinguished  from  these  as  the  actual 
object  of  them,  when  the  conjunct  apprehension  stands 
under  a  rule  which  distinguishes  it  from  every  other 
apprehension,  and  necessitates  a  specific  synthesis  of 
the  relative  complex.  That,  now,  in  the  general 
result  as  it  is  before  sense,  which  constitutes  the  con- 
dition of  this  necessary  rule  of  apprehension,  is  the 
object.^ 

But,  now,  fairly  to  take  up  the  problem  before  us. 
That  something  happens,  i.e,,  that  something,  or  some 
state,  comes  to  be,  which  previously  was  not,  cannot 
be  empirically  perceived,*^  unless  there  were  a  some- 
thing not  this  something,  or  a  state  not  tliis  state, 
preceding  either.  For  an  actual  something  which 
should  ensue  on  a  void  time — an  origination,  that 
is,  with  no  precedent  condition  of  things — can  just  as 
little  be  apprehended  as  empty  time  itself.  Said 
apprehension  of  an  event,  then,  is  an  empirical  per- 

*  I  desire  always  to  make  Kant's  meaning  not  only  clear,  but  even, 
perhaps,  so  far  as  allowable,  acceptable  to  the  reader.  Should  this 
reader,  then,  have  had  troubles  of  late — now  that  Kant  is  attempting  to 
bring  all  his  principles  together  practically  in  use — I  beg  him  not  to  lay 
the  whole  fault  at  the  door  of  the  translation.  Kant  in  the  schematism^  as 
I  believe,  is  always  now,  in  effect,  heatedly  and  confusedly,  fighting  against 
a  difficulty  that  has,  quite  unexpectedly,  come  in  at  last.  His  first  inten- 
tion was  to  confine  his  "possibility  of  experience"  to  "  space,  time,  and 
the  elementary  notions  of  the  understanding;"  but,  in  the  end,  for  his 
principal  categories,  a  second  intention  was  forced  upon  him :  that  of 
admitting  into  said  "  possibility  of  experience,"  certain  main  facts  of 
empirical  suggestion.  The  "  condition  "  above  I  do  not  think  to  mean 
any  such  fact,  and  yet  Kant  is  so  various  now,  that  it  is  just  possible  it 
may. — See  note,  p.  304.     (The  "  condition  "  meant  is  just  the  category.) 

*  Wahrgenommen  alone  means  empirically  perceived  ;  so  that  Kant's 
own  words  here,  ^^  empirisch  lüahrgenommen"  amount  to  the  awkward 
tautology,  empirically  empirically  perceived. 


ccption  such  that  it  ensues  on  another.     Inasmuch, 
however,  as  this,  so  far,  is  but  a  succession,  or,  with 
all  synthesis  of  apprehension,  only  so  situated  as  the 
complex  of  the  house  was,  there  is  no  distinction  so 
far  of  the  one  thing  from  the  other.     But  I  perceive 
also  that  if,  in  the  case  of  an  event,  I  call  the  first  state 
empirically  perceived  A,  and  the  subsequent  one  B, 
B  can  in  the  apprehension  only  follow  A,  while,  for 
its  part,  A  cannot  follow,  but  only  precede  B.     I  see, 
for  example,  a  ship  driving  down  stream.     My  per- 
ception of  its  position  down  stream  follows  my  per- 
ception of  its  position  up  stream  ;  and  it  is  impossible 
that,  in  the  apprehension  of  these  appearances,  the 
ship  should  be  first  seen  down  stream,    and  after- 
wards again  up.     The  order  in  the  sequence  of  per- 
ceptions  in   apprehension  is   here,   therefore,   fixed, 
and  to  this  order  these  perceptions  are  bound.     In 
the  previous  example  of  the  house,  my  perceptions  in 
the  apprehension  of  it  could  begin  with  the  top  and 
end  with  the  bottom,  or,  equally  well  also,  begin  here 
and  end  there.     They  might,  for  that  matter,  quite 
as  well  also,  apprehend  the  complex  of  the  empirical 
object  from  right  to  left,  or,  again,  from  left  to  right. 
In  the  series  of  these  perceptions,  then,  there  was  no 
fixed  order — no  order  which  necessarily  prescribed 
where,  in  the  apprehension,  I  should  make  my  be- 
ginning, in  order  to  convert  its  complex  into  the  due 
empirical  synthesis.     Such  necessity  of  rule,  however, 
is  always  present  in  any  case  of  an  event,  and  the 
order  of  the  consecutive  perceptions  (in  the  appre- 
hension  of  the   sensible  facts)  is  thereby  rendered 
necessary. 

In  this  case,  therefore,  it  is  from  the  objective  suite 
of  the  facts  that  I  must  infer  the  subjective  suite  in 
apprehension  ;  for  this  latter  suite  (of  mere  units  in 


I 


300 


TEXT-BOOK    TO   KANT  : 


sense)  is,  as  such,  quite  undetermined,  and  not  dis- 
criminative as  yet  of  object  from  object.  It  by  itself 
decides  nothing  in  regard  to  the  synthesis  of  the  com- 
plex in  the  object^  for  its  order  as  yet  is  quite  indiflFerent. 
The  objective  suite,  on  the  other  hand,  will  consist  in 
the  order  of  the  perceived  complex,  according  to  which 
order  the  apprehension  of  what  happens  (as  in  the 
case  of  the  ship)  will  follow  what  precedes  by  reason 
of  a  rule.  Only  so  can  I  be  empowered  to  say  of  the 
object  itself,  and  not  merely  of  my  apprehension,  that 
said  object  implies  a  consequence,  which  is  as  much 
as  to  signify  that  I  can  dispose  my  apprehension  not 
otherwise  than  precisely  in  such  and  such  order. 

By  reason  of  the  necessity  of  such  a  rule,  therefore, 
there  must  lie  in  the  antecedent  of  an  event  the  con- 
dition to  a  rule  such  that  this  event  must,  in  conse- 
quence thereof,  always  and  necessarily  ensue ;  but, 
inversely,  I  cannot  begin  from  the  consequent,  and 
thereby,  in  apprehension,  determine  what  precedes. 
For  from  the  subsequent  point  in  time  there  is  no 
going  back  of  things  to  the  preceding  one,  though 
referentially  connecting  itself,  certainly,  to  some  one 
or  other  that  preceded.  From  a  given  time,  again, 
the  progression  (on  the  part  of  things)  to  the  specially 
following  one  is  necessary.  Accordingly,  there  being 
something  that  follows,  I  must  necessarily  connect  it 
with  something  else  that  precedes,  and  of  such  a 
nature  that  it  follows  it  in  obedience  to  a  rule,  i.e,^ 
necessarily ;  with  the  general  result  that  the  event, 
as  what  is  conditioned,  assuredly  points  to  a  condition, 
and  that  this  condition  is  what  determines  the 
event. 

Suppose  we  assume  an  event  to  be  preceded  by 
nothing  which  it  is  necessitated  to  follow  according 
to  a  Enlei   tli^n   all  succession   of  perception  were 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


301 


solely  in  apprehension,  i,e.^  merely  subjective,  and  it 
were  not  at  all  objectively  determined  which  percep- 
tion must  be  properly  considered  antecedent  and 
which  consequent.  We  should  have,  so,  only  a  play 
of  intimations  in  consciousness  that  had  no  object  in 
regard.  In  our  perception,  that  is,  no  object  would, 
so  far  as  the  relation  of  time  is  concerned,  be  distin- 
guished from  another ;  the  reason  being  this,  that,  in 
our  merely  apprehending,  the  succession  is  always 
only  indifferent,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  appear- 
ances determinative  of  them  so  that  a  certain  conse- 
cution is  thereby  rendered  objectively  necessary.  I 
am  able  to  say,  therefore,  not  that  in  the  object  two 
states  follow  the  one  the  other,  but  only  that  one 
apprehension  follows  the  other,  which,  of  course,  is 
something  merely  subjective  and  indeterminative  of 
any  object — such,  then,  that  it  cannot  pass  for  the 
cognition  of  an  object  (even  as  lAenomenally  under- 
stood).^ 

*  I  cannot  help  offering  to  come  to  the  reader's  assistance  here. 
There  is  so  much  repetition  in  all  these  words  of  Kant's  that  one  cannot 
avoid  suspecting  that  he  is  merely  writing  with  the  hope  of  gaining  such 
time  as  will  procure  light  for  himself.  He  is  now  engaged  in  answering 
Hume — in  demonstrating  the  single  proposition  that  is  fulcrum  to  the 
whole  vast  enterprise,  the  whole  vast  enterprise  which  seems  already  to 
require  so  little  for  its  triumphant  and  definitive  completion,  and,  do  as 
he  may,  try  back  and  back  as  he  likes,  turn  up  his  box  and  shake  out 
his  principles  with  whatever  anxiety  and  minuteness  possible,  the  whole 
thing  seems  perpetually  to  have  gone  out  of  sight  and  to  elude  the  very 
touch.  Objects,  namely,  being  for  Kant  only  states  of  our  own  under  the 
synthetic  unity  of  a  category,  he  requires  to  regard  any  sensation  as  a 
complex  of  imits  such  that  in  it  the  order  of  these  is  in  the  first  instance 
merely  indifierent.  Even  in  causality,  consequently,  he  is  obliged  to 
assume  that  the  facts  are  so.  In  the  case  of  the  ship,  once  the  category 
has  acted,  we  see  the  necessary  order  of  the  positions,  and  from  that 
objective  order  we  may  infer  that  subjectively  the  positions,  even  while 
mere  units  of  sense,  were  in  precisely  the  same  order.  Otherwise,  how- 
ever, Kant  would  have  us  to  understand  that  we  should  have  found  the 
order  in  said  positions,  while  these  were  mere  units  of  sense,  absolutely 
indifferent.     I  assume  the  reader's  difficulty  to  concern  this  indifference. 


302 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


When  we  experience,  then,  something  that  hap- 
pens, we  always  presuppose  something  to  precede 
from  which  it  follows  according  to  a  rule.  For 
without  this  1  should  be  unable  to  say  of  the  object 
that  it  follows,  inasmuch  as  the  mere  succession  in 
my  apprehension,  if  undetermined  in  connexion  with 
something  that  precedes,  through  a  rule,  is  no 
warrant  for  a  consecution  in  the  object  Conse- 
quently, therefore,  it  is  always  by  reason  of  a  rule — 
a  rule  by  which  objects  are,  through  a  preceding 
state,  determined  in  their  consecution,  Le,^  in  the 
manner  in  which  they  are  a  happening — that  I 
make  my  subjective  synthesis  (as  in  mere  appre- 
hension) objective;  and  wholly  under  this  presup- 
position alone  is  there  even  the  possibility  of  the 
experience  of  something  that  happens/ 

But,  in  the  first  place,  how  does  Kant  himself  understand  it  ?  It  is  im- 
possible to  believe  that  he  did  not  regard  the  empirical  units  of  impres- 
sion as  coming  in  their  own  order.  He  cannot  have  supposed  the  various 
beds  in  a  gart! en,  or  the  various  events  in  a  battle  as  witnessed,  but 
while  both  beds  and  events  were  mere  units  of  impression  on  one's 
retina,  or  in  one's  sense,  to  have  been  in  their  order  "  beliebig "  in  this 
way,  that  we  might  set  any  one  bed  or  any  one  event,  or  all  the  beds  and 
all  the  events  togetlier,  into  what  relative  position  and  positions  we 
pleased.  That  is  all  too  manifestly  absurd.  We  must  assume  his 
indifference  ("etner^i")  to  mean,  then — ^here  especially  where  under 
causality  the  question  is,  and  in  every  stage,  of  nothing  but  sequences — 
that  the  succession  was  merely  a  following  on,  until  the  action  of  the 
category  converted  it  into  a  following /row.  But  even  that  understand- 
ing the  reader  will  find  himself  unable  to  accept  at  the  hands  of  Kant. 
It  is  all  very  well  for  Kant  to  say  with  Hume  that  cases  of  causality  are 
merely  matters  of  fact,  and  that  all  matters  of  fact  are,  just  as  such, 
necessarily  contingent.  We  teU  Kant,  for  all  that,  that  darkness  follows 
the  shutting  of  the  shutter  and  light  its  opening,  and  that  in  no  stage 
whatever  was  the  order  in  the  units  of  impression  an  indifferent  one  : 
that,  in  fact,  even  from  the  first  there  was  only  a  necessity  of  order,  and 
that  without  perception  of  that  necessity  we  should  have  had  no  reason 
for  setting  the  facts  under  the  rubric  of  causality  at  all. 

*  So  long  as  what  concerns  my  knowledge  of  objects  is  confined  to 
mere  units  of  sensation  as  mere  units  of  sensation,  these  are  as  yet  only 
feelings  in  my  sentiency,  and,  consequently,  only  subjective.   This  is  the 


THE   KRITIK   or  PURE   REASON. 


303 


I 


It  seems,  indeed,  as  though  this  were  in  contradic- 
tion of  every  observation  hitherto  made  in  respect  of 
the  process  in  the  exercise  of  understanding.  For, 
according  to  such  observations,  only  through  percep- 
tion and  comparison  of  the  concordant  foUowings  of 
many  events  on  preceding  states  is  it  that  we  have 
been  led  to  discover  a  rule  in  obedience  to  which 
certain  events  always  follow  certain  states ;  and,  con- 
sequently, only  thus  is  it  that  we  have  been  prompted 
to  form  the  notion  of  a  cause.  But  this  notion 
would,  on  such  a  footing,  be  only  empirical ;  and  the 
rule,  to  which  it  gives  rise,  that  everything  that 
happens  has  a  cause,  would  be  just  as  contingent  as 
experience  itself  The  universality  and  necessity  of 
this  rule  were  then  only  imputed,  and  would  have 
no  true  apodictic  validity,  inasmuch  as  they  would 
not  be  a  priori  established,  but  only  through  induc- 
tion. It  is  situated  here,  however,  as  with  other 
pure  a  priori  elements  (e.g.^  space  and  time) :  we 
derive  them  as  evident  notions  from  experience  only 
because  we  ourselves  have  first  of  all  put  them  into 
experience,  and  only  in  this  way,  indeed,  brought 
experience  about.  Certainly  the  logical  undeniable- 
ness  of  such  peculiar  rule,  determinative  of  the  series 
of  events  and  due  to  the  notion  of  causality,  is  only 
then  possible  when  we  have  made  proof  of  it  in 
experience ;  but  a  reference  to  it  as  condition  of  the 
synthetic  unity  of  things  in  time  was  still  the  founda- 

first  step  in  perception  to  Kant  and  everybody  else.  The  second  step 
to  Kant  is  that,  these  units  being  subsumed,  through  the  schema,  under 
the  category,  experience  (objective  recognition)  is  the  result.  This  second 
step  is  the  application  of  a  "  rule,"  then  ;  and  a  rule,  Kant  held,  was 
no  product  of  mere  sense.  Afterwards  he  saw  that  the  very  units  in 
sense  had  their  own  order,  and,  accordingly,  he  was  compelled  (in  the 
Prolegomena)  to  postulate  a  rule  subjective  which  was  the  cue  to  the  rule 
objective. 


304 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


305 


tion  of  experience  itself,  and  a  priori^  therefore,  pre- 
ceded it. 

It  is  important,  then,  by  actual  example  to  demon- 
strate that,  never  even  in  experience,  do  we  attribute 
(in  the  case  of  an  event,  where  something  comes  to 
be  which  previously  was  not)  the  sequence  to  the 
object,  and  accordingly  distinguish  it  from  the  sub- 
jective sequence  of  our  mere  apprehension,  unless 
there  be  presupposed  an  underlying  rule  which  com- 
pels us  to  observe  this  order  in  our  perceptions  rather 
than  another.  Nay,  it  is  properly  that  compulsion 
(necessity)  which  alone  makes  possible  the  perception 
of  a  succession  in  the  object.^ 

We  have  states  of  consciousness  in  us,  of  which, 
consequently,  we  may  be  aware.  But  let  this  our 
consciousness  be  as  wide,  and  as  minute,  and  as 
exact  as  it  may,  these  states  always  remain  that,  and 
no  more  than  that,  ie,,  internal  determinations  of 
our  own  mind  in  this  or  that  relation  of  time.  How 
now  do  we  come,  in  addition  to  that,  to  assume  an 
object  in  or  as  these  states  of  consciousness  ?  Or, 
over  and  above  the  subjective  reality  of  these  states 
as  modifications  of  our  own  sentiency,  how  do  we 

»  The  doctrine  here  clearly  is  that  necessity  and,  consequently,  objec- 
tivity are  due  to  the  a  'priori  elements  alone.  We  must  not,  then,  be 
misled,  when  we  read  such  a  sentence  as  this,  "  That,  in  the  conjunct 
presentation  to  sense,  which  supplies  the  condition  of  the  necessary  rule 
for  apprehension,  is  the  object "  (see  both  text  and  note,  p.  298),  to  infer 
that  the  condition  to  the  rule  (as  it  were  the  cue  to  it)  lies  for  Kant  in  the 
empirical  units.  We  have  just  been  told  that,  did  we  proceed  so,  any 
necessity  we  might  arrive  at,  would  be  only  one  of  "  induction "  and 
"  imputed."  That  point  of  view,  indeed,  is  what  is  dominant  in  Kant : 
The  necessity  we  ascribe  to  matters  of  fact  cannot  belong  a  posteriori  to 
them,  but  must  belong  a  priori  to  us.  He  handles  such  a  tangled  skein, 
however,  that  the  "  condition "  to  which  he  refers  seems  now  to  lie  in 
the  category,  and  again  only  in  a  generale  of  empirical  suggestion  as  in 
the  schema.  The  "  subjective  rule  "  (to  precede  the  objective  one)  was, 
undoubtedly,  his  last  shift  here. 


I 


come  to  put  in  place  of  them  I  know  not  what  objec- 
tive reality  ?  An  objective  value  cannot  consist  in  the 
reference  to  another  idea  (ofthat  which  we  would  name 
of  the  object) ;  for  then  we  have  just  the  same  question 
over  again :  How  does  this  idea,  for  its  part,  again, 
go  beyond  itself  and  attain  an  actual  objective  value 
in  addition  to  the  subjective  value  which  is  proper  to 
it  as  a  determination  merely  of  mind?  When  we 
examine  what  new  quality  the  reference  to  an  object 
extends  to  our  own  mere  states,  and  what  dignity 
they  attain  thereby,  we  find  that  this  reference  does 
no  more  than  make  the  conjunction  of  these  states,  in 
a  certain  way,  a  necessary  one,  and  this  through 
subjection  to  a  rule  ;  or,  inversely,  that  only  because 
of  a  certain  order  in  the  time-relation  of  our  own 
states  of  mind  is  it  that  an  objective  quality  is 
imparted  to  them.^ 

In  the  synthesis  of  perceptions,  the  units  of  the 
complex  so  constituted  always  follow  one  another. 
So  far  there  is  as  yet  not  any  consciousness  of  an 
object;  for  through  this  following,  common  as  it  is 
to  all  apprehensions,  there  is  not  as  yet  anything  dis- 
tinguished from  the  rest.  So  soon,  however,  as  I 
observe,  or  by  anticipation  assume,  that  there  is  in 
this  following  a  reference  to  the  preceding  state  on 
which  state  the  present  state  ensues  according  to  a 
rule,  then  I  have  something  before  me  that  so  hap- 
penSj  or  that  is  an  event,  ie.,  I  perceive  an  object 
which  I  must  set  in  time  in  a  certain  definite  position 
— a  position  such  that,  in  relation  to  what  precedes, 

*  The  reader's  attention  ought  to  be  particularly  awake  to  this  para- 
graph. We  have  here  Kant's  admission  that  we  can  know  only  ideas 
within  or  states  of  our  own,  and  that,  consequently,  his  peculiar  problem 
is,  How  does  that  which  is  manifestly  subjective  merely  become  objec- 
tive ]  Kant's  answer  is  his  whole  system  ;  and  that,  also,  is  his  answer 
to  Hume. 


306 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


it  cannot  be  different.  When  I  observe,  therefore, 
that  something  happens,  then  there  is  implied  in  this, 
that,  in  the  first  instance,  something  precedes ;  for  it 
is  just  in  reference  to  such  something  that  what  is 
observed  to  happen  gets  its  own  relative  place  in  time 
— gets  to  exist,  namely,  after  a  time  in  which  it  was 
not.  But  its  definite  time-place  in  this  relation  it  can 
only  get  in  this  way,  that,  in  the  preceding  state, 
there  is  presupposed  something  on  which  it  always, 
and  in  obedience  to  a  rule,  ensues.  From  this  it 
results,  firstly,  that  I  cannot  invert  the  terms  of  the 
series — set  what  happens  before  that  on  which  it  en- 
sues; and,  secondly,  that,  the  state  which  precedes 
once  for  all  being,  the  particular  event  necessarily 
and  inevitably  ensues.  In  this  way  it  is  that  there  is 
an  order  in  our  states,  such  that  in  it  what  state  is 
present  (so  far  as  it  is  a  become  state)  points  to  some 
preceding  state  as  its  correlate,  possibly  indeterminate 
as  yet,  at  the  same  time  that  this  correlate  refers  itself 
determinatingly  to  the  other  as  its  consequent,  and 
thus  necessarily  connects  it  with  its  own  self  in  the 
time-sequence. 

As,  now,  it  is  a  necessary  law  of  our  sensibility, 
and,  consequently,  a  formal  condition  of  all  our  per- 
ceptions, that  preceding  time  necessarily  determines 
following  time  (I  can  get  to  the  latter  only  through 
the  former)  ;  so  it  is  an  indispensable  law  of  empirical 
perception  in  time,  that  the  occurrences  of  the  past 
determine  those  of  the  future,  and  that  these  latter 
take  place  only  so  far  as  they  are  determined  by  the 
former,  2>.,  follow  them  according  to  a  rule.  For  it 
is  only  by  occasion  of  the  things  in  time  that  we  are  able 
empirically  to  recognise  this  continuity  in  the  connexion  of 
times  themselves} 

1  In  the  above  paragraph  Rosenkranz  has  a  "jenes  "  which  ought  to  be 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


307 


For  all  experience  and  its  very  possibility,  under- 
standing is  necessary,  and  its  first  respective  action  is, 
not  to  make  the  perception  of  an  object  clear^  but 
simply  possible.  It  effects  this  in  this  way,  that  it 
assigns  the  time-order  to  things  and  their  existence, 
even  in  assigning  to  each  of  them,  as  a  consequent, 
an  a  priori  determinate  place  in  time  (it  must  follow) 
in  regard  of  what  (relatively)  precedes.  Without 
such  determinate  place,  it  (the  effect)  would  not  co- 
incide with  time  itself,  which  imposes  on  all  its  parts 
their  places  a  ijriorL  This  determination  of  place, 
now,  cannot  be  derived  from  the  relation  of  things 
to  absolute  time  (for  absolute  time  is  not  an  object  of 
perception  at  all) ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  things  them- 
selves must  mutually  assign  one  another  their  time- 
places;  they  must  make  the  place  of  each  in  the 
time-order  necessary,  in  this  way,  namely,  that  what 
happens  must,  in  obedience  to  a  universal  rule,  fol- 
low its  preceding  state.  In  this  way  there  comes  to 
be  a  consequence  in  things,  which,  by  means  of  un- 
derstanding, effects  and  makes  necessary  precisely  the 
same  order  and  continuity  of  connexion  in  our  pos- 
sible perceptions  as  exist  a  jmori  in  the  form  of  in- 
ternal perception  (time),  in  which  all  our  perceptions 
must  have  their  places/ 

a  jedes.  I  may  remark,  also,  that  nothing  in  the  paragraph  really  coun- 
tenances the  idea  that  the  element  of  time,  though  all  must  obey  its 
succession,  contributes  anything  whatever  to  the  virtue  of  causality. 

*  This  paragraph  is  a  very  unsatisfactory  one  in  more  ways  than  one. 
Grammatically,  for  example,  it  is  a  very  glaring  instance  of  Kant's 
laissez  aller  in  composition.  There  is  a  "dieselbe"  which  must  refer 
very  awkwardly  back  for  any  antecedent.  Then  there  is  "  Reihe  of  per- 
ceptions "  which  determines  order,  etc.,  in  a  "  Reihe  "  as  something  else 
of  a  "  Reihe."  As  regards  sense,  though  time  is  declared  to  be  not  an 
absolute  object  determinative  of  things,  and  these  must  determine  each 
other ;  still  causality  is  spoken  of  as  reducing  things  into  some  coinci- 
dence with  time  itself.     This  may  mislead  us  to  mix  up  time  itself  in 


308 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


That  something  happens,  therefore,  is  a  perception 
belonging  to  a  possible  experience,  which  experience 
becomes  actual  when  what  happens  is  regarded  as 
determinately  placed  in  time,  and,  consequently,  as 
an  object  which  can  always  be  found  in  the  context 
of  perceptions  as  in  accordance  with  a  rule.  This 
rule,  now,  determinative  of  something  consequentially 
in  time,  is,  that,  in  what  precedes  the  condition  is  to 
be  found,  by  virtue  of  which  the  effect  always  {i.e., 
necessarily)  follows.  And  so  the  proposition  of  a 
suflScient  reason  is  the  ground  of  possible  experience, 
namely,  of  the  objective  recognition  of  events  as 
regards  their  relation,  consequentially,  in  the  series  of 
time. 

The  proof  of  this  proposition  depends  wholly  on 
the  following  moments.  There  is  required  for  all 
empirical  recognition,  the  synthesis  of  the  complex 
through  imagination,  and  that  synthesis  is  always 
successive:  the  impressions  in  imagination  follow, 
that  is,  the  one  the  other.  Imagination,  however, 
does  not  at  all  determine  the  order  (what  must  pre- 
cede and  what  mmt  follow).  So  far,  then,  the  series 
of  units  in  the  successive  impressions  may  be  taken 
quite  as  well  backwards  as  forwards.  But  if  this 
synthesis  is  a  synthesis  of  the  apprehension  of  the 
complex  of  a  given  event,  then  the  order  is  objectively 
determined,  or  there  is  an  order  in  the  succession 
determinative  of  an  object,  according  to  which  order 
something  must  necessarily  precede,  and,  it  being, 
something  else  must  necessarily  follow.  If,  then,  my 
perception  is  to  contain  the  cognition  of  an  event,  of 

the  very  virtue  of  causality.  Kant,  however,  does  not  mean  that ;  but  only 
that  what  is  causally  in  time  is  peculiarly  in  time.  Reciprocities  are  as 
much  in  time  as,  so  to  speak,  causalities  ;  and  Kant  does  not  require  to 
be  told  that. 


THE    KRITIK   OF  PURE   REASON. 


309 


something,  namely,  that  actually  happens,  then  this 
perception  must  be  an  empirical  judgment  in  which 
it  is  thought  that  the  sequence  is  determined,  ie.^ 
that  it  presupposes  something  else  in  time  on  which 
it  ensues  necessarily  or  according  to  a  rule.  For 
were  it  not  so,  and  if  I  assumed  the  antecedent,  and 
the  consequent  did  not  of  necessity  follow,  I  should 
be  forced  to  regard  it  as  only  a  subjective  sport  of  my 
imagination,  and  did  I  conceive  something  objective 
under  it,  I  should  be  obliged  to  name  it  a  mere 
dream.  Wherefore  the  relation  of  impressions  (as 
possible  perceptions),  according  to  which  relation  the 
consequent  (what  happens)  is,  through  some  ante- 
cedent, determined  in  its  existence  in  time,  necessarily 
and  according  to  a  rule — this  relation  (that  of  cause 
and  effect)  is  the  condition  of  the  objective  validity 
of  our  empirical  judgments,  in  regard  of  the  series  of 
perceptions ;  and  the  condition,  consequently,  of  the 
empirical  truth  of  these,  and  therefore  of  experience. 
The  principle  of  the  causal  relation  in  the  succession 
of  things,  therefore,  is  valid  for  all  objects  of  expe- 
rience (being  under  conditions  of  succession),  for  this 
reason,  that  it  itself  is  the  ground  of  the  very  possi- 
bility of  such  an  experience. 

There  comes  in  here  a  doubt,  however,  which  must 
be  removed.  The  proposition  of  a  causal  connexion 
amongst  objects  is,  as  now  put,  limited  to  successions 
of  them,  whereas  we  find  that,  in  the  actual  use  of  it, 
it  applies  to  consociations  of  things,  and  that  the 
cause  and  the  effect  may  both  be  together  and  at  one 
and  the  same  time.  There  is  a  warmth  in  this  room, 
for  example,  which  is  not  in  the  air  without.  I  look 
round  for  the  cause,  and  I  perceive  a  heated  fire-stove. 
Now  this  object  as  cause  is  at  one  and  the  same  time 
with  the  warmth  as  effect.     There  is  here,  therefore, 


310 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


as  between  cause  and  effect  and  in  point  of  time,  no 
relation  of  consecution  in  a  serial  form ;  the  cause  and 
the  effect,  namely,  are  here  together  and  at  once ;  and 
yet  the  rule  holds  good.  Most  natural  causes,  indeed, 
are  at  the  same  time  as  their  effects,  and  any  sequence 
on  the  part  of  the  latter  is  only  due  to  this,  that  the 
cause  does  not  always  realize  the  entire  effect  in  a 
single  moment.  But  the  instant  an  effect  is,  it  at 
once  is  with  the  causality  of  its  cause,  for  if  the  cause 
had  but  a  moment  previously  ceased  to  be,  the  effect 
never  would  have  been  at  all.  What  is  specially  to 
be  attended  to  here  is,  that  the  question  is  of  the 
order  of  time,  and  not  of  its  lapse:  the  relation 
remains,  let  there  have  been  no  lapse  on  the  part  of 
time  at  all.  Time,  as  between  the  cause  and  its  effect, 
may  vanish,  or  these  may  simultaneously  be;  still 
the  relation  of  the  one  to  the  other  is  determinable 
by  a  reference  to  time.  The  cannon-ball  that  lies  on 
a  cushion  is,  as  cause,  at  once  with  the  dint  as  its 
effect.  Nevertheless  I  distinguish  between  them  by 
means  of  the  time-relation  that,  dynamically,  connects 
them.  For  the  cushion  being  smooth,  I  lay  the 
bullet  on  it,  and  the  dint  follows.  But  if  we  invert 
the  facts,  and  suppose  the  latter  first,  it  is  certain  that 
a  lead-bullet  does  not  ensue  on  a  dint  in  a  cushion. 

Accordingly,  subsequence  in  time  is  certainly  the 
only  empirical  criterion  of  the  effect  in  relation  to 
its  cause,  which,  again,  precedes.  The  glass  is  the 
cause  of  the  water  rising  higher  than  the  level  of  it, 
though  both  facts  simultaneously  co-exist.  For  sup- 
pose from  a  larger  vessel  I  take  water  with  the  glass, 
a  result  ensues.  There  is  a  change  of  level,  namely. 
The  water,  which  in  the  larger  vessel  was  level,  has 
now  risen  above  that  level  at  the  sides  of  the  glass. 
That  is,  whereas  the  surface  of  the  water  was  (in  the 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


311 


larger  vessel)  previously  horizontal,  it  is  now  (in  the 
smaller)  concave  (and  this  is  due  to  the  glass). 

This  causality  leads  to  the  notion  of  an  act  or  action^ 
as  that  again  to  the  notion  of  force^  on  which  the 
notion  of  substance  follows.  As  I  do  not  wish  my 
critical  business  (which  is  occupied  solely  with  the 
sources  of  synthetic  cognition  a  priori)  to  be  com- 
plicated with  analyses  (which  concern,  again,  the 
mere  elucidation,  and  not  the  extension,  of  our 
notions),  I  leave  the  circumstantial  discussion  of  ana- 
lytical results  for  a  future  sy stein  of  pure  reason.  Not 
but  what  such  analysis  is  already  abundantly  to  be 
found  in  all  the  current  relative  text-books.  Never- 
theless, the  empirical  criterion  of  a  substance,  so  far 
as  it  appears  to  manifest  itself,  not  by  the  quality  of 
permanency  in  objects,  but  better  and  more  simply 
by  that  of  action,  I  cannot  help  referring  to  now. 

Where  action  is,  and  consequently  efficiency  and 
force,  there  also  must  be  substance ;  and  in  it  alone 
can  we  expect  to  find  these  conspicuous  sources  of  phe- 
nomena. That  sounds  well;  but  when  we  want  to 
explain  what  we  understand  by  substance,  and  would 
at  the  same  time  avoid  a  vicious  circle,  we  do  not 
find  it  just  so  easy  to  do  so.  How  is  it  that,  from  the 
action,  we  immediately  infer  the  permanency,  of  the 
agent,  this  which  is  a  property  so  essential  and  pecu- 
liar to  substance  {substantia  phcenomenon)  ?  But,  after 
the  preceding,  there  is  no  such  great  difficulty  in 
answering  the  question,  quite  insoluble  as  it  may 
appear  in  the  ordinary  proceeding  by  the  analysis  of 
notions.  Action  already  signifies  the  relation  of  the 
subject  of  causality  to  the  effect  of  it.  Inasmuch, 
now,  as  every  effect  consists  in  what  takes  place,  and 
consequently  in  what  is  changeable,  as  represented  in 
time  by  the  fact  of  succession,  the  ultimate  subject  of 


312 


TEXT-BOOK  TO    KANT: 


this  change  is,  as  substratum  of  all  that  changes,  the 
element  of  permanency,  «>.,  substance.  For,  on  the 
principle  of  causality,  actions  are  always  the  first 
ground  of  any  change  in  objects :  these  actions,  there- 
fore, cannot  lie  in  a  subject  that  does  itself  change, 
because  then  there  were  required  other  actions  and 
another  subject  as  determinants  of  the  cha^^o-e  in  it. 
From  this  it  follows  that  action,  as  a  competent  em- 
pirical criterion,  proves  substantiality,  without  my 
requiring  first  of  all  to  discover,  through  a  comparison 
of  perceptions,  permanency  in  this  criterion.  Such 
discovery  could  not,  in  such  manner,  be  effected, 
indeed,  with  that  completeness  which  is  required  for 
the  full  and  rigorous  universality  of  the  notion.  For 
that  the  first  subject  of  causality  in  all  that  comes  or 
goes  cannot  itself  (in  the  field  of  perceptions  of  sense) 
come  and  go,  is  a  sure  and  certain  conclusion  point- 
ing to  empirical  necessity  and  permanency  in  exist- 
ence, and  consequently  to  the  notion  of  substance  as 
phenomenal  fact. 

When  something  happens,  the  mere  happening^ 
without  reference  to  ivhat  happens,  is  even  in  itself 
an  object  of  consideration.  The  transition  from  the 
non-being  of  a  state  to  this  state  itself,  even  sup- 
posing this  state  to  be  considered  apart  from  any 
sensible  quality,  is  alone  a  necessity  to  be  inquired 
into.  A  coming  to  be  or  into  existence  of  this  nature 
does  not  (as  already  shown  under  section  A)  affect 
substance  (for  substance  is  not  an  affair  of  coming  to 
be),  but  only  its  state.  It  is  merely  change,  then, 
and  not  an  origination  out  of  nothing.  When  such 
origination  is  regarded  as  the  effect  of  some  different 
cause,  it  is  called  creation,  which  as  a  phenomenal 
fact  is  not  possibly  to  be  admitted,  inasmuch  as  its 
very  possibility  would   alone  destroy  the   unity  of 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


313 


experience.  At  the  same  time,  all  things,  if  I  regard 
them  not  as  phenomena,  but  as  things  in  themselves 
and  as  objects  of  understanding  simply,  are,  notwith- 
standing that  they  are  substances,  capable  of  being 
considered  dependent  for  their  existence  on  some 
cause  different  from  themselves;  but  this,  again, 
would  imoly  quite  another  use  of  words,  and  be 
inapplicable  in  regard  of  our  things  of  sense  as  pos- 
sible objects  of  experience. 

How,  now,  there  can  be  an  alteration,  simply  as 
such ;  how  there  is  the  mere  possibility  that,  on  one 
state  in  one  point  of  time,  there  can  follow  an  oppo- 
site state  in  another — of  that,  a  priori^  we  have  not 
the  least  idea.  There  is  required  then  a  knowledge 
of  actual  forces  which  can  only  empirically  be  given ; 
as,  e.g.^  of  motive  forces,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing, 
certain  successive  manifestations  (say  movements) 
which  indicate  such  forces.  But  the  form  in  every 
change — the  condition  under  which  alone  it  can  take 
place  in  regard  of  a  previous  state  (the  subject  of  the 
change,  or  the  particular  state  that  is  changed,  being 
what  it  may) — consequently  the  succession  of  the 
states  themselves  (the  bare  process)  is  still  capable 
of  an  a  priori  consideration  in  connexion  with  the 
law  of  causality  and  the  conditions  of  time.^ 

When  a  substance  passes  from  a  state  a  into  another 
state  6,  the  time-point  of  the  latter  is  distinguished 
from  the  time-point  of  the  former,  and  follows  it. 
The  second  state,  again,  is,  as  reality  (in  perception), 
distinguished  from  the  first,  as  h  is  from  zero.  That 
is,  were  the  difference  of  h  from  a  only  one  of  mag- 

'  It  must  be  carefully  observed  here  that  I  do  not  speak  of  the  change 
of  certain  relations,  but  of  that  of  a  state.  A  body  in  uniform  motion, 
for  example,  does  not  at  all  alter  its  state  (of  motion)  ;  but  let  the  motion 
increase  or  decrease,  and  it  certainly  does  alter  its  state. — K. 


314 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


nitude,  the  change  were  still  a  production  of  6— a,  a 
result  which  previously  was  not,  and  in  regard  of 
which  the  previous  state  a  is  really  =0. 

The  question  is,  then.  How  does  a  thing  pass  from 
a  state  =  a  into  another  =  b?  Between  two  moments 
of  time  there  is  always  a  time,  and  between  two  states 
in  these  moments  there  is  always  a  diiference,  which 
difference  has  a  certain  magnitude  (for  all  the  parts 
of  objects  are  always  quantitative).  Every  transition 
from  one  state  to  another,  therefore,  takes  place  in  a 
time  which  lies  between  two  moments,  the  first  of 
which  is  determinative  of  the  state /r(???i  which  a  thing 
passes,  and  the  second  of  the  state  into  which  it  passes. 
Both,  then,  are  limits  of  the  time  of  a  change,  and 
consequently  of  the  interval  between  the  two  states. 
Both,  as  such,  form  part,  then,  of  the  entire  change. 
Now,  every  change  has  a  cause  which,  during  the 
whole  time  of  the  change,  realizes  its  causality.  This 
cause,  then,  brings  its  change  forward  not  suddenly 
(at  once,  or  in  a  moment),  but  in  such  manner  in  a 
certain  time  that,  as  the  time  increases  from  its  be- 
ginning in  a  to  its  completion  in  6,  so  there  is  also 
generated,  through  all  the  smaller  degrees  between 
the  first  and  the  last,  the  magnitude  of  reality  (6— a). 
All  change,  consequently,  is  only  possible  through  a 
continuous  operation  of  causality,  in  which,  so  far  as 
it  is  uniform,  each  step  is  called  a  moment.  The 
change  does  not  consist  of  these  moments,  but  is 
generated  by  them  as  the  effect  of  them. 

That,  now,  is  the  law  of  continuity  in  all  change, 
and  it  founds  on  this,  that  neither  time,  nor  any  per- 
ception in  time,  consists  of  parts  which  are  the 
smallest  possible,  and  yet  that,  in  the  case  of  a 
change,  the  state  of  a  thing  passes  through  all  these 
parts,  as  elements,  into  its  second  state.    No  difference 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


315 


i 


of  the  reale  in  perception,  as  no  difference  in  the 
magnitude  of  times,  is  the  smallest  possible ;  and  the 
new  state  of  reality  increases  from  the  first  step  (in 
which  this  reality  was  as  yet  not),  through  all  the 
infinite  degrees  of  it  (the  reality),  between  which 
deirrees  the  differences  of  the  one  from  the  other  are 
smaller  than  the  difference  between  0  and  a. 

What  advantage  this  may  have  for  the  investiga- 
tion of  nature,  does  not  concern  us  here.  But  how 
such  a  proposition,  which  appears  to  enlarge  so  much 
our  knowledge  of  nature,  should  be  completely  a 
priori  possible,  that  very  expressly  demands  considera- 
tion on  our  part,  however  much  the  very  first  sight 
of  it  may  seem  to  prove  that  it  is  true  in  fact,  and 
however  much  we  may  seem  entitled  to  believe  the 
question  of  its  possibility  superfluous.  For  there  are 
so  many  unfounded  pretensions  to  an  enlargement  of 
our  knowledge  by  means  of  simple  reason  alone,  that 
we  must  take  it  to  us  as  a  general  principle  to  mis- 
trust such,  and,  in  the  absence  of  documents  thoroughly 
justificative,  to  believe  and  accept  nothing  of  the  kind, 
even  on  the  very  clearest  dogmatic  proof. 

All  increase  of  empirical  cognition,  as  every  ad- 
vance in  perception,  is  nothing  but  an  enlargement 
of  the  determination  of  inner  sense,  i.e.^  a  progression 
in  time,  let  the  objects  be  as  they  may,  perceptions 
pure  or  perceptions  sensible.  This  progression  in  time 
determines  everything,  but  is  itself  no  further  deter- 
mined by  anything,  i.e,^  the  constituent  parts  of  it 
are  only  given  in  time  and  through  the  synthesis  of 
time,  but  their  synthesis  is  not  before  time.  Hence 
every  transition  in  perception  to  something  that 
follows  in  time  is  a  determination  of  time  through 
production  of  this  perception  and,  as  time  is  always 
and  in  all  its  parts  a  magnitude,  through  production 


316 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


of  a  perception  as  a  magnitude  throughout  all  its  in- 
finitesimal degrees  from  zero  up  to  the  degree  actual. 
In  this  way  we  have  the  possibility  of  a  priori  cog- 
nising a  law  of  changes,  so  far  as  concerns  their  form. 
We  anticipate  only  our  own  apprehension,  the  formal 
condition  of  which,  inasmuch  as  it  exists  in  us  before 
entrance  of  any  object,  must  certainly  be  capable  of 
becoming  a  priori  known. 

Time,  then,  is  the  a  priori  sense-condition  of  the 
possibility  of  a  continuous  progression  from  what  is 
to  what  follows.  And,  in  the  same  way,  understand- 
ing also,  by  virtue  of  the  unity  of  apperception,  is  the 
condition  a  priori  of  the  possibility  of  a  continuous  de- 
termination of  all  positions  for  objects  in  time,  through 
the  series  of  causes  and  effects,  where  the  earlier  infal- 
libly involve  the  later,  and  thereby  render  the  empirical 
cognition  of  the  relatkas  in  time  universally  and  objec- 
tively valid. 

C,  Third  Analogy. 

Primary  Proposition  of  Simultaneity  in  accordance  with  tlie  Law  of 

Reciprocity  or  Community. 

All  substances,  so  far  as  they  may  simultaneously 
be  perceived  in  space,  are  in  thoroughgoing  recipro- 
city. 

Proof, 

Things  are  simultaneous  when,  in  empirical  fact, 
the  perception  of  the  one  can  follow  on  the  perception 
of  the  other,  and  vice  versa  (which,  as  has  been  just 
shown  under  our  second  primary  proposition,  cannot 
possibly  take  place  in  the  case  of  the  time-consecution 
of  perceptions).^     Thus,  I  may  first  look  at  the  moon 

»  Any  reader  who  fancies  that  he  has  just  seen  all  things  bound  to- 
gether into  an  iron  unity  by  causality  alone,  must  be  startled  to  be  re- 


THE   KRITIK   OF  PUKE   REASON. 


317 


and  then  at  the  earth,  or,  contrariwise,  first  at  the 
earth  and  then  at  the  moon,  and  just  because  the  per- 
ceptions of  these  objects  may  reciprocally  follow  each 
other,  do  I  say  that  they  exist  simultaneously.  Simul- 
taneity, now,  is  the  existence  of  the  whole  of  a  com- 
plex at  one  and  the  same  time.  But  it  is  not  possible 
to  perceive  time  itself,  in  order  to  infer  from  the  fact 
of  things  being  in  the  same  time,  that  the  perceptions 
of  these  may  reciprocally  follow  one  another.  The 
synthesis  of  imagination  in  apprehension  would  bring 
forward,  therefore,  each  of  the  perceptions  as  only 
of  such  a  nature  that  it  is  present  in  the  subject  when 
the  other  is  absent,  and  so  contrariwise ;  but  not  that 
the  objects  are  simultaneous — not  so,  that  is,  that 
when  the  one  is  the  other  also  is,  and  that  such  is 
necessarily  the  case  in  order  that  the  perceptions 
should  be  able  reciprocally  to  follow  each  other. 
There  is  consequently  required  a  notion  of  under- 
standing for  the  reciprocal  series  of  the  determina- 
tions of  things  existent  there,  apart  from  each  other, 
and  yet  simultaneously,  in  order  to  say  that  the  reci- 
procal succession  of  the  perceptions  is  one  that  takes 
place  in  the  object,  and  thereby  demonstrate  the 
simultaneity  as  objective.  But  now  that  relation  of 
substances,  in  which  the  one  is  the  subject  of  deter- 
minations that  have  their  ground  in  the  other,  is  the 
relation  of  influence — a  relation  that,  where  this  deter- 
mines that  and  that  this,  is  known  as  the  relation  of 
community  or  reciprocity.  The  simultaneity  of  sub- 
minded  here,  that  all  objects  or  perceptions,  sensible  or  pure,  are  to  Kant, 
as  each  is  a  Mannigfaltiges,  each  also  a  succession  in  time,  yet  that  this 
succession  is  not  always  irreversible  or  causal,  but  may,  as  is  emphatically 
declared  by  Kant  himself  also,  be  reversible  and  reciprocal,  etc.  Ob- 
viously, then,  Kant  has  had  in  view  heretofore  the  necessity  of  the  causal 
relation  only,  and  only  in  regard  of  its  own  appropriate  empirical  ante- 
cedents. 


318 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


319 


stances  in  space,  therefore,  is  not  capable  of  being 
Otherwise  cognised  in  experience  than  under  presup- 
position of  their  reciprocal  influence  the  one  on  the 
other,  and,  consequently,  just  such  reciprocal  influence 
is  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  things  themselves 
as  objects  of  experience. 

Things  are  simultaneous  so  far  as  they  exist  at  one 
and  the  same  time.  By  what  do  we  know,  however, 
that  they  are  in  one  and  the  same  time?  AVhen,  in 
the  synthesis  of  apprehension,  the  order  of  such  com- 
plex is  indifferent — when  it  may  proceed,  that  is,  from 
A,  through  B,  C,  D,  to  E,  or,  reverse-wise,  from  E, 
through  D,  C,  B,  to  A.  For  were  this  order  an  order 
of  simple  consecution  in  time  that,  beginning  in  A, 
concludes  in  E,  it  would  be  impossible  to  begin  ih^ 
apprehension  of  perceptions  from  E  and  go  back  again 
to  A,  because  in  that  case  A  would  be  an  affair  of 
past  time,  and  not,  consequently,  any  longer  an  object 
of  possible  apprehension. 

Let  us  suppose  now,  that,  in  a  complex  of  substances 
as  units  of  sense,  each  were  absolutely  isolated,  and 
not  one  among  them  the  subject  of  action  and  reaction 
in  regard  of  the  others,  then  I  say  that  the  simul- 
taneity of  these  would  be  no  object  of  a  possible  per- 
ception, and  that  the  existence  of  the  one  could  not  by 
any  path  of  empirical  synthesis  conduct  to  the  ex- 
istence of  the  other.  For,  when  it  is  considered  that 
they  would,  in  effect,  be  subjects  of  a  separation 
absolute,  it  will  be  understood  also  that  perception, 
still  conceived  capable  of  passing  from  the  one  to  the 
other  in  time,  would  successively,  indeed,  determine 
the  existence  of  each,  but  be  wholly  unable  to  dis- 
tinguish whether  the  one  were  objectively  after  the 
other  or  objectively  ahng  with  it. 
There  must,  therefore,  be  something  besides  mere 


existence  that  enables  A  to  determine  for  B  its  place 
in  time,  and  as  well,  at  the  same  time,  B  so  to  deter- 
mine A ;  for  only  under  such  a  condition  is  it  pos- 
sible to  conceive  of  substances  as  empirically  co-ex- 
istent.    Now,  only  that  determines  for  something  else 
its  place  in  time  which  for  this  latter  is  cause,  or  cause 
of  its  modes.     Every  substance,  therefore,  must  (as  it 
is  a  consequent  only  on  account  of  what  is  determined 
in  it)  be  the  subject  at  once  of  the  causality  of  certain 
determinations  in  the  other,  and  of  the  effects  of  that 
other's  causality  in  determination  of  its  own  self,  i,e. 
they  must  (directly  or  indirectly)  stand  in  dynamical 
unity,  if  ever  the  fact  of  their  co-existence  is  to  be 
possibly  perceived  in  experience.     Now,  in  regard  of 
the  objects  of  experience,  every  condition  is  necessary 
without  which  experience  of  these  objects  themselves 
would  be  impossible.     It  is  necessary,  then,  for  all 
substances  in  perception,  so  far  as  they  are  simul- 
taneous, to  stand,  one  with  the  other,  in  a  thorough- 
going community  of  reciprocity. 

The  word  community  is,  in  our  language,  ambigu- 
ous, and  may  mean  as  well  commercium  as  communio. 
We  use  it  here  in  the  former  sense  as  importing  a 
dynamical  community  without  which  even  the  local 
one  (the  communio  spatii)  would  never  be  capable  of 
being  empirically  perceived.     It  is  easy  to  observe 
from  our  own  experience  that  only  the  continuous 
influences  in  all  parts  of  space  can  lead  our  perception 
from  one  object  to  another.     The  light,  for  example, 
that  plays  between  our  eye  and  the  bodies  in  space 
effects  a  mediate  community  between  us  and  them, 
and  demonstrates  thereby  the  simultaneity  of  these! 
Nor,  again,  can  we  empirically  change  our  position, 
or   rather  perceive   such   change,  without  universal 
matter  rendering  it  possible  for  us  to  become  aware 


I'» 


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TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


of  our  new  position,  at  the  same  time  that,  only  by 
means  of  the  reciprocal  influence  of  its  elements,  it  is, 
that  this  matter  is  able  to  demonstrate  the  simultan- 
eity of  these,  and  thereby  the  co-existence  of  even  the 
remotest  of  them.  Without  community  every  one 
perception  (of  the  phenomena  in  space)  would  be 
sundered  from  the  other,  and  the  chain  of  empirical 
cognitions,  ie,j  experience,  would,  in  the  case  of  every 
new  object,  have  to  begin  quite  afresh,  without  pos- 
sibility of  any  previous  one  being  in  the  least  con- 
nected with  it  or  standing  along  with  it  in  the  rela- 
tion of  time.  I  do  not  mean  by  this  to  deny  the  fact 
of  a  vacuum  in  space ;  for  that  may  exist  where  no 
perceptions  reach,  and  where,  consequently,  no  em- 
pirical observation  of  simultaneity  takes  place.  In 
such  circumstances,  however,  it  is  no  object  whatever 
for  any  possible  experience  of  ours. 

In  illustration  the  following  may  serve.  All  per- 
ceptions must,  as  belonging  to  a  possible  experience, 
stand  in  our  mind  in  the  community  of  apperception. 
So  far,  also,  as  the  objects  are  to  be  perceived  con- 
joined in  a  simultaneity  of  existence,  they  must 
mutually  determine  their  places  in  one  and  the  same 
time,  and  thereby  constitute  a  whole.  If  this  sub- 
jective community,  now,  is  to  rest  on  an  objective 
ground,  or  be  referred  to  objects  as  substances,  the 
perception  of  these  must,  as  ground,  make  the  per- 
ception of  those  possible,  and  so  vice  versa,  in  order 
that  consecution,  which  is  a  necessary  character  of 
perceptions  as  apprehensions,  may  not  be  ascribed  to 
the  objects,  but  that  these,  on  the  contrary,  may  be 
perceived  together  and  at  once.  This  implies,  how- 
ever, a  reciprocal  influence,  i.e.,  a  real  commercium  of 
substances,  without  which  the  empirical  relation  of 
simultaneous  existence  would  be  impossible  in  expe- 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


321 


rience.  Through  this  commercium,  objects,  so  far  as 
they  stand  in  externality  the  one  to  the  other,  and 
yet  in  connexion,  constitute  a  compositum  reale,  and 
sucli  composita  are  possible  in  many  ways.  The 
three  dynamical  relations,  therefore,  from  which  all 
the  rest  follow,  are  that  of  Inherence,  that  of  Conse- 
quence, and  that  of  Composition. 

#  •  «  «  • 

These,  then,  are  the  three  analogies  of  experience. 
They  are  nothing  but  principles  determinative  in 
regard  to  the  existence  of  objects  in  time,  of  which 
they  follow  the  three  modi :  the  relation  to  time  itself 
as  a  magnitude  (the  magnitude  of  existence,  i.e.,  dura- 
tion) ;  the  relation  in  time  as  a  consecution ;  and 
lastly,  the  relation  of  time  as  a  sum  of  all  existence  at 
once.  This  unity  of  time-determination  is  altogether 
dynamical,  i.e.,  time  is  not  regarded  as  something  in 
which  experience  directly  determines  for  each  exist- 
ence its  own  place,  which  is  impossible,  inasmuch  as 
absolute  time  is  not  an  object  of  the  perception  of 
sense,  whereby  things  might,  as  it  were,  be  kept 
together;  but  the  rule  of  understanding,  by  which 
alone  it  is  possible  for  the  existence  of  objects  to  get 
synthetic  unity  in  accordance  with  the  relations  of  time, 
determines  for  each  of  these  objects  its  relative  place 
in  time,  and  that,  too,  a  pmori  and  as  valid  always. 

By  Nature  (in  an  empirical  sense)  we  understand 
the  context  of  existent  objects  as  submitted  to  neces- 
sary rules  or  laws.  There  are,  therefore,  certain  laws, 
a  priori,  which  alone  render  a  nature  possible.  Em- 
pirical laws  can  only  be  found  (or  exist)  by  means 
of  experience,  and  that,  too,  as  submitted  to  said 
primary  laws  which  alone  render  it  possible.  Our 
analogies,  therefore,  exhibit,  properly,  the  unity  of 
nature  in  the  connexion  of  all  things  under  certain 

X 


MM 


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TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


exponents,  which  exponents  express  nothing  else  than 
the  relation  of  time  (so  far  as  it  is  sum  of  all  exist- 
ence) to  the  unity  of  apperception,  which  unity  can 
exist  only  in  a  synthesis  on  rules.  They  collectively 
say,  then.  All  things  are,  and  must  be,  in  a  one 
nature,  for  without  such  a  priori  unity  there  would 
be  no  unity  of  experience,  and  consequently  no  de- 
termination of  objects  in  experience. 

As  regards  the  mode  of  proof,  however,  of  which 
we  have  availed  ourselves  in  the  case  of  these  tran- 
scendental laws  of  nature,  and  with  reference  to  its 
peculiarity,  there  is  one  observation  to  be  made  which, 
as  a  prescript  for  every  other  attempt  to  prove  intel- 
lectual and  synthetic  a  priori  propositions,  will  have 
its  own  importance.  Had  we  attempted  to  prove 
these  analogies  dogmatically  or  from  notions, — namely, 
that  all  that  exists  depends  only  on  what  is  per- 
manent; that  every  event  presupposes  something 
previous  from  which  it  follows  according  to  a  rule ; 
that  in  things  which  are  simultaneous,  their  states 
co-exist  in  mutual  co-reference  according  to  a  rule, — 
then  every  effort  would  have  been  all  in  vain.  For 
it  is  not  possible  for  us  to  get  from  one  object,  and 
its  existence,  to  the  existence,  or  the  mode  to  exist, 
of  another  object,  merely  by  the  aid  of  ideas  of  these 
things,  let  us  analyze  them  in  what  manner  we  may. 
What,  then,  was  left  us?  The  possibility  of  expe- 
rience, if  to  be  a  cognition,  in  which  all  objects  at 
last  must  be  capable  of  being  given  us,  so  far  as  their 
perception  is  to  have  for  us  objective  validity.  In 
this  teriium  quid,  now  (the  essential  form  of  which 
consists  in  the  synthetic  unity  of  all  apperception  of 
the  matter  of  apprehension),  we  found  a  j^'^iori  con- 
ditions of  the  universal  and  necessary  time-determina- 
tion of  all  existence  as  in  said  matter  of  apprehension. 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


323 


without  which  conditions  even  empirical  time-deter- 
mination would  be  impossible.  Rules  also  we  found  of 
synthetic  unity  a  priori,  by  means  of  which  we  were 
able  to  anticipate  experience.  In  absence  of  this 
method,  and  in  the  craze  dogmatically  to  try  to  prove 
synthetic  propositions  which  an  empirical  exercise  of 
understanding  recommends  as  its  principles,  it  has 
happened  that  there  has  been  so  often  and  so  vainly 
sought  a  proof  of  the  proposition  of  sufficient  reason. 
Of  the  other  two  analogies,  it  has  occurred  to  nobody 
to  think ;  although,  for  all  that,  there  was  no  want 
of  their  silent  adoption.  The  reason  of  this  lay  in  the 
want  of  the  clew  of  the  categories,  which  clew  is  alone 
able  to  discover  and  demonstrate  every  blank  of  the 
understanding  as  well  for  notions  as  judgments.^ 


4.  The  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought  in  General. 

1.  That  is  possible,  which  coincides  with  the  fornial 
conditions  of  experience  (in  pure  perception  and 
categories). 

2.  That  is  actual,  which  is  in  the  context  of  the 
matenal  conditions  of  experience  (sensation). 

3.  That  is  necessary,  or  necessarily  exists,  the  con- 
nexion of  which  with  actuality  is  determined  in 
accordance  with  the  universal  conditions  of  expe- 
rience. 

1  The  unity  of  the  universe  which  comprehends  all  things  is  evidently 
a  mere  inference  from  the  silently  assumed  proposition  of  the  community 
of  all  substances  which  are  simultaneous.  For  were  these  isolated,  they 
would  not  constitute  parts  of  a  whole ;  and  if  their  connexion  (reci- 
procity in  the  complex)  were  not  already  necessary  for  the  sake  of  co- 
existence, we  should  be  unable  to  conclude  from  this  simultaneity  as  a 
mere  ideal  relation  to  their  reciprocal  connexion  as  a  reale.  In  its  place 
we  have  proved  that  community  is,  properly,  the  ground  of  the  possibility 
of  an  empirical  perception  of  co-existence,  and  that,  therefore,  we,  pro- 
perly, only  reason  back  from  the  latter  to  the  former  as  its  condition.— K. 


324 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


Exposition, 

The  categories  of  modality  have  this  peculiarity, 
that  they  do  not  in  the  least  increase  the  notion  to 
which  they  are  predicatively  annexed,  as  determina- 
tion of  the  object,  but  only  express  the  relation  to  the 
cognising  faculty.  The  notion  of  something,  namely, 
being  itself  quite  complete,  I  can  still  ask  whether  this 
something  is  merely  possible,  or  actual,  or  necessary  as 
well  as  actual  ?  But,  so,  there  is  not  any  further  de- 
termination thought  in  the  object  itself.  The  question, 
rather,  is  only  how  does  this  object  (with  all  its  deter- 
minations) relate  itself  (1)  to  understanding  and  the 
empirical  exercise  of  understanding,  (2)  to  empirical 
judgment^  and  (3)  to  reason  (as  applied  to  experience). 

The  primary  propositions  of  modality,  therefore, 
are  no  more  than  definitions  of  the  notions  of  jwssi- 
hility^  actuality^  and  necessity^  so  far  as  they  are  applied 
to  experience,  and  so  far,  consequently,  as  they  are 
at  the  same  time  restrictions  of  all  the  categories  to 
an  employment  and  application  only  empirical,  and 
never  transcendental.  For,  if  they  (the  categories) 
are  to  have  more  than  a  logical  import,  analytically 
expressive  of  the  form  of  thought — if  they  are  to 
concern  things  and  the  possibility,  actuality,  and 
necessity  of  things,  they  must  relate  to  possible  expe- 
rience and  its  synthetic  unity,  in  which  alone  there 
are  for  cognition  given  objects. 

The  postulate  of  the  possibility  of  things  demands, 
therefore,  that  the  notion  of  these  should  be  in  agree- 
ment with  the  formal  conditions  of  experience  as  such. 
But  experience  as  such,  or  the  objective  form  of 
experience  generally,  includes  all  synthesis  that  is 
required  for  the  perception  of  objects.  A  notion  is 
to  be  held  void  and  without  objective  reference,  if. 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE    REASON. 


325 


even  though  possessing  synthesis,  this  synthesis  does  not 
relate  to  experience,  either  as  borrowed  from  it  (and 
then  it  is  an  empirical  notion)^  or  such  that  on  it,  as  a 
priori  condition,  experience,  or  the  form  of  experience, 
rests  (and  then  it  is  o.  pure  notion — that  relates  to  expe- 
rience, all  the  same  ;  for  only  in  experience  is  there  an 
object  to  be  found  for  it).    For,  where  shall  we  find  the 
character  of  the  possibility  of  an  object  that  is  to  be 
thought  through  an  a  priori  synthetic  notion,  unless  in 
the  synthesis  which  constitutes  the  form  of  the  em- 
pirical perception  of  objects  ?     That  in  such  a  notion 
no  contradiction  should  be  thought,  is  indeed  a  neces- 
sary logical  condition,  but  not  enough  by  far  for  the 
objective  reality  of  the  notion,  Le.^  for  the  possibility 
of  such  an  object  as  is  thought  in  the  notion.     Thus, 
there  is  no  contradiction  in  the  notion  of  a  fisfure 
which  is  inclosed  by  two  straight  lines,  for  the  notion 
of  two  straight  lines  and  the  meeting  together  of  them 
involve  no  negation  of  a  figure.     The  impossibility 
does  not  depend  on  the  notion  in  itself,  but  on  the 
construction  of  it  in  space,  i.e.^  on  the  conditions  of 
space  and  the  determinations  of  space.     But  these, 
again,  have  their  own  objective  reality,  i.e.^  they  relate 
to  possible  things,  because  they  a  priori  imply  the 
form  of  experience. 

And  now  we  shall  show  the  extensive  use  and 
influence  of  this  postulate  of  possibility.  If  I  con- 
ceive something  that  is  permanent,  in  such  wise 
that  all  that  changes  belongs  merely  to  its  state,  it  is 
impossible  for  me,  from  such  notion  alone,  to  discover 
that  any  such  thing  is  also  possible.  Or,  let  me  con- 
ceive something  which  is  to  be  of  such  a  nature  that, 
it  being,  something  else  always  and  inevitably  follows 
it.  So  far,  certainly,  it  is  possible,  without  contra- 
diction, to  think  this.     But  whether  such  a  virtue  (as 


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THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


327 


causality)  is  to  be  found  in  anything  possible,  cannot 
be  decided  from  that  alone.  Finally,  I  can  conceive 
several  things  (substances)  of  such  a  nature  that  the 
state  of  the  one  has  for  necessary  consequence  a  state 
in  the  other,  and  also  vice  versa.  But  whether  such 
a  relation  can  have  place  in  things,  it  is  impossible  to 
make  out  of  the  notions  themselves,  involving  as  they 
do  a  merely  supposititious  synthesis.  Only  by  this, 
then,  that  these  notions  express  a  priori  the  relations 
of  our  perceptions  in  every  experience,  do  we  perceive 
their  objectiA'^e  reality,  i.e.,  their  transcendental  truth. 
This,  too,  indeed,  independently  of  experience,  but 
still  not  independently  of  all  reference  to  the  general 
form  of  experience,  and  to  that  synthetic  unity  in 
which  alone  objects  can  be  empirically  perceived. 

Would  we  conceive  for  ourselves,  as  in  reference  to 
the  matter  given  us  in  perception,  some  entirely  new 
notions  of  substances,  forces,  re-actions,  without 
appealing  to  experience  for  examples  of  such  con- 
nexions, we  should  find  ourselves  in  presence  of  mere 
maggots  of  the  brain,  for  the  possibility  of  which 
there  is  no  evidence  whatever,  because  we  do  not 
apply  to  experience  to  inform  us  of  them,  nor  derive 
from  it  the  notions  of  them.  Such  imaginary  notions 
cannot  bring  with  them  a  character  of  possibility  in 
the  same  way  as  the  categories,  a  j.nm  conditions  on 
which  all  experience  depends.  They  can  only  pre- 
tend to  be  of  a  posteriori  validity,  and  such  as  are  to 
be  supposed  given  by  experience.  Their  possibility, 
in  truth,  must  be  either  a  posteriori  and  empirically 
made  good,  or  it  cannot  be  at  all  cognised.  A  sub- 
stance, which  is  permanently  present  in  space,  but 
without  occupying  it  (like  that  middle-thing  betAveen 
matter  and  mind  which  some  have  suggested) ;  or  a 
special    faculty    of    the    mind    to    see    the    future 


I 


beforehand  (and  not  simply  to  infer  it) ;  or,  finally, 
another  such  faculty  to  stand  in  a  communion  of 
thoughts  with  other  men  (no  matter  how  distant)  : 
these  are  notions,  the  possibility  of  which  is  entirely 
groundless,  because  it  cannot  be  established  on  ex- 
perience and  the  known  laws  of  experience  ;  without 
these  it  is  a  mere  arbitrary  construction  of  thought, 
which,  though  it  imply  no  contradiction,  cannot 
make  any  claim,  nevertheless,  to  objective  reality,  or 
to  the  possibility  of  an  object  that  is  to  be  thought  in 
it.  Whatever  has  claim  to  reality  precludes  of  itself 
our  thinking  it  in  concreto  unless  we  have  called  in 
experience  to  our  aid ;  for,  as  such,  it  can  only  relate 
to  sensation  which  is  the  matter  of  experience,  and  is 
no  affair  of  a  mere  form  of  relation,  with  which,  in- 
deed, it  is  always  possible  for  us  hypothetically  to  play. 

But  I  dismiss  from  consideration  here  everything 
the  possibility  of  which  can  only  be  made  out  from 
its  actuality  in  experience,  and  regard  only  the  possi- 
bility of  things  so  far  as  dependent  merely  on  a  jmori 
notions.  Now  of  such  things  I  repeat  that  they  can 
never  be  realized  from  these  mere  notions  alone,  but 
that  they  must  be  always  regarded  only  as  formal 
and  objective  conditions  of  experience. 

One  might  be  tempted  to  think,  indeed,  that  the 
possibility  of  a  triangle  might  be  discovered  from  its 
mere  notion  (it  is  certainly  independent  of  experi- 
ence) ;  for,  in  point  of  fact,  we  can  give  it  an  object, 
i.e.,  construct  it,  entirely  a  priori.  But  as  this  con- 
struction concerns  only  the  form  of  an  object,  such 
notion  would  remain  still  a  mere  product  of  imagina- 
tion, and,  consequently,  the  possibility  of  an  object 
for  it  would  be  still  doubtful,  more  being  required  in 
that  respect:  namely,  that  such  a  figure  (the  con- 
struction) should  be  thought  in  connexion  with  all 


328 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT! 


the  conditions  under  which  every  object  is  supposed 
to  stand  in  experience.  That,  now,  space  is  a  formal 
condition  a  priori  of  external  experiences — that  pre- 
cisely the  same  formative  synthesis,  by  which  we  con- 
struct a  triangle  in  imagination,  is  of  identical  nature 
with  that  synthesis  which  we  effect  in  the  appre- 
hension of  a  sensible  object  in  order  to  realize  an  em- 
pirical notion  of  it — it  is  that  alone  which  connects 
with  said  notion  the  further  conception  of  the  possi- 
bility of  such  a  thing.  And  thus— just  because  the 
relative  notions  are  all  synthetic— thus  it  is  that  the 
possibility  of  continuous  magnitudes,  nay,  even  of 
magnitudes  as  such,  is  clear  to  us,  never  from  notions 
themselves,  but  only  from  these  as  formal  conditions 
of  the  determination  of  objects,  generally,  in  expe- 
rience. Where,  indeed,  should  we  seek  to  look  for 
objects  which  should  correspond  to  the  notions,  if  not 
in  experience,  in  and  by  which  alone  objects  are 
given  to  us?  At  the  same  time  it  is  true  also,  that, 
even  without  premising  experience  itself,  we  are  quite 
able  to  discover  and  characterize  the  possibility  of 
things — merely  in  reference  to  the  formal  conditions 
under  which,  quite  generally,  anything  gets  determined 
as  an  object  in  experience,  but  still  only  as  referred 
to  experience,  and  within  the  limits  of  experience. 

The  postulate  that  bears  on  the  actuality  of  things, 
demands  perception  of  sense,  and  that  is  sensation,  of 
which  we  must  have  a  consciousness,  not  indeed 
necessarily  immediately  with  reference  to  the  object 
itself,  the  existence  of  which  is  to  be  recognised  ;  but 
still  we  must  be  aware  of  its  connexion  with  some 
actual  perception,  as  in  obedience  to  the  analogies  of 
experience  which  exhibit,  generally,  every  real  con- 
nexion in  experience. 

In  the  mere  notion  of  a  thing  there  comes  forward 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


329 


no  character  of  its  existence.  For,  though  such 
notion  be  so  complete  as  to  want  nothing  whatever 
that  is  required  for  the  thinking  of  a  thing  with  all 
its  inner  specificates,  still  existence  has  nothing  to  do 
with  all  that,  but  only  with  the  question :  Whether 
such  a  thing  is  given  to  us,  and  in  such  manner  that 
the  perception  of  it  may  at  all  times  precede  the 
notion  of  it?  For  that  the  notion  precedes  the  per- 
ception, signifies  its  mere  possibility.  Whereas  the 
perception  of  sense  which  adds  matter  to  the  notion 
is  the  sole  and  single  character  of  actuality.  Still, 
even  before  perception  of  a  thing,  and  thus  compara- 
tively a  priori,  we  may  come  to  know  the  existence  of 
this  thing,  should  it  but  connect  itself  with  actual 
perceptions,  and  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
the  empirical  conjunction  of  these — that  is,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  analogies.  For  then  the  existence  of 
the  thing  really  coheres  with  our  perceptions  in  a 
possible  experience,  and,  led  by  the  analogies,  we  may 
get  from  our  actual  perception  to  the  thing  itself  in 
the  series  of  possible  perceptions.  Thus,  we  know 
the  existence  of  a  magnetic  matter  pervading  all 
things,  from  the  perception  of  the  attracted  filings  of 
iron,  although  any  direct  perception  of  this  matter 
is,  from  the  nature  of  our  organs,  impossible  to  us. 
For,  following  the  laws  of  sense  and  the  context  of 
our  perceptions,  we  should  hit,  even  in  experience, 
on  the  direct  empirical  perception  of  it,  if  only  our 
senses  were  fine  enough,  the  consideration  of  their 
coarseness  nowise  concerning  the  form  of  possible 
experience.  Wherever  perception,  then,  and  its  im- 
plications according  to  empirical  laws  reach,  so  far 
reaches  also  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  things. 
But  if  we  do  not  begin  from  experience,  or  proceed 
according  to  the  laws   of  the  empirical  context  of 


330 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


THE    KlUTIK    OF    PURE    REASON. 


331 


things,  all  our  attempts  are  vain  to  divine  or  detect 
the  existence  of  anything  whatever/ 

As  concerns  the  third  postulate,  lastly,  its  business 
is  with  the  material  necessity  in  existence,  and  not 
with  the  merely  formal  and  logical  necessity  that  lies 
in  the  connecting  of  notions.      As,  now,  no  existence 
of  the  objects  of  the  senses  can  be  recognised  fully 
a  priori;  still,  nevertheless,  comparatively  a  priori  as 
in  relation  to  some  other  existence  already  given ; 
but  even  then  only  such  an  existence  «s  must  be 
capable  of  being  actually  met  with  somewhere  in  the 
context  of  that  experience  of  which  the  given  percep- 
tion forms  part:  so,  necessity  of  existence  can  be 
cognised,  never  from  notions,  but  always  only  from 
the  connexion,  according  to  general  laws  of  experi- 
ence, with  that  which  has  been  perceived.'*    Now, 
there  is  no  existence  which,  under  condition  of  other 
given  perceptions,  might  be  cognised  as  necessary, 
except,  according  to  laws  of  causality,  the  existence 
of  effects  from  given  causes.     Consequently  it  is  not 
the  existence  of  things  (substances),  but  that  of  their 
state,  in  regard  to  which  we  can   alone  recognise 
necessity ;  and  that,  too,  only  according  to  the  laws 
of  causality,  from  other  states  which  are  given  in  per- 
ception.    It  follows  from  this,  that  the  criterion  of 
necessity  lies  solely  in  the  law  of  possible  experience, 
according  to  which  every  event  has  from  its  cause  a 
determination  of  an  a  priori  force.     Hence  we  cog- 
nise the  necessity  only  of  those  effects  in  nature,  the 
causes  of  which  are  given  us,  and  the  character  of 
necessity  in  existence  extends  no  farther  than  the 

"  Simply  as,  so  far,  hardly  relevant,  and  not  as  wishing  to  indicate  a 
judgment,  I  omit  here  the  "  Refutation  of  Idealism"  which  Kant  inter- 
calated in  his  second  edition. 

«  The  last  word,  "  können,"  in  this  sentence,  is  a  manifest  slip  of  the 
pen. 


field  of  possible  experience.     Even  here,  indeed,  it  is 
not  to  the  existence  of  things  as  substances  that  it 
relates ;  because  substances  can  never  be  regarded  as 
empirical  effects,  or  as  something  that  happens  and 
takes  birth.     Necessity  concerns,  therefore,  only  the 
relations  of  the  perceptions  according  to  the  dynamical 
law  of  causality,  and  the  possibility  that  is  founded 
on  it  of  concluding  a  priori  trom  some  given  existence 
or  other  (a  cause)  to  another  existence  (an  effect). 
Every  event  is  hypothetically  necessary.     That  is  a 
proposition  which  subjects  change  in  the  world  to  a 
law,  namely,  to  a  rule  of  necessary  existence,  without 
which  nature  would  not  be  even  possible.      Hence 
the  proposition,  nothing  happens  from  blind  chance 
(in  mundo  non  datur  casus)  is  an  a  priori  law  of  nature. 
So  also  that  no  necessity  in  the  world  is  blind,  but 
conditioned,  and  consequently  intelligible   {non  datur 
fatum).     Both  are  laws  such  that  through  them  the 
play  of  changes  is  subjected  to  a  nature  of  tilings  (as 
objects  of  sense),  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  to  the 
unity  of  the  understanding,  in  which  alone  they  can 
belong  to  an  experience  as   the   synthetic  unity  of 
perceptions.     Both  of  these  propositions  are  of  the 
dynamical  class.     The  former  is  properly  a   conse- 
quence  of  the   proposition  of  causality  (under  the 
analogies  of  experience).     The  latter  belongs  to  the 
propositions  of  modality,  which  (modality)  adds  to 
the    causal    determination    further    the    notion    of 
necessity,  but  as  placed  under  a  rule  of  the  under- 
standing.    The  principle  of  continuity  forbade,  in  the 
series  of  changes,  any   interruption    (in  mundo   non 
datur  saltus)^  but  any  gap  or  cleft,  as  well,  between 
two  perceptions  in  the  totality  of  empirical  objects  in 
space  {non  datur  hiatus) ;  for  we  may  so  express  the 
proposition  that  nothing  can  come  into  experience 


332 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


which  would  indicate  a  vacuum,  or  even  only  admit 
it  as  part  of  the  empirical  synthesis.  As  regards  a 
vacuum,  indeed,  that  may  be  supposed  beyond  the 
field  of  possible  experience  (the  world),  such  does 
not  come  under  the  jurisdiction  of  mere  understand- 
ing, which  only  decides  on  questions  concerning  the 
use  of  given  objects  for  empirical  cognition.  It  is  a 
problem  ibr  reason  in  the  field  of  the  ideas,  wliich 
transcends  the  sphere  of  possible  experience  and 
would  decide  on  what  circumscribes  and  limits  ex- 
perience itself.  That,  then,  is  a  consideration  for  the 
transcendental  dialectic.  These  four  propositions  {in 
mundo  non  datur  hiatus,  non  datur  saltus,  non  datier 
casus,  non  datur  fatum),  and  all  other  propositions  of 
transcendental  derivation  as  well,  we  might  easily 
expound  in  their  order,  following  that  of  the  cate- 
gories, and  assign  each  its  place ;  but  the  initiated 
reader  will  now  do  this  for  himself,  or  easily  find  the 
clew  to  it.  They  are  all  there  solely  for  this,  that,  in 
the  empirical  synthesis,  nothing  is  to  be  admitted 
which  could  interrupt  or  infringe  understanding  and 
the  continuous  coherence  of  all  perceptions,  i.e.,  the 
unity  of  its  notions.  For  it  is  in  understanding  alone 
that  the  unity  of  experience  (in  which  all  perceptions 
must  have  their  places)  is  possible. 

Whether  the  field  of  possibility  be  of  greater  ex- 
tent than  that  where  all  actuality  is  comprised,  which 
again  shall  exceed  that  where  what  relates  to  necessity 
is  comprised — these  are  interesting  questions,  and  of 
synthetic  solution,  but  amenable  only  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  reason.  What  they  would  say,  namely,  is 
whether  all  things,  as  objects  of  sense,  belong  to  the 
totality  and  context  of  a  single  experience,  of  which 
every  given  perception  is  a  part,  which  cannot,  there- 
fore, be  cQunectfid  witli  ötllßr  wm:h  objects,  or  whether 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


333 


my  perceptions  may  belong  to  more  than  one  possible 
experience  (in  its  general  connexion).     Understand- 
ing  a  j)riori  extends  to  experience   only  the  rules, 
dependent  on  the  subjective  and  formal  conditions,  as 
well  of  sense  as  apperception,  which  rules  alone  make 
experience  possible.     Forms  of  perception  other  than 
space  and  time,  and  forms  of  understanding  other  than 
the   categories    (were   such   even   possible),   we   are 
wholly  unable  to  conceive  or  render  intelligible  to 
ourselves.     Nay,  were  this  really  possible,  these  same 
forms  would  have  no  place  in  experience,  which,  how- 
ever, is  the  single  and  sole  element  in  which  objects 
are  given  us.     Whether  other  perceptions  than  those 
which  belong  to  our  general  possible  experience,  and 
Avhether,   therefore,   there  can  possibly  ever  exist  a 
quite  other  field  of  matter — these  are  questions  be- 
yond the  power  of  understanding  to  decide ;  which, 
for  its  part,  has  only  to  do  with  the  synthesis  of  what 
is  given.     In  all  other  respects  the  poverty  of  our 
usual  reasonings  for  the  realizing  of  a  wide  realm  of 
possibility,  with  the  actual  (every  object  of  experi- 
ence) as  only  a  small  part  of  it,  is  very  striking.     All 
that  is  actual  is  possible.     From  this  there  follows 
naturally,  according  to  the  logical  rules  of  conversion, 
the  merely  particular  proposition,  something  possible 
is  actual.     But  this,  again,  only  seems  to  signify  as 
much  as,  that  there  is  a  great  deal  possible  which  is  not 
actual.    It  even  sounds  as  though  the  amount  of  the  pos- 
sible were  thereby  capable  of  being  expressly  extended 
beyond  that  of  the  actual,  inasmuch  as  something 
must  still  be  added  to  the  former  in  order  to  constitute 
the  latter.     But   this  addition  to  the  possible  is  to 
me  unknown.     For  what  were  to  be  supposed  added 
over  and  above  to  it,  would  be  impossible.     There 
can  be  added  to  my  understanding  only  something 


334 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


more  than  the  fact  of  simple  agreement  with  the  for- 
mal conditions  of  experience,  connexion,  namely,  with 
some  actual  perception  or  other;  and  whatever  is, 
according  to  empirical  laws,  the  subject  of  such  con- 
nexion, that  is  actual,  though  it  may  not  be  im- 
mediately perceived.  But  that  there  is,  in  complete 
coherence  with  what  is  given  me  in  perception,  the 
possibility  of  another  series  of  perceptions,  and  con- 
sequently more  than  a  single  all-embracing  experi- 
ence, cannot  be  inferred  from  anything  given  us,  and 
still  less  were  we  to  suppose  nothing  given  us ;  for 
there  is  nowhere  anything  thinkable  that  is  without 
matter.  What  is  possible  only  under  conditions  which 
are  only  themselves  possible,  is  not  possible  in  every 
point  of  mew.  But  it  is  in  that  sense  the  question  is 
taken  when  we  would  know  whether  the  possibility  of 
things  stretches  farther  than  experience  can  reach. 

I  have  made  mention  of  these  questions  merely  to 
leave  no  gap  in  what  is  usually  considered  to  belong 
to  categories.  In  point  of  fact,  however,  absolute 
possibility  (or  such  as  is  valid  in  every  point  of  view) 
is  no  mere  notion  of  the  understanding  (category), 
and  cannot  in  any  way  be  of  empirical  application, 
but  belongs  only  to  reason  as  in  transcendence  of  all 
possible  empirical  application  of  the  understanding. 
Hence  here  we  have  necessarily  to  content  ourselves 
with  a  mere  critical  remark,  but  for  the  rest  to  leave 
the  thing  in  its  own  obscurity  till  the  further  discus- 
sion that  will  follow. 

As  I  will  now  bring  this  fourth  number  to  a  close, 
and  with  it  the  entire  system,  as  well,  of  all  th^ 
primary  propositions  of  pure  understanding,  it  is  in- 
cumbent on  me  to  explain  why  I  have  named  the 
principles  of  modality  precisely  postulates.  I  shall 
not  take  this  expression  in  the  meaning  here,  which 


THE    KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


335 


some  more  recent  philosophical  authors  have  given  it 
in  opposition  to  that  of  the  mathematicians,  to  whom 
it  properly  belongs,  namely,  that  to  postulate  is  as 
much  as  to  assume,  without  justification  or  proof,  a 
proposition  as  immediately  certain.  For,  should  we 
admit  in  the  case  of  synthetic  propositions,  let  them 
be  as  evident  as  they  may,  that,  on  the  mere  aspect 
of  their  peculiar  burden,  and  without  deduction,  we 
may  unconditionally  accept  them,  then  all  critique  of 
the  understanding  were  a  lost  labour.  In  that  case, 
indeed,  as  there  is  no  want  of  the  hardiest  assump- 
tions, not  to  be  denied  even  by  common  belief  (which, 
however,  is  no  creditive),  our  understanding  will 
stand  open  to  every  craze,  without  power  to  refuse  its 
assent  to  even  illegitimate  propositions  which  demand, 
in  precisely  the  same  tone  of  assurance,  to  be  admitted 
as  actual  axioms.  Whenever,  therefore,  there  is  added 
to  the  notion  of  a  thing  an  a  priori  synthetic  deter- 
mination, then  for  such  a  proposition  there  is  indis- 
pensably necessary,  if  not  a  proof,  at  least  a  deduction 
of  the  legitimacy  of  its  import. 

The  propositions  of  modality,  however,  are  not 
objectively  synthetic,  inasmuch  as  the  predicates  of 
possibility,  actuality,  and  necessity  do  not  in  the 
least  increase  the  notion  of  which  they  are  enunciated 
by  adding  anything  to  the  conception  of  the  object. 
Inasmuch,  nevertheless,  as  they  are  synthetic,  they 
are  only  subjectively  synthetic,  z.^.,  they  conjoin  with 
the  notion  of  a  thing  (a  reale)  ^  of  which  itself  they 
say  in  other  respects  nothing,  the  cognitive  faculty  in 
which  it  originates  and  has  its  seat.  That  is,  they 
effect  this  so  that,  when,  merely  in  understanding, 
the  notion  is  in  connexion  with  the  formal  con- 
ditions of  experience,  its  object  is  possible;  while, 
when  it   is   coherent  with  perception   (sensation  as 


336 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


matter  of  sense),  and  through  perception  further 
determined  by  understanding,  its  object  is  actual; 
and,  lastly,  when  the  notion  is  determined  on  cate- 
gories as  regards  the  context  of  perceptions,  its  object 
is  necessary.  The  propositions  of  modality,  there- 
fore, predicate  nothing  else  of  a  notion  than  the 
action  of  the  cognitive  faculty  whereby  it  is  pro- 
duced. Now  a  mathematical  postulate  is  a  practical 
proposition  which  concerns  nothing  but  the  synthesis 
by  which  we  first  give  ourselves  an  object,  and  create 
for  ourselves  a  notion  of  it,  as,  e.g.^  with  a  given  line 
and  a  given  point,  to  describe  a  plane  circle :  such  a 
proposition  cannot  be  proved,  and  just  for  this  reason, 
that  the  procedure  required  is  precisely  that  whereby 
we  first  of  all  create  the  notion  of  such  a  figure.  Ac- 
cordingly, in  the  same  manner  and  with  the  same 
right,  we  are  authorized  to  postulate  the  propositions 
of  modality,  because  they  do  not  increase  their  notion 
of  things,  but  only  indicate  the  manner  in  which  said 
notion  is  united  with  the  cognitive  faculty.^ 


General  Remark  on  the  System  of  Primary  Propositions. 

It  is  something  very  remarkable  that  we  cannot 
see  into  the  possibility  of  anything  with  the  mere 
category ;  but  that  we  must  always  have  a  percep- 
tion by  us  whereby  to  demonstrate  the  objective 
reality  of  the  category.     Let  us  take,  for  example,  the 

'  By  the  actuality  of  a  thing,  of  course,  I  imply  more  than  its  possi- 
bility, but  not  in  the  thing  ;  for  that  can  never  contain  more  in  actuality 
than  was  contained  in  its  complete  possibility.  But,  as  its  possibility 
was  merely  a  position  of  the  thing  in  relation  to  the  understanding  (em- 
pirically applied),  its  actuality  is  a  connexion  of  it,  as  well,  with  percep- 
tion.— K.  In  effect,  with  Kant,  possibility  means  at  times  actuality. 
To  demonstrate  the  possibility  of  something  is  to  demonstrate  its  actu- 
ality, as  in  the  case  of  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God. 


THE    KRITIK   OF  PURE   REASON. 


337 


categories  of  relation. .  It  is  impossible  to  understand 
from  mere  notions  how,  1,  something  can  exist  only 
as  subject,  not  as  mere  modus  of  other  things,  i.e.^  be 
substance;  or  how,  2,  something  must  be  because 
something  else  is — be  a  cause,  consequently ;  or  how, 
3,  in  the  case  of  several  things,  something  should 
eventuate,  from  the  fact  of  one  of  them  being  given, 
to  the  rest  of  them,  and  vice  versa,  so  that  there  should 
be  such  a  thing  as  a  community  of  substances.  Nay, 
precisely  the  same  thing  holds  of  the  other  categories, 
e.g.,  how  one  thing,  together  with  many,  may  be  of 
one  sort,  i.e.,  be  a  quantity,  etc.,  etc.  So  long,  then, 
as  perception  is  absent,  it  is  impossible  to  know 
whether  there  is  an  object  thought  in  the  categories, 
or  whether  at  all  an  object  can  anywhere  be  found 
for  them.  And  from  this  it  is  evident  that,  alone 
and  by  themselves,  they  are  not  cognitions  proper, 
but  mere  thought-forms,  there  only  to  make  cogni- 
tions proper  of  given  perceptions  of  sense.  Hence  it 
is  that  no  synthetic  proposition  can  be  constructed 
from  mere  categories.  For  example,  in  every  exist- 
ence there  is  substance,  something,  that  is,  that  can 
exist  only  as  subject  and  never  as  simple  predicate ; 
or  everything  is  a  quantum.  In  all  such  cases  there 
is  nothing  to  enable  us  to  pass  beyond  a  given  notion 
and  connect  with  it  another.  Hence,  also,  there  has 
never  been  any  success  for  the  attempt  to  prove  a 
synthetic  proposition  by  bare  categories,  as,  e.g.,  the 
proposition,  that  everything  contingently  existing 
must  have  a  cause.  Here  there  is  no  getting  any 
further  than  to  prove  that,  without  this  relation,  it  is 
impossible  for  us  to  comprehend  the  existence  of  what 
is  contingent,  i.e.,  a  priori  to  acknowledge  through  the 
understanding  the  existence  of  anything  such.  But 
it  does  not  follow  that  precisely  this  relation  in  ques- 


338 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


tion  is  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  things  them- 
selves. If  we  recur,  then,  to  our  proof  of  the  pro- 
position of  causality,  we  shall  find  that  it  was  not 
possible  for  us  to  effect  this  unless  for  objects  of 
possible  experience.  We  shall  find  that  we  were  so 
situated,  indeed,  as  to  be  able  to  prove  this  proposi- 
tion (all  that  happens,  every  event,  presupposes  a 
cause)  only  as  a  principle  of  the  possibility  of  experi- 
ence, consequently  of  the  cognition  of  an  object  given 
in  empirical  perception,  and  not  from  mere  notions. 
JSCevertheless  that  the  proposition,  all  that  is  contin- 
gent must  have  a  cause,  will  be  clear  to  every  one 
from  notions  only — that  is  not  to  be  denied.  But 
then  the  notion  of  contingency  is  already  so  under- 
stood that  there  is  involved  in  it,  not  the  category  of 
modality  (as  something  the  non-being  of  which  were 
thinkable),  but  that  of  relation  (as  something  that  can 
exist  only  as  consequence  of  something  else);  in 
which  case,  plainly,  it  is  no  more  than  the  identical 
proposition,  what  can  exist  only  as  effect  has  its  cause. 
In  point  of  fact,  should  we  wish  to  give  any  actual 
examples  of  contingent  existence,  we  must  always 
refer  to  changes^  and  not  merely  to  the  possibility  of 
thinking  an  oj)jposed  state}     But  a  change  is  an  event, 

*  It  is  easy  to  think  the  non-existence  of  matter  ;  but  the  ancients  did 
not  infer  from  that  its  contingency.  Nay,  the  very  alternation  of  the 
being  and  non-being  of  a  given  state  of  something  (and  all  change  con- 
sists in  that)  is,  as  regafd«  this  state,  no  proof  as  it  were  from  its  opposite. 
For  instance,  rest  in  a  body,  following  on  motion  in  it,  is  no  proof  of  the 
contingency  of  the  motion  in  it  for  the  mere  reason  that  the  former  is  the 
opposite  of  the  latter.  For  here  this  opposite  is  only,  logically,  not  really 
opposed  to  the  other.  We  must  prove  that,  instead  of  the  preceding 
motion,  it  was  quite  possible  for  there  to  have  been,  on  the  part  of  the 
body,  rest,  if  we  would  prove  the  contingency  of  the  motion.  It  is  not 
enough  that  the  rest  followed  ;  for  it  is  quite  possible  for  both  states  to 
be,  consistently  with  each  other. — K. 

Kosenkranz  has  in  this  note,  by  slip  of  pen  or  printer,  "  Verbindung  " 
instead  of  the  Veränderung  that  ought  to  be. 


THE   KRITIK   OF   PURE   REASON. 


339 


/ 


which,  as  such,  being  only  possible  through  a  cause, 
is  such  that  in  itself  its  non-being  is  consequently 
possible ;  and  so  it  is  that,  from  something  being  able 
to  exist  only  as  the  effect  of  a  cause,  we  recognise 
contingency.  Hence,  on  assumption  of  something  as 
contingent,  it  is  an  analytical  proposition  to  say,  it 
has  a  cause. 

Still  more  remarkable  is  it,  however,  that  to  un- 
derstand the  possibility  of  things  as  following  the 
categories,  and  thus  to  demonstrate  the  objective 
reality  of  these,  we  require  not  merely  perception, 
but  even  always  also  external  iierceptions.  If,  for 
example,  we  take  the  categories  of  relation,  we  find, 
1,  that  in  order  to  give,  in  correspondence  with  the 
notion  of  substance,  something  permanent  in  percep- 
tion (and  demonstrate  thereby  the  objective  reality 
of  this  notion),  we  require  a  perception  in  space  (of 
matter),  and  for  this  reason,  that  space  alone  has  the 
determination  of  permanence,  while  time,  for  its  part 
(with  all,  consequently,  that  is  in  inner  sense),  con- 
stantly fleets.  In  order,  2,  to  exhibit  change  as  the 
perception  correspondent  to  the  notion  of  causality^ 
we  must  take  motion  for  example,  or  change  in  space. 
By  it  alone,  indeed,  is  it  possible  for  us  to  make 
changes  perceivable;  the  possibility  of  these  being 
incomprehensible  by  any  pure  understanding.  Change 
is  a  conjunction  of  determinations  contradictorily  op- 
posed to  each  other  in  the  existence  of  one  and  the 
same  thing.  How,  now,  it  is  possible  that,  on  a  given 
condition,  an  opposed  one  should  follow  in  one  and 
the  same  thing,  is  not  only  impossible  for  any  under- 
standing to  make  conceivable  to  itself  without  an 
example,  but  without  perception  even  to  make  intel- 
ligible to  itself.  That  necessary  perception  here  is 
one  of  the  motion  of  a  point  in  space,  the  existence  of 


340 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT: 


THE  KRITIK  OF  PURE  REASON. 


341 


which  in  different  places  (as  a  sequence  of  opposed 
determinations)  only  first  of  all  makes  changes  actual 
perceptions  to  us.  For,  in  order  afterwards  to  make 
even  inner  changes  thinkable,  it  is  necessary  for  us 
to  make  comprehensible  to  ourselves,  in  a  figurate 
manner  by  means  of  a  line,  time,  and,  through  the 
drawing  of  this  line  (motion),  inner  change,  con- 
sequently, also,  by  means  of  external  perception,  th© 
successive  existence  of  our  own  selves  in  different 
states.  And  the  reason  proper  of  this  is,  that  all 
change  presupposes  in  perception  a  something  per- 
manent, in  order  even  to  get  perceived  as  change, 
whereas,  in  the  inner  sense,  there  is  not  any  per- 
manent perception  to  be  found.  Lastly,  the  category 
of  community  is,  as  regards  its  possibility,  incon- 
ceivable to  mere  reason;  and,  consequently,  the 
objective  reality  of  this  notion  cannot  possibly  be 
cognised  without  perception,  and  that,  too,  an  exter- 
nal perception  in  space.  For  how  are  we  to  think  it 
possible  that,  several  existent  substances  being  given, 
from  the  existence  of  the  one,  there  can  reciprocally 
follow,  to  the  existence  of  the  rest,  something  (as 
effect),  and  that  therefore  because  there  is  something 
in  the  former,  there  must  also  be  in  the  others  some- 
thing, which  last,  from  the  existence  of  the  others 
alone,  cannot  be  understood?  As  much  as  this, 
namely,  is  required  for  community,  but,  among 
things  each  wholly  isolated  by  its  own  subsistency, 
is  utterly  inconceivable.  Hence  Leibnitz,  in  attri- 
buting community  to  the  substances  in  the  world 
only  as  the  bare  understanding  thinks  them,  stood  in 
need  of  a  divinity  for  mediation  ;  for  from  their  mere 
existence  they  rightly  appeared  to  him  unintelligible. 
We  are  quite  able,  however,  to  make  the  possibility 
of  community  (in    substances   as  objects  of  sense) 


f 


I 


■  I 

/ 


easily  intelligible  to  us,  if  we  picture  them  in  space 
and  so  in  external  perception.  For  space  possesses 
in  itself,  already  a  priori^  formal  external  relations  as 
conditions  of  the  possibility  of  real  things  (in  action 
and  reaction,  and,  consequently,  community).  We 
may  easily  show  in  the  same  way  that  the  possibility 
of  things  as  quantities,  and  therefore  the  objective 
reality  of  the  relative  category,  can  also  be  demon- 
strated only  in  external  perception,  and  through  it 
alone  be  afterwards  applied  to  the  internal  sense. 
But,  to  avoid  prolixity,  I  must  leave  exemplification 
here  to  the  reflection  of  the  reader. 

This  whole  remark  is  of  great  importance,  not  only 
to  confirm  our  refutation  of  idealism,  but  still  more, 
when  self-cognition,  from  simple  inner  consciousness, 
and  the  determination  of  our  nature  with  no  assist- 
ance from  external  empirical  perceptions,  are  in 
question,  in  order  to  manifest  to  us  the  limits  of  the 
possibility  of  such  a  cognition. 

The  final  result,  therefore,  of  this  whole  section  is  : 
All  the  primary  propositions  of  pure  understanding 
are  nothing  more  than  principles  a  priori  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  experience,  and  to  experience  alone  do  all 
a  priori  synthetic  propositions  refer;  nay,  on  this 
reference  rests  wholly  the  possibility  of  these. 


I 


COMMENTARY. 


Introduction. 

I. 

There  is  no  aim  here  but  to  suggest  to  the  reader 
that  a  cognition,  a  perception,  may  consist  of  two 
elements,  one  a  priori,  and  the  other  a  posteriori.  We 
are  woke  up  to  know  or  perceive  anything,  and  we 
can  be  so  woke  up,  only  by  sensible  experience. 
Still  this  experience  may  be  a  compound ;  consisting, 
on  one  hand,  of  ingredients  given  by  the  senses,  and, 
on  the  other,  given  by  the  mind  itself.  There  is  a 
relative  use  of  the  phrase  a  priori^  as  when  w^e  refer 
some  particular  to  a  general  rule ;  but  still  the  general 
rule  itself  may  be  only  inductively  acquired.  Kant's 
a  priori,  we  are  to  understand,  then,  is  not  the  rela- 
tive a  priori,  but  an  element  in  actual  cognition  that 
is  still  independent  of  every  contribution  whatever  of 
special  sense.  It  is  important,  also,  to  observe  that 
room  is  left  for  a  mixed  a  priori.  Change,  for  ex- 
ample, is  an  idea  which  we  could  not  possibly  possess 
without  experience ;  and  yet  the  proposition  of  caus- 
ality, connected  with  it,  must  be  considered  a  priori. 
The  judgment  change  has  cause,  therefore,  is  a  priori, 
but  not  purely  a  priori.  It  cannot  be  said,  however, 
that  Kant  remains  always  true  to  the  distinction. 
The  term  a  ^nm  has — universally,  we  may  saj^ — with 


346 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


Kant,  the  force  of  purely  a  jmorz,  and  seldom  if  ever 
that  of  relatively  a  priori.  However  it  be  with  the 
idea  of  change,  too,  it  is  certain  that  the  proposition 
of  causality  (though  not  possibly  to  be  formed  with- 
out reference  to  that  idea)  seems  always  to  be  spoken 
of  by  Kant  as  purely  a  priori  (even  on  the  very  next 
page  but  one). 

The  study  of  Kant  among  us  has  as  yet,  for  the 
most  part,  been  conducted  in  the  midst  of  so  much 
difficulty,  not  only  as  concerns  the  thoughts,  but  even 
the  language,  that  the  result,  gathered  dimly  and 
haltingly  from  the  suggestion  of  merely  rhapsodic 
phrases,  has  been,  but  too  frequently,  a  simple  cari- 
cature. Even  now  there  is  a  mystical,  ideal  Kant  in 
fashion  very  unlike  his  own  plain,  old-maiden  self. 
Now,  the  position  we  see  Kant  assume,  even  in  his 
very  first  words,  ought  to  correct  this.  The  subject 
is  at  once  taken  on  the  ordinary  ground  of  experience. 
It  is  experience  that,  striking  on  the  faculties,  rouses 
them  into  action  ;  and  it  is  experience  that  is  known. 
The  whole  position  is  but  the  position  of  Locke  with 
a  complement.  Locke  drew  from  the  intellect  as 
well  as  the  senses,  and  Kant  does  no  more ;  but,  in 
what  concerns  the  senses  (to  confine  ourselves  to  that) 
the  latter  introduces  a  modification.  Even  in  what 
we  call  experience,  and  hold  to  be  due  to  the  senses, 
may  there  not  be,  he  asks,  an  element  from  within 
that  adds  itself  to  the  element  from  without  even  in 
the  very  act  of  receiving  this  latter  ?  What  we  are  to 
see,  then,  is  not  a  mystical,  idealistic  philosophy,  but 
a  mere  physiological  or  psychological  theory  of  percep- 
tion,  on  the  ordinary  basis  of  common  sense.  That 
is,  in  view  of  his  own  presuppositions,  we  shall  expect 
Kant  to  explain  how^  possessed  of  impressions  which 
come  successively  into  us,  we  convert  these,  merely 


COMMENTARY. 


347 


\\ 


subjectively  internal  as  they  are  (and  only  hy  action 
of  our  own  internal  faculties)  into  the  objectively 
external  world  around  us.  From  first  to  last,  indeed, 
in  Kant,  it  is  experience  that  is  referred  to,  and  the 
common  ground  throughout  is,  as  has  been  so  often  re- 
marked by  Kant's  own  countrymen,  that  of  the  ordinary 
Lockeian  pyschology.  At  all  events,  the  question  Kant 
immediately  opens  before  us  is.  How  do  we  modify 
the  subjective  and  internal  sensations  we  receive^  into 
the  objective  and  Q^tonisl jierceptions  which  exist? 

The  German  technical  terms  we  select  for  notice 
are  these :  Erkenntniss^  Erkenntnissvermögen,  Erfahrung, 
Gegenstand,  Vorstellung,  Verstand,  Eindrücke,  a  j^yriori, 
a  posteriori.  Empirisch,  Rein, 

The  first  of  these  terms  may,  certainly,  be  translated 
knoivledge ;  but  that  word  generally  covers  for  us  rather 
ideas  than  objects,  rather  what  is  intellectual  than 
what  is  perceptive.  Now  it  is  the  latter  reference 
that,  at  least  for  the  present  inquiry,  is  with  Kant  the 
dominant  one.  An  Erkenntniss,  what  we  erkennen, 
is  to  be  understood,  generally,  as  what  we  objectively 
perceive.  The  Erkenntnissvermögen  is,  in  the  same 
way,  for  the  most  part,  the  perceptive  faculty ;  but, 
perception  for  Kant  always  involving  notions,  the 
faculty,  so  far,  is  intellectual  as  well  as  sensuous,  and 
the  German  term,  without  risk  of  misleading,  may  be 
translated  generally  cognitive  faculty. 

Erfahrung  is  the  objective  system  of  things  we  per- 
ceive and  live ;  but  it  always  involves  the  element  of 
special  sense.  Empirisch  has  the  same  reference,  as 
an  adjective,  which  is  possessed  by  Erfahrung  as  a 
substantive.  Rein,  again,  is  simply  non-empirical; 
it  is  pure  as  without  ingredient  of  sense.  We  have 
seen  already  how  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  similarly 
apply  here.      Eindrücke  mean  for  the  Germans  pre- 


348 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


cisely  what  impressions  mean  for  us.  Gegenstand  is 
simply  the  object  of  a  faculty,  usually  the  perceptive 
one.  Verstand  may  be  used  generally  as  in  designa- 
tion of  all  the  intellectual  faculties,  or  it  may  be  used 
specially  as  distinguished,  as  well  from  judgment  as 
from  reason.  The  latter  is  the  Kantian  use  proper. 
Then  it  is  the  faculty  of  notions,  the  simple  appre- 
hension of  the  logicians,  as  judgment  is  the  faculty 
that  under  notions  subsumes  examples.  Then,  too, 
reason  has  a  strictly  Kantian  sense,  and  peculiarly 
limited  application,  as  the  faculty  of  the  idea^  only, 
of  which  there  are  only  three ;  and  their  function  is 
to  round  and  complete  the  work  of  understanding  in 
perception,  by  adding  regulative  principles  for  the 
production  of  system.  Reason  and  the  Ideas,  how- 
ever, will  not  concern  us  in  the  present  volume. 
Vorstellung  is  a  peculiarly  difficult  word  for  us.  It  is 
exactly  the  Lockeian  idea ;  but,  unfortunately,  we  are 
precluded  from  the  use  of  this  word  (idea),  exactly 
meeting  our  want  as  it  does,  by  the  special  meanings 
which  Kant,  to  say  nothing  of  Hegel,  has  given  to  it. 
In  the  immediate  text,  a  Vorstellung  is  the  result  in 
consciousness  of  the  action  of  objects  on  the  senses. 
It  is  an  intimation  in  consciousness,  an  impression  on 
sense.  It  may  at  times  be  rightly  enough  translated 
by  the  most  general  term  possible,  consciousness  itself, 
awareness^  even  feeling,  and  again  by  the  most  special, 
conception,  perception,  impression.  I  shall  be  found 
to  avail  myself  of  an  ample  latitude  here  in  order 
to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  individual  case. 


IL 

For  understanding  I  have  nothing  to  add  here; 
and,  in  this  volume,  it  is  only  understanding  that  is 


COMMENTARY. 


349 


my  object,  and  not  criticism.  Nevertheless,  I  may 
remark  that  the  fortune  of  all  that  follows  depends 
upon  the  competence  or  incompetence  of  the  criteria 
offered  now.  These,  plainly,  are  taken  directly  from 
Hume's  distinction  between  Matters  of  Fact  and  Rela- 
tions of  Ideas.  The  contingency  alleged  of  the  one,  as 
the  necessity  alleged  of  the  other,  are  evidently  such  as 
(for  any  future  advance)  to  exact  the  strictest  inquest 
and  a  definitive  decision.  This  is  a  staple  article  of 
discussion  between  Mr  Mill  and  the  usual  Kantian 
'*  introductions."  But  of  that  I  am  not  qualified  to 
speak.  We  have  to  point  out  here,  however,  that  it 
is  Kant  himself  gives  us  our  very  first  check  to  the 
doctrine  we  have  just  read.  He  goes  on  immediately 
to  tell  us  that  said  criteria  of  universality  and  neces- 
sity are  to  be  had  at  a  very  cheap  rate  in  all  analytic 
propositions.  Of  what  value,  for  example,  is  the 
apodictic  validity  of  the  proposition  that  all  Islands 
are  cut  off  from  Continents  ? 

But,  leaving  that  for  the  present,  I  may  remark 
that  this  section  already  contains  by  implication  the 
entire  programme.  It  is  said,  for  instance,  "  Besides 
demonstrating  the  actual  existence  in  our  knowledge 
(perception)  of  principles  a  priori  by  a  reference  to 
fact,  we  might  even  a  j^riori  prove  as  much.  We 
might  demonstrate,  that  is,  the  indispensable  necessity 
of  such  principles  to  the  very  possibility  of  experience. 
For  how  should  there  be  any  certainty  in  experience, 
were  all  the  rules  in  it  only  empirical  and  (con- 
sequently) contingent?  It  were  hardly  possible, 
evidently,  to  allow  any  such  rules  the  name  of  first 
principles."  This  is  at  once  the  very  key-note  of  the 
whole  business.  What  is  empirical  in  perception 
(sensations,  namely)  is  but  subjective  affection,  a  mere 
internal  chaos  of  feeling  that,  without  rule,  can  never 


350 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


351 


become  that  orderly  context  and  necessary  system  of 
objective  experience  we  call  world.  So  far,  however, 
we  ha^ve  hut  the  a  posteriori^  the  contributions,  namely, 
of  the  lower  cognitive  faculty,  or  of  the  senses.  But 
there  is  left  us  still  the  higher  cognitive  faculty,  the 
intellect,  the  understanding:  will  not  it  also  contribute, 
and  will  not  its  contributions  be,  from  the  very  nature 
of  the  faculty,  princijäes?  These  contributions,  fur- 
ther, as  independent  of  the  senses,  will  be  a  jmori. 
This  is  the  scheme,  then.  The  lower  cognitive  faculty 
will  contribute  matter;  the  higher, /(?rm.  Principles 
will  make  objective  experience  oi  fact%  the  ap>riori  of 
the  a  posteriori^  function  of  affection.  We  here  see  the 
two  sides :  contingency^  under  various  names,  on  the 
one ;  necessity^  under  various  names,  on  the  other. 
This,  then,  is  what  the  j^ossibiUty  of  experience  means. 
Those  principles,  that  a  priori,  those  intellectual  con- 
ditions, which  shall  throw  the  contingent,  a  p>osteriori, 
subjective,  sense-feelings,  out,  into  the  necessity  of  a 
ruled  and  regulated  objective  universe,  named  experi- 
ence. This  was  undoubtedly  all  that,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, Kant  meant  to  himself  by  the  possibility  of 
experience.  Whether  or  not  a  necessity  to  extend 
his  formulary,  and,  with  more  or  less  of  uncertainty, 
introduce  into  it  even  empirical  references,  no  less  to 
the  confusion  and  perplexity  of  his  own  self  than  to 
those  of  his  readers — whether  or  not  this  necessity 
seemed  to  him  to  arise,  is  what  we  have  steadily  to 
watch.  In  the  meantime,  let  us  take  it  for  granted 
that  the  very  hinge  of  all  his  relative  reasoning  is  the 
thought,  "Where  would  experience  get  its  certainty," 
"  how  would  there  be  a  possibility  of  experience,"  if 
not  from  the  a  priori  conditions  of  intellectual  prin- 
ciples ?  It  is  with  this  thought  in  his  mind  that  he 
goes  on  to  suggest  his  further  proceedings  by  the  ex- 


I 


amples  of  space  and  substance.  And  here  we  may  see 
that  even  the  phrase  "Erkenntniss  a  priori''  is  not 
necessarily  only  logical;  it  may  refer  to  space,  which 
though  a  priori  to  Kant,  is  still  apperception — to  him, 
as  to  us. 

III. 

This  section,  being  quite  simple  and  general,  may 
be  left  to  itself.  Of  technical  terms  there  is  an 
"  a  priori  "  towards  the  end,  which,  as  valid  through 
the  identity  of  mere  exposition,  has  only  the  force  of 
a  relative  a  j^riori  as  previously  referred  to.  In  the 
beginning  there  are  Erkenntnisse  spoken  of,  which,  as 
without  empirical  objects,  are  not  perceptions,  but 
only  conceptions.  Conception,  too,  is  plainly  only 
the  "Vorstellung"  that  is  given  to  the  "light  dove." 
We  have  here  also  two  other  most  important  technical 
terms,  though  not  in  the  present  instance  at  all 
ambiguously  or  critically  placed.  The  one  is  "  An- 
schauung "  and  the  other  "  Erscheinung,"  and  with 
Kant,  such  is  the  use  he  can  put  them  to,  they  both 
mean  pretty  much  the  same  thing.  An  Anschauung 
is  a  perceived  object.  The  "  objective  lessons  "  intro- 
duced by  Pestalozzi,  and  such  as  we  see  now  in 
infant-schools,  have  such  terms  applied  to  them  by 
the  Germans  as  "Anschauungslehre"  and  "An- 
schauungsübungen." The  sense  of  sight  is  undoubt- 
edly the  sense  specially  signified  in  the  word  itself; 
but  there  may  be  an  Anschauung  without  sight.  A 
potato  is  quite  as  decided  an  object,  an  Anschauung, 
to  a  blind  man  as  to  me  or  you.  Whatever  special 
sensations  are,  from  mere  feelings,  raised  and  con- 
creted into  what  we  regard  as  an  object  apart  from  us 
— these  issue  in  an  Anschauung.      Anschauung,  then, 


352 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT  : 


is  our  percejition.  Object-recognition,  the  capability 
of  the  mind  having  what  we  call  an  object  present  to 
it,  i8  evidently  to  Kant  a  special  and  peculiar  faculty. 
To  most  British  psychologists,  the  intellectual  facul- 
ties are  analyzed  into  Sensation,  Memory,  and  Judg- 
ment. But  those  to  whom  this  is  enough  have  never 
once  thought  of  the  difficulty  of  how  mere  feelings  in 
the  mind,  as  light  and  sound,  can  possibly  be  con- 
creted and  thrown  out  into  a  single  perceived 
object,  say  a  Bell.  Psychologists,  to  whom  this  diffi- 
culty has  occurred,  therefore,  say  the  intellectual 
faculties  are  P(^rcß/>ifi(?n,  Memory,  and  Judgment;  and, 
surely,  with  reason.  This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss 
the  subject  of  perception ;  it  is  enough  here  to  say 
that  Kant's  word  for  the  faculty  in  question  was 
Anschauung.  But  we  must  add  (as  partly  already 
noticed)  that  to  Kant  this  faculty  was,  from  first  to 
last,  much  more  a  simple,  special,  and  peculiar 
faculty  than  perception  is  or  was  to  any  British 
inquirer.  Perception  to  Kant  was,  further,  either 
pure  or  empirical.  For  the  latter  Wahrnehmung  is 
the  proper  term ;  but,  though  Kant  uses  Anschauung 
as  the  general  term  for  the  faculty  of  the  character- 
istic function,  he  at  times  varies  Wahrnehmung  by  the 
expression  "  empirische  Anschauung ;  "  and  he  there- 
by indicates  that  Anschauung  by  itself  means  pure 
perception.  Now  there  are  to  Kant  only  two  pure 
perceptions,  space  and  time ;  and  generally  it  is  to 
them  alone  the  word  points.  Space  and  time,  then, 
thus,  are  pure  objects  to  Kant,  just  as  a  potato  is  an 
empirical  one.  This  is  very  particularly  to  be  borne 
in  mind.  I  am  not  required  to  mention  here  other 
uses  of  the  word  Anschauung,  as  when  we  hear 
men's  principles  spoken  of,  their  beliefs,  convictions, 
Anschauungen  t    In  that  case  the  word  means  what 


f 


i 


* 


COMMENTARY. 


353 


peculiar  views  men  may  have  come  to  on  this  and 
that.  Anschauung  in  that  sense,  indeed,  is  an  idea, 
or,  better,  a  theory  (it  may  be  an  intuition),  and  it 
will  consist  of  a  number  of  Vorstellungen — as  mere 
subordinate  conceptions.  But  that  is  not  the  sense 
which  we  have  specially  to  see  in  Kant. 

Then,  as  regards  Erscheinung^  in  English,  percep- 
tion is  one  thing,  and  a  perception  quite  another; 
and  so  also  empirical  perception,  and  an  empirical 
perception.  Erscheinung,  now,  is  an  empirical  percep- 
tion. It  has  the  force  in  it  of  the  presentation  of  (or  to) 
the  subjective  faculty.  Erscheinungen,  in  fact,  are  to 
Kant  simply  presentations  of  or  to  sense.  We  have  only, 
indeed,  to  see  the  origin  of  the  term  in  the  need  for 
it  which  the  peculiar  theory  entailed.  Kant  did  not 
deny  at  last,  and  was  under  no  necessity  to  seem  to 
doubt  at  first,  Dinge  an  sich,  objects  in  themselves, 
independent  external  things  which  acted  in  such  and 
such  manner  on  us.  But,  neither  doubtino-  nor 
denying  them,  or,  indeed,  whether  doubting  or 
denying  them,  it  was  enough  for  him  that  we  did  not 
know  them,  or  could  not  know  them.  As  I  have  so 
often  said,  the  scratch  only  knows  itself;  it  knows 
nothing  of  the  thorn.  And  that  was  the  way  in  which 
Kant  viewed  the  result  of  any  action  on  us  of 
possible  things  in  themselves.  We  could  not,  by  any 
possibility,  know  them,  he  thought,  but  only  what 
they  did  to  us.  We  had  colours,  sounds,  feels, 
smells,  tastes  in  ourselves,  possibly,  probably,  or  cer- 
tainly, from  outer  things ;  but  these  outer  things  we 
did  not  know,  and  could  not  know.  We  could  know 
only  their  eflfects  upon  us,  these  colours,  sounds,  etc. 
Object  to  us  could  not,  then,  be  any  Thing  in  itself, 
but  only  such  object  as  we  constructed  to  ourselves 
out  of  these  colours,  sounds,  feels,  etc.     (His  whole 

z 


•» 


354 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


theory,  consequently,  was  how  we  accomplish  this.) 
But  such  an  object  could  only  be  an  "  Erscheinung," 
what  ajipeared  to   us — say  in   consequence   of  the 
action  of  the  presupposed  unknown  things  in  them- 
selves.    Kant*s  Erscheinungen^  then,  are  simply  oiir 
ohjecU ;  but  he  thinks  that  he  is  under  a  necessity  to 
call  them  so,  because,  when  properly  viewed,  they  are 
not,  as  vulgarly  supposed,  the  things  in  themselves, 
but  only  the  appearances  to  sense  set  up  in  us  by 
these  things  in  themselves ;  of  which  latter  the  ex- 
istence is  only  an  inference,  a  supposition,  an  hypo- 
thesis;   and  this  inference,  supposition,  hypothesis, 
nowise  helps  us  to  perceive  said  existence.      That 
existence,  then,  is  not  perceived,  but  only  the  appear- 
ances, the  feelings,  the  affections,  the  states  of  our 
own — ^say  the  scratches  which  it  causes  in  us.     This 
point  of  view  is  fundamental  with  Kant,  and  it  must 
never  be  lost  sight  of.     We  can  see,  then,  now,  that 
an  Erscheinung,  as  an  Anschauung,  as  a  Wahrneh- 
mung, is  simply  what  we  call  an  object,  and  that  Kant 
himself  would  seek  to  add  to  this  word  nothing  but 
the  phrase  to  sense.     Each  of  these,  he  would  say,  is 
an  object  to  sense.     It  is  the  difficulty  with  these  and 
other    such   words  which   has   largely   led   to    the 
Kantian  caricatures  which,  hitherto,  we  have,  in  many 
cases,  witnessed.     It  is  often  particularly  amusing  to 
behold  the  "  noble  Briton  "  stumbling  along,  ''  nothing 
daunted,"  amid  those  supererogatory  blocks  of  "  intui- 
tings"  and  " envisagings,"    "inspections"  and    *'as. 
pections,"    " phaenomena,"   "shows,"    "appearances," 
"manifestations,"   "ghosts"!      The    words,   for    all 
that,  are  often  not  easy  suitably  to  translate,  and  I 
shall  be  found  to  avail  myself  here,  too,  of  a  consider- 
able latitude  of  phrase. 


COMMENTARY. 


355 


IV. 

That  the  judgment,  "  a  body  is  extended,"  should 
be  called  a  priofi,  necessary,  universal,  etc.,  is  con- 
fusing, until  the  reader  has,  once  for  all,  taken  what 
we  may  call  Kant's  groove.  1  have  already  referred 
to  this.  The  a  jmori  here  is  the  relative  a  priori,  and 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  a  priori  which  constitutes 
Kant's  theme.  If  we  have,  once  for  all,  the  notion 
body,  we  find  involved  in  the  very  notion  the 
quality  of  extension.  It  is  quite  evident,  then,  that, 
so  far  or  relatively  a  priori,  we  can  say  a  body  is 
extended,  and  that  the  force  of  the  averment,  depend- 
ing on  a  foregone  conclusion,  is,  to  that  extent,  uni- 
versal and  necessary.  It  is,  however,  confusing  that 
these  predicates,  so  essential  as  they  are  in  the  other 
sense  to  the  entire  inquiry,  should  be  at  all  rela- 
tively or  analytically  applied.  Then,  again,  the 
unreserved  a  priori  attributed  to  the  proposition,  no 
change  without  a  cause,  is  fitted  to  stumble  the  un- 
practised reader  who  remembers  that  Kant  has  just 
told  him  that  the  notion  change  is  empirical.  Kant, 
for  all  that,  is  still  speaking  quite  correctly  and  con- 
sistently. To  call  any  synthetic  proposition  a  priori, 
etc.,  Kant  has  only  to  see  the  characters  of  necessity 
and  universality  in  it,  let  the  others  be  as  empirical  as 
they  may.  The  synthetic  propositions  he  calls  a  priori 
are  not  a  ^nm  in  the  sense  of  preceding  all  experience, 
or  of  being  absolutely  free  from  all  elements  and  ad- 
mixture of  experience  (which,  indeed,  they  cannot  be, 
as  all  begins  with  experience)  ;  but  they  are  a  priori 
in  the  sense  that  they  contain  a  necessity,  etc.,  which, 
synthetic  as  they  are,  sense  or  experience  could  not 
give  them,  and  which,  then,   they  must  owe  to  the 


356 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


subject — to  the  higher  cognitive  faculty  itself.  It  is 
important,  therefore,  to  see  that  the  analytic  judg- 
ments form  no  part  of  our  inquiry  at  present,  but 
only  those  which  are  synthetic.  These,  again,  are 
either  empirical  or  pure.  Empirical  synthetics  are 
such  as  possess  the  predicate  which  they  add  to  the 
notion,  from  a  direct  reference  to  experience.  We 
know  what  a  body  is,  say ;  but  now,  should  it  be 
asked.  Are  all  bodies  heavy?  how  can  I  know  this 
without  trying  the  fact  in  actual  experience  ?  That 
is  not  the  case  with  the  proposition,  Every  effect  has 
a  cause.  That  is  a  proposition  pure  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  non-empirical,  and  it  is  non-empirical  in  the 
sense  that,  though  the  things  united  are  only  em- 
pirical (any  actual  effect,  or  any  actual  cause,  is  only 
known  from  experience),  the  nexus  between  them 
is  not  empirical ;  the  senses  only  show  a  first  and 
a  second;  the  senses  cannot  see  a  relation  of 
necessity.  That,  then,  is  the  reason  that  the  pro- 
position of  causality  is  called  a  priori  No  smelling 
or  tasting  or  listening  or  looking,  no  measuring  or 
weighing,  will  arrive  at  the  necessary  nexus  between 
the  two  affections :  they  can  apply  themselves  only 
to  these  affections  themselves.  You  see  the  hammer 
fall,  you  hear  the  sound  follow ;  but  that  is  all  that 
the  senses  can  tell  you — a  first  and  a  second.  Even 
were  the  facts  so,  the  senses  could  not  say,  the  first 
is,  being  first,  cause,  and  the  second  is,  being  second, 
effect.  But  the  very  facts  are  not  so ;  lightning  is 
not  the  cause  of  thunder ;  precedence  is  not  always 
the  cause  of  sequence  ;  nor  is  post  hoc  by  any  means 
necessarily  propter  hoc.  It  is  by  reason  of  the  nexus, 
then,  which  is  something  quite  beyond  the  senses, 
that  the  proposition  of  causality  is  named  a  true 
a  priori  synthetic.     It  may  be  called  pure  also  so  far 


COMMENTARY. 


357 


. 


as  this  nexus  is  non-empirical ;  but  it  is  not  pure 
so  far  as  what  the  nexus  unites  are  things  empirical. 
We  may  perfectly  well  understand  now,  too,  what 
Kant  means  when  he  says  that  "such  synthetic 
principles  constitute  the  entire  end  and  aim  of  his 
whole  inquiry."  The  proposition  of  causality  pre- 
cisely involves  such  a  priori  synthetic  principle :  he 
will  be  able  to  answer  Hume's  question,  then,  and 
much  more,  should  he  be  able  to  demonstrate  and 
explain  an  entire  system,  or  the  entire  system  of  such 
principles.  That  is  his  one  business,  but  in  the  pro- 
secution of  this  business  it  comes  out  that  it  is  pre- 
cisely these  principles  (an  a  priori  of  the  intellect) 
which  make  of  our  mere  subjective  sense-feelings  this 
objective  or  g'wa^z-objective  universe. 

V. 

The  important  point  in  this  section  is  the  affirma- 
tion of  it,  as  contained  at  once  in  its  title.  In  fact,  it 
places  us  at  once  before  the  question  of  metaphysic — 
the  question  of  categories,  and  of  categories  a  priori. 
For  the  reader  that  already  knows  Kant  perceives  at 
once  that  Kant  is  speaking  with  all  his  categories  in 
his  mind — specially  those  of  substance,  causality,  and 
reciprocity.  Nay,  we  may  say  that  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  Kant  is  speaking  wdth  all  his  principles  in  his 
mind;  for  pure  perception  (time  and  space)  being 
added  to  the  categories,  we  may  hold  the  table  of  his 
principles  proper  to  be  thereby  completed,  the  rest 
(the  Ideas  with  practical  principles  and  aesthetic 
principles)  being,  on  the  whole,  pretty  well  corollaries. 
The  importance  of  the  term  Anschauung  comes  here 
again,  consequently,  to  be  well  illustrated.  In  fact, 
it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  keep  ever  before 


358 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


the  mind  this,  that  even  with  his  categories  Kant  is 
unable  to  move  from  the  spot  unless  by  stepping 
on  to  the  objectivity  of  perception.  That  is  the 
necessary  complement  to  his  categories ;  and  without 
it  they  are  but  pictures,  immobile,  inert,  sterile.  We 
saw  that  the  source  of  what  predicates  we  took  up 
and  added  on  in  empirical  synthesis  was  actual  expe- 
rience. Now,  here,  where  the  question  is  of  pure, 
non-empirical,  or  a  priori  synthetics,  we  have  to  see 
that  it  is  Anschauung  plays  for  Kant  the  part  of 
Erfahrung.  This  is  very  important.  Indeed,  it  will 
become  a  question  in  the  end  (perhaps  in  another 
work)  whether  or  not  Kant  has,  for  the  getting  of 
his  pieces  into  action,  been  obliged  to  exceed  even 
Anschauung,  and  so  to  double  over  on  to  experience 
as  to  reduce  his  entire  industry  to  a  palpable  begging 
of  the  single  question.  But,  be  this  as  it  may,  this 
section,  surely,  leaves  no  possibility  of  doubt  as  to 
what  Anschauung  means,  whether  we  translate  it 
perception  or  intuition.  To  have  recourse  to  ima- 
gination for  the  realization  of  a  triangle  is  the  same 
thing  as  to  have  recourse  to  Anschauung.  Actual  in- 
spection of  an  object  outwardly  (by  special  sense)  or 
inwardly  (by  general  sense-imagination)  is  Anschau- 
ung. In  his  first  preface  Kant  sets  "discursive 
(logische)  Deutlichkeit,"  or  the  "  Deutlichkeit  durch 
Begriffe,"  against  "intuitive  (sesthetische)  Deutlich- 
keit," or  the  "  Deutlichkeit  durch  Anschauungen,  dl^ 
Beispiele  oder  andere  Erläuterungen  in  concreto^ 
The  word  occurs  so  often  in  all  of  the  German  philo- 
sophers, and  so  often  in  the  same  unmistakable  sense, 
that  it  is  somewhat  humiliating  to  find  one's  self 
expatiating  on  it.  I  vividly  recollect,  however,  how, 
on  the  appearance  of  my  first  work,  a  reputed  great 
German  scholar  questioned   my  translation  of  An- 


COMMENTARY. 


359 


schauung,   and  objected  as  what   must  wholly  and 
hopelessly  pose,  "  die  Anschauung  Gottes  " ! 

VI. 

The  moment  we  get  the  point  of  view  that  the 
judgment  of  causality,  every  effect  must  have  a  cause 
(the  whence  of  the  undoubted  necessary  connexion  in 
which  was  Hume's  question),  is  an  a  priori  synthetic 
proposition,  we  get  to  see  also  the  general  problem. 
If  Hume  asked,  how  is  the  a  priori  synthetic  proposi- 
tion of  causality  possible,  it  was  easy  for  Kant  to  say, 
Nay,  how  are  all  a  priori  synthetic  propositions  pos- 
sible? Of  course,  though  Kant  tells  truly  enough 
what  the  question  came  to,  he  does  not  accurately 
name  Hume's  thought.  It  never  occurred  to  Hume 
"  to  make  out  that  such  a  proposition  is,  a  jtriori^ 
impossible."  The  idea  of  an  a  priori  force  in  its 
reference  was  precisely  the  very  last  that  would  have 
come  to  him  even  in  a  dream.  From  the  footstep  in 
the  sand  he  was  necessitated  to  think  a  human  foot ; 
and  from  the  watch  he  found,  a  maker  of  it ;  but  he 
would  have  rather  stared  if  he  had  been  told  that  the 
necessary  connexion  he  was  led  to  assume  between 
footstep  and  foot  and  between  watch  and  maker  lay 
a  priori  in  his  own  mind!  Hume  died  in  1776,  but 
had  he  been  alive  in  1781, 1  do  not  believe  that  Kant 
himself  would  have  been  able  to  convince  him  of  that ! 
"  Had  he  but  caught  sight  of  our  problem  in  its  uni- 
versality," of  course,  it  is  impossible  to  say  what  he 
might  have  done ;  but,  viewing  his  fifty  long  pages 
on  mathematical  evidence  under  the  "  Ideas  of  Space 
and  Time,"  it  is  very  doubtful  that  what  Kant 
said  of  mathematics  would  have  at  all  changed  him, 
and  it  is  quite  certain  that  he  acquiesced,  just  as  we 


360 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


361 


all  do,  in  the  necessary  connexion  of  cause  and  effect, 
though  he  reflected  that,  from  the  state  of  the  case, 
the  belief  could  rest,  naturally,  only  on  an  instinct, 
or,  philosophically,  only  on  a  custom.  The  section, 
as  a  whole,  is  general,  and  very  properly  points  out 
that  a  jjrio7i  synthetics  being,  certain  pure  sciences 
will  also  be.  The  question,  "How  are  these  pos- 
sible ?  "  explains  that  other  as  concerns  the  **  possi- 
bility of  experience."  As  they  "actually  are,"  it 
actually  is ;  and  as  they  rest,  it  will  rest— on  a  jmori 
synthetics. 

VII. 

The  system  of  pure  reason  figured  here  might  very 
profitably  be  applied  in  explanation  of  the  i^ov?,  at 
any  time  that  Aristotle  talks  of  it  as  apxh  eirLCTTmn^. 
But  this  travels  farther  than  Kant,  and  opens  a  very 
wide  matter.  We  see  here  very  clearly,  too,  what  Kant's 
inquiry  is  to  be :  it  is  not  to  be  a  system,  but  only  a 
gathering  and  a  search  of  what  will  constitute  the 
principles  towards  such.     It  is  important  to  note, 
too,  that  it  is  not  to  "  extend,"  but  only  '•  clear  "  and 
"guard"  reason.     The  result,  then,  cannot  be  any 
dogmatic  absolute  philosophy,  but  merely  an  account 
of  those  a  priori  intellections  that  enable  us  to  turn 
our  own  a  posteriori  feelings  into  objective  perceptions, 
the  objective  perceptions  of  experience.     That,  then, 
is  what  the  possibility  of  experience  means.     The 
word  transcendental  refers  to  it;  or  what  underlies 
that  word  may  be  said  to  concern  the  rationale  of  the 
possibility  of  experience ;  though  starting  with  the 
simple  question  of  a  priori  synthetics,  that  is  what 
the  whole  inquiry  comes  to  be.     A  priori  synthetics 
found   or  ground   "  the   possibility   of  experience." 
What  is  transcendental  forms  part  of  the  rationale 


that  explains  how  this  actual  experience  of  ours  is 
possible.  Experience  requires  synthesis,  and  what  is 
transcendental  supplies  and  explains  all  a  priori  ele- 
ments of  synthesis  in  general.  It  is  on  these  that  the 
possibility  of  experience  depends.  The  whole  matter, 
then,  may  be  called  a  sort  of  dissecting  of  reason  into 
its  own  primitive  fibres — the  fibres  by  which  it  catches 
up  into  objects  all  special  sensations.  So  it  is  that 
it  is  a  critique — a  critical  search,  and  a  transcendental 
critical  search,  but  not  into  "things"  which  are  "in- 
exhaustible," but  only  into  the  "  understanding," 
which,  already  a  restricted  object,  is  further  to  be 
merely  restrictedly  questioned.  We  see  that  a  canon 
is  a  code  of  rules  or  laws  whereby  to  judge,  while  an 
organon  would  mean  a  collection  of  prescripts  whereby 
to  realize.  What  is  ]>ropwdeutical  is,  of  course,  a  pre- 
liminary teaching  of  the  way.  What  is  transcendent  is 
beyond  experience ;  but  what  is  transcendental^  though 
beyond  special  sense,  is  not  beyond  experience,  but 
is  in  experience,  and  is  even  precisely  that  element 
which,  out  of  mere  subjective  special  sensations  like 
ours,  renders  this  experience  of  ours  possible.  Still, 
Kant  would  have  it  used  specially  when  it  is  theory 
or  rationale  that  is  in  regard.  Transcendental,  in  a 
certain  way,  is  whatever  can  be  known  of  sense,  inde- 
pendently of  sense.  "  It  is  occupied,  not  so  much 
with  objects,  as  with  the  manner  of  our  knowledge 
of  them,  so  far  as  that  may  be  a  priori  possible."  And 
that  just  means,  transcendental  concerns  a  rationale 
or  the  rationale  of  the  possibility  of  experience  through 
certain  a  priori  general  mental  forms  which,  so  to 
speak,  objectify  our  a  posteriori  special  sense-matters. 


/ 


362  TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


Transcendental  Esthetic. 

§1. 

Taking  all,  so  far,  on  Kant's  own  terms,  there  is 
but  little  difficulty  in  understanding  where  we  pre- 
sently are.     There  are  such  things  as  a  jmori  syn- 
thetics, and  we  have  already  seen  a  number  of  them, 
as  substance  and  reciprocity,  in  addition  to  causality. 
Now,  confined  as  we  are,  so  far  as  what  the  senses 
tell  us,  only  to  our  own  subjective  affections,  only  to 
certain  states  of  special  feeling  within  ourselves,  lio-ht, 
sound,  smell,  etc.,  what  is  sought  will  be  that  a  priori 
that  rescues  us  from  this  a  posteriori,  that  intellection 
that  rescues  us  from  this  sensation,   that  objective 
subjectivity    that    rescues   us    from    this    subjective 
subjectivity— or,   just   in    general,    that   objectivity, 
simply,  which  rescues  us  from  our  own  affections, 
which  actually  throws  up  or  out  our  own  affections 
into  the  vast,   seemingly  external,    seemingly  inde- 
pendent world  around  us.     The  great  question  here, 
then,  evidently  comes  at  once  to  be.  What  are  these 
principles,  and  whence  do  we  derive  them  ?     As  we 
have  seen,  they  must  be  a  priori;  i.e.,  they  must  lie 
in  our  minds,   they  must  be  products  of  our  own 
mental  faculties.     But,  again,  there  is  not  required 
any  difficult  or  laborious  analysis  of  these  faculties. 
It  is  enough  for  us  to  take  them  quite  generally. 
And  our  faculties,  quite  generally  taken,  consist  of 
no  more  than  the  two  sources  of  knowledge.  Sense 
by  which  matter  is  given  to  us,  and  understanding 
by  which  it  is  further  worked  up  in  the  forms  of 
intellection.     As   Kant   himself  has  just  intimated, 
then,  we  have  to  inquire,  1,  Is  there  anything  a  priori 
connected  with  sense?  and,  2,  What  are  the  a  j^riori 


COMMENTARY. 


363 


principles  of  intellection?  More,  indeed:  What  are 
the  a  priori  principles  of  intellection  that  are  percep- 
tive elements?  Kant  will  be  found  afterwards  to 
divide  principles  of  intellection  into  those  of  the 
Understanding  proper  and  those  of  Reason.  These 
latter,  however,  which  are  the  three  Ideas,  are  only 
regulative;  and,  in  this  volume,  it  is  our  intention  to 
confine  ourselves  to  the  important  constitutive  principles. 
What  we  have  now  directly  to  see,  consequently,  is,  in 
search  of  an  a  priori  element,  the  critique  of  Sense. 

This  section  offers  a  valuable  opportunity  for  the 
explanation  of  terms ;  and  with  that,  and  what  has 
been  already  said,  enough  will  have  been  done  here 
in  that  direction. 

We  have  already  discussed  perception,  and  can 
very  well  understand,  not  only  from  objects  of  sight, 
but  also  from  the  blind  man  and  his  potato  (his  shoe, 
his  watch,  his  house,  if  you  will)  what  Kant  means 
by  its  reference  to  objects  being  direct  or  immediate 
(unmittelbar).  The  concep.tion  of  copper  is  mediate, 
indirect,  mittelbar  (that  is,  the  idea  or  notion  of  it), 
through  a  variety  of  individual  go-betweens ;  but  the 
perception  of  a  penny  is  immediate  and  direct,  and 
wholly  without  intervention  (or  mediation)  of  any- 
thing else.  An  object  of  perception  is  also  given; 
that  is,  the  matter  of  it,  the  sensation  of  it,  is  con- 
tributed to  us  by  the  special  senses,  sight,  hearing, 
touch,  etc.  The  general  faculty  which  enables  us  to 
be  capable  of  sensation  is  our  sensibility.  It  is  through 
sensibility  alone  that  we  possess  perceptions ;  some  of 
which,  as  due  only  to  general  (not  special)  sensi- 
bility, maybe  called  ^wr^  (n  on- empirical)  perceptions. 
Notions  are  the  progeny  of  the  understanding ;  but 
Kant  indicates  that  they,  and  thought  generally,  are 
vacuous  and  idle  unless  filled  and  realized  by  actual 


364 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


contributions  of  sense.     Sensation  will  be  understood 
at  once ;  as  also  empirical,  which  is  the  adjective  for 
(special)    sensation.      Erscheinung  is  more   difficult; 
but  the  difficulty  lies  only  in  the  term  as  a  term,  not 
in  its  meaning.     It  has  been  already  explained,  and 
is  further  furnished  with  a  gloss  in  the  text.     It  will 
be  seen  that  I  even  at  times  translate  it  impression. 
The  matter  of  sensation  will   also  be  plain.      The 
''form,''  however,  that  throws  the  complex  of  impres- 
sion {''das  Mannigfaltige  der  Erscheinung'')  into  '^cer- 
tain relations,"  will  not  be  the  worse  of  a  word  or 
two.  ^  An  Erscheinung,  an  Empfindung,  an  Eindruck, 
that  is,  a  colour,  a  sound,  a  feel,  a  taste,  a  smell,  is 
not  conceived  by  Kant  as  unity,  or  a  unit,  simple,  and 
single,  absolutely  one.    On  the  contrary,  it  is  to  him, 
and  he  calls  it  always,  a  "  Mannigfaltiges;'  a  complex^ 
a  multiplex,  a  manifold— that  is,  a  complex,  a  multi' 
plex,  a  manifold  of  units  of  sense-impression.     Now, 
the  order  of  these  units,  further,  Kant  conceives  to  be 
no  affiiir  of  sense  as  sense.     Sense  only  receives;  it 
must  be  another  faculty  dis-jmes.     Now  all  this  may 
be  doubtful ;  but  if  we  are  to  go  on  at  all,  we  must 
simply  take  it  at  the  hands  of  Kant  on  trust.     A 
colour  comes  to  us  only  in  units  of  colour,  and  it  is 
not  the  eye  gives  us  these  units  as  we  think  we  see 
them  arranged.      So  of  the  other  senses.     Possibly 
we  may  object  that  some  special  sensations  are  them-  • 
selves   only   simple  units,   and  that  others,  though 
supplying  a  complex,  supply  that  complex  in  an  order 
of  units  manifestly  derived  only  from  themselves,  as 
the  breadth  of  a  smell  from  the  sense  that  is  named 
smell ;  but  we  had  better  suppress  objection,  so  far, 
and  simply  take  all  as  it  is  given  us.     It  is  certain 
that  we  can  allow  Kant  as  much  as  this  at  once,  that, 
though  the  succession  or  collocation   in  which  the 


COMMENTARY. 


365 


i 


units  of  one  or  more  senses  may  come  to  us  must  be 
due  to  that  or  these,  still  the  interpretation  which  we 
at  last  give  to  said  succession  or  said  collocation  is 
often  no  affair  of  sense,  but  of  the  intellect  alone. 
We  may,  then,  so  limiting  Kant's  meaning,  accom- 
pany him  in  his  further  discussion,  without  any  con- 
stant or  haunting  sense  of  some  hiatus  on  his  part. 
In  fact,  it  really  comes  to  this,  What  are  units  to 
Kant?  When  he  speaks  of  the  units  of  a  house,  he 
means  the  material  particles  that  are  side  by  side  in 
it.  When  he  speaks  of  the  units  of  heat,  or  light,  or 
colour,  he  means  the  degrees  in  these.  When  he 
speaks  of  the  units  of  substances,  he  means  their 
qualities  or  accidents.  And  when  he  speaks  of  the 
units  of  causality  or  reciprocity,  he  means  the  objects 
(not  the  units  of  these  objects)  that  may  happen  to 
be  respectively  so  connected.  A  ship  up  and  down 
a  stream,  water  fluid  and  water  solid,  water  and  a 
glass,  a  bullet  and  a  cushion,  a  stone  and  the  sun, 
the  moon  and  the  earth :  these  objects,  as  we  shall 
find,  are  all  to  his  mind  units  in  relation  the  one  to  the 
other,  and  the  Mannigfaltiges  he  conceives  in  all  these 
cases  consists  in  the  complex  of  connected  objects. 
What,  then,  is  a  unit  of  complex  dificrs  to  Kant  with 
the  difi^ering  relation  :  in  certain  relations  it  is  a 
constituent  unit  of  a  single  object,  and  in  others  it  is 
a  constituent  object  in  a  complex  of  such.  Still  it  is 
to  be  understood  that  whether  the  elements  of  a  com- 
plex be  themselves  units  or  at  once  objects,  Kant 
conceives  the /arm  of  their  order  (not  but  that  suc- 
cession is  to  Kant  himself,  indeed,  quite  an  aflair  of 
sense  itself)  to  be  submitted,  in  a  certain  way,  to  the 
influence  of  a  priori  principles.  Time,  space,  quan- 
tity, quality:  these  are  a  priori  principles  and  act  on 
units,  if  also  on  objects.     Substance,  causality,  and 


366 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


reciprocity,  again,  seem  principally  to  act  on  ready- 
made  objects.  What  is  "pure  in  a  transcendental 
sense"  is  whatever  is  non-empirical.  It  is  important 
to  see  that  Kant  attributes  such  cognitions  as  sub- 
stance, force,  divisibility,  etc.,  to  understanding; 
such  as  impenetrability,  hardness,  colour,  etc.,  to 
special  sense;  and  such  as  extension  and  shape  to 
general  sense.  These  last,  in  fact,  he  attributes  to 
that  element  of  pure  a  priori  perception  he  calls  space. 
Transcendental  ^Esthetic  and  Transcendental  Logic 
are  now  of  themselves  intelligible.  When  Kant 
speaks  of  isolating  sense  and  performing  a  process, 
British  readers  expect  to  see  an  interesting  induction 
begin,  and  are  apt  to  feel  disconcerted  and  rebuffed 
when  abruptly  informed  that  the  operation  has  been 
already  realized,  and  that  they  have  to  take  time  and 
space  as  the  results.  Similar  other  abrupt  intima- 
tions in  similar  other  circumstances  are  not  rare 
in  Kant.  It  is  to  be  said,  however,  that  in  what 
follows  on  Space  and  Time  we  really  have  what 
amounts  to  an  actual  induction  of  these  as  pure  or  a 
priori  forms  of  general  sense.  Call  the  process  here, 
indeed,  induction  or  deduction,  it  comes  very  much 
to  the  same  thing. 

§  2.  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  the  Notion  of  Space. 

Space  is  the  universal  form  of  all  we  experience 
externally,  and  time  is  equally  the  universal  form  of 
all  we  experience  internally.  But,  even  as  such,  and 
just  looked  at,  so  to  speak,  with  our  usual  eyes,  there 
is  something  very  peculiar  and  interesting  about  them. 
Even  as  we  walk  about,  or  sit  by  ourselves,  it  may 
occur  to  us  as  a  point  of  curiosity,  what  can  be  the 
real  nature  or  origin  of  such  vast,  indispensable,  all- 


COMMENTARY. 


367 


'? 


I 


embracing,  but  strange,  singular,  and  extraordinary 
figures  ?  Can  they  possibly  be  things  ?  we  ask  our- 
selves. If  not  things  (and  they  are  not  at  all  like 
what  we  call  "other"  things),  can  they  only  be 
qualities  or  relations  of  things?  Or,  finally,  can 
they  be  neither  things  nor  affections  of  things,  but 
forms  of  our  own  which,  though  always  only  within 
our  own  selves,  we  yet  attribute  to  things,  as  if  real 
and,  so  to  speak,  themselves  things.  Leibnitz  seems 
to  have  held  the  second  position,  viz.,  that,  things  so 
acting  and  reacting  on  each  other,  time  and  space  were 
their  results.  The  first  position  is  that  of  vague  com- 
mon sense  which  has,  as  yet,  not  even  questioned 
itself:  space  and  time,  however  peculiar,  it  thinks, 
are  still  independent  realities.  Kant  argues  against 
both  of  these  positions,  and  stands  by  that  which  is 
left.  Time  and  space  are  to  him  subjective  forms 
within  ourselves,  or  from  within  ourselves.  Now  it 
is  important,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  exact  force  of 
this  should  be  realized.  Suppose  a  magic-lantern, 
suppose  it  to  shrink  together  into  its  own  slide,  into 
the  focus  of  its  own  slide — nay,  suppose  that  focus  to 
be  a  mere  geometrical  point — well,  now,  if  alone  in 
the  world  and  opposed  by  nothing,  any  such  magic- 
lantern  could  not  possibly  exhibit  any  of  its  figures, 
but  let  it  have  the  power  now  to  throw  out  of  its  own 
self  a  white  sheet,  or  the  spectral  phase  of  a  white 
sheet,  then  on  to  that  white  sheet  it  could  project  its 
figures,  and  yet  all  would  be  from  within,  and  really 
still  within,  its  own  self.  So  it  is  that  Kant  figures 
space.  It  is  within,  but  when  we  are  touched  within 
by  any  special  sensation,  space,  on  the  instant,  stands 
without  holding  it.  Thus,  then,  we  can  conceive 
space  as  an  expansible  disc  potentially  packed  within 
us,  but  starting  out,  even  infinitely  around  us,  on 


368 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


any  call  of  actual  sensation :  it  is,  as  it  were,  a  mere 
spectrum,  a  mere  mirage  of  the  eye.  Now,  if  we  can 
conceive  that  of  space,  we  may  similarly  conceive  it 
of  time;  and  that  is  the  position  of  Kant.  Under 
the  Arabian  seal,  the  genius  was  within,  invisible  ; 
but  the  seal  being  broken,  it  was  a  smoke  without 
that  filled  the  universe.  We  have  now  to  see  Kant's 
arguments. 

These,  naturally,  must  be  conditioned  in  the  first 
place  by  Kant's  presuppositions.     Now,  one  of  these 
was  that  whatever  we  mateiially  knew  could  only  be 
an  affection  of  our  own,  and,  consequently,  within  our 
own   mind.      But  though  every  sensation   was   our 
own  and  within  us,  it  did  not  follow  that  it  was  an 
act  of  our  own,  or  at  all  depended  upon  m.     We 
were,  indeed,  in  certain  cases  active;   but  we  were 
also  in  other  cases  passive.    We  could  solve  problems 
and  consider  a  great  variety  of  things  actually  in  our 
own  head ;  but  we  could  not,  of  our  own  will,  brinir 
into  our  head   either   any  one  colour,  or  any  one 
sound,  or  any  one  touch,  or  any  one  taste,  or  any 
one  smell.      In  all  these  references  we  were  quite 
passive,  and  had  to  wait     Or,  in  Kant  s  own  phrase, 
all  these  were  intimations  given.     In  his  first  edition, 
it  seemed  to  be  indiff^erent  to  him  whether  they  were 
given  from  within  or  from  without.     Locke  might  be 
in  the  right,  but  so  also  might  Berkeley.     This  he 
altered  in  his  second  edition;    and  persistently  de- 
clared thenceforward,  that  there  were  actual  outer 
objects,  things  themselves,  or  things  in  themselves, 
which  things  acted  on  us,  and  so  set  up  in  us  the 
affections  of  our  own  which  we  called  sensations,  but 
which  we  threw  out  and  built  up  into  perceptions. 
These  perceptions,  then,  were  but  constructions  of 
our  own   affections,  and   had   nothing  to   do   with 


COMMENTARY. 


369 


« 

I 


i    1 

I 

1 


thinors  themselves.    Thin^fs  themselves  were  unknown 
to  us,  for  we  could  only  know,  not  them,  but  the 
effects  they  caused  in  us.     All  this,  of  course,  does 
not  sound  very  unreasonable  on  the  large  scale ;  for 
it  is  easy  to  see  that  all  we  materially  know  is,  at 
bottom,  subjective  sensation,  as  colour,  sound,   etc. 
Nevertheless,  if  the  reader  will  but  try  it  by  reference 
to  any  actual  object,  he  will  find  it  hopeless.     Let 
him  take  out  his  watch,  break  it  up  into  its  various 
pieces,  and  put  it  together  again.     He  will  find,  of 
course,  that  what  he  has  put  together  into  wheel  and 
lever,  main-spring  and  fusee,  pinion  and  axle,  inner 
case  and  outer  case,  dial  plate  and  hands,  gold  and 
glass,  etc.,  etc.,  were,  in  the  first  instance,  as  regards 
each  and  all  of  them,  simply  colours  and  feels.     Still 
he  will  not  find  it  easy  to  conceive  that  all  was  owing 
to  perfectly  unknown  things  in  themselves  which  set 
up  these  feelings  in  us,  and  so  merely  gave  us  oppor- 
tunity to  construct  a  watch  out  of  them.     I  do  not 
think  it  will  help  him  either  to  be  told,  by  Berkeley, 
that  there  are  not  any  such  things  in  themselves,  but 
only  a  Being  in  Himself,  only  God,  and  that  it  is  He, 
from  moment  to  moment,  gives  us  this  colour  and 
that,  this  feeling  and  that,  and  so  makes  it  possible 
for  us  in  the  end  to  construct  a  watch.     It  is,  surely, 
a  curious  idea,  to  conceive  God  holding  up  the  glass 
to  me,  and  handing  me  the  razor  that  enables  me  to 
shave !     Of  course,  there  are  two  ways  of  conceiving 
the  things  in  themselves :  either  simply  as  something, 
singular  or  plural,  in  the  unknown,  inconceivable  absc- 
lute,  which,  as  potentially  alien  to  us,  acts  on  us  we 
know  not  how  ;  or,  taking  up  a  bit  of  the  gold,  or  glass, 
or  steel  of  the  watch,  we  may  say  the  thing  in  itself 
to  be  conceived  here  is  not  that  absolutely  unknown 

thinf^  in  itself,  but  only  that  relatively  unknown  thing 
°  2  a 


370 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


in  itself  which,  as  a  substance,  is  so  and  so  to  us,  but 
to  subjects  differently  endowed  might  be  quite  other- 
wise. I  take  leave  to  say  that  people,  if  they  like, 
may  feign  that  what  to  me  is  a  bit  of  wire  may  to  an 
inhabitant  of  the  moon  be  a  leech,  but,  for  all  that, 
what  is  conceived  as  the  relatively  unknown  thing  in 
itself  is  precisely  the  one,  single,  absolutely  known 
thing.  I  decline  to  believe  any  pin  a  mere  cry  from 
the  awful  sanctuary  of  the  thing  in  itself. 

But  be  all  that  as  it  may,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
Kant,  and  it  is  Kant  concerns  us  here,  did  conceive 
the  thing  in  itself  absolutely  unknown,  and  what  we 
call  an  object  only  a  qiiasi-ohject  put  together  out 
of  our  own  subjective  states.  The  question  with  him 
now,  then,  naturally  would  be,  How  does  this  take 
place?  How  can  a  mere  series  of  feelings  in  the 
single  point  of  consciousness  within  us  become  an 
object  without  us,  and  the  whole  universe  of  objects 
without  us?  It  would  strike  him  at  once  that  if  they 
are  all,  firstly,  within  us,  they  are  all,  secondly,  in 
time  and  space,  and  that  in  these  must  largely  lie  an 
essential  part  of  the  problem.  It  would  also  occur  to 
him  that,  if  these  are  to  act  on  what  is  within,  they 
must  themselves  be  within.  The  next  thing,  then, 
would  be  to  prove  that,  and  make  it  credible  to  him- 
self. And  here  he  would  separate  the  two  things ; 
here  he  would  say  that,  in  reference  to  sense,  these 
two  things  indicated  a  double  side.  There  were  in 
sense  feelings  that  always  remained  internal,  joy,  grief, 
pain,  etc. ;  but  there  were  also  feelings,  as  colours, 
sounds,  touches,  etc.,  that  came  immediately  somehow 
to  be  regarded  as  external.  Now,  if  time  could  be 
truly  predicated  of  all  feelings,  space  could  only  be 
predicated  of  those  to  which  externality  was  attri- 
buted.   Space,  the»,  might  be enMeda  forija of  external 


COMMENTARY. 


371 


sense,  and  time,  similarly,  a  form  of  internal  sense. 
All  that  we  call  external  presents  itself  in  relations  of 
space,  and  all  that  we  call  internal  we  perceive  in  re- 
lations of  time.  That  is,  there  is  an  external  sense,  and 
there  is  an  internal  sense.  By  the  former  we  perceive 
what  we  call  things,  and  by  the  latter  we  perceive, 
not  our  own  soul  (that  as  an  object  we  never  perceive), 
but  the  feelings  of  it,  the  states  of  it.  Things,  then, 
are  perceived  in  space;  and  our  own  internal  con- 
dition, our  own  states,  in  time.  Now,  then,  we  may 
repeat  our  questions  in  regard  to  space  and  time; 
and,  having  done  so,  we  shall  be  prepared  for  recep- 
tion of  the  arguments  of  Kant.  And  here  we  are  told 
at  once  that  the  exposition  constituted  by  these  argu- 
ments will  be  a  metaphysical  one,  or  that  it  will  prove 
the  notions  on  which  it  is  employed  to  be  a  iwiorL 

The  first  argument  for  the  peculiar  nature  of  space 
is  that  it  Ts  not  of  "empirical"  origin.  Empirical, 
as  we  have  seen,  applies  to  whatever  is  a  product  of 
special  sense.  Now,  conceiving  that  special  sense  has 
no  objects  but  colours,  sounds,  etc.,  it  does  appear  as 
if  space  were  no  product  of  special  sense,  but  rather — 
all  objects  of  special  sense  being  perceived  not  only  as 
diff^erent  the  one  from  the  other,  but  also  as  in  different 
places  the  one  from  the  other — as  though  this  circum- 
stance of  place  (^>.,  space)  were  simply  involved  in  the 
perception  of  objects,  and  came  along  with  these.  It 
does  seem  that  the  external  relations  of  objects  imply 
space  as  already  existent,  rather  than  that  space  is  a 
consequence  of  these  relations.  Space,  in  fact,  shows 
rather  as  a  condition  of  the  very  possibility  of  expe- 
rience than  as  a  fact  derived  from  experience. 

The  second  argument  is  to  make  good  the  necessity 
and  universality  of  space,  and,  consequently,  the  in- 
ference that  it  is  a  priori. 


372 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


The  third  argument  will  prove  space,  though  a  priori^ 
to  be  still  a  perception,  and  not  a  notion.  It  has 
both  the  unity  and  the  parts,  namely,  of  a  perceptive, 
and  not  those  of  a  logical,  object.  I  have  given  a 
decidedly  logical  import  to  '^  Bestandtheile,"  as  author- 
ized by  the  corresponding  passage  under  the  exposi- 
tion of  Time  (and  as  fully  explained  elsewhere). 
That  space,  too,  should  be  the  basis  of  geometry  cor- 
roborates its  a  jjriori  nature. 

The  fourth  argument  is,  like  the  third,  in  support 
of  the  perceptive,  not  merely  notional  nature,  of  space; 
the  infinitude  of  which,  in  relation  to  its  parts,  is  still 
perceptive,  and  not,  like  that  of  a  notion,  merely 
logical. 


§  3.  Transcendental  Exposition  as  Regards  Space. 

The  first  word  here  relating  to  transcendental  inti- 
mates that  that  term  means,  not  only  what  is  a  priori^ 
but  what,  as  a  priori^  is  the  foundation  of  other  a  priori 
synthetics — manifestly  in  experience,  like  causality, 
etc.     Kant's  transcendental  machinery,  then,  consti- 
tutes what  he  proposes  in  relative  answer  to  Hume. 
But  the  immediate  reference  here  is  to  space  as  bear- 
ing on  geometry ;  and,  in  that  reference,  the  former 
is  the  transcendental  principle  of  the  latter.      The 
reasoning,  nevertheless,   and   intelligibly  so,    is   not 
from  the  former  to  the  latter,  but  from  the  latter  to 
the  former.     Geometry  is  derivative  from  space  ;  and 
again,    geometry  is  only  explicable  on  the  presup- 
position that  space  is  so  and  so.     These  are  so  far 
reasons,  as  well  for  the  perceptive  as  the  a  prion 
nature  of  space.     I  may  remark  that  we  have  here 
the  terms  Anschauung^  Wahrnemung,  etc.,  so  used  that 
the  senses  we  have  already  given  them  are  rendered 


COMMENTARY. 


373 


quite  unmistakable.  It  is  specially  illustrative  of  the 
word  Vorstellung,  too,  that  an  Anschauung  should  be 
called  an  unmittelbare  Vorstellung, 


Inferences  from  these  Ideas. 

There  are  a  good  many  essential  Kantian  distinc- 
tions here,  which  it  is  important  for  us  clearly  to 
recognise  and  securely  take  along  with  us.  There 
are  expressions  in  Kant  about  a  ojie  all-embracing  space 
and  a  one  all-embracing  time,  or  that  seem  to  bear  on 
a  making  good  of  relations  in  all  time  or  in  all  space, 
which  may  mislead  certain  students,  who,  as  is  their 
way  with  their  Aristotle  and  their  Plato,  have  eyes 
and  ears  only  for  j)assages  in  their  Kant  or  their 
Hegel — expressions,  then,  in  such  references,  which 
may  mislead  such  students  to  attribute  to  Kant  some- 
thing very  like  an  absolute  space,  and  an  absolute 
time,  and  a  one  only  possible  absolute  experience. 
Now  due  consideration  of  the  section  before  us  is, 
surely,  alone  adequate  to  break  up  and  disperse  all  such 
fogs  and  mists  of  mere  dream,  apt  as  they  may  be  to 
settle  down  on  the  very  clearest  heights  or  the  most 
undeniable  hollows.  We  are  reminded,  for  example, 
that,  possessing  sense  itself  before  any  action  on  sense, 
we  may  possess  also,  in  our  own  subjective  structure, 
pre-existent  forins,  pre-existent  conditions,  attached  to 
the  susceptibility  itself,  which,  on  reception  of  im- 
pressions, may  be  called  out  and  come  forward  to  add 
themselves  on  to,  and  mix  and  mingle  with,  these. 
Now  of  this  nature  is  space.  It  is  but  a  colour  or  a 
twist  which  we  ourselves  give  to  things.  "  Absolute 
reality,"  as  it  is  (IL,  44)  expressly  denied  time,  is  in 
truth  denied  space.  Space,  in  fact,  is  "nothing," 
the  moment  we  abstract  from  our  own  peculiar  sub- 


374 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


jective  structure.     Wittout  this  abstraction,  but  with 
express  reference  to  the  peculiar  structure  of  our  own 
senses,  it  may,  indeed,  be  named  a  pure  perception ; 
but  even  as  such  it  is  a  void  subjective  form.     Nor, 
in  this  form,  is  it  things  we  see,  but  only  appearances 
to  sense.      Such  things — things  in  themselves— are 
not  at  all  known  to  us — such  things  neither  are  nor 
can  be  known  to  us — such  things,  indeed,  are  never 
asked  after  by  us.     How,  then,  in  the  midst  of  such 
mere    subjective     fictions    of    various    kinds,     any 
one  can  dream  of  an  absolute  experience  is  some- 
thing very  strange.      Why,  the  idea  of  an  absolute 
experience  never  once  struck  Kant.     We  know  that, 
besides  his  "  intuitm  derivativus^''  he  postulated  an  "  in- 
hiitiis  originarim ;''  and  we  see  here  his  very  ^^iniuitus 
derivativus "  split  up  into  an  actual  infinitude  of  pos- 
sible experiences.    Of  the  perception  described  here,  it 
is  only  from  the  point  of  view  of  "  a  human  being  "  that 
we  can  talk  of  it :  "  as  regards  the  perceptions  of  other 
thinking  beings  we  cannot  at  all  judge."     Even  if  we 
examine  Kant's  expressions  themselves  in  regard  to  a 
"  one  "  time  and  "  all "  time,  they  will  not  be  found 
to  bear  out  those  seeming  absolute  wonders  of  an  all- 
embracing  space  and  an  all-embracing  time,  of  which 
we  have  heard  so  much.     He  says  (II.,  128),  for  ex- 
ample, a  certain  schema  concerns  *'the  relation  of 
the  sensuous  perceptions,  the  one  to  the  other,  in  all 
time;"  and,  again  (153),  he  talks  of  this  same  rela- 
tion as  that  of  "  the  one  to  the  other  in  one  time." 
These  expressions,  then,  are  equivalent  the  one  to  the 
other.     Whatever  is  meant  by  *'  one  time,"  that  same 
thing  is  meant  by  "  all  time."     Now  to  this  latter  ex- 
pression there  is  a  parenthetic  clause  added  which  ex- 
plains what  Kant  means  by  it :    "  The  relation  of  the 
sensuous  perceptions,  the  one  to  the  otlir,  in  all  time 


COMMENTARY. 


375 


(that  is,  according  to  a  rule  of  time- determination)'' 
Now  this  "rule  of  time-determination  "  means  nothing 
but  the  moment  of  objectivity  in  the  action  of  a  cate- 
gory of  relation  on  any  connected  objects  whatever. 
"AH  our  judgments,"  says  Kant  (III.,  58),  "are  at 
first  mere  judgments  of  sensuous  perception ;  so  far, 
they  concern  only  us,  le,,  our  own  subject;  it  is  only 
afterwards  that  we  give  them  anew  nexus,  to  an  object 
namely,  and  then  there  will  be  validity  always  for 
us,  and  in  the  same  way  for  everybody."  And  this 
means  that  the  judgment,  at  first  subjective,  in  regard 
to  the  stone  and  the  sun,  or  the  mutual  relations  of  the 
moon  and  the  earth,  is,  in  the  second  instance,  objec- 
tive. There  is  a  nexus,  now,  of  causality  in  the  one 
case  and  of  reciprocity  in  the  other.  That  is  all  that 
the  prodigious  phrases  "  one  time,"  "  all  time  "  mean : 
merely  that,  in  any  one  case  whatever,  the  subjective  sen- 
sations have  become  converted,  through  the  category, 
into  objective  perceptions.  That  is  the  whole  matter; 
and  we  call  in  all  Kant's  cases  to  illustrate  it:  the 
house,  ice,  ship,  stone  and  sun,  bullet  and  cushion, 
glass  and  water,  earth  and  moon.  When  Kant  objec- 
tified his  house,  his  ship,  his  warm  stone,  his  dinted 
cushion,  I  wonder  if  he  had  the  idea  that  he  was  care- 
fully laying  all  these  things  up  in  a  one  all-embracing 
space  and  a  one  all-embracing  time — for  his  own  sub- 
sequent commodity  when  he  pleased  to  want  them ! 
Both  the  "one"  time  and  the  "all"  time,  then,  mean 
merely  a  "rule  of  time-determination,"  and  this  rule 
results  from  the  action  of  a  category  that,  quantitatively, 
qualitatively,  or  relatively,  connects  objectively  in 
time  what  were  previously  only  unruled  subjective 
sensations.  The  idea  of  an  all  or  a  whole  of  a  one  all- 
embracing  time  "  never  once  occurred  to  Kant  in  this 
reference.      Any  approach  to  such  phrase  in  Kant, 


376 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


377 


indeed,  means  only  the  same  thing— precisely  the 
same  thing— which  he  means  by  the  indefinite  phrase, 
a  ruled  and  regulated  context  of  experience.  And 
that  nieans  that  there  are  to  be  necessity  and  objec- 
tivity in  our  knowledge,  and  not  subjectivity  and  con- 
tingency merely.  The  "  rule  of  time-determination," 
in  fact,  only  determines  something  as  after  another, 
or  before  another,  or  at  the  same  time  with  another, 
according  to  the  category  that  acts,  causality,  recipro- 
city, etc. ;  it  only  determines  the  time-relation  of  one 
thing  to  another,  there  being  no  consideration  what- 
ever, with  reference  to  time  and  space,  but  of  the  two 
things  themselves.  The  Brobdingnagian  idea  of  con- 
necting  each  individual  thing  into  the  collective  con- 
tents  of  the  whole  huge  universe  would  have  made 
Kant  stare. 

We  are  told,  then,  that  space  gives  no  intimations 
to  us  of  things  in  themselves  or  of  the  native  relations 
of  things  in  themselves.     It  is  only  a  peculiar  spec- 
trum vouchsafed  to  us  peculiarly,  in  order  that  our 
subjective  affections  may  become  for  us  certain  ex- 
ternal appearances  to  sense.     The  conditions  of  our 
sense  belong  to  us,  and  not  to  things ;  and  so  it  is 
that  qualities  dependent  on  these  conditions  may  be 
known  a  jriori  or  in  priority  to  the  things  themselves. 
All,  too,  is  only  ex  analogia  hominis ;  or  all  is  only  sub 
s/ecie  hominis,  and  not  sub  specie  ceternitatis.     But  if 
space  is  only  subjective,  we  must  not  confound  it 
with  other  things  which  are  also  commonly  called 
subjective.     From  the  ordinary  empirical  position  a 
rose  is  conceived  as  a  thing  in  itself,   but  still  its 
colour  is  acknowledged  to  be  subjective,  or  an  affec- 
tion in  us.     So  it  is  with  what  are  called  secondary 
qualities  in  general.     These,  however,  are  sensations, 
and  we  are  limited  to  each  as  we  feel  it.     Space, 


I 


i 


.' 


though  subjective  in  place,  is  not  a  sensation,  but  a 
perception,  and  as  such  objective  in  function  to  the 
development  of  a  number  of  a  priori  synthetics.  The 
rose  is  conceived  as  a  sort  of  thing  in  itself  when 
compared  with  its  own  colour;  but  in  the  case  of 
space  there  is  only  itself;  and  apart  from  itself  there 
is  nothing  in  itself  to  which  to  refer  it.  It  is  only 
the  potential,  spectral,  subjective  projection  we  de- 
scribe. 


§  4.  Metaphysictil  Exposition  of  the  Nature  of  Time. 

The  first  argument  here  is,  as  in  the  case  of  Space, 
that  Time  is  no  contribution  of  special  sense,  but  is 
simply  implied  in  the  successions  and  co-existences  of 
the  actual  objects  of  sense.  Like  space,  also,  it  is 
universal  and  necessary.  For  that  reason,  too,  it 
similarly  gives  rise  to  apodictic  derivatives.  Neither 
is  time,  any  more  than  space,  a  notion :  it  is  a 
perception,  and  for  precisely  the  same  reasons  (per- 
haps more  simply  put).  The  infinitude  of  time, 
likewise,  is  associated  with  similar  considerations, 
which  constitute,  indeed,  a  welcome  gloss  to  those 
on  space. 

§  5.  Transcendental  Exposition  of  the  Notion  of  Time. 

There  is  no  comment  required  here. 

§  6.  Inferences  from  these  Ideas. 

Comment  here,  too,  is  pretty  well  superfluous.  It 
is  suggestive  that  time  and  space,  unlike  sensations, 
are  not  referred  to  objects  other  than  themselves.  It 
is  for  that  reason  that  Kant,  by-and-by,  calls  them 


378 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


"Unthings."  They  are  to  him  only  two  formative 
properties  of  our  own  soul.  The  subreptions  of  sense 
have  no  analogy  to  the  ideality  of  time,  either.  They 
are  sensations,  and  referred  to  an  object ;  but  time  is 
a  perceplion,  and  referred  to  no  object. 

§  7.  Further  Explanations. 

What  is  said  here,  too,  is  very  clear.  The  calling 
of  time  and  space  two  eternal,  infinite,  and  self- 
subsistent  nonentities  (unthings),  etc.,  will  be  ob- 
served. It  is  worth  while  pointing  out  here,  too, 
that  while  loe  mean  only  consciousness  by  the  term 
inner  sense,  Kant  means  by  it  emphatically  a  sense. 
An  inner  sense  is  an  absolute  necessity  to  him  in 
order  that  he  may  account  for  time  as  only  a  form  of 
it  On  any  other  supposition  time  would  become 
simply  a  quality  of  our  inner  nature,  and  unaccount- 
able so.  Of  course,  there  is  some  room  for  objecting 
to  such  doubling  of  ourselves  as  gives  us  two  modes 
of  looking  at  our  own  interiors.  We  shall  find  the 
distinction  involved  here  further  discussed  under  II. 
of  the  section  that  follows. 


§  8.  General  Remarks. 

On  the  whole,  these  remarks  also,  as  exoteric  and 
easy,^  may  be  left  without  comment.  No.  II.  perhaps 
requires  a  little  attention,  Kant's  distinction  between 
appercejnim  and  inner  sense  being,  at  first  sight,  some- 
what difficult.  It  means  only  this:  Apperception 
merely  logically  knows  a  bare  thought,  "I,"  or  "  It  is 
I  that  am  thinking ;  "  while  inner  sense  perceptively 
knows  one's  own  inner  sense-states.  But  these  being 
5^/Wd-states,  all  within  is  as  phenomenal  as  without, 


COMMENTAKY. 


379 


I 


I 


for  the  "  I "  is  but  logical,  and  wholly  without  matter 
of  objectivity.  That  is,  our  own  subject  is  known 
only  as  it  appears  to  us  under  the  modifications  of 
our  own  inner  sense,  and,  consequently  under  the 
condition  of  time.  M.  Cousin  is  eminently  mistaken 
in  what  he  understands  here — see  4me  Le9on,  Estlie- 
iique  Transcendentale,  p.  82. 

Returning  to  No.  I.,  we  may  just  say  that  it  pro- 
ceeds thus.  We  know  not  things  in  themselves,  but 
only  the  manner  in  which  they  appear  to  us.  And 
in  that  manner  there  are  two  distinctions,  one  formal, 
and  one  material.  Time  and  space  constitute  what 
is  formal,  and  special  sensation  what  is  material. 
Both  are  emphatically  subjective ;  but  time  and  space, 
as  perceptive,  are  objective  in  function.  These,  too, 
are  a  priori  and  pure;  while  what  is  material  is 
a  posteriori  and  empirical.  Evidently  it  is  through 
possession  of  the  formal  elements  that  we  are  able  to 
foretell  circumstances  which  no  material  element,  as 
it  arrives,  will  fail  to  exemplify. 

Kant  is  very  stout  upon  this,  that,  were  time  and 
space  real,  the  very  existence  of  two  such  unthings 
(monsters)  would  be  enough  to  convert  the  whole  of 
experience  into  illusion — it  is  their  ideality  shall 
insure  reality!  This  is  not  Carlyle's  interpretation 
in  the  Sartor.  So  it  is  that  time  and  space  cannot  be 
attributed  as  forms  to  the  perception  of  God.  His 
perception  Q'  intuitus'')  must  be  ^^  originariics :''  ours 
is  but  "  derivativus^'^  and  an  "  intuitus  derivativm " 
may  appear  in  many  modes. 

The  general  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  question, 
How  are  a  priori  synthetics  possible?  is  this:  In 
certain  cases,  when  we  w^ould  advance  beyond  a 
notion,  not  by  analysis,  but  by  synthesis,  we  may 
accomplish  this  by  having  recourse  to  the  pure  per- 


380 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


if 


feptions  time  and  space,  but  always  only  in  reference 
to  objects  of  possible  experience. 

If  we  look  back  now  on  what  has  been  done,  we 
shall  have  no  difficulty  in  seeing  that  Kant,  first, 
came  to  assume  the  proposition  of  causality  to  be  an 
a  prion   synthetic.     What  must   have  further   sug- 
gested itself  then  to  the  thought  of  Kant,   is  also 
pretty  plain.     When  we  want  to  increase  our  know- 
ledge, we  turn  to  experience.     The  notion  of  some- 
thing  or  other  is  presented  to  us,  say  a  Voltaic  pile. 
Well,  at  first  our  knowledge  of  it  is  little  or  nothing. 
We  want  to  increase  our  knowledge,  consequently, 
and  what  do  we  do  ?     We  subject  what  is  in  question 
to  expmmenU-^io  trials,  that  is,  in  actual  experience ; 
and  each  trial  tells  us  something,  adds  new  fact  after 
new  fact  to  the  sum  of  our  knowledge.     I  pick  up  a 
plant,  and  I  try  it  in  experience  by  many  ways — count- 
ing its  stamens,  pistils,  inquiring  into  its  tissue,  etc., 
and  at  last  I  know  a  hundred  things  about  it  which 
I  did  not  know  before.     Or  I  pick  up  a  stone,  and 
try  it  with  knife,  hammer,  acid,  etc.     In  this  way  it 
is  quite  easy  to  see  the  possibility  of  a  posteriori  ncAv 
judgments  or  of  (?m/2nca/ synthetics ;  but  how  are  we 
to  conceive  the  possibility  of  adding  a  priori  to  some 
notion  ?     Anything  a  priori  is  alone  there  before  us  : 
we  may  analyze  it,  of  course,  but  how  can  we  possibly 
seek  to  add  to  it  from  an  elsewhere,  when  any  else- 
where exists  not  ?     That  is  the  meaning  of  how  are 
a  imoH  synthetics  possible  ?     The  example  of  expe- 
rience is  at  least  calculated  to  suggest  a  medium  of 
reference,  and  we  ask— or,  presumably,  Kant  asked— 
is  it  possible  there  can  be  any  medium  which  will 
extend  to  us  expedients  of  a  priori  synthesis  ?     Here, 
possibly,  the  pure  mathematics  may  present  them- 
selves, and  we  may  ask  further  how  are  their  pro- 


COMMENTARY. 


381 


positions,  which  are  in  great  part  pure  and  at  the 
same  time  synthetic — how  are  they  possible  ?  Were 
such  question  asked,  it  were  hardly  possible  but  that 
space  should  suggest  itself,  and,  if  space,  by  necessary 
consequence,  time.  But  what  "  a  going  up  of  a  light " 
such  suggestion  would  be  to  Kant,  who  firmly  be- 
lieved tilings  to  be  only  his  own  sensations,  his  own 
aff^ections,  his  own  states !  The  whole  possibility  of 
an  external  objectivity  that  was  all  the  while  only 
internal  and  subjective,  would  at  once  dart  upon  him. 
Empirical  experience  (if  the  collocation  be  pardoned 
for  the  nonce),  he  would  immediately  say  further  to 
himself,  is,  so  to  speak,  not  the  only  experience ;  there 
is  actually  a  pure  experience,  an  a  priori  experience. 
All  the  components  of  experience  are  not  by  any 
means  restricted  to  the  a  posteriori.  There  is  pure 
sense,  as  well  as  empirical  sense;  general  sense,  as 
well  as  special  sense.  Should  we  want  a  priori  syn- 
thetics, we  may  take  them  up  by  the  handful,  if  we 
but  turn  to  pure  experience,  to  pure  sense.  Now 
then,  it  would  be,  that  Kant  would  think  again  of 
the  proposition  of  causality,  and  try  if  he  could  answer 
Hume's  question  in  that  regard  by  a  reference  to  this 
new  element  he  had  come  upon  of  pure  perception. 
But,  plainly,  if  this  did  happen  to  him,  he  must,  so 
far,  have  failed.  No  reference  to  time  or  space  as 
medium  will  find  in  it  the  idea  of  necessary  connexion^ 
the  origin  of  which  was  all  that,  relativel}',  tasked  the 
curiosity  of  Hume.  But,  rebuffed  from  pure  sense,  it 
is  only  natural  to  suppose  that  pure  intellect  would 
be  the  next  idea,  and  the  consequent  question  instan- 
taneously follow.  Is  it  possible  that  pure  intellect, 
quite  as  well  as  pure  sense,  may  be  an  actual  source 
of  a  priori  synthetics  ?  In  that  case  the  proposition 
of   causality   may   be   one   of  them?     So   situated, 


V 


382 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


they  will  plainly  constitute  a  system,  too;  and  a 
single  general  rationale  will  account  for  the  whole  of 
them. 

This  that  concerns  intellect  is,  as  the  reader  him- 
self will  readily  surmise  now,  what  we  are  goin«-  to 
see  in  the  Transcendental   Logic.     But,  as  regards 
the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
that  Kant,  while  he  still  confined  himself  to  its  in- 
terests proper,   would  find  himself  impelled  in   the 
first  place  to  seek  for  proofs  in  regard  to  this  sur- 
prising suggestion  of  the  a  priori  nature  of  space  and 
time.     Now  there  were  just  two  necessities  in  any 
question  of  a  proof     If  space  and  time  were  to  con- 
stitute a  medium  of  pure  experience  for  the  supply  of 
a  priori  synthetics,  they  must  be  proved,  first,  a  priori, 
and,    second,    perceptive.      In   point   of  fact,    Kant 
seems  to  have  four  arguments  here ;  but  the  truth  is 
that  there  are  only  two  hinges   of  argumentation, 
though  each  is,  in  a  certain  way,  double.     Space  and 
time  are  proved  a  priori  as  being,  1,  Not  special  sen- 
sations themselves,  but  presupposed  by  all  such,  and, 
2,  In   their   own    nature   universal   and   necessary. 
That  they  are  perceptive,  again,  is  proved  by  refer- 
ence, 1,  To  their  nature  as  wholes  and  parts,  and,  2, 
To  that  same  nature  even  as  considered  infinite  {ie.^ 
as  wholes,  as  parts,  as  infinitudes,  all  is  aesthetic  and 
perceptive,  not  logical  and  notional).     There  is,  of 
course,  a  sort  of  argument  by  mathematical  corollary 
in  support,  but  it  hardly  requires  separate  mention. 
That,  then,  is  plain.     Kant  is  under  a  necessity  to 
prove  time  and  space  a  priori  and  perceptive,  and 
nothing  more.     They  are  to  Kant,  then,  simply  the 
same  forms  which  they  are   to   us— with  only  this 
difference,  that  to  him  they  are  a  priori  and  within, 
to  us  a  posterion  and  without.      Those  extraordinary 


COMMENTARY. 


383 


monsters  attributed  to  a  one  alLembracing  space  and 
a  one  all-embracing  time  are  but  the  Ossianic  delu- 
sions of  failure  to  follow  the  thought,  or,  it  may  be, 
only  the  German. 

Transcendental  Logic. 

.  The  immediately  preceding  comment  referred  to 
§  8,  and  I  shall  remark  here  only  on  what  general 
introductory  matter  (with  regard  to  logic)  precedes 
§  9.  Said  matter  is  eminently  Kantian;  but,  as 
quite  current,  it  stands  in  no  need  of  interpretation. 
How  perceptions  rest  on  affection,  and  notions  on 
function,  as  well  as  what  these  words  mean,  will  be 
understood  without  difficulty.  One  great  point  is  to 
observe  how  Kant  looks  on  general  logic,  and  how  he 
prefigures  a  transcendental  logic.  General  logic,  as 
applying  to  mere  forms  available  for  objects  generally, 
and  independent  of  what  objects  may  be  specially,  is 
for  Kant  wholly  non-empirical;  and,  consequently, 
wholly  pure  or  a  priori.  A  transcendental  logic,  then, 
will  contain  what  principles  in  preparation  for  ex- 
perience are  produced  by  the  action  of  the  pure 
logical  elements  on  the  pure  perceptive  elements. 
And,  naturally,  this  suggests  two  divisions :  one  for 
the  discovery  and  tabulation  of  the  required  logical 
elements ;  and  another  for  the  rationale  and  expla- 
nation of  how  these  pure  logical  elements,  towards 
experience,  combine  with  the  pure  perceptive  ele- 
ments. The  first  division  Kant  calls  his  Analytic^ 
and  the  second  his  Schematism,  Further  than  these 
we  do  not  go  in  this  volume,  but  leave  what  con- 
cerns the  Idea^  and  the  consequent  Dialectic  un- 
touched. 

We  are  to  understand,  then,  that  the  meaning  of 


I 


384 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


an  inquiry  called  transcendental  is  this.     We  ask  in  it, 
Is  it  possible  to  attain  to  perceptions  before  percep- 
tion, to  a  knowledge  of  objects  before  presentation 
of  objects, — so   to   speak,  to   experience  before  ex- 
perience?      Such  results,   in  the  event  of  any,  we 
should  call  transcendental     For  anything  to  be  tran- 
scendental, it  is  not  enough  that  it  should  be  simply 
a  jmori.      The    propositions    in    mathematics    are 
a  priori,  but  we  do  not   call  them   transcendental. 
We  do  not  call  space  itself  transcendental    merely 
because  it  is  a  jmori,  but  for  this,  That  it  is  a  con- 
dition,  source,  ground  of  an  actually  perceptive  know- 
ledge of  objects  in  independence    of  objects  them- 
selves— that  is,  in  antecedence  and   anticipation  of 
objects.     Now,  if  there  are  such  transcendental  per- 
ceptive elements  as  time  and  space,  may  there  not  be 
also  transcendental  discursive  elements — logical  ele- 
ments as  well  as  aesthetic  elements — a  transcendental 
logic  as  well  as  a  transcendental  a3sthetic  ?     Any  such 
elements  can  only  be  notions,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  notions  are  to  be   applied  in    experience,   not 
only   a  priori  perceptively,   but  perceptively  at  all. 
Still  we  may  pre-admit  or  suppose  some  such  action 
in  perception  even  on  the  part  of  notions.     If  such 
notions  are,  what  are  they,  or  how  find  them  ?     And 
here  Kant  suggests  that  notions  are  only  predicates  of 
possible  judgments,  and  that  judgment  is,  of  under- 
standing,  precisely  the  characteristic  act.     The  con- 
clusion is  not  far  to  seek,  then,  that,  if  we  can  enumerate 
for  understanding  all  its  own  proper  functions  of  judg- 
ment, we  shall  have  arrived  also  at  what  elements 
in  that  connexion  are  to  be   called  transcendental. 
But  where  are  we  to  get   an   enumeration  of  the 
functions  of  judgment,  if  not  in  logic,  and  in  logic, 
too,  that  is  already,  complete,  pure,  and  perfectly 


COMMENTARY. 


385 


a  priori?  In  this  way  we  are  guided  to  a  clew  to  the 
principles  which  are  specially  in  request.  Such  clew 
lies  in  the  analysis  of  the  understanding  as  a  syste- 
matic unity  of  certain  constitutive  functions;  and 
such  clew,  also,  being  under  guidance  of  a  principle, 
cannot  fail  completely  to  succeed. 

This  I  think  contains  all  that  is  said  by  Kant  here 
as  in  special  bearing  on  his  single  object.  Of  course, 
we  have  a  great  many  more  things  said;  but,  as 
perfectly  general,  they  are  at  once  intelligible  in  them- 
selves. All  these  clearly-distinguished  various  logics, 
all  these  canons,  organons,  and  catharticons — as  pre- 
cisely the  outside  examination-element  that  is  in 
request  there — we  shall  leave  for  the  professional 
classroom. 

We  shall  merely,  in  conclusion  here,  insist  on  the 
reader  bearing  in  mind  what  sort  of  faculty  under- 
standing is  as  opposed  to  perception  proper :  that  is, 
that  it  is  non-sensuous;  non-perceptive  therefore; 
and,  consequently,  only  discursive,  or  cognisant 
through  notions.  While  perception  rests  on  affection, 
we  must  see  understanding  to  rest  on  function ;  and 
function  is  that  act  whereby  several  elements  (pos- 
sibly perceptive)  are  reduced  into  unity  under  another 
element  (possibly  logical)  that  is  common  to  them 
all.  Spontaneity  (intellectual  action)  and  receptivity  (of 
sense)  may  be  both  at  once  necessary,  then,  for  any 
and  every  act  of  perfected  perception — the  perception 
of  experience.  Now,  if  we  would  complete  our  list  of 
the  a  priori  factors  in  the  perception  of  experience — 
our  list,  consequently,  of  the  possible  sources  of 
a  priori  synthetics — w^e  have  only  to  add  to  the  ex- 
haustively complete  elements  of  pure  sense  (time  and 
space)    which   we   have    succeeded   to   discover,   an 

equally  exhaustively  complete  enumeration  of  Avhat 

2b 


386 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


a  prion  functions  of  the  understanding,  of  what 
a  priori  notions,  are  necessary  to  reduce  the  units  in 
every  varied  complex  of  sense-impression  (but  re- 
ceived once  for  all  into  time  and  space)  into  the 
eclipsing  unity— almost,  as  it  were,  into  the  forma- 
tive kaleidoscopic  unity — of  a  single,  organic,  true 
perceptive  act.  Such  latter  list,  it  is  easy  to  see,  we 
shall  complete  by  exhaustively  analyzing  the  function 
of  understanding.  But  the  function  whereby  to 
understand  is  identical  with  the  function  whereby  to 
judge.  It  at  once  strikes  us,  then,  that  it  may  not  be 
so  difficult  to  discover,  in  the  first  place,  all  the 
native  functions  of  judgment,  and  then,  in  the  second 
place,  most  probably  through  them,  the  complete 
system  of  the  various  a  priori  notions  that  are  neces- 
sary for  the  reduction  into  perceptions  of  the  various 
sense-manifolds  of  impression. 


§  9.  Of  the  Logical  Function  of  the  Understanding  in  Judging. 

It  is  natural  now,  then,  after  what  precedes,  that 
Kant  should  proceed  here  actually  to  analyze  the 
function  of  understanding  or  judgment.  He  does 
not  inform  us,  however,  of  his  various  steps  in  the 
general  heuristic  process,  and  we  are  rather  discon- 
certed and  thrown  out  by  the  suddenness  and  abrupt- 
ness of— without  more  ado— a  matured  and  com- 
pleted reference  to  ordinary  school-logic.  Still,  we 
have  to  consider  all  that  has  been  already  said  of 
logic.  We  have  to  see  that  it  (universal  logic) 
amounts  to  an  idea  of  pure  understanding,  or  that  it 
is  the  a  priori  system  of  the  pure,  completely  general 
forms  of  intellection  ;  and,  so  seeing,  we  shall  be  at 
once  ready  to  conclude  with  Kant  that  it  is  there  (in 
logic)  we  shall  find  the  required  systematic  analysis 


COMMENTARY. 


387 


of  the  functions  of  judgment  which  will  directly  lead 
us  to  our  ultimate  object  in  this  place — a  complete 
list  of  all  a  priori  notions.  Kant,  in  taking  up  for 
his  purpose  the  various  classes  of  judgments  as  they 
appear  in  the  "  usual  technic  of  the  logicians,"  will  be 
found  to  have  very  considerably  —  but  very  in- 
geniously and  attractively — dressed  them,  toioards  that 
purpose.  It  will  be  the  reader's  duty,  therefore,  to 
give  himself  the  advantage  of  a  reflective  pause  here. 
This  dressing  of  Kant  represents  on  his  part  a  whole 
drama  of  meditation.  It  is  deep,  true,  full.  It 
throws  much  light  on  the  process  of  thought  as 
thought,  and  is  really  very  valuable.  That  the 
moments  of  modality  may  be  regarded  as  applicable 
to  the  function  of  thinking,  successively  in  the  form 
of  understanding,  judging,  and  reasoning,  is  not  only 
engaging,  but  happy  and  suggestive :  they  really  seem 
to  represent  three  degrees  of  incorporation,  so  to 
speak,  into  the  mind.  But  all  here  is  so  plainly  put 
as  to  suffice  for  itself,  without  a  word  of  exposition. 


§  10.  Of  the  Pure  Notions  of  the  Understanding  (the  Categories). 

There  is  a  good  deal  here — in  what  relates  to  syn- 
thesis, perhaps,  rather  than  to  the  categories  them- 
selves— which  may  excusably  appear  difficult  and 
prove  not  inconsiderably  embarrassing  to  the  reader. 
The  first  point,  then,  is  this.  Time  and  space  are  con- 
ceived by  Kant  as  already  5önÄ^-materials  (not  special 
sense-materials,  but  general  sense-materials)  towards 
the  formation  of  two  a  priori  perceptive  objects.  Of 
course,  in  regard  to  such  objects,  there  can  be  no 
question  of  what  is  properly  called  matter  (the  con- 
tributions of  special  sense),  and  the  word  materials 
must  be  understood  to  imply  here  only  materials  of 


388 


TEXT-BOOK    TO   KANT  : 


COMMENTARY. 


389 


form.  Time  and  space,  if  a  jmori  perceptive  objects, 
will  still  (as  devoid  of  all  elements  of  special  sense) 
be  mere  forms — forms,  namely,  of  general  sense.  Still 
these  forms  are  not  blank ;  they  have  each  such  and 
such  a  nature ;  they  have  each  such  and  such  con- 
tents ;  they  are  composed  each  of  such  and  such  ele- 
ments, and  these  elements  may  be  regarded  as  their 
constitutive  materials.  To  Kant,  in  short,  each, 
whether  time  or  space,  is  a  unity,  but  the  unity,  so 
to  speak,  of  a  multiple,  a  manifold:  in  his  own 
words,  indeed,  each  is  an  ''Einheit,''  but  each  also  is 
a  ''Mannigfaltiges:'  We  have  simply  to  conceive 
time  and  space,  that  is,  as  certain  peculiar  a  priori 
webs  or  tissues ;  each,  as  a  web  or  tissue,  one,  but 
each  also,  as  the  same  web  or  tissue,  composite — a 
complex,  a  concrete  of  certain  specific  constituent 
elements  (the  two  and  the  three  dimensions  respec- 
tively)— ^it  being  at  the  same  time  understood,  never- 
theless, that,  in  all  other  respects,  each  is  precisely 
what  and  as  we  know  it  in  everyday  experience. 

Well,  we  are  to  conceive  time  and  space  as  at  first 
only  general  sense-materials  towards  objects.  But 
being  a  priori,  they  are  necessarily  mental,  and  neces- 
sarily held  of  the  intellect.  Then,  again,  being  held 
of  the  intellect,  it  is  impossible  but  tliat  this  intellect 
should  have  taken  possession  of  them.  In  what 
faculty  or  function  of  the  intellect  they  are  held,  that 
is  the  imagination.  Now  the  imagination  must  be 
conceived  possessed  of  a  power  of  movement  even  a 
priori.  It  is  an  active  faculty,  and  if  rejmductive  in 
regard  to  empirical  matter,  it  may  surely  be  allowed 
to  be  productive  (active,  motive)  in  regard  to  a  jjriori 

or  formal  matter.     But  taken  up  by  imagination, 

currently  and  recurrently,  from  end  to  end,  possessed 
by  imagination,— what  is  this  but  synthesis?     The 


I* 


y 


general  sense-forms  laid  into  imagination,  then,  must 
be  conceived  to  undergo  a  first  process  of  synthesis 
thus ;  and  necessary  action  on  the  part  of  memory  as 
well,  is  not  to  be  objected,  for  memory  is  itself  ima- 
gination, or  a  form  or  phase  of  it.  Imagination, 
in  short,  gives  synthetic  continuity  to  any  complex  of 
units  committed  to  it. 

It  is  fully  too  soon  to  say  so ;  but  it  will  help  in- 
telligence, to  understand  at  once  that  there  is  really 
postulated  by  Kant  (as  he  expressly  declares  himself 
here,  indeed)  what  amounts  to  a  second  synthesis — 
the  result  of  the  action  of  the  categories  (under  pure 
apperception  or  self-consciousness)  on  said  first  syn- 
thesis. It  is  imagination,  that  is,  which  holds  up 
time  and  space  to  the  categories  as  the  various 
functions  of  unity  appertinent  to  the  unity  of  apper- 
ception. Imagination  gives  continuity  to  the  units  ; 
the  categories  give  them  unity — into  apperception. 
It  is  only  so  at  last  that  time  and  space  themselves 
may  be  conceived  to  have  become  a  priori  objects 
actually  formed. 

Now  what  is  the  most  important  point  of  view  by 
far  that  we  can  gain  here  is  this.  That  reduction  of 
time  and  space,  under  the  unity  of  apperception, 
through  functions  of  apperception,  is  the  whole  of 
Kanfs  work.  That  is  the  transcendental  new  pro- 
vince he  claims  to  have  conquered  for  us :  that  is  his 
answer  to  Hume.  General  logic  is  without  matter ; 
but  transcendental  logic  has  the  matter  of  the  tran- 
scendental Esthetic.  This  Kant  tells  us  again  and 
again ;  and  we  see  in  it  what  was  his  specific  idea : 
The  functions  of  apperception  acting  on  time  and 
space  shall  generate  an  a  piiori  schematism,  into 
which  received,  these  our  own  subjective  affections 
(sensations),  shall  appear  to  stand  out  around  us  as 


390 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


objective  things  in  an  objective  universe.  I  think 
this,  with  the  note  under  the  text^  will  suffice  to  make 
plain  whatever  concerns  synthesis  here.  That  the 
categories,  too,  may  be  described  as  grounds  of  syn- 
thetic unity apnmwill  now  not  be  hard  to  understand: 
each  category  is  a  principle  of  a  priori  synthesis  for 
the  manifolds  of  a  priori  sense — into  the  unity  of  self- 
consciousness. 

As  regards  the  cateffories  themselves,  many  readers, 
it  is  to  be  feared,  will  be  disconcerted  by  a  certain 
feeling  of  suddenness  and  abruptness  in  their  case  too. 
They  have  too  much  the  look  of  being  merely  set 
down,  and  we  think  to  ourselves  we  should  like  to 
have  seen  them  issue  from  some  recognised  process  of 
actual  derivation.  If,  however,  we  but  admit,  and 
put  ourselves  at  home  with,  the  preceding  table  of 
the  moments  of  judgment,  we  shall  find  that  we 
may  grant  said  difficulty  to  have  pretty  well  disap- 
peared. 

Synthesis,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  pre- 
cedes analysis ;  and  it  is  not  hard  to  conceive  that 
the  same  functions  that  give  unities  of  judgment  in 
analysis  may  very  well  act  similarly  in  synthesis. 
But  the  moments  of  judgment,  regarded  as  synthetic, 
are  at  once  a  priori  notions  of  synthesis,  are  at  once 
the  categories.  That  is  all  that,  by  way  of  deriva- 
tion, we  are  to  understand  for  the  categories ;  and, 
if  we  will  but  co-operatively  think  with  Kant,  perhaps 
that  is  all  that,  in  such  respect,  we  need  understand 
for  them.  What  follows  under  the  name  of  "deduc- 
tion" is  not  a  derivation,  but  a  justifying  illustration 
of  the  categories  as  compared  with  the  actual  wants 
and  facts  of  experience.  It  is  an  illustrative  confir- 
mation  of  them  by  arguing  their  actual  use.  In 
regard  to  both  points,  indeed,  it  is  right  to  warn  the 


I 


COMMENTARY. 


391 


reader  of  a  probable  feeling  of  difficulty  on  his  part. 
Not  only  may  the  categories  appear  to  him  insuffi- 
ciently derived ;  but  their  deduction  may  appear 
much  less  a  deduction  than  a  miscellany  of  remark. 
These  remarks,  however,  are  arguments  for  the  cate- 
gories from  their  more  or  less  possible,  their  more  or 
less  probable,  or  their  more  or  less  indispensably 
necessary,  use. 

Of  course,  we  have  to  grant  that  the  previous  table 
of  judgments  is  exhaustively  complete,  if  we  are  to 
assume  as  much  for  the  present  table  of  categories. 
In  regard  to  both  tables,  as  said  already,  also,  we 
have  to  co-operate  with  the  author,  if  we  are  not  to 
hold  of  both,  that  they  are  simply  dogmatically  as- 
signed.    The  rest  of  the  section  is  easy. 

§  11. 

We  are  to  understand,  then,  that  synthesis  is  the 
result  of  the  understanding  (through  movement  of 
imagination  and  under  unity  of  self-consciousness), 
inspecting,  selecting,  and  connecting  the  various 
units  in  the  complex,  composite,  or  manifold  of 
perception ;  which  manifold,  further,  may  either  be 
empirical  (as  due  to  special  sense)  or  pure  (as  due 
only  to  general  sense).  This  eleventh  section,  we 
may  say,  is,  in  many  respects,  not  only  as  regards 
Kant,  but  as  regards  successors  of  his,  a  very  impor- 
tant one.  So  free  is  it  in  expression,  however,  that 
no  remark  seems  called  for.  We  see  in  it  how 
Kant's  own  sense  of  having  discovered  the  very 
system  of  all  the  moments  of  mind  and  under  unity 
of  a  single  principle,  grows  more  and  more,  at  every 
successive  step,  into  bulk  and  certainty  with  him. 
One  has  seen,  also,  so  many  strangely  unintelligent 


392 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


393 


mistakes  as  to  the  relative  importance  of  the  two 
main  divisions  of  categories,  that  a  word  in  that 
direction  may  prove  not  superfluous.  I  may  say  at 
once,  then,  that  there  are  no  grounds  whatever  for 
holding  the  dynamical  categories  to  be  more  real, 
more  existential,  or  simply,  in  any  way,  more  impor- 
tant— so  far,  that  is,  as  the  general  scheme  goes 

than  the  others  which  are  named  mathematical.     It, 
surely,  indicates  very  negligent  reading  not  to  know 
that  Kant,  again  and  again,  and  very  emphatically, 
declares  the  dynamic  to  be  less  apodictic,  less  pure- 
less  cogent  and  powerful,  then— than  the  mathema- 
tical categories.     We  can  see  for  ourselves,  indeed, 
that  what  is  mathematical  enters  into  and  forms  part 
of  objects  themselves— is  constitutive ;  while  what  is 
dynamical   only   concerns   relations   between   objects 
(taking  no  note  now  of  those  between  objects  and  the 
mind),    or  is   only  regulative.      The   mathematical 
categories,  therefore,  are,  in  point  of  fact,  more  real, 
more  existential,  than  the  dynamical  ones.      Kant 
thinks  it  necessary  to  point  out,  as  though  it  were 
something  unexpected,  that  the  dynamicaf  categories 
have  correlates  and,  so  far,  diifer  from  the  mathema- 
tical ones.     But,  surely,  where  the  question  is  ot  con- 
nexions,  one  would  be  surprised  not  to  have  correlates. 
It  is  not  out  of  place  to  remark  here,  either,  that 
Hume   divides  his  categories   (and  these   are,   with 
mention  of  time  and  space,  quantity,  quality,  causality, 
resemblance,  contrariety,  and  identity)  into  two  main 
classes  precisely  similar  to  those  of  Kant.    Hume  him- 
self names  {Treatise,  I.,  III.,  I.)  the  one  class,  "such 
relations  as  depend  entirely  on  the  ideas  which  we 
compare  together,"  and  the  other,  "  such  as  may  be 
changed  without  any  change  in  the  ideas."     I  take 
leave  to  call  these  two  classes,  respectively,  intrinsic 


and  extrinsic,  and  these  two  words  will  be  seen  at 
once  accurately  to  correspond,  the  one  with  Kant's 
mathematical,  and  the  other  with  his  dynamical,  or 
with  what  is  constitutive  and  what  regulative.  It  is 
to  the  rest  of  the  section  that  we  particularly  refer  as 


bearing  on  Kant's  successors. 


§12. 


I  fancy  most  readers  will  find  themselves  rather 
disturbed  than  assisted  by  this  section.  It  is  certainly 
a  very  curious  interpolation,  and  seems  very  super- 
fluous. If  the  ancients  are  to  be  complimented  with 
the  possession  of  a  transcendental  philosophy  because 
of  these  distinctions,  why,  we  may  be  apt  to  think, 
does  Kant  omit  all  mention  of  many,  to  all  seeming, 
quite  as  good,  say  in  the  TroXXaxw?  Xeyofiiva  of  Aris- 
totle alone  ?     Surely,  one  thinks,  apxn>  a-roixelov,  (pva-i?, 

6v,  ravToVy  erepovy  irporepov  koi  vcrrepov,  ic.t.X.,  have  quite  as 

good  a  right  to  be  called  into  remark  as  unum,  verum, 
bonum.  When  afterwards,  in  section  16,  we  find 
Kant  referring  to  a  qualitative  unity  and  indicating 
this  section  12  as  the  authority  in  place,  we  wonder 
if  he  can  have  taken  all  that  trouble  for  nothing  but 
this.  The  more  usual  form  of  the  brocard  is,  qucelibet 
causa,  una,  vera,  bona,  sit  oportet.  So  we  have  it  in 
Newton's  first  rule :  "  Causas  rerum  naturalium, 
non  ];lures  admitti  debere,  quam  quae  et  vera  sint,  et 
earum  phsenomenis  explicandis  sußciant''  Here 
Newton  evidently  means  what  is  concerned  to  be, 
if  possible,  numerically  one,  actually  existent,  and 
actually  adequate.  In  the  applications  of  Kant,  we 
should  rather  say  that  the  meaning  is  self-consistency 
in  an  idea,  truth  in  regard  of  its  relations,  and 
success  in  regard  of  its  intention  or  end. 


394 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


395 


Deduction  of  the  Categories. 
§  13.  Principles  of  a  Transcendental  Deduction  in  General. 

It  is  important  here  fairly  to  understand  what  is 
meant  by  quid  facti  and  what  by  quid  juris,  Locke 
could  show  a  number  of  actual  instances  of  causality, 
as  in  eclipses,  rain,  frost,  snow,  etc. ;  and  could  say, 
there  you  have  the/ac^,  and,  evidently,  it  is  from  the 
fact  that  you  have  the  idea.  That,  then,  is  what  is 
to  be  understood  by  the  quid  facti.  But  now  Kant 
breaks  in  with,  the  quid  facti  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  question.  In  causality,  namely,  an  idea  of  neces- 
sary connexion  is  present,  and  no  reply  to  quid  facti 
can  explain  that ;  for  the  fact,  though  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  itself  as  a  fact,  is  no  explanation  of  a  validity 
which  exceeds  the  fact.  The  fact  is  a  matter  of  sense, 
and,  as  such,  it  always  is  as  it  is,  and  we  can  say 
no  more  about  it.  But  when  we  say  such  and  such 
rule  must  he  in  the  facts,  then  evidently  we  must  seek 
the  source  of  such  rule  somewhere  quite  else  than  in 
the  facts  themselves.  It  will  do  no  harm  to  anticipate 
here  (at  least  to  a  certain  extent),  and  say  that  Kant's 
answer  is,  we  add  the  necessity  to  the  facts  by  virtue 
of  a  certain  system  of  transcendental  schematism 
within  us.  One  can  see  here  also  that  Hume  regarded 
Locke's  procedure  pretty  much  as  we  represent  Kant 
to  have  done.  Hume,  indeed,  just  said  to  Locke,  the 
fact  is  all  very  well,  but  no  matter  of  fact  is  adequate 
to  an  idea  of  necessity ;  hence  that  idea  can  be  due 
only  to  custom,  or  a  natural  instinct,  or  both.  This 
will  enable  us  to  understand  that  the  quid  juris  repre- 
sents an  appeal  to  the  element  of  necessity  in  the  facts 
to  account  for  itself  and  make  good  its  title— justify  it- 
self, or  demonstrate  the  legitimacy  of  its  own  authority. 


u 


I 


And,  in  the  circumstances,  it  is  quite  plain  that  this 
can  only  be  accomplished  by  means  of  a  transcendental 
deduction— Q.  deduction,  or  justification,  that  is,  which, 
precluded  from  the  a  posteriori^  is  consequently  driven 
into  the  a  priori^  where  it  finds  to  its  hand  a  system 
of  general  elements  of  sense  and  understanding  ready 
for,  and  in  anticipation  of,  the  intimations  of  special 
sense,  or  of  experience.  That  is  full,  complete,  and 
home. 

This  being  understood,  Kant  endeavours  to  make 
it  intelligible  how  notions  (a  rule^  as  in  causality,  must 
depend  on  a  notion)^  quite  as  well  as  perceptions^  may 
enter  into  and  form  part  of  the  actual  experience  of 
sense.  He  indicates  that  the  nature  of  a  perception 
of  sense  proper  is  to  be  a  complex,  a  composite,  a 
manifold,  a  breadth  of  units  or  particulars,  and  that 
notions  are  necessary,  through  rule,  law,  order,  and 
arrangement,  to  condense  and  consolidate  these 
breadths  of  units  and  particulars  into  the  unities  of 
single  objects,  and  the  unity  of  a  ruled  and  regulated 
context  of  experience  of  objects.  He  illustrates  this 
from  the  notion  of  a  cause.  We  might  very  well 
have  perceptions,  he  says — and  that,  of  course,  means 
only  crude^  not  formed  perceptions — without  any  rule 
of  causality  being  at  all  present  in  them,  or,  in  fact, 
without  any  influence  whatever  falling  from  the 
understanding  on  them.  But,  in  that  case,  experience 
would  be  wholly  without  any  principle  of  necessity : 
we  should  never  be  able  to  say  then^  quantity  must  be 
an  extensive,  and  quality  an  intensive,  magnitude; 
matter  must  always  be  identical  in  amount ;  action 
and  re-action  are  always  equal,  etc.,  etc.  And  this, 
probably,  will  suffice  to  make  credible  and  intelligible 
the  presence  of  notions  in  our  actual  perceptions  of 
the  objects  of  sense.     How  time  and  space,  though  a 


^'  > 


396 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


priori^  might  condition  the  special  perceptions  which 
had  to  appear  in  them,  and  were  only  possible  through 
them,  was  not,  as  Kant  remarks,  hard  to  realize ;  it  is 
harder  to  realize  this  for  notions,  but  we  shall  now 
assume  even  that  effected.     Of  course,  it  will  be  easily 
understood,  that  necessity  being  impossible  a  posteriori^ 
its  source  must  be  only  ajmori^  or  it  itself  a  phantom. 
Hence  the  indispensableness  of  a  deduction,  a  justifi- 
cation, an  explanation,  a  vindication,  a  proof  which 
is  transcendental;  for  transcendental  refers  with  Kant 
to  the  demonstration  of  a  w^hole  system  of  ay;?  zm  and 
non-empirical   principles  which,   entering  into,    and 
forming  part  of,  all  empirical  matter,  become  as  much 
real,  objective,  and,  so  to  speak,  outward  elements  of 
actual  experience  as  that  matter  itself      In  short,  a 
transcendental  deduction  is  a  verification  of  a  priori 
powers   by  an  illustrative  argumentation  from   the 
necessities  of  the  case — the  conditions  of  the  very 
possibility  of  our  experience:    the  necessity  of  the 
machinery  employed  is  deduced,  justified,  or  demon- 
strated by  the  rationale  of  its  action.     And  it  is  again 
suggested  to  us  here,  that,  though  the  terms  a  priori  fiwA. 
transcendental  may  frequently  be  indifferently  used, 
and  frequently  are  so  used,  yet  that  there  is  a  certain 
distinction  between  them.     In  fact,  one  and  the  same 
thing  is  quite  capable  of  exhibiting  not  only,  firstly, 
an  a  priori  aspect,   and,  secondly,  a  transcendental 
aspect,  but  even,  thirdly,  an  empirical  aspect.     Space, 
for  instance,  as  it  is  applied  in  geometry,  may  be  seen 
to  be  in  its  nature  a  priori^  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
in  looking  at  that  house,  or  this  tree,  or  yonder  star, 
it  is  quite  as  evidently  empirical.     But,  again,  when 
we  recognise  space  to  be  an  a  priori  element  and  yet, 
in  its  own  force,  actually  present  in,  and  constitutive 
of,  objects  and  the  validity  of  objects,  experience  and 


1^ 


COMMENTARY. 


397 


1 

I 


the  validity  of  experience,  then  we  are  aware  of  an  ele- 
ment that  is  transcendental — an  element  a  priori  and 
empirical  at  once.  A  transcendental  deduction,  conse- 
quently, makes  good  the  legitimacy  in  facts  of  a  validity 
in  facts  to  which  (validity)  facts  as  facts  are  quite  in- 
competent, while  a  deduction  that  is  empirical  con- 
tents itself  with  simply  pointing  to  the  facts  as  facts. 
It  is  evident  that  geometry  is  quite  free  to  proceed  in 
its  own  way  without  a  question  of  a  priori  space  as 
its  basal  principle;  but,  when  there  comes  to  be  a 
question  of  the  peculiar  action  of  the  categories  on 
the  actual  facts  of  experience,  it  is  no  less  evident 
that,  for  a  complete  rationale  of  what  is  in  question, 
space  quite  as  much  as  the  categories  will  demand 
a  deduction  which  can  be  only  transcendental — demon- 
stration, that  is,  of  empirical  action  on  the  part  of  an 
a  priori  element. 

We  have  in  this  section  at  least  one  example  of  how 
difficult  it  is  to  avoid  verbal  contradictions  in  the  use 
of  the  word  perception.  "The  categories  of  the 
understanding,"  it  is  said,  "  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  conditions  of  perception;"  and  yet,  immediately 
afterwards,  we  are  made  to  understand  that  these 
same  categories  "  furnish  conditions  of  the  very  pos- 
sibility of  all  our  perception."  The  contradiction 
depends  upon  this,  that  the  first  perception  spoken  of 
is  elemental  perception,  sensuous  objective  presenta- 
tion considered  only  as  that ;  while  the  second  per- 
ception is  the  formed  perception  of  experience.  Per- 
ception as  perception,  what  we  may  call  elemental 
perception,  is  that  which  has  before  it,  no  matter 
whether  subjectively  or  objectively,  a  presented  com- 
plex of  sense ;  and  in  such  presentation,  so  long  as  it 
is  only  sensuous,  the  categories,  as  non-sensuous, 
have  evidently  no  part.     Nevertheless  to  make  objects 


398 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


of  subjective  presentations,  experience  of  mere  appear- 
ances to  sense, — in  a  word,  formed  perception  oi  crude 
perception,  it  is  precisely  the  categories  that  are 
required.  The  reader  must  be  on  his  guard  when- 
ever the  word  perception  appears. 

It  is  important  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  here 
that  Kant  is  perfectly  well  aware  of  the  possibility  of 
the  one  perception,  even  without  categories  to  convert 
it  into  the  other.  "There  certainly  may  very  well 
be  presentations  of  objects,  without  there  being  any 
necessity  to  refer  them  to  functions  of  the  understand- 
ing at  all;"  "understanding  need  not  involve  any 
share  in  the  formation  of  objects;"  "presentations 
may  be  given  in  sense  without  calling  in  understand- 
ing;" "presentations  might  very  well  be  such  that 
they  would  involve  no  harmony  with  the  unity  of  the 
understanding;"  "there  might  be  nothing  in  them 
correspondent  to  the  notion  cause;"  "presentations 
in  sense  would  not  the  less  for  that  furnish  us  with 
objects  so  far  perceptive ;"  etc.  These  passages,  con- 
sequently, are  a  curious  comment  on  the  ascription  to 
Kant  of  the  doctrine  that  the  possibility  of  succession 
as  succession  depends  on  the  pre-supposition  of  the 
succession  causal  I  Evidently  to  Kant's  mind  there 
might  very  well  be  in  the  sequence  of  phenomena  no 
principle  of  synthesis  whatever. 

To  repeat.  The  phrases  quid  juris  and  quid  facti 
felicitously  indicate  the  whole  inquiry.  Locke,  for 
example,  shows  the  latter — the  what  of  the  fact — but 
it  is  Kant  that,  in  view  of  a  fact  of  sense  with  claim 
to  a  validity  beyond  a  fact  of  sense,  shows  the  former 
— the  legitimacy  and  right,  the  title,  guarantee,  and 
warrant  of  this  claim  of  the  fact.  When  we  wake 
up  to  the  question  of  whence  such  notions  as  fortune, 
fate,  etc.,  the  explanation  or  justification  which  may 


COMMENTARY. 


399 


r 


be  supposed  to  follow  will  illustrate  what  is  meant 
by  a  deduction.  But  should  there  be  other  notions 
manifestly  empirical,  but  of  a  force  that  is  as  mani- 
festly supra-empirical,  these  notions  will  very  specially 
and  peculiarly  call  for  a  deduction.  This  deduction, 
further,  precluded  by  the  very  terms  of  the  case  from 
any  reference  to  what  is  a  posteriori^  can  only  turn  to 
what  is  a  priori,  A  deduction  now  of  empirical 
functions  on  the  part  of  a  priori  principles  is  a  tran- 
scendental deduction.  What  is  transcendental  is  not 
transcendent;  that  is,  it  is  not  transcendent  absolutely 
of  experience ;  it  is  in  experience,  but  transcendent 
of  the  element  of  sense  in  experience.  Of  course, 
what  is  transcendental  being  found  in  experience, 
and  without  experience,  indeed,  not  possibly  to  be 
found,  there  is  always  room  for  an  inquiry  into  its 
empirical  occasions  and  into  the  forms  and  facts  of  it 
as  in  experience.  For  showing  us  the  way  to  such 
an  inquiry  as  this,  we  have  to  thank  Locke.  But  no 
such  inquiry,  limited  as  it  is  to  the  mere  exhibition 
of  a  fact,  will  ever  explain  the  presence  in  that  fact 
of  an  authority  and  reach  which  are  utterly  beyond 
and  absolutely  above,  not  that  fact,  but  simply  any 
and  every  fact  (i.e.,  of  sense).  There  is  here  evidently 
a  quite  transcendental  element  that  demands  a  quite 
transcendental  deduction. 

Such  a  deduction  was  easy  for  sense-forms,  for  the 
sense-forms  of  space  and  time,  inasmuch  as  these 
forms  are  themselves  perceptive  objects,  and  are 
readily  seen  and  understood  to  become  part  of  all 
perceptive  objects;  but  the  case  is  quite  otherwise 
with  notions.  How  can  what  is  intellectual  become 
sensuous,  what  is  discursive  become  intuitive,  become 
perceptive — how  can  a  notion  be  seen,  touched, 
handled,    or   heard?     Well,    quite    evidently,    they 


400 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


CiuiBot,  materially,  enter  into  perception:  they  can 
never  be  so  much  stuff  actually  presented.  Still  they 
may  enter  fonnalli/  into  experience.  They  cannot  be 
precisely  perceptive,  as  so  many  individual  objects  ; 
still  they  may  be  perceptive,  actually  perceptive,  as 
so  many  connexions  of  objects :  they  may  be  objectively 
connective,  and,  as  objectively  connective,  necessarily, 
so  fiir,  objectively  perceptive.  There  is  the  notion 
cause,  for  example.  It  is  not  itself  an  object ;  still  it 
is  a  connexion  among  objects ;  and  it  is  actually  per- 
ceived as  suck 

Now,  so  far  as  objects  themselves  are  concerned, 
there  seems  at  first  sight  no  necessity  for  any  such 
principle  of  connexion.     There  is  the  cause  A  and 
the  effect  B ;  but  A  is  A,  B  is  B,  and  each  is  an  object 
Oil  its  own  account ;  there  seems  no  reason  why  there 
should  be  any  connexion  between  them,  why  A  should 
not  follow  quite  as  much  as  precede,  and  B  precede 
quite  as  much  as  follow.    It  is  not  at  all  manifest 
beforehand  why  experience  should  contain  such   a 
connexion,  such  a  principle  of  synthesis.     It  is  plain 
that  objects  must  obey  sense  and  be  subject  to  con- 
ditions of  sense ;  but  it  is  not  at  all  plain  that  they 
may  not  be  independent  of  conditions  of  the  under- 
standing.    It  does  not  even  settle  the  question  and 
end  our  difficulties  here  to  say  that  such  connexions, 
principles  of  synthesis,  actually  are.    For  we  naturally 
turn  and  wonder  then  how  can  such  things  be  ?     Ex- 
perience may  certainly,  indeed,   give   us   abundant 
opportunity  and  occasion  for  observation  of  the  fact 
of  causality;    but  no   experience   can   explain    the 
validity  (that  is,  the  apodictic  authority)  of  the  fact. 
A  principle  of  such  authority  must  either  be  a  jmmi 
(it  simply  cannot  be  a  posteriori)^  or  it  is  hollow,  null 
and  void,  meaningless,  a  »ere  Musion  that  does  not 


COMMENTARY. 


401 


exist  at  all.  Experience  is  only  competent  to  declare 
that  so  and  so  usually,  but  not  necessarily  and  uni- 
versally, happens.  Causality  has  a  dignity  and  worth, 
then,  other  than  empirical :  the  effect  does  not  follow 
the  cause  as  merely  added  to  it,  but  as  implied  in  it 
and  occasioned  by  it.  Hence  the  necessity  of  a  mode 
of  explanation  that  is  beyond  the  experience  of  sense ; 
or  here  of  a  dedtictio  juris. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  it  is  that  we  have  arrived 
here.     Hume  seemed  to  demonstrate  that,  the  pro- 
position of  causality  concerning  a  matter  of  fact  and 
not  a  relation  of  ideaSy  there  could  be  no  source  for 
the  necessary  connexion  we  attribute  to  it,  bnt  the 
power  of  custom.     This  struck  Kant,  and  he  was  led 
to  inquire^  when  it  presently  occurred  to  him  that  the 
apodictic  necessity  attributed  to  the  proposition  really 
existed,  at  the  same  time  that  custom  was  totally 
inadequate  to  yield  any  such  validity.     The  suoffires- 
tion,7hen,  plainly,  in^m^tely  was,  How  could  there 
be  a^Hxlictic  evidLa  in  what,  after  all,  was  a  matter 
of  fact?     As  Hume  said,  no  such  evidence  could 
attach  to  it  so  far  as  concerned  the  precise  element 
of  fact,  the  precise  element  of  sense,  or  the  experience 
of  sense.     For  any  such  element  (of  sense)  we  had 
always  only  to  wait,  and  take  it  as  it  came.     That  is, 
any  such  element  came  to  us  only  a  posteriori.     So 
far  as  concerned  what  was  a  posteriori  in  the  pro- 
position,  then,  there  was  no  possible  origin  of  the 
validity  in  question  ;  but  what  of  the  a  priori^  and  of 
the  a  priori  as  such  ?     We  called  applications  of  prin- 
ciples only  a  posteriori  in  their  original  source,  infer- 
ences a  priori ;  but  the  a  priori  of  which  there  was 
question  now  must  be  an  absolute  a  p^riori.     Further, 
conceived  to  oppose  the  a  j)osteriori  of  sense  as  a  source 
of  cognitions,  such  a  priori^  if  to  yield  other  cogni- 

2c 


400 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


cannot,  materially,  enter  into  perception:  they  can 
never  be  so  much  stuff  actually  presented.  Still  they 
may  enter  formally  into  experience.  They  cannot  be 
precisely  perceptive,  as  so  many  individual  objects ; 
still  they  may  be  perceptive,  actually  perceptive,  as 
so  many  connexions  of  objects :  they  may  be  objectively 
connective,  and,  as  objectively  connective,  necessarily, 
so  far,  objectively  perceptive.  There  is  the  notion 
cause,  for  example.  It  is  not  itself  an  object ;  still  it 
is  a  connexion  among  objects ;  and  it  is  actually  per- 
ceived as  such. 

Now,  so  far  as  objects  themselves  are  concerned, 
there  seems  at  first  sight  no  necessity  for  any  such 
principle  of  connexion.  There  is  the  cause  A  and 
the  effect  B ;  but  A  is  A,  B  is  B,  and  each  is  an  object 
on  its  own  account ;  there  seems  no  reason  why  there 
should  be  any  connexion  between  them,  why  A  should 
not  follow  quite  as  much  as  precede,  and  B  precede 
quite  as  much  as  follow.  It  is  not  at  all  manifest 
beforehand  why  experience  should  contain  such  a 
connexion,  such  a  principle  of  synthesis.  It  is  plain 
that  objects  must  obey  sense  and  be  subject  to  con- 
ditions of  sense ;  but  it  is  not  at  all  plain  that  they 
may  not  be  independent  of  conditions  of  the  under- 
standing. It  does  not  even  settle  the  question  and 
end  our  difficulties  here  to  say  that  such  connexions, 
principles  of  synthesis,  actually  are.  For  we  naturally 
turn  and  wonder  then  how  can  such  things  he  ?  Ex- 
perience may  certainly,  indeed,  give  us  abundant 
opportunity  and  occasion  for  observation  of  the  fact 
of  causality;  but  no  experience  can  explain  the 
validity  (that  is,  the  apodictic  authority)  of  the  fact. 
A  principle  of  such  authority  must  either  be  a  priori 
(it  simply  cannot  be  a  posteriori)^  or  it  is  hollow,  null 
and  void,  meaningless,  a  mere  delusion  that  does  not 


COMMENTARY. 


401 


exist  at  all.  Experience  is  only  competent  to  declare 
that  so  and  so  usually,  but  not  necessarily  and  uni- 
versally, happens.  Causality  has  a  dignity  and  worth, 
then,  other  than  empirical :  the  effect  does  not  follow 
the  cause  as  merely  added  to  it,  but  as  implied  in  it 
and  occasioned  by  it.  Hence  the  necessity  of  a  mode 
of  explanation  that  is  beyond  the  experience  of  sense ; 
or  here  of  a  deductio  juris. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  it  is  that  we  have  arrived 
here.  Hume  seemed  to  demonstrate  that,  the  pro- 
position of  causality  concerning  a  matter  of  fact  and 
not  a  relation  of  ideas,  there  could  be  no  source  for 
the  necessary  connexion  we  attribute  to  it,  but  the 
power  of  custom.  This  struck  Kant,  and  he  was  led 
to  inquire,  when  it  presently  occurred  to  him  that  the 
apodictic  necessity  attributed  to  the  proposition  really 
existed,  at  the  same  time  that  custom  was  totally 
inadequate  to  yield  any  such  validity.  The  sugges- 
tion, then,  plainly,  immediately  was,  Hoiv  could  there 
be  apodictic  evidence  in  what,  after  all,  was  a  matter 
of  fact?  As  Hume  said,  no  such  evidence  could 
attach  to  it  so  far  as  concerned  the  precise  element 
of  fact,  the  precise  element  of  sense,  or  the  experience 
of  sense.  For  any  such  element  (of  sense)  we  had 
always  only  to  wait,  and  take  it  as  it  came.  That  is, 
any  such  element  came  to  us  only  a  posteriori.  So 
far  as  concerned  what  was  a  posteriori  in  the  pro- 
position, then,  there  was  no  possible  origin  of  the 
validity  in  question  ;  but  what  of  the  a  priori,  and  of 
the  a  lyriori  as  such  ?  We  called  aj^pUcations  of  prin- 
ciples only  a  posteriori  in  their  original  source,  infer- 
ences a  priori;  but  the  a  priori  of  which  there  was 
question  now  must  be  an  absolute  a  priori.  Further, 
conceived  to  oppose  the  a  jwsteriori  of  sense  as  a  source 
of  cognitions,  such  a  priori,  if  to  yield  other  cogni- 

2c 


4" 


402 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


tions,  must  simply  be  an  a  priori  of  our  cognitive 
faculties  themselves.  That  is,  into  the  a  posteriori 
matter  of  knowledge,  there  will  be  thrown  fomis  of 
knowledge  from  the  mind  itself.  It  is  to  some  such 
form  actually  present  in  the  proposition  of  causality 
that  we  must  attribute  its  peculiar  validity.  Ob- 
viously, then,  it  will  greatly  assist  us  to  a  complete 
discovery  of  said  forms,  if  we  inquire  whether  there 
are  not  other  such  propositions  as  the  proposition  of 
causality.  Now,  Kant,  to  his  own  belief,  found  a 
variety  of  other  such  propositions,  some  empirical  in 
the  manner  that  the  causal  proposition  was  empirical, 
and  others  non-empirical  or  pure.  It  was  the  mathe- 
matical field  exhibited  the  latter,  and  it  was  especially 
in  consideration  of  these  that  Kant  was  led  to  assume 
the  a  priori  nature  of  space.  But  space  could  only 
be  followed  by  time  in  a  like  reference.  These  now, 
then,  would  constitute  the  a  priori  contributions  of 
sense,  but  what  now  of  those  of  the  understanding  ? 
Now,  Kant  could  not  think  any  such  question  of  the 
understanding  without  being  immediately  referred  to 
Logic,  which  is  the  science  of  the  understanding,  and 
the  rather  that  this  science  was  itself,  evidently,  of  a 
demonstrated  non-empirical  or  a  priori  nature.  Here, 
too,  it  would  necessarily  occur  to  him  at  once  that, 
while  sense  contributed  what  could  be  called  material 
elements,  understanding  would  contribute  elements, 
again,  that  were  only  formal  But  what  was  formal, 
not  being  at  all  of  the  nature  of  stuflF,  and  yet  acting 
on  stuff,  the  stuff  of  experience,  could  only  refer  to 
coninexions  in  and  of  stuff,  in  and  of  objects. 

Now  the  sections  before  us,  13  to  20,  both  inclu- 
sive, may  be  said  introductorily  to  handle  precisely 
these  subjects.  That  is,  Kant,  with  connerioiis  now 
Bccessarily  occupying  and  absorbing   his   attention, 


COMMENTARY. 


403 


applies  himself  to  the  consideration  of  synthesis  as 
synthesis.  Any  synthesis  within  the  mind,  even  of 
elements  contributed  by  sense,  he  conceives,  in  the 
first  place,  to  be  placed  in  the  imagination.  But  the 
imagination  is  at  once  under  the  unity  of  self-con- 
sciousness which,  to  make  any  complex  contained  in 
imagination  its  own,  must  connect  every  unit  of  that 
complex  to  its  own  self,  and,  consequently,  all  together 
to  one  another.  The  result,  evidently,  is  synthesis. 
It  is  self-consciousness,  then,  that  synthetically  estab- 
lishes unity  in  every  act  of  knowledge ;  and  without 
self-consciousness  there  is  not  even  the  possibility  of 
any  unity  in  knowledge.  But  it  is  self-consciousness 
understands,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  it  is  self- 
consciousness  judges.  Now  a  judgment  is  only  a 
certain  adjustment  of  focus,  so  to  speak,  to  the  unity 
of  self-consciousness;  and  of  this  unity  there  are 
twelve  such  focij  or  this  unity  is  susceptible  of  twelve 
modi  under  the  twelve  functions  of  judgment  which 
logic  presents  to  us.  In  this  way,  towards  synthesis, 
there  is  first  the  pure  sense-material  of  time  and 
space ;  second,  the  taking  possession  of  this  material 
by  imagination  under  self-consciousness ;  and,  third, 
the  reduction  of  this  material  so  placed  into  twelve 
a  priori  forms  of  synthesis  under  the  twelve  functions 
of  self-consciousness  (or  judgment).  These  forms, 
now,  being  there  only  as  checkers  for  the  reception 
and  elaboration  of  the  contributions  (colours,  feels, 
etc.)  of  special  sense,  are  manifestly  to  be  called 
transcendental.  We  may  add,  what  we  stop  short  of 
here  in  our  text,  that  Kant  proceeds  to  complement 
these  twelve  constitutive  transcendental  principles  de- 
rived from  the  forms  of  the  judgment,  by  three 
regulative  transcendental  principles  similarly  derived 
from  an   assumptive   analysis  of  the  forms   of  the 


404 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


syllogism.  These  are  the  three  Ideas;  and  for  result, 
Kant  supposes  that  he  has  thus  explained  how,  out  of 
our  own  subjective  afFections,  we  have  this  actual  world 
before  us,  and  not  only  as  objectively  perceived,  but 
also  as  (under  the  ideas)  theoretically  reasoned.  We 
are  to  conceive,  consequently,  that  we  have  here  in 
Kant  a  metaphysic  as  well  as  a  theory  of  perception, 
though,  in  the  present  volume,  it  is  to  the  latter  we 
confine  ourselves. 


§  14.  Transition  to  the  Deduction  of  the  Categories. 

The  mtellect,  through  its  notions,  if  at  all  contri- 
butive,  so  to  speak,  to  the  bolus  of  experience,  will 
not  be  able  to  contribute  any  stuff,  but  only  con- 
nexion, or,  as  it  were,  focus  to  stuff  (sensuous  stuff) ; 
and  that  connexion  or  focus,  as  depending  on  notions, 
will  be  readily  realized  if  we  conceive  these  notions  to 
amount  to  rules  (as  that  of  causality,  for  example). 
So  only  it  will  be  that  intellect,  as  factor  in  percep- 
tion, can  be  understood  to  make  even  actual  objects 
(experience)  at  all  possible. 

That  the  notion  of  an  object  at  all  is  not  a  matter 
of  sense  (affection),  but  of  intellect  (function),  will 
not  cause  difficulty.  Substance  is  what  Kant  himself 
has  here  in  mind.  That  what  the  sense-elements 
unite  in  should  be  conceived  or  perceived  as  a  sub- 
stance, it  is  that  Kant  thinks  of  as  no  contribution  of 
sense ;  and  we  have  seen  the  same  thing  repeatedly 
already  {Introduction,  XL,  at  end ;  also  §  1,  paragraph 
4).^  But  as  regards  the  notion  simply  of  object  as 
object,  Plato  may  be  referred  to.  Socrates  asks 
Theajtetus  (184  D-186  D)  whether  it  would  not  be 
strange  that  our  various  senses  should  not  meet  in 
"a  certain  one  idea,"  to  be  called  *^soul"  or  other- 


COMMENTARY. 


405 


P 


wise ;  whether  there  are  not  more  things  in  percep- 
tion than  can  be  referred  to  "the  body;"  whether 
what  things  are  perceived  by  one  faculty,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  perceive  by  another,  as  what  by  hearing,  by 
sight,  and  what  by  sight,  by  hearing ;  and  whether, 
at  the  same  time,  they  are  not  conceived  together, 
while  this  community  in  their  regard  must  be  per- 
ceived by  something  that  is  neither  sight  nor  hearing ; 
whether  also  there  is  no  organ  proper  for  discovery 
of  this  unless  precisely  the  soul  itself;  whether,  con- 
sequently, some  things  are  not  perceived  by  the  soul 
itself,  and  others  by  faculties  of  the  body ;  whether, 
then,   the   general   conclusion    is   not :    'Ei/  ^lev  rol^ 

TraO/f/maa-iv    ovk    €VL    eTnorTrjimt],   ev  Se.    tm    irepi    eKeivtßv    ^u\- 

\oyta-iJ.w  (there  is  no  science  in  the  affections,  but  in 
the  reasoning  about  them)  ?  This  reference,  probably, 
will  sufficiently  illustrate  the  consideration  in  hand. 
Schwegler  {Handbook,  71)  sums  up  here :—"  Prota- 
goras knows  not  the  a  priori  element  of  knowledge : 
it  results  from  an  analysis  of  sensuous  perception, 
that  not  the  whole  sum  involved  in  any  one  act  of 
perception  is  produced  or  introduced  by  the  action  of 
the  senses,  but  rather  that,  besides  this  sensuous 
action,  there  are  implied  as  well  certain  intellectual 
functions,  and,  consequently,  an  independent  sphere 
of  extra-sensuous  knowledge"  (but  see  further).  It 
is  to  be  observed  that  it  is  Kant,  and  not  Plato,  has 
introduced  the  term  a  priori  here.  In  reference  to 
this  term,  we  may  here  remark,  also,  that  it  is  not 
verbally  correct  to  refer  it  to  Hume  in  that  sense,  or 
to  say  that  he  (Hume)  saw  it  to  be  necessary  ''  that 
said  notions  should  be  possessed  of  an  a  priori  origin." 
Hume  certainly  asked  after  the  origin  of  such  a  notion 
(the  necessity  that  was  present  in  causality),  but  it  is 
not  the  literal  truth  to  say,  he  saw  it  must  be  a  priori 


406 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


It  was  only  Kant  saw  that.  Hume  saw  only  that 
necessity  could  not  be  a  product  of  sense,  could  not 
be  a  posteriori;  but  he  was  not  led  thereby  to  the  a 
priori  of  Kant.  Rather  it  pleased  him  to  prove  that 
said  origin  could  neither  be  a  posteriori^  nor  yet— in 
his  sense  of  the  expression  truly — a  priori.  We  saw 
the  necessity  of  the  one  billiard  ball  communicating 
motion  to  the  other,  neither  after  the  fact,  nor  yet 
before  it.  With  this  small  gloss,  all  else  in  Hume's 
reference  is  correct— all  here,  on  the  whole,  is  per- 
fectly well  said,  indeed. 

Kant  is  too  perfunctory  as  regards  his  ^*  definitions 
of  the  categories."  The  example  of  substance,  if,  from 
step  to  step  dwelt  upon,  will  be  found  perfectly  deter- 
minative ;  but  the  statement  of  it  does  not  run  well, 
and  the  reader  is  apt  to  neglect  it.  Rather  than  this, 
however,  the  reader  ought  to  pause  here,  and  make 
plain  to  himself  how  it  is  that  each  special  category 
is  specially  derived  from  each  correspondent  function 
of  judgment  (or  form  of  the  judgment),  as  causality, 
for  example,  from  antecedent  and  consequent.  In 
short,  the  categories  collectively  are  the  entire  sys- 
tematic tree  of  the  logical  functions  of  judgment,  ap- 
plied determinatively  to  a  priori  conditions  of  percep- 
tion (time  and  space) — and  so  a  priori  prescriptive  of 
how  experience  shall  be.  That  is  in  sum  all  that  tran- 
scendental means— the  entire  a  jmori  that,  out  of  an 
a  posteriori^  renders  an  experience  possible. 

§  15.  Of  the  Possibility  of  Conjunction  in  General. 

Sense,  whether  special  or  general  (time  and  space), 
is  only  passively  recipient.  If  what  it  receives  does 
not^  lie  there  as  it  simply  is  received,  but  becomes  a 
subject  of  synthesis,  this  must  be  an  action  beyond 


COMMENTAEY. 


407 


sense,  and,  consequently,  one  of  the  understanding. 
But  synthesis,  being  a  uniting,  a  union,  involves  a 
principle  of  unity.  Nay,  analysis  itself  presupposes 
synthesis.  But  this  principle  must  evidently  be  more 
than  the  category  of  quantitative  unity :  it  must,  in 
fact,  be  qualitative.  What,  then,  is  this  principle  of 
qualitative  unity  ?  It  must  be  the  general  principle 
of  unity  to  the  categories  themselves — the  general 
principle  of  unity,  indeed,  to  the  understanding  it- 
self (imagination  included). 

Kant  is  not  at  all  clear,  simple,  and  methodic  in 
his  explanation  of  synthesis :  it  is  a  long  time  before 
it  finally  comes  out,  and  is  finally  seen  in  all  its 
parts.  The  reader  ought  at  once  to  know  that  self- 
consciousness,  the  unity  of  apperception,  is  the  single 
general  principle,  and  that  the  categories  are  simply 
particular  functions  under  it ;  lastly,  that  the  vehicle 
of  all  synthesis — fö  affection  (special,  general,  or  both), 
through  function  (the  categories),  under  unity  (the 
unity  of  apperception) — is  imagination.  It  is  worth 
while  pointing  out  that  now  the  use  of  §  12  is  seen : 
it  was  introduced  for  nothing  else  than  to  give  the 
expression  qualitative  unity !  As  regards  the  necessity 
of  a  general  principle  of  unity,  it  is  to  be  borne  in 
mind  that  judgments  at  all  already  involve  such 
principle,  and  that  the  categories  are  but  derivatives 
from  judgments.     In  fact,  it  all  runs  thus : — 

We  obtain  a  complex,  or  variety  of  particulars, 
from  sense.  Among  these  particulars  combination 
takes  place.  This  combination  cannot  proceed  from 
the  senses,  which  simply  give.  It  must  be  an  act  of 
the  spontaneity  of  the  subject,  consequently,  of  the 
understanding  of  the  subject.  This  action  of  the  un- 
derstanding, which  is  a  general  one,  and  of  universal 
application,  we  name  synthesis.     Synthesis,  too,  must 


408 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


precede  analysis,  for  we  cannot  detach  unless  we 
have,  first  of  all,  attached.  Again,  combination  in- 
volves an  idea  of  unity,  an  idea  of  synthetic  (conjunc- 
tive) unity.  This  idea,  then,  must  even  precede  and 
condition  synthesis  itself.  Where  is  its  source  ?  Not 
in  the  categories,  which  themselves  presuppose  syn- 
thesis, the  synthesis  of  judgment.  Where,  then,  but 
in  a  general  principle  operative  of  this  same  synthesis 
of  judgment,  which  principle,  evidently,  must  condi- 
tion the  action  of  the  understanding  itself. 


§  16.  Of  the  Synthetic  Unity  of  Apperception. 

This  is  an  all-important  consideration;  and  Kant 
must  be  allowed  to  have  made  a  distinguished  notch 
in  it.  All,  however,  is  so  plain  here  that  comment 
seems  unnecessary.  "  We  can  all  fancy  an  ego,  an  I 
— fancy  it  as  a  unit  or  unity,  as  the  primal  unit,  the 
primal  unity.  Well,  to  feel,  to  know,  this  unit  must 
be,  so  to  speak,  charged  with  something,  an  object. 
Now,  this  object,  whatever  it  be,  has  parts,  it  possesses 
a  certain  breadth,  it  is,  as  compared  with  the  unit  into 
which  it  is  received,  a  complex,  a  manifold ;  and  it  is 
by  connecting  the  various  units  of  this  manifold  to 
each  other  and  to  itself  that  the  primal  unit  or  unity, 
the  ego  or  I,  can  come  to  possess,  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  to  knoiv  an  object"  {Lectures  on  the  PhilosojJiy  of 
Law,  p.  3). 

Kant,  we  see  too  here,  assumes  as  it  were  two  Vs, 
the  pure  I  or  I  think  of  bare  self-consciousness,  and 
the  concrete  I  of  empirical  feeling.  Each  of  these, 
however,  may  be  seen  to  be  identically  the  same  I, 
but  with  different  fillins. 

Here,  too,  we  have  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  possi- 
bility of  more  than  one  kind  of  perception. 


COMMENTARY. 


409 


It  may  be  worth  while  to  point  out  that  appercep- 
tion is  perceptio — ad. 

Of  course  it  is  to  be  understood  that  it  is  imagina- 
tion and  the  categories  bring  the  hreadtlis  of  objects 
under  the  focus  of  the  single  general  principle. 

Lastly,  what  concerns  analysis,  as  opposed  to  syn- 
thesis, and  especially  personal  identity,  should  be  well 
considered  here.  As  regards  terms  we  see  clearly 
here  that  transcendental,  as  applied  to  the  unity  of 
apperception,  means  something  that  is  indicative  and 
explicative  of  an  a  priori  element  in  what  is  empirical. 


§  17.  This  Synthetic  Unity  the  Ultimate  Principle  of 

Understandmg. 

Anything  here  simply  corroborates  what  imme- 
diately precedes.  The  essential  conditions  of  percep- 
tion as  perception  are  very  clearly  put.  What  space 
and  time,  too,  are  to  Kant  is  well  seen.  Note  also 
the  doctrine  of  a  plurality  of  understandings,  etc. 
We  see  here  Aiischauung  rather  to  convey  crude  per- 
ception, and  Erkewßimss  a  formed  perception. 


§  18.  Objective  Unity  of  Self- Consciousness. 

That  perceptive  units  are  cemented  together  and 
into  a  single  unity,  is  attributed  to  an  objective  func- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  unity  of  consciousness.  This, 
then,  being  the  objective  unity  of  consciousness,  and 
really  resulting  in  what  appears  an  alien  object  and 
in  relations  of  necessity,  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  subjective  unity  of  consciousness,  which  refers 
only  to  the  successive  moments  of  actual  feeling  in 
inner  sense  as  perceptively  affected.  Now  this  sub- 
jective state  of  consciousness  has  its  own  importance, 


410 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


for  it  is  the  first  factor  towards  production  of  all  the 
formed  objects  of  actual  experience.     It  means,  in 
fact,  the  whole  of  what  is  empirical  in  objects.     But 
what  is  empirical  in   objects  is,   in   a  certain  way, 
these  objects  themselves.     Let  consciousness  contri- 
bute to  that  whatever  it  may,  it  evidently  cannot 
contribute  anything  substantial.     The  empirical  ele- 
ment is  astronomy,  and  meteorology,  and  geography; 
the  empirical  element  is  the  whole  of  history,  Greece 
and  Rome,  Pericles,  Pompey,  and  Augustus  Caesar; 
the  empirical  element  is  this  paper,  pen,  and  ink,  this 
desk,  table,  carpet,  room,  that  window  and  the  garden 
outside  of  it.     It  is  absurd  to  su2)pose  the  transcen- 
dental element  to  have  more  than  a  mere  function  of 
arrangement  here.     Nay,   Kant  would  not  seek  to 
ascribe  any  such  power  to  consciousness,  and  to  ex- 
clude arrangement  from  the  empirical  element  itself, 
were  he  not  under  the  conviction  that  the  whole  of 
that  element  was  only  subjective  sensation,  which 
could,  consequently,  as  being  within,  be  only  further 
manipulated  from  within.     Still  sensations  were,  for 
all  that,  the  whole  burthen  of  time  and  space,  the 
whole  contents  of  experience,  the  whole  contents  of 
history.     All  this  is  implied  in  that  single  sentence  : 
"Whether  I   shall  be  empirically  conscious  of  the 
units  in  sense  as  themselves  co-existent  or  themselves 
successive  the  one  to  the  other,  depends  on  circum- 
stances, or  empirical  conditions."     We  know  that  all 
units  in  sense  are  held  by  Kant  to  be  successive  the 
one   to   the   other.      Still   there   are   circumstances, 
empirical  conditions,  actually  accompanying  the  units 
in  sense,  in  such  wise  that  they  enable  us  to  pro- 
nounce whether  these  units— m  the  object — are  to  be 
held  as  together  or  as  only  after  one  another.     That 
is,  it  depends  on  circumstances,  on  empirical  condi- 


COMMENTARY. 


411 


tions,  whether  the  units  are  such  as  to  call  for  the 
categories  of  quantity,  quality,  substance,  reciprocity, 
etc.,  or  for  that  of  causality.  Further,  there  is  that 
in  these  sense-units  themselves  which  determines 
them  as  independent  of  the  succession  of  time,  though 
in  the  element  of  time.  In  fact,  when  all  that  has 
been  considered,  the  transcendental  elements  will  be 
found,  so  far  as  their  possible  application  is  con- 
cerned, to  be  very  peculiarly  and  heavily  weighted. 
It  is  doubtful,  indeed,  whether,  apart  from  conscious- 
ness itself,  much  or  anything  will  remain  for  the 
transcendental  elements  as  actually  named,  should 
Kant's  mistake  be  corrected,  and  knowledge  of  units 
in  sense  be  recognised  to  eventuate  in  knowledge  of 
actual  things  without. 

It  is  as  dependent  on  the  a  posteriori  element  that 
the  empirical  consciousness  ("  the  empirical  unity  of 
consciousness"  means  no  more  than  that)  is  called 
*' contingent."  That  concerns  special  sense;  but 
Kant  will  have  it  that  general  sense  is  different.  The 
consciousness  of  what  belongs  to  general  sense  (time 
and  space)  is,  as  concerning  what  is  a  priori,  itself  a 
jmori  and  necessary. 

In  this  section  we  have  that  use  of  the  word 
objective  which  is  so  current  in  Kant's  moral  treatises. 
AVhat  is  objective  in  a  moral  sense,  namely,  is  what  is 
valid  always  and  for  everybody.  In  the  language  of 
the  text,  what  is  '' objectiv  gültig ''  is  ^^  nothwendig  und 
allgemein  geltend''  The  objective  unity  of  conscious- 
ness, then,  may  be  conceived  as  extended  into  its 
action  on  time  and  space.  Such  unity  of  general 
sense  under  consciousness  will  be  seen  to  underlie 
any  consciousness  due  to  special  sense,  which  is  the 
empirical  consciousness.  The  empirical  consciousness, 
also,  as  an  affair  of  sensation,  is  easily  seen  to  be  con- 


y 


E£S» 


412 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


413 


tingent  and  subjective.  Of  course,  it  is  not  the 
empirical,  but  only  the  transcendental  consciousness, 
that  is  under  the  discussion  of  Kant. 


§  19.  The  Logical  Form  of  all  Judgments,  etc. 

We  here  see,  what  from  the  general  situation  is 
very  credible,  that  Kant  wants  to  identify  the  act  of 
pronouncing  a  judgment  with  that  of  realizing  our 
subjective  impressions  into  actual  objects.  This 
follows  from  the  fact  that  the  categories  (which  are 
the  agents  of  objectivity)  are,  in  essential  nature, 
judgments.  So  it  is  that  to  Kant  the  copula,  the 
"is,"  simply  pronounces  objectivity.  The  units  of 
special  sense  are  pronounced  to  have  collapsed,  or  to 
have  eclipsed  themselves,  into  the  a  'priori  focus  of 
objectivity,  which,  in  forms  of  general  sense,  in  cate- 
gories, in  apperception,  has  been  prepared  for  them. 
These  units  are  in  themselves  contingent  (say  any 
particular  effect  and  any  particular  cause),  but  it  is 
as  received  into  said  focus  that  they  take  on  necessity 
of  nexus.     The   focus   concerned   is,  as   it  were,   a 


referential  conjunction  of  differents  to  each  other  in 
objective  apperception.  The  probability  here  is  that 
Kant  is  only  dominated  by  his  own  needs — judgment 
shxill  objectify  the  mere  subjective  relations  of  ordinary 
association — but  it  is  enough  as  yet  simply  to  under- 
stand. It  is  not  wonderful  that  Kant,  with  his  pure 
objective  understanding  now  ready  there  to  his  hand, 
should  wish  to  judge  into  it,  subsume  into  it,  objec- 
tify into  it,  his  subjective  units  of  mere  sense.  It  is 
in  this  way  we  see  how  it  is  that  necessity  gets 
insinuated  into  units  which  are  themselves  only  em- 
pirical and  contingent.  I  have  no  doubt  that  Hegel's 
use  of  the  word  might  have  been  suggested  by  Urtheil 


here.    That  is  XhQ  primitive  parting  when  the  universal 
subject  recognises,  or  parts  into,  objectivity. 

§  20.  All  Perceptions  of  Sense  stand  under  the  Categories. 

Having  realized  the  last  step,  we  simply  expect  the 
present  one :  the  categories  are  the  system  of  what 
judges  subjective  impressions  into  the  objective 
actualities  of  experience. 

§  21.  Remark. 

Comment  here  is  not  required.  Note  only  again 
Kant's  doctrine  of  man's  intellect  being  simply  a 
certain  inexplicably  given  one — a  given  one  out  of 
many  possible  others.  The  idea  of  the  universe  as  a 
one  absolute  product,  of  a  one  absolute  reason,  seems 
never  to  have  dawned  upon  Kant. 

Between  sense  (general  and  special)  on  the  one 
hand,  and  understanding,  judgment,  self-conscious- 
ness (in  its  categories)  on  the  other,  there  must 
always  be  conceived  to  play  or  ply  the  productive 
imagination. 


§  22.  Application  of  the  Categories. 

This  is  only  an  insistance  on  the  two  sides  neces- 
sary to  our  sort  of  intellects:  notions  without  per- 
ceptions are  void;  perceptions  without  notions  are 
blind. 

§23. 

We  see  here  again  that  peculiar  doctrine  of  a 
possible  plurality  of  intellects :  our  categories  would 
still  hold  good  with  other  senses.    Still,  this  important 


414 


TEXT-BOOK    TO    KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


415 


necessity  comes  out,  that  the  sense-matter,  be  it  what 
it  may,  must  at  least  correspond  to  the  scope  of  the 
categories. 

§  24.  Application  of  the  Categories  to  Sense. 

The  two  sides,  of  understandinf^  and  sense,  a^ain 
insisted  on.  How  what  is  a  priori  in  the  one  may 
coalesce  with  what  is  a  priori  in  the  other  to  the  pro- 
duction of  the  entire  provision  of  transcendental 
forms — those  forms,  namely,  which  though  a  priori 
in  themselves,  are  yet  empirically  present  with  the 
actual  aposterioyi  of  sensation.  The  synthesis  of  the 
one  side  and  the  other,  intellectual  and  specious,  very 
clearly  put.  The  full  force  of  transcendental — an 
a  priori  that  is  also  a  posteriori — is  very  well  seen. 
The  r6le  assigned  to  imagination  is  also  very  plain ; 
and  in  that  reference,  it  is  easy  to  understand  that 
reproductive  imagination,  or  what  is  otherwise  called 
association,  the  association  of  ideas,  is  excluded  from 
transcendental  discussion  for  precisely  the  same  reason 
that  we  saw  in  bar  of  empirical  consciousness  (§  18). 
But  this,  at  least  as  far  as  the  asterisks,  is  probably 
the  most  crucially  decisive  section  in  the  whole  of  the 
deduction,  and,  simple  though  it  be,  we  had  better, 
perhaps,  treat  it  more  at  full. 

What  we  have  to  attend  to  here,  then,  are  the 
three  expressions:  the  intellectual  synthesis,  the 
figurate  synthesis,  and  the  transcendental  synthesis 
of  the  imagination. 

1.  The  intellectual  synthesis  is  simply  the  cate- 
gories, or  all  that  is  involved  in  the  function  of  a 
category.  I  have  called  it  elsewhere  ih^  multiple 
(which  is  also  a  unity)  of  the  category.  Each  cate- 
gory, that  is,  is  the  unity  of  an  intellectual  multiple 


I 


I 


(as  antecedent  and  consequent),  and  is  there  to  act, 
in  its  unity  of  function,  on  any  many  of  affection 
(human  or  not)  that  may  in  some  way  (say  any 
actual  case  of  cause  and  effect,  as  the  sun  rising,  a 
stone  warms)  correspond  to  it.  Each  category  is  but 
a  form  of  the  unity  of  apperception.  As  such  form, 
too,  it  is  evidently  only  intellectual  or  logical ;  that 
is,  it  is  only  formal  or  void  till  filled  by  some  due 
particulars  of  affection  (sense)  actually  submitted  to 
it.  So  it  is  that  the  categories  condition  the  possi- 
bility of  such  an  experience  as  ours  that  rests  on 
affection  of  sense.  This  synthesis,  viewed  apart  and 
in  itself,  is  purely  intellectual ;  but  it  is  also  transcen- 
dental, for  its  empirical  application  is  the  purpose 
and  use  of  it. 

2.  The  figurate  synthesis  is  the  result  of  the  action 
of  the  intellectual  synthesis  (or  simply  the  categories) 
on  the  a  priori  sense-matter  of  us,  that  is,  on  the 
many  or  particulars  of  time  and  space,  which  are  the 
constitutive  complex  of  our  a  priori  or  general  sense. 
Time  and  space  are  to  be  conceived  of  the  nature  of 
impressions,  and  to  lie  in  our  sensibility  or  recep- 
tivity of  impression,  but  still  to  be  a  priori  so,  and  to 
lie  a  priori  so,  as  a  transcendental  provision  in  recep- 
tion of  the  products  of  subjective  sensation  towards 
objective  experience.  Our  understanding  synthetic- 
ally acts  on  the  various  units  of  these  a  priori  webs, 
and  in  such  wise  as  to  realize  into  the  synthetic  unity 
of  apperception  various  a  priori  and  transcendental 
schemata.  It  is  evident  that  all  objects  of  experience 
must  stand  under  the  conditions  of  this  general 
transcendental  machinery.  It  is  evident  also  that  all 
such  objects,  so  placed  and  so  constituted,  cannot  be 
noumena  or  actual  things  in  themselves  which  we 
only  come  to  and  take  up,  but,   as  in  every  way 


ÜI 


416 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


COMMENTARY. 


simple  constructions  of  our  own  out  of  our  own 
subjective  thought-forms  and  our  own  subjective 
sense-affections  (a  certain  matter),  mere  phenomena 
or  appearances  to  sense. 

3.  Now,  again,  it  must  be  seen  that  if  we  are  to 
look  for  the  seat  of  the  figurate  synthesis,  that  seat 
can  only  be  in  the  element  of  imagination  ;  for  it  is 
imagination  that  is  the  seat  and  the  element  of  all 
that  is  perceptive  or  exhibitive,  whether  in  the  so- 
called    thing   from   without    or    idea   from   within. 
Imagination,  that  is,  holds  at  once  of  sense  and  of 
intellect ;  it  is  sensuous  in  that  it  exhibits,  and  it  is 
intellectual  in  that  it  is  self-determinant  and  can  ex- 
hibit an  object,  even  when  no  object  is  presented  to 
it.     Our  a  prion  perceptive  synthesis  under  the  cate- 
gories, then,  may  be  styled  transcendental  synthesis 
of  imagination.     Imagination,  here,   too,  evidently, 
must  be  conceived  as  productive  and  not  as  repro- 
ductive.   Productive  imagination  we  can  easily  realize 
to  ourselves  by  conceiving  it  to  act  on  a  jyriori  space 
to  the  production  of  any  kind  or  amount  of  geomet- 
rical figuration. 

The  rest  of  this  section,  what  follows  the  asterisks, 
is  a  piece  of  as  slovenly  and  unsatisfactory  writing  as 
is  to  be  found  in  the  whole  of  the  present  Kritik 
The  theme  is  that,  not  only  do  we  know  objects,  not 
as  they  are,  but  simply  as  they  appear,  but  even  our 
own  subject  we  know  not  in  any  respect  differently : 
this  subject,  our  own  ego,  our  own  self,  we  know  not 
as  it  is^  but  only  as  in  sense  it  seems.  An  object  is  a 
subjective  sensation,  in  the  subjective  elements  of 
time  and  space,  and  as  subjectively  determined  into 
synthesis  by  the  subject's  categories,  under  the 
subject's  unity  of  apperception;  and  precisely  in 
the  same  manner  the  subject,  any  state  of  the  subject, 


417 


'% 


I 


is  a  subjective  affection  in  the  subjective  element  of 
time;  it  is,  so,  a  manifold  subjectively  determined 
into  synthesis  by  the  subject's  own  categories,  under 
the  subject's  own  unity  of  apperception;  which  unity, 
further,  is  only  a  thought,  and  not  a  perception,  not 
a  complex,  not,   so  to  speak,   an  object.      All  the 
moments  of  Kant's  discussion  are  contained  in  the 
above ;  but  what  he  seems  to  labour  most  at,  is  the 
idea  that  the  subject  is  to  itself  only  as  to  itself  it 
determines  itself  (alluding  to  the  action  of  the  intel- 
lect, on  the  complex  of  affection,  in  the  many  of  time). 
The  other  main  moment  is,  that  anything  to  be  any- 
thing must  have  a  perceptive  complex,  a  perceptive 
complex  to  be  then  categorized  and  understood,  and 
that  apperception,  the  bare  "  I,"  or  "  I  think,"  has  no 
complex  whatever  and  is  only  a  thought,  a  reflection, 
a  mere  logical  connecting  act.     The  general  position 
I  shall  not  criticise,  but  I  may  add  this.     In  my  first 
article  on  Mr  Buckle  {North  American  Review,  July 
1872,  pp.  95-98),  there  is  considered,  almost  in  detail, 
what  is  now  under  discussion,  and  what  I  allude  to 
in  the  Schwegler  (p.  105)  as  "that  peculiar  view  of 
Kant  in  reference  to  an  inner  sense  over  which  poor 
Mr  Buckle  has  so  stumbled,  this,  namely,  that  know- 
ing our  own  inner  like  our  outer,  only  sensuously,  we 
know  it  not  as  it  is,  but  as  it  seem^:'     It  is  worth 
while  realizing  Buckle's   "  it  is  only  just  to,"  etc., 
here ! 

On  the  whole,  the  text  may  be  taken  to  run  thus: — 
That  internal  sense  should  exhibit  to  consciousness 
our  own  selves,  not  as  we  are,  but  as  we  seem,  and 
because  we  perceive  ourselves  only  as  we  are  inter- 
nally affected  (in  such  a  case  by  our  own  selves,  that 
is,  which  involves  a  contradiction  apparently  at  once) 
— this,  a  necessarily  surprising  paradox,  requires  ex- 

2d 


418 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


419 


planation.  We,  namely,  contrary  to  custom,  widely 
discriminate,  as  two  different  independent  powers, 
inner  sense  on  the  one  hand,  and  self-consciousness 
on  the  other. 

What  brings  the  complex  of  inner  sense  into  ap- 
perception (which  for  definite  cognition — sense  being 
merely  passive — is  a  necessity),  is,  in  its  synthetic 
categories,  the  function  of  the  understanding.  Un- 
derstanding unites,  but  has  no  manifold  of  its  own ; 
perception  has  the  manifold,  but  does  not  unite. 
The  synthesis  of  understanding,  consequently,  is  but 
an  act — of  course,  so  far,  a  self-cognisant  act,  but,  as 
yet,  without  objective  filling.  To  contribute  this 
filling  a  sense  is  necessary.  Such,  then,  are  the 
relations  of  apperception  on  the  one  hand,  and  an 
inner  sense  on  the  other.  The  one,  as  sole  source  of 
synthesis,  is  the  universal  prius ;  and  its  synthesis  is 
a  necessity  for  the  other,  which,  else,  would  be  a 
mere  indifferent  and  indefinite  many  of  passive 
affection  —  in  a  certain  general  perceptive  form, 
truly.  As  regards  any  information  of  inner  sense, 
namely,  it  is  we  ourselves  make  it  for  ourselves. 
An  inner  affection  is  an  affection  set  up  in  our- 
selves by  ourselves;  and  further,  to  make  cogni- 
tion of  this  affection,  it  is  we  ourselves  must,  by 
categories  of  ourselves,  gather  it  together  into   an 

apperception,  a  self-consciousness,  which  is  also  our 
own. 

Here,  in  short,  Kant  is  simply  as  everywhere.  He 
believes  in  the  possibility  of  a  variety  of  general 
modes  to  know  or  perceive.  There  is  the  possibility, 
first,  of  what  he  calls  intuitus  originaritis,  an  under- 
standing that,  as  understanding  and  directly  in  its 
own  self,  is  at  once  perception ;  and  there  is  the 
possibility,    second,    of  an   intuitus  derivativus,  of  an 


I 


understanding  that  is  only  an  intellectual  act,  and, 
though  with  a  variety  of  functions,  is  only  an  act  and 
formal  merely,  vacant  merely,  till  materialized,  till 
filled  with  the  material  which  shall  be  supplied  by  a 
sense.     Further,  Kant  evidently  believes  that  two  or 
more    understandings    might,   while   provided   with 
identically  the  same  intellectual  functions,  exhibit  an 
absolutely  different  supply  of  senses   or  groups   of 
senses.     Now  man's  mind  is  only  a  mind  amongst 
minds ;  and  its  peculiarity  is  to  be  such  and  such  an 
apperception,   articulated  into  such  and   such   cate- 
gories, and  seated  on  such  and  such  general  forms  of 
sense.      To  man,  then,  a  cognition  is  always  an  affec- 
tion of  his  sense  in  one,  or  other,  or  both  of  its  two 
general  forms   (space   and   time),    gathered  by   the 
synthesis  of  his  categories  into  the  unity  of  his  apper- 
ception, or,  shortly,  it  is  the  many  of  his  affection  in 
the  unity  of  his  function.     But,  so,  evidently,  a  cog- 
nition from  within  is  quite  in  the  same  way  consti- 
tuted as  a  cognition  from  without.      Consequently,  if 
a  cognition  from  without  is  only  known  to  us  as  it 
seenis  and  not  as  it  is^  it  cannot  be  different  in  that 
respect  with  a  cognition  from  within.     There,  too,  we 
only  know  our  own  subjective  state  as  further  mani- 
pulated  by   machinery    of    our   own.      With    such 
beliefs  before  him,  it  is  evident  how  remote  Kant  must 
have  been  from  the  bare  thought  of  an  absolute  ex- 
perience,  from    the   bare    thought  of    existence   as 
existence,  and,  consequently,  from  the  bare  thought 
of  a  philosophy  as  philosophy. 

Kant's  exemplification  of  the  action  of  productive 
imagination  is  clear  enough  in  itself;  and  it  must  be 
now  plain  how  it  is  that  apperception,  as  only  an  act 
and  without  matter  of  contents,  is  different  from 
inner  sense,  which  displays  a  matter,  and  yet  that  it 


420 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


is  the  same  subject  that  is  concerned,  a  subject  which, 
in  such  circumstances,  however,  can  be  known  not  as 
it  is,  but  as  it  appears.  That  we  should,  in  this  way, 
only  know  ourselves  phenomenally,  however,  is  not,  in 
the  least,  more  difficult  than  that  we  should  know 
ourselves  at  all.  For  the  words,  "  In  that  I  can  con- 
ceive other  modes  of  perceptive  cognition  as  at  least 
possible,"  to  substitute  these,  "  For  an  understanding 
that  should  at  once  perceive  itself  is  conceivably 
possible,"  may  seem  violent ;  but  as  it  is  the  intuitus 
derivatimis  that  has  been  under  debate,  it  is  only  the 
iniuitm  miginarius  that  can  be  the  other  "mode  of 
perceptive  cognition  "  parenthetically  referred  to. 

§25. 

The  same  subject  continued ;  the  mere  formality  of 
apperception,  and  as  requiring  a  perceptive  complex 
from  elsewhere,  is  particularly  insisted  on.  But  on 
these  points  there  has  now  been  enough  said. 

§  26.  Transcendental  Deduction,  etc. 

By  italicising  empirical  in  the  title,  and  carefully 
translating  according  to  the  designed  powers  of  the 
words  in  the  original,  I  shall  hope  to  have  made  clear 
the  peculiar  purpose  of  this  section,  which,  consider- 
ing what  precedes,  has  sometimes,  and  not  un- 
naturally, caused  question.  It  is  not  unapt  to  be 
overlooked,  namely,  that  Kant,  occupied  hitherto 
with  general  perception,  conceives  himself  now  only 
for  the  first  time  to  approach  the  consideration  of 
particular  perception,  special  sense. 

What  the  one  deduction  and  the  other  (meta- 
physical and  transcendental)  precisely  mean  will  now 


COMMENTARY. 


421 


be  set  beyond  doubt.  The  latter,  it  will  be  observed, 
is  said  to  make  manifest  the  "  possibility  "  of  the  cate- 
gories ;  but  possibility  with  Kant  may  mean  pretty 
well  actual  existence,  fact  of  existence,  or  even  ne- 
cessity of  existence.  I  should  say  that  it  is  the 
purpose  of  the  transcendental  deduction  to  urge  the 
indispensable  need  of  categories,  in  order  to  produce, 
or  in  order  to  account  for,  the  presence  of  necessity  in 
the  actual  facts  of  sense,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing 
(inasmuch,  evidently,  as  synthetic  necessity,  excluded 
from  the  a  posteriori  of  sense,  can  originate  only 
a  prioii  in  the  understanding),  the  presence  of  the 
a  priori  in  what,  nevertheless,  is  undoubtedly  a 
posteriori.  Kant  himself  has  the  expression,  how 
manifest  matter  of  special  sense  can  "stand  under 
laws,  which  have  their  source  only  a  priori  in  the 
understanding  itself,"  This  will  be  at  once  under- 
stood if  we  only  intercalate  after  the  "  which "  the 
words  "  as  necessary."  Laws,  namely,  which  arc 
apodictically  necessary  and  non-contingent,  being  un- 
avoidably precluded  from  the  a  posteriori,  are  mani- 
festly shut  in  to  the  a  priori,  and  that  is  the  under- 
standing (for  what  is,  but  is  not  in  sense,  must  be  in 
the  understanding:  there  is  no  other  alternative). 

It  may  be  worth  while  remarking,  that  we  ought  to 
take  such  expressions  as  "  dictate  laws  "  and  "  make 
nature  itself  possible "  with  the  due  grain  of  salt. 
These  laws  are,  after  all,  only  the  categories  of  rela- 
tion, causality,  reciprocity,  etc.,  and  the  necessity 
which  we  attribute  to  them  as  apparent  in  the  things 
of  nature  does  not  exist  there.  So  far  as  these  things 
are  concerned,  indeed,  the  necessity  in  question  is 
not  intrinsic  and  original,  but  extrinsic  and  borrowed. 
It  is  only  the  show  of  a  necessity  transferred;  it 
is  only  the  reflection  of  a  necessity  from  where  it  does 


* 


422 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT 


exist  to"  where  it  does  not  exiat— through  a  mere 
analogy.  The  vast  laws  we  impose  on  nature,  then,  are 
(for  Kant)  simply  fictions.  And  yet  how  very  com- 
Mion  it  is  to  find  people  daring  to  breathe  only  awful 
whispers  of  Kant  as  discoverer  at  last  of  the  very  seat 
•  of  nature,  and  consequent  creator  of  the  deepest  and 
most  mysterious  of  philosophies.  Nevertheless,  all 
that  is  but  a  dream,  and  there  are  few  things  in 
truth  simpler  than  what  Kant  has  to  show. 

We  then  learn  that  what  is  meant  by  apprehension 
is  the  empirical  consciousness  of  any  sense-many. 
We  are  further  to  understand  that  the  word  generally 
applies  only  to  the  subjective  state  consequent  on  any 
sense-impression;  it  does  not  follow,  however,  but 
that  it  may  exceptively  apply  to  the  same  state 
after  it  has  been  made  objective  by  action  of  time, 
space,  and  the  categories. 

We  are  next  told  that  this  first  state  of  subjective 
apprehension  must  take  on  the  form  of  general  sense 
(time  and  space).  But  the  further  intimation  is  that 
these  forms  have  already  a  priori  undergone  the 
action  of  the  synthesis  of  apperception  and  the  cate- 
gories. It  follows,  in  conclusion,  therefore,  that 
even  all  empirical  apprehension  must  be  submiss  to 
the  a  priori  or  transcendental  machinery.  And  to 
bring  out  as  much  was  the  object  of  the  section. 

The  rendering  of  the  expression  "  einer  gegebenen 
Anschauung  "  by  the  phrase  "  of  an  inherently  given 
perception  "  may  prove,  in  its  elucidation,  neither 
unsound  nor  unacceptable.  It  is  always  to  be  borne 
in  mind  that  Kant  distinguishes  between  a  faculty  of 
perception  and  a  faculty  of  sensation,  and  that  he 
credits  us  with  both.  His  "gegebene  Anschauung'' 
here,  then,  can  mean  nothing  but  that  provision  of  a 
perceptive  manifold  with  which  he  considers  us  to  be 


» 


i 


COMMENTARY. 


423 


a  priori  endowed ;  or  his  word  '^  given  "  must  be  con- 
ceived to  possess  the  force  of  a  priori  or  inherently 
given.  What  is  so  given,  too,  is  Anschauung  überhaupt^ 
general  perception. 

It  is  now  that  we  perceive  what  was  meant  in  §  21, 
by  the  words :  "  From  the  manner  in  which  empirical 
perception  is  given  in  sense,  it  will  be  shown  in  the 
sequel  (§  26)  that  the  unity  of  this  (empirical)  per- 
ception is  no  other  than  that  which  the  category, 
according  to  the  preceding  §  20,  prescribes  to  the  units 
of  a  general  perception  inherently  given  ;  and  by  the 
demonstration,  consequently,  of  the  category's  a  ^^nm 
validity  in  regard  of  all  the  objects  of  our  senses,  the 
design  of  the  deduction  will  be  then  at  last  fully 
accomplished."  Readers  of  Kant,  as  has  been  al- 
ready remarked,  may  have  sometimes  felt  a  difficulty  in 
regard  to  this ;  but  we  shall  hope  now  that  any  such 
difficulty  has  been  removed.  We  may  remark  here, 
too,  that,  in  the  passage  quoted,  there  again  occurs 
the  phrase  "a  given  general  perception,"  without 
doubt  in  the  same  sense. 

On  the  whole,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  admit  that 
whatever  unity  of  synthesis  has  been  found  binding 
for  space  and  time  will  prove  binding  as  well  for  all 
empirical  apprehension  in  these.  That  such  synthesis 
is  given  with^  not  m,  these  forms,  must  mean,  that  it 
is  not  they^  in  their  oivn  force^  extend  it.  In  this  last 
respect,  they  can  prescribe  only,  each  the  peculiar 
succession  of  its  own  constitutive  units.  It  is  only 
as  acted  on  from  elsewhere  that  they  have  any  part 
in  the  synthesis  in  view,  and  so  it  is  that  this  syn- 
thesis is  to  be  understood  as  given  with^  not  in;  or 
we  may  suppose  that  it  is  only  the  succession  is  m, 
while  the  synthesis  is  simply  with. 

The  greatest  point  of  difiiculty  here,  probably,  de- 


424 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


pends  on  the  footnote,  at  least  when  put  in  comparison 
with  the  text.     The  note  is  to  this  effect :  The  matter 
of  a  priori  perception,  lohile  still  only  sensuous,  is  to  be 
conceived   as  no  more  than  an  indefinite  potential 
manifold  of  indifferent  sense-units.     Synthesis  cannot 
come  to  it  from  sense  as  sense :  such  virtue  is  an  affair 
of  the  understanding  only.     But  still  space  and  time 
are  conceived  by  us,  not  only  as  such  indefinite  sense- 
forms,  but  also  as,  so  far,  definite  objects,  each  with  its 
own  peculiar  complex  of  constitutive  units.     That  is, 
they  are  conceived  as  already  under  synthesis.    Now  it 
is  here  that  our  difficulty  emerges ;  for  while  the  text 
plainly  includes  the  participation  of  the  categories  in 
the  synthesis,  the  note  seems  equally  plainly  to  ex- 
clude it.     The  unity  of  synthesis,  it  is  declared  in 
the  latter,  was  "  attributed  to  sense  in  order  only  to 
signalize  that  it  was  prior  to  every  Begriff,"  and  yet 
we  are  immediately  led  to  understand  that  this  syn- 
thesis is  necessarily  presupposed  in  order  to  make 
"possible  any  Begriffe  of  space  and  time.''     From 
what  we  learned,  a  good  way  back,  in  regard  to 
synthesis  in  general,  we  interpret  this  to  mean  that 
the  synthesis  of  imagination  under  apperception  was 
what  happened  first,  and  then  it  became  possible  for 
us  to  have  Begriffe  of  space  and  time.    But  by  Begriffe 
so  used,  we  must  understand  Kant  to  mean  mere 
Vorstellungen,    mere    conceptions,  what   is  generally 
understood  by  the  word  ideas  as  currently  and  loosely 
used.     The  notion  of  space,  in  short,  according  to  this 
usage,  is  simply  space  as  it  is  before  consciousness, 
and  of  course  we  know  such  sense  of  the  word  to  be 
quite  current  in  Kant.    It  is  the  same  word,  however, 
as  it  appears  in  the  next  sentence,  that  constitutes 
the  special  difficulty,  and  it  does  so  doubly.     "As 
through  this  unity  of  synthesis  (in  that  understand- 


COMMENTAllY. 


425 


I 


ing  determines  sense)  space  and  time  are  first  given 
as  definite  perceptions,  it  is  to  space  and  time  that 
the  unity  of  this  perception  a  priori  belongs,  and  not 
to   the   Begriffe  of  the   understanding."     Here  not 
only  this  last  "Begriff,"  compared  with  the  other 
two,   is  not  the  same,   but  even  the  action  of  the 
understanding   which   is   expressly   asserted  in    the 
first  line  seems  no  less  expressly  excluded  in  the  last. 
What  is  meant  can  only  be  this,  however;  the  syn- 
thesis of  imagination  precedes  any  Begriff  as  idea  of 
an  object,  but  Begriffe,  as  mere  ideas  of  an  object,  do 
yet,  in  regard  to  the  manifolds  of  space  and  time  as 
primarily  only  in  imaginative  synthesis,  precede  any 
action  proper  of  a  category.     But  the  other  half  of 
the  difficulty  remains.     Here  in  the  note  the  category 
is  in  this  manner  expressly  excluded,  while  in'^the 
text  it  is  in  so  many  terms  affirmed.     There  cannot 
be  a  doubt,  indeed,  but  that  the  single  purpose  of 
the  whole  section  is  to  declare   that   all   sensuous 
apprehension  must,   in  taking  on   time   and   space, 
take  on  as  well  the  entire  round  of  synthesis  which 
these,   as  under  imagination,  apperception,  and  the 
categories,  have  already  undergone.      With  as  much 
as   that  before   us,  it  is  difficult   for  us  to  under- 
stand  what  the  note  is  at  all  there  for.     The  text 
(not   the   note)    runs   thus:   "This   synthetic  unity 
cannot  be  any  other  than  that  of  the  synthesis  of  the 
complex  of  a  given  general  perception,  in  an  original 
self-consciousness,  conform  to  the  categories,''  etc.     The 
truth  is  this.     That  sentence  is  completely  in  inde- 
pendence of,  and  has  no  reference  to,  the  note.     The 
preceding  sentence  in  the  text,  to  which  there  is 
allusion,  runs  again  thus:  "But  space  and  time  are 
not   merely  conceived  to  be  perceived  as  forms  of 
sensuous  perception,  but  as  themselves  definite  percep- 


426 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


tions  (implying   a   constitutive  complex):    they   are 
therefore  a  priori  perceived  with  the  determination  of 
the  unity  of  this  complex  in  them."     To  this   the 
reference  is  added,  "  see  Transc.  ^sth.,"  and  the  note 
has  no  object  but  to  explain  that  reference.     It  is  con- 
fined, then,  to  a  statement  of  the  first  synthesis ;  and 
it  is  sufficiently  in  place  that  the  reference  to  the  cate- 
gories should,  in  the  next  sentence  of  the  text,  follow. 
There  is  so  much  before  us  at  present,  whether  in 
text  or  note,  that  concerns  Einheit  in  regard  to  space 
and  time,  that  this  seems  an  excellent  opportunity 
for  a  review  of  the  whole  topic.     What  imposes  this, 
however,  is  neither  any  difficulty  in  the  necessities  of 
the  case  itself,  nor  yet  in  Kant's  treatment  of  it :  we 
simply  feel  unwillingly  involved  in  no  agreeable  duty 
in  consequence  of  the  relative  ruling  of  a  late  very 
prominent  and  widely  accepted  critical  expounder. 
Unity  of  time  and  space,  indeed,  we  may,  surely, 
not  unfairly  characterize  as  simply  the  dominant  of  the 
critical  exposition  in  question.     The  great  issue  of  the 
whole   machinery  of  Kant   appears   to   be  what   is 
named  there  a  dating  in  time,  even  an  emjnrical  datin  «• 
in  time.     Almost  the  one  interest  is  "  relation  to  the 
unity  of  time  and  space  as  individual  wholes ;  "  and 
nothing  seems  even  possible  "  except  by  relating  to 
one  all-embracing  space  and  one  all-embracing  time." 
A  single  all-embracingness,  that  is  the  word ;  and  to 
effect  as  much  seems  the  sole  mystery  of  Kant.    What 
.  we  have  named  the  necessities  of  the  case  itself  do, 
indeed,  intervene,  as  it  were,  to  give  pause  at  once. 
We  cannot  suppose  that  Kant's  time  and  space  are 
more,  or  can  do  more,  than  the  time  and  space  of  the 
universe.     We  know,  then,  that  both  are  receptacles  ; 
and  we  know,  further,  that  both  afffect  their  contents, 
like  other  receptacles,  each  only  by  its  peculiar  sJiaiJe. 


COMMENTARY. 


427 


The  contents  of  space  are   side   by  side  with   one 
another,    and   the   contents   of  time   are   after    one 
another ;  but  it  is  quite  impossible  to  perceive  more 
than  that — more  than  that,  that  is,  as  displaying  a 
like  nature  with,  but  not  necessarily  as  receiving  a 
like  nature  from,   the  natures  proper  of  time  and 
space.     We  cannot  conceive  of  space  placing,  or  of 
time  dating,   any   one  affair  of  the  earth  whatever. 
More   than    that;    we   cannot   conceive  of  any  one 
category,    or  of  all   the   categories  together,  either 
placing  in  space  or  dating  in  time.     The  death  of 
^Eschylus   occurred   at  Gela  b.c.   456  in   a   certain 
manner,   on  a  certain   spot,   at   a   certain   moment. 
But  let  time  and  space  contribute  what  they  may, 
and  let  all  the  categories  contribute  what  they  may, 
we  know  not  that  the  determination  of  either  time,  or 
place,   or  manner,  depended  on  anything  whatever, 
unless  on  the  legs  of  the  man,  the  wings  of  the  bird, 
and  the  shell  of  the  reptile.     Surely  the  bald  head  of 
the  poet  and  its  presence  there  and  then  were  matters 
wholly  of  their  own ;  and  surely  it  was  neither  time 
nor  space,  but  only  the  suggestion  of  a  rock,  that 
determined  the  eagle  to  drop  the  tortoise  that  crushed 
the  skull  without  the  assistance  of  a  single  category. 
We  know  the  very  cannon  that  took  the  Marquis  of 
Anglesey's  leg  off*;  we  know  the  exact  spot  where, 
the  precise  moment  when;  and  we  know  that  all 
that,  and  every  point  and  circumstance  in  all  that, 
have  been  accurately  united  into  an  all-embracing 
space  and  an  all-embracing  time ;  but  we  cannot,  for 
the  life  of  us,  understand  what  time  and  space  them- 
selves, or  what  any  category  or  categories  whatever, 
had  to  do  with  the  determination  of  all  that.     Nay, 
even  grant  with  Kant  time  and  space  to  be  perceptive 
projections  of  our  own,  nor  less  the  categories  to  be 


428 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


concentrating  perceptive  foci  of  our  own,  it  is  impos- 
sible for  us  to  understand  how  such  appliances  were 
simply  more  than  eyes  to  see  by  things  which  were 
themselves  absolutely  independent  of,  utterly  indiffer- 
ent to,  anybody's  eyes  whatever.  Anything  more  ex- 
traordinary, in  fact,  than  this  contemplated  dating  in 
time,  it  is  not  well  possible  to  conceive.  The  common- 
places that  rest  upon  it,  too,  issue  in  such  soberly- 
assured  wisdoms  I  "  We  cannot  represent  an  object 
as  existing,  or  an  event  as  occurring,  except  in  space 
and  time"  (why  not  in  Padalon  or — in  Pande- 
monium) ?  ''  Every  object  must  exist  in  a  definite 
part  of  the  one  space ;  and  every  event  must  occur  at 
a  definite  moment  of  the  one  time,"  etc.,  etc.,  usque  ad 
interminableness ! 

But  where  can  we  find  any  countenance  for  all 
this  in  Kant  himself,  or  in  what  expressions  of  his  can 
we  surmise  it  to  originate  ?  In  the  passage  before  us 
we  are  referred  to  the  transcendental  a3sthetic,  as  also 
to  a  footnote.  We  shall  take  the  latter  first.  It  is 
at  once  intimated  in  it  that  space  (or  time)  as  an 
"object,"  is  more  than  space  (or  time)  as  a  "form." 
By  form  is  meant  the  constitutive  manifold,  the  native 
plurality  of  units,  that,  as  specific  co-existence  or  suc- 
cession of  parts,  is  peculiar  to,  or  distinctive  of,  space 
(or  time) ;  and  by  object  is  meant  that  this  form,  this 
indefinite  many,  has  undergone  synthesis  and  become, 
so  to  speak,  a  special  perceptive  entity.  As  such, 
evidently,  it  is  a  unity,  or  is  characterized  by  unity. 
For  the  requirements  of  mathematics,  it  is  at  once 
obvious  that  space,  though  in  itself  a  mere  a  jmori 
indefinite  form,  must  exhibit  itself  as  a  special  and 
peculiar  object,  in  which  there  is  the  possibility  of 
demonstrating  an  even  infinite  number  of  charac- 
teristic  properties.     Kant  expressly  declares  all  this. 


COMMENTARY. 


429 


Mere  form  of  perception  is  one  thing,  he  says,  but 
the  formal  perception  itself  is  quite  another.  The 
former  is  a  simple  Mannigfaltiges  (many,  manifold, 
complex,  etc.)  ;  but  the  latter  is  a  unity  of  cognition 
in  consciousness.  The  latter,  indeed,  is  brought  about 
only  by  Zusammenfassung  (synthesis)  of  the  manifold, 
according  to  its  form  as  originally  given  to  sense, 
and  into  a  one  perceptible  cognition.  This  unity, 
further,  was  in  the  Esthetic  attributed  to  sense,  and 
for  no  other  reason  than  to  intimate  that  it  was  to  be 
understood  as  implying  a  synthesis  anterior  to  that 
of  the  categories.  Now,  however,  it  is  expected  of  us 
to  be  aware  that  synthesis  at  all,  any  synthesis,  can- 
not be  a  product  of  sense,  but  must  emanate  from  the 
understanding  alone.  In  fact,  what  unity — mere 
continuity — is  now  before  us  is  that  of  the  first  crude 
imaginative  synthesis  (§§  15  and  24) ;  and  without  it 
there  could  be  no  Begriff  of  space  or  time.  It  is  to 
be  said  again  in  passing,  however,  that  that  Begriff 
is,  like  the  Begriff  of  the  "  hundred  dollars,"  only  a 
Vorstellung,  only  what  we  mean  by  conception,  or 
idea,  when  loosely  and  currently  used ;  it  is  only  a 
definitely  recognised  consciousness.  It  is  to  under- 
standing, in  this  its  first  synthesis,  certainly,  that  we 
owe  the  consciousness  of  time  and  space  as  peculiar 
objects ;  but  still  this  unity  belongs  to  space  and  time 
themselves,  and  is  not  that  which  follows  from  action 
of  the  categories.  The  (immediate)  text  is  to  the 
same  effect  as  the  note ;  and  it  is  perfectly  intelligible 
how  the  sentence  immediately  succeeding  the  reference 
should  intimate  that  this  synthesis  of  which  there  has 
been  question  gets  presently  generalized  into  the 
universal  synthesis  of  apperception,  "  den  Categorien 
gemäss^''  under  which  all  contributions  of  sense  must 
finally  stand.     So  far  we  see  that  Kant  must  have  felt 


430 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


time  and  space,  as  mere  indefinite  sense-manies,  to  be 
insuflScient  for  his  purposes :  it  became  plain  to  him 
that,  for  the  success  of  his  operations,  they  must  be 
acknowledged  to  be  definitely  recognised  in  conscious- 
ness. But  that  already  presupposed  a  certain  unity  of 
synthesis.  This  unity,  not  possibly  due  to  sense,  could 
only  be  a  product  of  the  understanding,  in  priority, 
however,  to  any  action  of  the  special  categories. 

Turning  to  the  ^Esthetic  now,  we  are  disposed  to 
believe  that  what  is  referred  to  is  contained,  most 
conspicuously,  if  not  exclusively,  in  such  passages  as 
these :  "  A  great  number  of  a  priori  apodictic  and 
synthetic  propositions  presents  itself  from  both  "  time 
and  space  (II.,  52).  "Time  and  space,  accordingly, 
are  two  sources  of  cognition,  from  which,  a  priori, 
various  synthetic  propositions  may  be  derived,  as  is 
especially  exemplified  in  pure  mathematic  with  regard 
to  space  and  the  relations  of  space  "  (46).  "  Space  is 
conceived  as  an  infinite  magnitude  there  before  us ; 
...  all  the  parts  of  space  are  at  one  and  the  same 
time  together  in  it  ad  infinitum''  (712).  "That  cer- 
tain sensations  are  referred  to  something  out  of  me, 
.  .  .  further,  that  I  can  perceive  them  as  out  of  and 
near  each  other,  ...  to  that  the  perception  of  space 
must  be  already  presupposed"  (34).  "Space  is  a 
necessary  perception  apriori,  which  is  presupposed  by, 
and  underlies,  all  external  perception"  (35).  "We 
can  conceive  only  a  single  space,  and  when  we  speak 
of  spaces,  we  mean  only  parts  of  one  and  the  same 
sole  space.  These  parts  cannot  precede,  either,  the 
one  all-comprehending  space  as  though  they  were  the 
particulars  from  which  it  is  generalized ;  but,  on  the 
contrary,  they  are  only  thought  in  it.  It  is  essenti- 
ally one,  any  plurality  of  parts  or  units  (consequently, 
also,  the  general  notion  of  spaces)  rests  solely  on 


COMMENTARY. 


431 


limitations  of  itself"  (35,  36).  "Different  times  are 
only  parts  of  precisely  the  same  time,  but  the  cogni- 
tion which  can  be  yielded  only  by  a  single  object  is 
perception  ;  .  .  .  the  fact  that  different  times  are  not 
at  the  same  time,  is  inderivable  from  a  general  notion  ; 
...  it  is  directly  implied,  therefore,  in  the  simple 
idea  of  time.  .  .  .  That,  the  parts  and  every  magni- 
tude of  which  can  be  conceived  as  determined  only  by 
limitations,  cannot  be  given  through  notions,  but  must 
involve  a  direct  perception"  (41). 

These  passages  will  excellently  illustrate  all  that 
has  been  just  declared  by  the  footnote.  They  (like 
it),  generally,  mean  no  more  than  that  time  and  space 
must,  for  the  working  of  the  entire  machinery,  be 
conceived  to  be  actually  objectively  present,  as  deter- 
minate perceptions,  to  consciousness  potentially  from 
the  first :  they  are  not  to  be  conceived  as  mere  in- 
diflferent,  indefinite,  scattered,  passive,  inert  forms: 
they  assuredly  possess  at  all  times  for  consciousness — 
at  least  potentially — a  certain  objectivity.  It  is  this, 
for  example,  that  is  evidently  concerned,  when  it  is 
reasoned  that  the  referring  of  sensations  once  for  all 
out  and  apart,  involves  space,  etc.  To  assume  time 
and  space  as  wholly  in  affection,  indeed,  would  be  to 
assume  them  as  wholly  indefinite.  But  were  they 
indefinite,  they  would  not  answer  the  purposes  in 
hand.  They  must  be  assumed  as  in  some  way  definite, 
then ;  but  definiteness  is  not  an  action  of  sense ;  it 
can  belong  to  the  understanding  alone.  And  it  is  in 
this  way  that  it  is  necessary  to  assume  that  time  and 
space  already  exhibit  a  certain  synthesis  (due,  of 
course,  to  imagination  under  apperception)  even 
before — nay,  for  the  needs  of  the  exposition,  neces- 
sarily before,  reference  to  the  categories.  In  fact,  just 
to  give  consistency  and  relevance  to  the  phrase  that 


432 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


time  and  space  are  "Vorstellungen,"  and  Vorstel- 
langen  which  "zum  Grunde  liegen,"  Kant  thinks  it 
necessary  to  rescue  them  from  the  indefiniteness  of 
bare  sense  into  the  definiteness — say  continuity — of 
the  first  crude  synthesis. 

Time  and  space,  then,  require,  in  some  sort,  to  be 
definite ;  bufc  still  more  do  they  require  to  be  reco«-- 
nised  as  perceptions  of  sense  (general  sense),  and  not 
as  notions  of  the  intellect.     And  it  is  for  that— it  is 
for  their  perceptivity  as  against  their  mere  conceptivity 
—that  their  "  oneness  "  and  "  singleness,"  as  well  as 
the  nature  of  their  parts  to  be  in  themselves,  and  only 
limitations  of  themselves,  are  so  much  and  so  strongly 
insisted  upon.     What  Kant  means  by  his  unity^of 
time  and  space,  therefore,  must  now  be  clear.     They 
are  themselves  wholly  a  priori  and  mental ;  but  still 
they  hold  of  sense,  not  intellect;  they  are  percep- 
tional, not  notional;  and,  potentially,  they  are  apos- 
teriori  presentant.     Now,  for  the  recognition  of  them 
in  consciousness  a  certain  unity  is  required  on  their 
part ;  and  that  unity  is  claimed  for  them :  it  is  the 
elemental  unity  of  each  of  them  as  a  perceptive  object. 
Further— and  precisely  in  consequence  of  that  last 
consideration— it  is  perceptional  unity,  a  unity  such 
that  it  has  a  many  of  co-existent  or  successive  parts ; 
which  parts  are  only  limitations  of  itself.     There  is 
surely  nothing  in  all  this  of  a  marvellous  peculiarity 
on  the  part  of  time  and  space,  discovered  by  Kant  or 
given  by  Kant,  by  which  there  is  provided  for  us  a 
new  philosophy  that   explains,   or  demonstrates,   or 
evinces  as  necessary,  an  absolute  dating  in  time  and 
fixing  in  space !     With  such  things  before  us,  it  has 
its  own  efifect  to  consider  that,  after  all,  and  in  very 
truth,  and  on  Kant's  own  demonstration,  time  and 
space  havej  of  themselves,  no  unity.    They  are  but  spectral 


COMMENTARY. 


433 


receptacula  for  unities  of  objects,  and  unities  of  groups 
of  objects ;  all  of  which  unities  are  from  elsewhere — all 
of  which  unities,  in  fact,  are  only  thrown  on  the  tissue 
of  time  and  space,  like  so  much  sunshine  on  the  tissue 
of  a  mist.     Nay,  it  is  not  unity  at  all  that  time  and 
space  as  such  impose  on  objects,  but  rather  variety,  the 
variety  of  the  many  of  units,  co-existent  or  successive, 
proper  and  peculiar  to  \ki^  form  of  each.     The  mist 
no  more  receives  light  into  the  extension  that  is  pecu- 
liar to  it,  than  time  and  space  receive  sensation  into 
the  extension  that  is  peculiar  to  them.     Whatever 
talk  there  may  be  of  unity  in  their  regard,  it  is  not 
they  bestow  unity;    and   to   conduct   the  many  of 
Kant  into  any  unity  of  theirs  as  alone  ultimate  and 
supreme,  is  to  conduct  all  into  the  element  of  dream. 
Just  to  finish  this  general  subject  of  the  "  unity  of 
an  all-embracing  space  and  an  all-embracing  time,"  it 
may  not  be  amiss  to  grasp  forward  to  a  certain  re- 
appearance of  it  in  connexion  with  the  categories  of 
relation.     There,  too,  a  reference  is  conjured  up  on 
the  part  of  Kant  to  a  literal  "dating "in  time,  to  a 
literal  determining  of  facts  to  "a  definite  moment  of 
objective  time."   Now,  the  following  quotations  (which 
have  been  referred  to  already)  will  show  what  Kant 
actually  means  here.     "  It  is  seen  that  the  schema  of 
the  categories  of  relation  implies  and  exhibits  the 
relation  of  the  sense-perceptions,  the  one  to  the  other, 
at  any  time  (/.^.,  according  to  a  rule  of  determination 
in  time)"  (128).     "The  universal  proposition  of  the 
analogies  of  experience  is,  All  objects  of  sense  stand,  as 
regards  their  existence,  a  jmori  under  rules  of  the 
determination  of  their  relation,  the  one  to  the  other, 
in  one  time  "  (152).     The  expressions  "  at  any  time," 
"in  one  time,"  "according  to  a  rule  of  determination 
in    time,"    are,    from    these   quotations,    manifestly 

2e 


434 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


-  synonymous.  The  thought  in  any  of  them,  therefore, 
is  not  of  an  all  or  whole  of  a  one  all-embracing  time, 
but  simply  of  a  rule  of  time-determination  applicable 
to  objects  relatively  in  time,  as  reciprocally  together, 
for  example,  or  causally  after  one  another.  What  is 
concerned,  then,  is  merely  a  universal  necessity  of 
relation,  and  time  has  no  more  to  do  with  it  than 
this,  that  the  relation  is  in  time,  or  appears  in  the 
succession  of  time. 

Nothing,  in  short,  as  regards  the  whole  subject,  can 
be  more  decisive  than  the  note  which  is  actually 
before  us.  There  we  are  distinctly  told  that  time 
and  space  have  no  unity  of  themselves ;  but  that,  in 
all  cases,  they  must  borrow  as  much  from  elsewhere. 
Contrast  now  with  all  this  the  following  summary  of 
Kant's  ^Esthetic  and  of  Kant's  Analytic^  of  what  I  call 
bis  theory  of  perception,  or  of  what,  with  the  writer 
quoted,  may  be  viewed  as  his  (Kant's)  theory  of 
"  experience "  (see  Journal  of  Spec.  Phil  for  April 
1879,  p.  215  sq.). 

"Kant's  view  of  experience  may  be  summarized 
thus.     In  the  ^Esthetic  he  shows  that  inner  and  outer 
perception,  involving  as  they  do  determinations  of 
time  and  place,  are  possible  only  through  the  pure 
perception  of  time  and  space  [That  is  to  say,  if  there  is 
the  particular  (time),  there  is  also  the  general  (time),  and 
as  much  as  that,  surely !  is  correct  enough ;  but  would 
any  one,  at  all  naturally,  suspect  it  to  be  made  out  of 
Kant's  argument  that.  Things  being  perceived,  not  as 
simply  such,  not  as  simply  they  struck  sense,  but  as, 
in  addition,  out  tJiere,  beside  and  after  one  another, 
time  and  space  were,  manifestly,  already  to  the  fore?] 
For,  he  argues,  a  moment  in  time  and  a  place  in  space 
can  be  represented  by  us  only  in  relation  to  other 
times  and  other  places,  and,  therefore,  in  relation  to 


COMMENTARY. 


435 


the  unity  of  time  and  space  as  individual  wholes  [It 
is  not  easy  to  conceive  any  declaration  that  should  be 
less  in  place  than  this ;  that  argument  of  Kant  (about 
things  being  given  not^^r  se,  but  with  time)  is  to  be 
understood  as.  Time-moments  and  space-points  being 
seen  only  in  connexion  with  other  time-moments  and 
space-points,  therefore  there  is  that  unity  of  an  all- 
embracing  space  and  an  all-embracing  time,  and  they 
(these  moments  and  points)  are  in  it !     We  see  here 
the  actual  genetic  process  to  which  that  strange  unity 
owes  birth!     We  know  that  such  argutice  are  their 
inventor's  own ;    that  Kant  is  quite  incompetent  to 
anything  bearing  the  very  slightest  resemblance  to 
them ;  that  Hieir  argument  is  as  like  to  his  as  a  reel 
in  a  bottle  to  a  steam-engine.     We  should  also,  per- 
haps, feel  somewhat  puzzled  with  the  reasoning  that, 
there  being  time-moments  and  time-moments,  space- 
points  and  space-points,  therefore  there  is  "  the  unity 
of  time  and  space  as  individual  wholes;"  but,  just 
opening  our  eyes  to  ordinary  time  and  space,  we  do 
see  that  there  is  really  a  one  space  and  really  a  one 
time,  as  well  as  that  the  one  space  consists  of  infinite 
spaces,  and  the  one  time  of  infinite  times.    We  wonder, 
nevertheless,  if  that  mysterious  philosophy  is  all  there 
only  to  create  that !     And  still  more  do  we  wonder, 
perhaps,  as  that  "dating"  suggests  itself  again !  To  date, 
the  writer  himself  gives  us  to  understand,  is  to  "  deter- 
mine to  a  definite  moment  of  objective  time."   That  we 
know  to  be  correct.  But  a  philosophy  that  shall  actually 
determine  things  for  us  "  to  definite  moments  of  objec- 
tive time"— that  will  be  chronology,  history— that  will 
be  to  create  the  universe !     Shall  we  expect  that  of 
Kant  ?]  We  cannot  perceive  any  object  of  experience, 
as  here  and  now  present  to  us,  except  by  relating  it  to 
one  all-embracing  space,  and  one  all-embracing  time 


436 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


V 


[Do  I  relate  that  chair  to  an  all-embracing  space,  and 
the  present  quarter  to  Twelve  which  I  actually  now  see 
upon  my  watch,  to  an  all-embracing  time  ?  Would  it 
be  impossible  for  me  to  see  either  the  one  or  the  other 
unless  I  did  so?  Not  but  that,  really  now,  that  chair 
has  actually  its  own  place  in  the  one  infinite  space, 
and  this  quarter  to  Twelve  its  own  moment  in  the  one 
infinite  time — so,  too,  that  no  power  whatever  could 
take  where  from  the  one,  or  when  from  the  other! 
Surely  it  must  be  an  enormous  philosophy  that  has 
the  deduction  of  all  that !]  The  particular  is  known 
through  the  universal,  and  as  determined  by  it 
[This  shows  that  we  were  right  in  our  characteriza- 
tion of  the  first  sentence ;  but  it  would  have  been 
quite  as  apposite  to  have  said  here,  the  fire  burns  or  the 
rain  wets.]  In  the  Analytic  Kant  takes  another  step 
[And  are  we  to  understand  we  have  now  seen  Kant's 
step  in  the  jEsthetic  ?  Surely,  like  Hegel,  he  must 
have  drawn  his  seven-league  boots  on  !] ;  for  there  he 
seeks  to  show  that  no  one  thing  or  event  can  be  known 
as  objectively  existing  or  occurring,  except  in  so  far 
as  it  is  definitely  related  by  means  of  the  categories 
to  other  things  and  events,  and,  therefore,  to  the 
unity  of  experience  as  one  all-embracing  whole 
[This  is  the  same  determination  to  moments  and 
places  in  that  marvellous  unity,  which  we  only  see 
above,  and  which  we  are  to  understand  is  the  achieve- 
ment of  philosophy  in  the  hands  of  Kant.  There  is 
only  added  now  a  reference  to  the  categories.  Of 
course,  we  still  readily  admit  that  "  no  one  thing  or 
event  can  be  known  as  objectively  existing  or  occur- 
ring, except  in  so  far  as  it  is  definitely  related  to 
other  things  and  events,  and,  consequently,  to  experi- 
ence as  a  whole ; "  but  we  only  ask,  did  we  want  a 
ghost  from  the  grave  to  tell  us  that,  or  is  it  possible 


II 


COMMENTARY. 


437 


\ 


to  believe  that  Kant  could  "seek  to  show"  such — 
puerilities?  That  shall  be  philosophy — nay,  that 
shall  be  the  philosophy  of  the  Colossus  Kant !]  This 
objective  determination  and  reference  to  the  sys- 
tematic unity  of  experience  are,  for  Kant,  one  and  the 
same  thing  [That  is  true  when  the  phrase  "sys- 
tematic unity  of  experience ''  is  correctly  understood ; 
but  when  it  is  supposed  to  mean  "the  systematic 
unity  of  experience,"  as  we  actually  have  experience 
in  empirical  chronology  and  empirical  geography, 
then  it  means — a  nightmare ;  which  it  were  impos- 
sible to  impute  even  to  the  "gemeinsten  Menschen- 
verstand, wenn  er  nicht  ganz  thierisch  ist,"  and  which 
"  bis  auf  die  neuesten  Zeiten  in  der  Philosophie  uner- 
hört ist."]  In  working  out  this  last  thesis,  however, 
Kant  finds  himself  obliged  to  prove  that  the  former 
determination  of  things,  which  was  demonstrated  in 
the  JEsthetic^  is  not  possible  except  through  the  latter, 
which  is  discussed  in  the  Analytic ;  i.e.^  that  we  can- 
not know  things  as  in  time  and  space  without  deter- 
mining them  by  the  categories  in  relation  to  the  unity 
of  experience.  In  other  words,  while  we  cannot  repre- 
sent an  object  as  existing,  or  an  event  as  occurring, 
except  in  space  and  time,  we  cannot  determine  either  to 
a  definite  place  or  time,  except  through  the  categories, 
and  especially  through  the  analogies  of  experience." 

There  are  three  sentences  that  follow,  but  they  are 
absolutely  to  the  same  efiect ;  and  even  in  the  above 
it  is  to  be  understood — not  that  it  makes  any  differ- 
ence— that  there  is  a  more  decided  trafficking  with 
categories  now,  than  preceded  conviction  of  the 
blunder  that  causality  alone  was  the  minister  of  ob- 
jectivity. Everywhere  we  see  the  one  ever-present 
delusion  that  relative  position  means  a  thing's  precise 
date  in  time  and  place  in  space,  and  that  the  principles 


438 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


of  general  experience  must  be  regarded  as  deter- 
minative of  the  individual  facts  of  the  empirical 
world  whether  as  in  time  or  space.  It  is  easy  for  any 
one  to  see  how  far  our  ordinary  time  and  space  are 
operative  as  concerns  the  production  of  actual  events 
and  facts,  and  to  know  that,  while  the  time  and  space 
of  Kant  cannot,  in  that  respect,  do  more  than  the 
ordinary  ones,  they  will  never  be  able  to  explain 
either  the  why  or  the  what  of  them  (or  of  themselves). 
As  little  as  there  is,  in  the  real  time  and  the  real 
space  (as  such),  a  power  to  determine  what  empirically 
is  or  happens,  just  as  little  is  there  any  such  power 
in  the  spectra  of  Kant.  These  spectra,  rather,  are 
declared  by  Kant  himself  to  be  in  themselves  only 
analytic  (disjunct)  manies  of  indefinite  affection — 
just  so  much  unconnected  loose  mist  before  the  eyes; 
and,  so  far  as  any  synthetic  (conjunct)  unity  is  con- 
cerned, they  are  further  declared  merely  passively  to 
take  it  on,  as  imposed  upon  them,  and  when  imposed 
upon  them,  from  a  region  utterly  alien  and  diverse 
(see  also  under  Schematism^  Chapter  I.) 

What  follows  under  the  first  asterisks  is  a  couple 
of  illustrations,  which,  duly  studied  and  understood, 
are  calculated  to  throw  a  very  decisive  light  on  the 
general  purposes  and  proceedings  of  Kant.  The  first 
thing  I  would  allude  to,  is  the  acknowledgment  that 
the  category  of  quantity  amounts  to  "  precisely  the 
same  synthetic  unity  "  as  "  the  synthetic  unity  of  the 
complex  in  space."  Quantity,  then,  expressly  a  priori 
given,  at  once  in  an  object  of  sense  and  a  notion  of 
intellect,  would  seem  to  involve  a  very  unnecessary 
duplication.  Had  space  been  a  posteriori,  Kant 
would  have  had  no  difiiculty  in  recognising  the 
notion  of  quantity  as  merely  derivative.  He  might 
have  seen  that  the  fact  of  sense  being  a  priori,  in  no 


COMMENTARY. 


439 


wise  altered  the  case.  An  object  of  sense,  whether 
given  in  one  way  or  the  other,  must  surely  be  re- 
garded as  given,  and  if  given,  it  is  there  for  the  under- 
standing to  form  a  notion  of  it.  We  cannot  make 
any  similar  remarks  in  regard  to  the  second  illustra- 
tion, however,  though  it  is  quite  certain  that  Kant 
would  have  us  regard  time  and  causality  here,  as 
precisely  on  the  same  line  with  space  and  quantity 
there.  Space  actually  was  quantity,  in  bodily  form, 
quantity ;  but  time  is  not  causality,  not  as  in  bodily 
form  causality.  Necessary  synthetic  unity  of  a  cantle 
of  space  is  at  once  quantity,  quantity  in  express  and 
direct  form.  But  necessary  synthetic  unity  of  a 
cantle  of  time  is  not  causality.  We  cannot  apply  to 
time  any  unity  that  will  not  just  take  in  so  much 
succession,  as  an  hour,  or  half  an  hour,  a  day,  a 
month,  etc.,  but  that  is  still  only  quantity — quantity, 
though  in  another  element.  No  unity  of  time  as 
time,  and  no  unity  of  the  succession  of  time  (the 
manifold)  as  the  succession  of  time,  will  ever  yield  a 
type  of  causality,  the  type  of  one  thing  out  of  another. 
Nor  is  the  state  of  the  case  in  the  slightest  different, 
should  we  regard,  not  time,  but  the  filling  of  time. 
Filling  of  time,  to  be  possibly  called  a  jmori,  can  only 
be  the  generale  of  the  bare  faculty  or  function,  sensa- 
tion ;  and  that,  to  Kant  himself,  can,  on  the  question 
of  unity,  only  yield  degrees.  Of  course,  it  may  be 
asserted  that  the  filling  of  time  means  more  than  a 
generalization  of  sensation  in  its  mere  form  as  from 
something  to  nothing  or  vice  versa — it  may  be  asserted 
that  the  filling  of  time  means  actually  the  things  in 
time.  Well,  suppose  it  does,  the  case  is  not  altered. 
Unity  of  things  in  time  is,  simply  as  such  unity,  a 
quantitative  collection — precisely  such  collection  as 
we  called  a  synthetic  unity  of  a  cantle  in  space.     In 


■•■■■•■■•■■I 


440 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


fact,  no  anity  öäti  be  granted  as  a  jmon  permissible 
for  space  or  time,  that  is  not,  either  as  extense  or 
intense,  a  simple  quantity.  That  is,  even  grant  (the  ex- 
treme case)  the  possibility  of  an  in  and  in  of  something 
in  time  that  is  in  time  only  and  shows  not  a  vestige  of 
space,  the  result  would  be,  not  unity  of  causality,  but 
unity  of  intension.  No  a  priori  type,  even  in  the  most 
distant  shadow,  is  to  be  found  for  causality  anywhere. 
The  only  possible  type  of  causality  is  the  empirical 
generalization,  at  any  time  that  the  reale  A  is,  the 
reale  B  always  ensues.  This,  we  may,  with  Kant,  if 
we  will,  call  a  schema,  and  expect  to  pass  as  a  jmori  ; 
but  it  is,  for  all  that,  simply  empirical,  and  at  once  a 
taking  for  granted  of  the  entire  case.  And  this  is  a 
consideration  which  sists  the  whole  business,  and  we 
have  only  ruins  around  us. 

The  analogy,  then,  which  Kant  intimates  here,  does 
not  exist.     If  I  am  to  picture  the  one  object   (the 
house)  as  conform  to  the  complex  of  the  one  percep- 
tion (space),  I  must  picture  the  other  object  (freezing 
water)  as  conform  to  the  other  perception  (time)*^ 
and  as  quantity  is  the  notion  that  is  analogous  there,' 
causality  must  be  the  notion  that  is  similarly  analo- 
gous here.     But  this  is  not  so.     Laid  into  space,  the 
units  of  the  house  are  precisely  as  the  units  of  space— 
simjily  side  by  side.     But  laid  into  time,  the  units  of 
liquid  then  and  solid  now  are  not  precisely  as  the 
units  of  time~si)npli/  after  one  another.     After  one 
another  they  are,  of  course ;  but  they  are  not  simplif 
after  one  another ;  they  are  not  after  one  another  in 
the  same  way  as  the  units  of  time   are  after  one 
another.     They  are  not  only  after  one  another,  but 
actually   tkroitgh  one  another.      The  ticks   of  ones 
watch  are  after  one  another,  simply  after  one  another; 
but  it  is  quite  different  with  shadows  after  clouds  or 


COMMENTARY. 


441 


full  shoots  after  rain  :  these  are  after,  indeed,  but  they 
are  not  in  the  same  way  after ;  they  are  not  simply 
after :  they  are  not  only  after  but  through.  In  order 
to  complete  the  analogy,  the  units  of  the  house  ought 
to  add  to  their  mere  side  by  side,  as  in  space,  the  rela- 
tion as  well  of  through.  As  that  water  and  this  ice  are 
not  only  the  one  after  the  other,  like  the  units  of 
time,  but  also  the  one  through  the  other ;  so  likewise 
that  stone  and  this  stone,  in  the  house,  should  not 
only  be  side  by  side  like  the  units  of  space,  but  also 
the  one  through  the  other. 

But  if,  as  the  one  object  is  conform  to  the  one 
element,  the  other  object  is  not  conform  to  the  other 
element,  neither  is  the  one  category  analogous  here, 
as  the  other  category  was  analogous  there.  This, 
however,  has  been  already  sufficiently  suggested,  and 
we  shall  not  dilate  upon  it.  It  will  suffice  to  say  this. 
The  category  quantity  is  precisely  the  same  thing 
ideally  and  intellectually  that  space  is  objectively  and 
sensuously.  Kant  himself  expressly  asserts  this ;  he 
expressly  exhibits  space  as  objectively  pure  quantity 
(126, 142,  754).  But  it  is  impossible  to  entertain  the 
conception  for  a  single  moment  that  causality  is  pre- 
cisely the  same  thing  ideally  and  intellectually  that 
time  is  objectively  and  sensuously.  It  is  quite  im- 
possible to  say  that,  "  leaving  out  of  view  the  form  of 
time,  precisely  the  same  synthetic  unity  is  to  be 
found  in  the  understanding  as  category  of  causality." 
And  it  is  equally  impossible  to  say  for  causality  and 
time,  as  is  said  for  quantity  and  space,  "  It  is  one  and 
the  same  mental  spontaneity  which,  there  as  imagina- 
tion, and  here  as  understanding,  effects  synthesis  in 
the  complex  that  may  be  before  perception."  But  it 
is  that  Kant  would  wish  us  to  understand. 

We  may  advantageously  set  this  in  yet  another 


442 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


443 


light.  The  supposition  is  that  causality  in  relation  to 
time  is  parallel  with  quantity  in  relation  to  space. 
Well,  now,  we  saw,  in  the  one  case,  that,  if  space  as 
object  was  quite  on  terms  of  identity  with  quantity 
as  notion,  there  was  no  use  whatever  of  postulating 
an  a  priori  place  and  quality  for  both.  The  object 
being  given,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  notion  of  it 
would  follow.  The  parallel  holding  good,  then,  a 
like  superfluity  ought  to  appear  in  the  one  case  as  in 
the  other.  That  is,  causality  as  notion  being  iden- 
tical with  time  as  object,  it  is  unnecessary  to  make  an 
a  priori  postulate  of  what  can  so  self-evidently  be  an 
a  posteriori  inference.  But  is  this  possible  ?  Surely 
it  is  inconceivable  that  time  as  time  would  ever  yield 
to  any  process  or  processes  of  thought  whatever,  the 
notion  of  causality.  May  we  not  take  it  for  granted 
now,  indeed,  that,  if  quantity  can  very  readily  find 
its  own  image  in  space  as  space,  it  has  been  con- 
vincingly proved  that  it  is  utterly  impossible  for 
causality  to  find  any  such  image  of  itself  in  time  as 
time.  The  conclusion  is,  that  there  may  be  the  cate- 
gory ;  but  there  mmt  be  the  "  empirical  instruction." 
After  the  second  asterisks,  there  follow  other  expla- 
nations which  would  evince  how  it  is  that  categories 
can  act  in  regard  of  experience  in  the  way  Kant 
would  have  us  accept.  And  here  he  at  once  makes 
use  of  pure  perception  as  the  stepping-stone.  It  is 
easy  to  see,  he  seems  to  say,  how  the  forms  of  general 
sense  dictate  to  those  of  special  sense ;  but,  in  reality, 
that  categories  should  be  alleged  also  to  act  in  the 
same  way,  is  not  a  whit  more  difficult.  Of  course, 
the  reason  is  that  the  objects  of  perception,  being 
merely  affections  within  ourselves,  are  quite  as  well 
situated  to  take  on  one  set  of  internal  forms  as 
another.     It  is  then  shown  that  both  sets  of  internal 


forms  meet  in  imagination,  introduced  into  which 
clement,  consequently,  special  sense  must  find  itself 
in  subjection  to  the  combined  action  of  both.  We 
are  warned,  however,  that  this  action  is  only  syn- 
thesis; and  may,  accordingly,  understand  that  it  is 
still  to  the  senses  we  must  be  indebted  for  all  that 
substantially  constitutes  history,  life,  experience. 
Abraham  built  an  altar,  and  bound  Isaac,  and  laid 
him  on  the  altar  upon  the  wood,  and  stretched  forth 
his  hand,  and  took  the  knife  to  slay  his  son ;  but  the 
angel  of  the  Lord  called  unto  him ;  and  he  lifted  up 
his  eyes,  and  looked,  and,  behold,  behind  him  a  ram 
caught  in  a  thicket  by  the  horns :  there  is  a  good 
deal  here,  but  one  would  like  to  see  the  very  dot  in  it 
that  is  owing  to  a  category.  Alexander  speared 
Clitus  in  a  certain  spot  at  a  certain  time :  it  would 
have  been  a  happy  thing  for  the  conscience  of  the 
king,  had  it  been  only  a  category  that  willed  the 
event.  It  is,  no  doubt,  true  that  Bruce  struck  down 
de  Boune  at  a  very  definite  moment  of  time  and  in  a 
very  definite  point  of  space ;  but  it  is  hard  to  see 
what  the  categories  had  to  do  with  "  determining  "  to 
either  point  or  moment.  If  words  are  at  all  to  be 
held  responsible  for  the  meaning  they  unmistakably 
convey,  then  the  actual  dating  and  the  actual  placing 
which  are  attributed  to  the  categories  must  be 
allowed  not  unrighteously  to  exercise  our  minds  with 
hesitation,  perplexity,  and  surprise.  In  the  section 
before  us,  Kant  himself,  notwithstanding  all  that  he 
would  like  to  claim  for  his  transcendental  machinery, 
evidently  feels  bound  to  hint  as  much. 

§  27.  Result. 

We  see  the  transcendental  principles  both  of  sense 


444 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    K^VNT : 


COMMENTARY. 


445 


and  understanding ;  and  we  see  also  that  they  are 
only  for  empirical  use.     The  alternative  is  suggestive, 
— that  either  experience  makes  notions,  or  notions  ex- 
perience, possible.     For,  evidently,  if  all  our  notions 
depend  upon  experience,   they   must   only  be   con- 
tingent, and  such  a  thing  as  a  necessary  notion  is 
impossible.      But   we   have   necessary   notions.      To 
ascribe  an  empirical  origin  to  such,  then,  would  be  a 
generatio   cequivoca.      The    second    alternative,    that 
notions  shall  be  present  with  us,  independent  of  ex- 
perience, and    in    prescription    of   experience,   will 
amount  to  an  epigenesis  of  pure  reason ;  that  is,  an 
epigenesis  of  a  priori  necessity  on  a  posterion  contin- 
gency will  be  determined  from  within   us  through 
certain  pure  principles  of  sense  on  the  one  hand  and 
understanding  on  the  other.     Were  such  things  due 
to   an   arbitrary  pre-formation^  they   would  be  only 
subjective  and  unpossessed  of  the  necessity  and  objec- 
tivity of  intellect.     After  all,  however,  Kant  himself 
is  not  quite  free  from  this  position  which  he  rejects. 
If  Kant  cannot  exactly  say,   *'I  am  so  made  that  I 
cannot  otherwise  think  these  facts  than  as  so  and  so 
connected,"  he  must  admit  that  he  is  so  made  that  he 
cannot  but  infuse  into  the  contingency  of  his  senses  a 
necessity   that  exists  only   elsewhere.     It  is  really 
doubtful,  then,  if,  even  on  Kant's  position,  we  are  safe 
against  the  sceptic  denying  this  and  that  for  his  sub- 
jectivity, and  objecting  to  the  fact  of  any  necessary 
judgments.     On  that  position  we  are  really  still  under 
the  power  of  peculiarity  of  subjective  construction ; 
and  on  that  position,  we  can  still  object  to  judgments 
in  empirical  matter,  the  validity  of  which  is  but  a 
validity  borrowed. 

The  Brief  Idea  names  again  all  the  transcendental 
factors.    We  see,  first,  special  sense-multiples  \  second. 


s 


general  sense-multiples;  third,  categorical  multiples 
(which  are  still  unities)  ;  and,  fourth,  the  unity  of 
apperception.  On  the  whole,  one  is  tempted  to  say 
that  he  who  does  not  understand  all  this  now,  ought 
to  look  rather  curiously  at  his  own  self.  It  ought  to 
be  seen,  too,  that  the  entire  machinery  is  absolutely 
within ;  that  there  is  no  provision  in  Kant  for  more 
than  a  false  show  of  externality  ;  and  that  no  one 
object  we  know  as  outer  or  inner  is^  but  only  seertis. 

I  may  further  remark  that  the  division  by  §§,  now 
to  be  abandoned,  has  been  for  the  purpose  of  making 
prominent  the  successive  steps  of  the  deduction. 
From  what  is  said,  too,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  much 
light  will  be  extended  to  us  from  the  practical  part  of 
the  deduction,  the  demonstration  of  the  transcendental 
machinery  in  actual  use,  which,  under  the  title 
judgment^  follows.  This  portion  of  the  work,  though 
objected  to  by  some,  is,  in  reality,  perhaps,  the  most 
indispensable  of  all.  The  p)ieces  can  never  be  sup- 
posed good,  until  they  have  been  shown  together  and 
in  place  in  actual  experience.  This  practical  part 
falls  under  judgment,  for  it  is  the  function  of  judg- 
ment to  subsume  the  particular  under  the  general ; 
that  is,  to  do  what  we  mean  by  apply.  The  subject, 
then,  of  pure  sense  and  pure  understanding,  we  must 
conceive  to  have  fallen  under  simple  app)rehe7ision ;  for 
pure  objects  and  pure  notions  come  naturally  under 
terms.  If  Kant  had  quite  consciously  done  this,  he 
might  have  struck  on  some  little  improvements ;  and, 
seeing  that  he  is  going  to  follow  up  the  propositions 
of  judgment  by  the  syllogisms  of  r^a^ow  (in  the  ideas), 
it  is  not  quite  intelligible  how  the  conception  of 
terms  and  simple  apprehension  escaped  him.  It  is  to 
be  said  at  the  same  time  that,  in  these  collocations 
of  Kant  and  his  successors,  we  may  quite  as  often 


446 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


447 


suspect  a  vacant  ingenuity,  as  recognise  a  filled  ratio- 
cination. 

The  Deduction  in  its  First  Form. 

If  we  cast  a  glance  on  the  first  edition  of  the  K,  of 
Pure  Eeasoriy  we  shall  find  the  deduction  there  to 
differ  from  the  foregoing  at  least  in  length.  But 
there  is  more  than  that,  perhaps.  It  is  quite  possible, 
namely,  that  what  is  shorter  may  be  also  clearer.  At 
all  events,  he  who  has  assimilated  the  longer  state- 
ment will  find  himself  very  much  to  gain  in  the 
assurance  of  conviction  by  a  perusal  of  the  shorter. 
It  may  be  well,  then,  that,  in  conclusion  here,  we 
should  add  a  remark  or  two  as  in  connexion  with 
such  perusal. 

The  basis  of  Kant  comes  out  very  specially  clear 
here.     That   is  what  Reid   calls  the   ideal  theory. 
According  to  that  theory  we  never  get  beyond  our 
own  interiors  in  regard  to  anything  perceived.     Any- 
thing in  sense,    sound,    smell,    colour,    or  whatever 
else,  is  only  an  affection  of  our  own,  a  state  of  our 
own,  a  modification  of  our  own  selves.     But   such 
supposition,  evidently,  involves  at  once  the  further 
assumption  that  the  world  of  experience,  this  exter- 
nality which  we  fancy  ourselves  to  perceive,  is  only  a 
consequence  of  a  manipulation  within,  of  our  affec- 
tions within.      As  much  as  this  is  said  again  and 
again  by  Kant  here,  as,   "  Objects  as  such  are  not 
outside  of  ourselves,  but  exist  only  in  our  sensibility. 
.    .    .    Objects    are   not   things  in   themselves,   but 
what  we  call  Erscheinungen,  and  any  such  are  only 
competent  to   an   object  which   is  within  us;    for, 
evidently,  any  modification  of  our  own  sense,  is  not 
possibly  out  of  us ;  .  .  .  all  objects,  to  which  we  can 
possibly  turn,  are bodily  in  me;  that  is,  they  are 


modifications  of  my  own  identical  self.  .  .  ,  There- 
fore the  manner  in  which  such  affections  are  united 
into  consciousness,  must  lie  in  consciousness  itself; 
that  is,  an  intellectual  form  must  precede  any  actual 
cognition  of  such  objects"  (113-115).  It  is  easy  to 
understand,  then,  how  Kant  follows  up  reception  into 
sense,  by  the  apprehension  of  imagination,  and  that, 
again,  by  a  concentrating  union  into  the  pure  ego 
itself.  These  are  the  subjective  transcendental  con- 
ditions of  all  experience. 

But  this,  probably,  will  be  the  fitting  place  for 
notice  of  the  contending  opinions  here.  The  occa- 
sion of  these  is  this.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  accusation,  in  a  certain  Review,  of  Berkeleian 
idealism,  blind  and  unjust  as  it  was  to  Kant's  own, 
not  only  vexed  this  latter,  but  startled  him  into  the 
necessity  of  correction.  The  critical  idealism  was 
certainly  a  system  of  its  own,  and  it  would  be  to  miss 
all,  to  confound  it  with  what  was  known  as  subjec- 
tive or  ordinary  idealism.  Hence,  undoubtedly,  the 
changes  which  Kant  brought  forward  in  his  second 
edition.  Now,  then,  the  question  is.  What  do  these 
changes  amount  to  ?  Schopenhauer  believes  Kant  to 
have  been  only  a  renegade  to  his  first  subjective 
idealism,  and  to  have  thereby  simply  stultified  him- 
self. Ueberweg,  on  the  contrary,  holds  Kant  to  have 
altered  words,  but  never  opinions ;  and  that  is  Kant's 
own  asseveration.  Schopenhauer  is  a  very  small  au- 
thority here,  and  his  view  errs  very  much  by  excess. 
In  no  case  can  Kant  be  said  to  have  exactly  stultified 
himself.  He  might  have  expressed  himself  in  the 
first  edition  as  not  unfriendly  to  ordinary  idealism ; 
but  it  was  neither  to  stultify  himself  nor  recant,  that, 
in  his  second  edition,  he  altered  too  friendly  or 
equivocal  phrases  of  the  first,  and  formally  added  an 


^ 


448 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


449 


express  rejection  of  all  idealism  but  his  own.    It  does 
not  follow,  however,  that  the  contention  of  Ueberweg 
is  the  right  one.     In  that  reference,  it  is  quite  allow- 
able  to   contrast   Kant's  first   expressions  with  his 
second  ones,  and  to  point  out  how  really  friendly  the 
former  are  to  the  idealism  which  the  latter  expressly 
deny.     But  further,  as  I  demonstrated  to  Ueberweg, 
in  an  epistolary  correspondence  which  I  held  with 
him  several  years  ago,  Kant  has  not,  as  is  generally 
supposed,  altered  in  the  second  edition  all  his  ques- 
tionably idealistic  expressions  in  the  first;  inadver- 
tently, as  I  believe,  there  are  still  left  standing  one  or 
two  that  are,  in  their  eflect,  singularly  betraying.    In 
what  of  the  first  edition  we  have  now  before  us,  there 
occurs  a  passage  w^hich  may  be  said  sufficiently  to 
represent  the  assumed  idealistic  expressions  of  that 
edition :    "  Our  perceptions  may  proceed  from  what 
sources  they  may,  whether  they  are  brought  about 
by  the  influence  of  external  things,  or  through  inter- 
nal causes  "  (93).     Of  passages,  again,  inadvertently 
left  unaltered  in  the  second,  the  following  may  suffice 
as  a  satisfactorily  striking  example.     It  occurs  in  the 
second  paragraph  that  precedes  the  asterisks  towards 
the  end  of  "  Remark  to  the  Amphiboly  of  the  Notions 
of  Reflection."     "  Understanding,  accordingly,  limits 
sense,  in  that  it  warns  sense  not  to  presume  that  it 
(sense)    reaches    things    in   themselves,    but   solely 
Erscheinungen,      Understanding,  however,  does  not 
thereby  extend  its  own  field;  nor,  even  though  it 
postulates  a  thing  in  itself,  is  that  thing  more  than  a 
transcendental   object,    which   is   the   cause   of  the 
Erscheinung  (not,  consequentlj-,  itself  Erscheinung), 
and  not  possibly  to  be  thought  as  quantity  or  quality, 
or  substance,  etc.  (for  these  categories  require  always 
sensible  immä mmMx^  they  determine  an  object). 


Of  such  transcendental  object,  then,  consequently,  it 
is  quite  unknown,  whether  it  is  inside  of  us  or  outside 
of  us,  whether  it  would  disappear  if  sense  disappeared, 
or,  even  then,  remain."     When  one  considers  such 
words  as  these,  one  must  admit  that  to  grant  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  originating  cause  or  causes  of  our  ex- 
ternal afiections  being  within,  is  not  indirectly  or 
ambiguously   to  favour  subjective   idealism;    while 
expressly  to  deny  such  idealism,  and  yet  leave  such 
expressions  standing,  is,  surely,  to  commit  an  inad- 
vertence.    Another  very  glaring  contradiction  I  may 
point  out  in  the  last  sentence  quoted.    I  have  already 
said  that  the  transcendental  object,   as  utterly  un- 
known, may  be  called  transcendent     Nevertheless  it 
may  be  called  transcendental,  because  it  is  an  assumed 
factor  in  experience,  even  as  the  ideas  are,  nay,  more 
than  the  ideas  are,  for  while  these  remain  ideas,  it, 
even  in  name,  is  an  assumed  object.     But,  that  apart 
— we  see  it  asserted  that  the  transcendental  object 
cannot  possibly  "  be  thought  as  quantity,  or  quality, 
or  substance,  etc.  (for  these  categories  require  always 
sensible  forms  in  which  they  determine  an  object)." 
That  is,  the  transcendental  object  cannot  be  charac- 
terized by  any  category ;  and  yet  at  that  very  moment 
it  is  actually  characterized  by  the  category  cause! 
It  is  not  Erscheinung,  but  yet  it  is  "the  cause  of  the 
Erscheinung."      As   one   sees,    the   contradiction   is 
doubly  glaring  here.     The  category  of  categories  is 
asserted  of  the  transcendental  object   at  the   same 
instant  that  all  categories  are  expressly  excluded  from 
it ;  and  while  categories  are  regarded  as  applicable 
only  to  Erscheinungen,  a  category  is  applied  to  the 
transcendental  object  at  the  very  moment  that  it  is 
directly  denied  to  be  an  Erscheinung  at  all.    In  illus- 
tration of  the  contradiction  of  the  second  edition  to 

2f 


450 


TEXT-BOOK    TO   KANT  : 


the  first,  we  may  complement  the  extracts  that  bear 
on  the  latter,  with  one  from  the  nominally  express 
"  Refutation  of  Idealism,"  which  constitutes,  in  this 
reference,   the  remarkable   feature    of   the   former. 
Kant  talks  of  more  justly  retaliating  the  "  Spiel  wel- 
ches der  Idealism  trieb;"  and  it  is  just  possible  that 
his  refutation  is  a  mere  Spiel.     For  it  is  certain  that 
Kant  had  quite  as  good  a  right  to  practise  the  well- 
known  doMe  entendre  as  Berkeley  himself     "Even 
our  inner  experience  is  only  possible  under  presup- 
position of  external  experience;"  it  "proves  the  ex- 
istence of  objects  in  space  without  me."     These  seem 
clear  expressions ;  but  still  Kant  may  mean  them  to 
refer  only  to  his  own  peculiar  external  Erscheinungen. 
The  whole  course  of  the  Refutation,  however,  seems  to 
refer  to   actual  transcendental  things  as  external ; 
and  we  have  seen,  twice  over,  the  possibility  of  the 
transcendental  object  being  within  us,  directly  as- 
serted.    Now,  however,  in  this  Refutation  that  such 
cause  may  be  within  us,  is  a  doctrine  expressly  attri- 
buted to  the  idealists,  and  denied  for  himself     In  his 
second  preface,  too,   he   avers  that,    "however  in- 
nocuous (which  in  point  of  fact  it  is  not),  as  respects 
the  essential  ends  of  metaphysic.  Idealism  may  be,  it 
remains   a  perpetual  scandal  for  philosophy   to   be 
obliged  to  leave  only  for  faith  the  existence  of  things 
without  us    (to   which   things   we   owe   the    entire 
material  of  our  perceptions)."     He  did,  then,  at  that 
time,   accentuate  the  probable  existence  of  causes 
really  external  in  explanation  of  the  affections  we 
call  external.     Not  but  that  he  had  previously  loosely 
granted  that  these  causes  mifjht  be   internal.     The 
Review  in  question  had  been  really  a  serious  shock 
to  him.     It  was  necessary  to  checkmate  a  very  mis- 
leading  and   mischievous,   but    gratuitous  mistake. 


I 


COMMENTARY. 


451 


Now,  however,  I  doubt  not,  notwithstanding  what 
countenance  his  principles  of  Taste  seem  to  lend, 
but  not  by  any  means  necessarily,  to  an  externality 
proper,  that,  were  Kant  alive,  he  would  find  it  quite 
consistent  to  return  to  his  first,  quite  inessential, 
admission,  let  the  transcendental  object  be  without  or 
within.  His  critical  idealism^  so  far  as  he  is  coiicerned^ 
remains  essentially  the  same  under  either  supposition. 
And,  with  all  this,  we  should  not  hesitate  to  appeal, 
quite  as  much  as  Ueberweg,  to  Kant  as  a  man  dis- 
tinguished '' incorrujjta  veritate'' 

But  let  us  return  to  the  text  immediately  before 
us.  The  great  interest  here  is  the  triple  synthesis : 
1,  The  synopsis  of  the  perceptive  units  furnished  by 
the  sense-affection ;  2,  The  synthesis  of  these  units  in 
imagination ;  3,  The  recognition  of  the  various  syn- 
theses into  unities  of  objects  in  the  unity  of  apper- 
ception. These  three  factors  in  an  act  of  perception 
would  be  more  distinctively  realized,  perhaps,  should 
I  give  them  the  titles  now  by  which  I  named  them 
to  myself  more  than  twenty  years  ago.  I  described 
them  respectively  then,  as  1,  The  Diathesis  or  Dis- 
position of  Sense ;  2,  The  Synthesis  or  Composition 
of  Imagination;  and,  3,  The  Metathesis  or  Trans- 
position of  Understanding,  under  the  Henosis  or 
Union  of  Apperception.  Generally  the  whole  process 
was  regarded  as  one  of  Synopsis  or  Apprehension, 
followed  by  another  of  Synthesis  or  Reproduction 
which  ended  in  the  communing  and  commuting  of 
any  manifold  concerned  into  the  Recognition  or 
Henosis  of  Apperception. 

The  text  of  the  first  edition,  however  brief,  is  not 
to  be  regarded  as  by  any  means  clearly  and  unam- 
biguously written.  By  "  affinity  of  complex  "  is  pro- 
bably meant  the  ruled  and  regulated  result  of  the 


452 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


various  processes,  but  that  is  not  certain.  One  is 
inclined  to  think,  also,  that  what  is  meant  by  "  Asso- 
ciation "  is  the  mere  work  of  imagination,  but  again  it 
seems  (109)  to  point  to  some  rule  proper  to  the  sense- 
units  themselves  "  whereby  one  rather  than  another 
enters  into  combination  with  a  third  in  imagination." 
One  has  to  think  to  himself  here,  even,  that  Kant  does 
not  often  admit,  especially  for  synthesis,  any  empirical 
condition,  though  such  conditions,  evidently,  must 
be,  in  order  that  the  a  posteriori  matter  may  be  found 
to  fit  this,  that,  or  the  other  a  priori  form.  Without 
detailing  them,  I  may  say  that  expressions  occur 
more  or  less  welcome  in  explanation  of  various  terms, 
as,  dependence  of  perception  on  connexion  (92), 
Anschauung  and  its  Manifold  (93),  Meaning  of  Be- 
griff (97),  what  an  object  is  (97-101),  Apperception 
Transcendental  and  Empirical  (99),  Synthesis  of 
Begriffe  (102),  what  Nature  is  (104),  Understanding 
(108),  Erscheinung  and  Wahrnehmung  (105,  108), 
Apprehension  (109),  what  Hegel  calls  "  ungeheuere 
Aposteriorität "  (114),  etc.,  etc.  "understanding  is 
always  busy  spying  through  the  empirical  impres- 
sions in  order  to  find  a  rule  in  them."  That  is  a 
sentence  (113)  which  would  seem  to  grant  rule  to 
empirical  matter  in  itself. 


Book  II. — The  Analytic  of  Judgments. 

What,  in  general,  we  have  to  see  here,  has  been 
already  intimated,  the  subsumption,  namely,  of  the 
pure  manies  of  sense  (a  priori  perception)  under  the 
pure  unities  of  understanding,  with  the  consequent 


COMMENTARY. 


453 


production  of  certain  pure,  or  non-empirical,  or 
a  priori  and  transcendental,  propositions. 

We  see  at  once  that  Kant  has  had  in  mind  the 
simple  apprehension,  quite  as  well  as  the  judgment 
and  reason,  of  school  logic.  We  suggest,  however, 
that,  had  he  used  precisely  that  title  instead  of  un- 
derstanding, he  would  have  gained  in  simplicity; 
for  he  might  have  included  under  it  the  -Esthetic 
as  well. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  Introduction  that  calls  for 
separate  remark.  We  can  understand,  and  admit 
for  the  nonce,  that  Judgment  is  only  a  faculty  of 
discernment,  which,  in  regard  of  given  rules,  looks 
out  for  cases.  As  concerns  the  Secunda  Petri,  called 
also  Altera  ^?ar5  Petri,  the  allusion  is  to  the  second 
division.  Judgment,  of  the  logic  of  Petrus  Ramus. 
There  are  those,  however,  who  derive  it  from  the 
epitaph  on  Ramus:  Hie  jacet  Petrus  Ramus,  vir 
magnaö  memoriae,  expectans  judicium.  Of  course, 
judicium  here  may  be  referred  to  the  faculty  of  that 
name,  and  poor  Peter  inferred,  consequently,  to  have 
wanted  it,  inasmuch  as  he  was  still  expecting  it. 
The  remarks  here,  whether  special  or  general,  are  so 
very  plain  that  comment  is  superfluous.  On  the 
whole,  we  have  to  understand  that  what  we  have 
seen  hitherto  was  the  collection  of  the  various  neces- 
sary pieces;  and  what  we  have  to  see  now  is  the 
application  of  these  pieces  into  a  single  act  of  percep- 
tion, and  then,  collectively,  into  all  those  acts  of  the 
same  faculty  or  function  which  constitute  experience  ; 
said  experience  itself  being  this  all  of  things  and 
events  which  is  given  us  to  live  in. 


454  TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 

CuAPTER  I. — The  Schematism  of  the  Categories. 

We  are  told  at  once  that  the  instrument  of  the 
schematism  is  a  ieriium  qiiidy  holding  on  one  side 
of  sense,   and  on  the  other  of  intellect;  and  it  is 
evident  that  any  such  double-sided  principle,  being 
pure,    non-empirical,    a  priori,    will    also    be    tran- 
scendental.    It  is  quite  certain,  then,  that  Kant,  in 
the  first  instance,  looked,  for  this  tertium  quid,  wholly 
to  time:  the  categories  should  find,  in  peculiarities 
of  the  perceptive  manifold  of  time,  actual  sensible 
(perceptible)  schemata  of  their  own  intellectual  selves. 
It  is  this  the  student  has  to  watch.     In  point  of  fact, 
is  there  in  time  a  correspondent  sense-many  for  each 
intellectual  many  implied  in  the  respective  unities  of 
the  various  categories?     Of  course,  such  schemata 
being,  they  will  be,  as  said,  manifestly  transcendental, 
and  that  term  is  by  no  means  arbitrary.    As  schemed, 
the  general  idea  is  eminently  simple  and  intelligible. 
We  see,  too,  that  what  is  to  result — the  entire  pro- 
vision of  a  priori  forms  (pure  intellect  on  the  one 
hand,   pure   sense  on   the  other,   and,  in  schemata 
between  both,  the  pure  communion  of  both) — will  be 
what  we  find  so  often  referred  to  as  the  conditions  of 
possible  experience.     It  is  to  be  understood,  at  the 
same  time,  that  the  possible  experience  meant  is  not 
any  possible  experience,  but  only  that  single  expe- 
rience which  is  alone  possible  to  us — as   creatures 
limited  to   intellects  which   can   realize   themselves 
only  on  and  through  the  internal  affections  of  what 
are  called  senses.     Kant  himself  directly  says  this 
here.     The  categories,  he  alBrms,  have  no  bearing  on 
an  absolute  experience  that  takes  note  of  things  in 
themselves :  they  have  no  meaning  whatever  for  us 
when  mignMsted  tp  the  conditions  of  our  sensibility. 


COMMENTARY. 


455 


And  they  are  so  "  restricted."  Each  category,  though 
only  for  use  in  experience,  is,  in  the  first  instance, 
"  restricted  "  to  its  own  peculiar  schema. 

The  sixth  paragraph  here  may  be  regarded  as  an 
excellent  summary  of  the  Deduction ;  w^hile  the  defi- 
nition and  illustration  of  schematism  which  follow 
are  particularly  interesting  and  striking.  The  schema 
is,  so  to  speak,  no  picture-image ;  it  may  be  called 
rather  a  notion-image — even  as  the  conception  of  a 
triangle  is  a  notion-image.  The  idea  of  a  triangle, 
namely,  must  be  wholly  general;  it  can  neither  be 
scalene,  equilateral,  nor  isosceles,  and  yet  it  must  be 
all.  The  schemata,  then,  are  to  be  such  notion- 
images;  and  the  schematism  itself,  as  a  whole,  is 
''  eine  verborgene  Kunst  in  den  Tiefen  der  men- 
schlichen Seele — a  hidden  art  in  the  deeps  of  the 
human  soul."  For  full  understanding,  let  the  reader 
fancy  a  triangle  Sisßgura  of  a  schema.  In  a  word,  the 
notion  is  to  be  conceived  reflected  into  a  schema 
through  the  a  priori  sense-forms.  Kant  immediately, 
however,  proceeds,  as  usual  when  we  expect  a  rationale 
of  origin,  just  to  set  down  the  schemata.  He  does 
this,  he  says,  ''  not  to  stop  now  for  a  long  and  tedious 
analysis."  This  manner  of  Kant's  always  gives  a  jolt ; 
but  such  jolt  will  be  found,  in  some  cases,  to  have 
become  a  shock,  and  a  shock  followed  by  an  absolute 
halt.  Kant  himself,  for  example,  declares  (HI.,  6) 
Hume  to  have  summoned  reason  to  produce  her  right 
to  assert  "  something  such  that,  it  being,  something 
else  thereby  necessarily  follows ;  "  and  yet  what  this 
same  Kant  simply  sets  down  as  the  schema  of  causality 
is,  "  something  such  that,  it  being,  something  else 
always  follows."  What  is  interrogative  in  Hume, 
is  only  affirmative  in  Kant !  What  Hume  hands  to 
Kant  as  the  problem  to  solve,  Kant  simply  hands 


456 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


back  to  Hume  as  the  solution  to  accept !     The  same 
thing  is  glaringly  the  case  with  reciprocity,  etc. 

By-and-by  we  have  the  phrase  that  the  schema  of 
relation  refers  "to  the  connexions  of  the  sense-units 
in  each  other's  regard  at  any  time."  What  is  trans- 
lated here  "at  any  time"  is  the  expression  "zu  aller 
Zeit;"  and  the  translation  may  be  possibly  cavilled 
at — especially  by  those  who  have  the  craze  to  see  no 
object  on  the  part  of  Kant  but  to  bring  everything 
together  to  be  determined  into  the  unity  of  time  it- 
self—into "alle"  Zeit  or  "eine"  Zeit.  We  actually 
have  (II.,  152)  the  expression  :  "  The  general  principle 
of  the  analogies  of  experience  is,  all  objects  of  sense, 
as  concerns  their  existence,  stand  a  priori  under  rules 
of  the  determination  of  their  relation  mutually  in  one 
time  (in  einer  Zeit)."  Now  there  is  no  question  here 
but  that  the  one  phrase  is  perfectly  equal  to  the  other : 
each  is  put  forward  as  an  exact  and  formal  definition 
of  what  refers  to  the  principles  of  relation.  It  be- 
comes, then,  necessary  to  determine  how  the  two 
phrases,  "zu  aller  Zeit"  and  "in  einer  Zeit,"  can  be 
possibly  held  to  mean  the  same  thing,  and  what  that 
exactly  is.  Well,  suppose  we  assume,  in  the  first 
place,  what  the  expounders  alluded  to  evidently  be- 
lieve. In  that  case,  in  the  one  phrase  it  is  to  be  sup- 
posed that  what  is  concerned  is  a  determining  in  all 
timey  as  in  one  time  in  the  other.  Now,  what  may 
that  itself  mean  ?  What  is  to  determine  in  all  time  ? 
What  is  to  determine  in  one  time?  This  pen  is  an 
object,  and  the  trickling  of  ink  from  that  overturned 
bottle  is  an  event.  There  cannot  be  a  doubt  that  the 
one,  simply  as  being  an  object,  and  the  other,  simply 
as  being  an  event—that  they  are  both  determined  in 
**  one  "  time  and  in  "  all "  time.  And  we  shall  take  it 
for  granted  that  the  relative  general  conditions  in 


COMMENTARY. 


457 


1 


their  case  will  be  the  same  in  that  of  all  others,  whether 
events  or  objects.  How,  then,  is  it  true  that  this  pen 
and  that  trickling  of  ink  are  determined  in  all  time  ? 
Why,  we  see  that  this  must  be  so,  simply  from  the  con- 
ditions of  time  itself.  The  pen  was  looked  at  exactly 
at  half-past  12  on  such  and  such  a  day  of  such  and 
such  a  year,  and  the  spilling  of  the  ink  took  place  pre- 
cisely one  minute  later.  The  pen  and  the  ink,  then,  are 
so  related  in  all  time.  There  is  no  power  on  earth — 
there  is  no  power  in  heaven — that  can  alter  that,  even 
to  a  hair's  breadth.  As  pen  and  ink  were  at  such 
and  such  a  moment,  so  at  that  moment  they  are  de- 
termined in  all  time.  Any  one  fact  whatever,  whether 
object  or  event,  is  at  every  instant  of  its  existence 
photographed,  to  say  so,  in  all  time.  But  if  it  is 
easy  to  see  this,  as  in  the  case  of  "  all "  time,  it  is 
equally  easy  to  see  the  same  thing  as  in  reference  to 
"  one  "  time.  For  there  is  but  one  time.  Time  cannot 
be  taken,  so  to  speak,  at  any  time,  but  as  a  whole. 
There  is  but  a  single  chronology.  And,  in  that  chrono- 
logy, there  is  no  one  thing  or  event  whatever  but 
has  its  own  proper,  special,  and  peculiar,  its  own 
absolutely  individual,  its  own  absolutely  inalienable 
right.  AH  is  a  becoming,  and  each  and  every  unit 
of  that  becoming  can  only  exist  when  and  where  it 
is.  One  may  say — as  we  have  said — that  that  is  be- 
cause of  the  very  nature  of  time ;  but  one  cannot  say 
that  that  is  because  of  the  very  nature  of  time,  more 
than  that  it  is  because  of  the  very  nature  of  existence  as 
existence.  That,  however,  wholly  apart,  one  cannot 
say  that  that  is  any  more  because  of  Kant's  time  than 
because  of  time  vulgar.  Or,  what  is  simply  to  the 
point  here,  one  cannot  say  that  Kant's  time  explains 
that.  Kant's  time  has  not,  in  a  single  iota,  more 
power  than  what  we  have  just  called  time  vulgar. 


458 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANTf 


COMMENTARY. 


459 


Kant's  time  is,  in  short,  accurately  time  vulgar,  and 
accurately  nothing  but  time  vulgar.  For  time  is  in 
every  respect  identical,  and  self-identical,  whether  as 
given  to  the  subject  (to  us)  from  the  subject's  own 
interior,  or  from  the  subject's  own  exterior.  Kant 
says  that  it  is  given  from  our  own  interior :  we  say 
it  is  given  from  our  own  exterior.  But  exterior,  in- 
terior, homoiousiaj  homoonsia^  it  is  perfectly  the  same 
thing  in  both.  And  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that 
Kant  makes  any  other  claim,  Kant  knows  no  other 
"  one  "  of  time  but  the  one  we  know.  Kant  knows 
no  other  "  all "  of  time  but  the  all  we  know.  And 
the  darkness  involved  in  any  other  supposition  is 
simply  Cimmerian.  Fancy  such  grave  propositions 
as,  "  We  cannot  represent  an  object  as  existing,  or  an 
event  as  occurring,  except  in  space  and  time  "  (where 
else,  in  the  name  of  common-sense,  could  we  do  so, 
or  is  it  Kant's  philosophy  that  does  do  so?) ;  ''every 
object  must  exist  in  a  definite  part  of  the  one  space, 
and  every  event  must  occur  at  a  definite  moment  of 
the  one  time,"  etc.  What  are  we  to  conceive  of  the 
ratiocination  concerned,  that  could  so  occupy  itself? 
Does  Kant's  philosophy — does  any  philosophy  do  that? 
But  if  that  is  the  state  of  the  case  as  regards  the 
unity  of  time  and  space  conceived  as  in  and  of  them- 
selves, is  there  any  difference,  in  that  respect,  to  be 
attributed  to  the  categories?  What  has  either  quan- 
tity or  quality,  what  has  either  relation  or  modality 
got  to  do  with  the  determination  of  anything  what- 
ever in  time  chronologically  or  in  space  geographi- 
cally? This  my  pen,  that  trickling  of  ink  from  the 
overturned  bottle,  what  has  any  category  of  mine,  or 
yours,  or  anybody  else's,  got  to  do  with  the  deter- 
mination of  either?  Why,  nothing.  It  is  not  even 
relevant  to  speak  ofthat;  but  suppose  it  k  categories 


that  enable  me  to  determine  that,  it  is  not  that  which, 
even  in  that  case,  they  determine.  Even  in  that  case, 
they  do  no  more  than  Cheselden's  knife  did  to  the  blind 
man ;  they  enable  me  to  see.  What  I  see,  however, 
is  absolutely  independent  of  my  seeing  or  any  seeing. 
What  I  see  comes  neither  from  time  nor  space,  and 
much  less  from  any  category.  What  I  see,  in  fact, 
dictates  to  space,  dictates  to  time,  dictates  to  the 
categories,  and  is  not  dictated  to,  whether  by  all  or 
either.     And  this,  as  said,  is  the  teaching  of  Kant. 

Time  is  a  "one,"  then,  and  time  is  an  "all;"  but, 
neither  in  our  time  nor  in  Kant's  time,  for  all  that,  is 
there  any  mysterious  necessity  of  a  mysterious  "  all- 
cmbracingness,"  which  only  the  most  mysterious  of 
all  philosophies,  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  shall  have 
mysteriously  discovered  and  more  mysteriously  de- 
monstrated. 

But,  if  we  dismiss  time  and  space,  if — at  least  for  any 
action  on  time  and  space — we  dismiss  the  categories 
themselves  here,  there  can,  plainly,  be  nothing  left  us 
but  what  are  called  things.  It  will  be  on  things  that 
that  unity,  that  allness,  is  accomplished,  and  not  on 
time  or  space.  The  categories  may  have,  indeed,  an 
application  there.  But  it  is  on  relations  that  we  are 
employed,  and  there  can  be  no  question  in  that  regard 
of  any  unity  or  of  any  allness  that  is  not  relatively 
such.  The  unity  of  which  Kant  speaks  shall  simply 
be  a  unity  of  things  relatively  the  one  to  the  other ; 
and  so,  similarly,  of  any  such  allness.  And  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  this  is  demonstrated  by  the  text. 

It  was  with  the  phrase  "the  connexions  of  the 
sense-units  in  each  other's  regard  at  any  time "  we 
began  here,  and  specially  with  the  translation  "at 
any  time"  for  "zu  aller  Zeit."  Now,  if  we  will  look 
at  the  text,  we  shall  find  that  this  phrase  is  followed 


460 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


by  a  parenthetic  clause  which  is  there  for  no  other 
purpose  than  to  explain  it.  The  clause  runs  thus, 
"  that  is,  as  in  accordance  with  a  rule  of  the  deter- 
mination in  time."  "  Connexions  of  the  sense-units 
in  each  other's  regard  zu  aller  Zeit "  means,  conse- 
quently, no  more  than  that  these  units  are,  by  a  rule, 
related  to  each  other  in  time.  If  A  B  be  causal,  then 
B  is  so  related  to  A  by  a  rule  in  time,  that  whenever 
A  is,  B  necessarily  follows.  Or  if  A  B  be  reciprocal, 
then  B  is  so  related  to  A  that  it  is  one  with  it  in  a 
relation  of  action  and  re-action.  We  see  the  nature 
of  the  rule  meant,  and  we  see  the  nature  of  the  deter- 
mination meant.  Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  is  to 
be  taken  up  as  a  mysterious  prong  that  is  mysteriously 
to  spit  things  and  events  into  a  mysterious  fixed  unity 
of  a  one  all-embracing  time.  When  I  observe  the  ink 
trickling  from  the  inverted  bottle,  or  when  I  see  that 
the  pen,  paper,  desk,  table,  floor,  room,  are  all 
together,  then  I  perceive  also  certain  unities  of  re- 
lation, which  unities  are,  of  course,  like  all  other 
things,  in  time,  and  in  the  succession  of  time,  but 
which,  for  all  that,  may  be  said  to  be  quite  indepen- 
dent of  time,  and  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  time. 

But  we  have  seen  that  the  quotation  from  IT.,  152,  had 
the  same  reference  as  that  from  II.,  128.  The  phrase 
"rules  of  determination  of  relation  in  each  other's 
regard  in  einer  Zeit"  is  to  be  held  as  completely 
parallel  with  the  preceding  phrase  "connexions  in 
each  other's  regard  zu  aller  Zeit."  "  In  einer  Zeit,"  in 
fact,  must  be  held  to  be  in  some  way  tantamount  to 
"  zu  aller  Zeit,"  and  to  be  equally  susceptible  of  the 
parenthetic  gloss  that  declares  no  more  to  be  meant 
than  a  rule  of  relation  between  things.  We  may  add, 
of  course,  in  time,  but  cela  va  sans  dire,  and  we  have 
gained  nothing  by  the  addition.     And  this  is  Kant's 


COMMENTARY. 


461 


own   understanding.      So   little   does   Kant   himself 
make  of  the  mention  of  time  in  the  statement,  that 
he  is  actually  found  in  his  second  edition  expressly 
to  eliminate  it.     The  words  of  the  first  edition,  "  The 
general  principle   of  these  is.  All  presentations   to 
sense,  as  regards  their  existence,  stand  a  jmori  under 
rules  of  the  determination  of  their  relation  the  one  to 
the  other  in  einer  Zeit,"  are  found  in  the  second 
edition  to  run  thus :  "  The  principle  of  these  is,  Ex- 
perience is  only  possible  through  the  perception  of  a 
necessary  connexion  in  the  presentations  to  sense." 
In  this  regard,  indeed,  Kant  not  only  saw,  probably, 
that  the  reference  to  time  was  unnecessary ;  but  he 
must  have  seen  that  the  addition  "  in  einer  Zeit "  was 
only  calculated  to  obstruct  and  mislead.     The  head- 
ing was  quite  general,  for  example,  and  bore  to  apply 
to  all  relations ;  but  it  was  only  the  factors  of  a  reci- 
procity that  were  literally  and  accurately  "  in  einer 
Zeit."     They  were  all  together,  and  at  once,  and  in 
the  same  time.     To  be  sure,  the  causal  tie  was  so 
close,   and  intimate,  and   instantaneous,  that   there 
likewise  the  relative  factors  might,  with  perfect  truth, 
be  said  to  be  "in  einer  Zeit,"  or  in  one  and  the  same 
time;   but  still,  potentially  at  least,  the   effect  was 
always  after  (that  is,  not  at  the  same  time  as)   the 
cause.     It  was,  probably,  some  such  considerations 
as  these,  then,  that  led  Kant  to  the  withdrawal  of 
"  in  einer  Zeit ; "  but  if  the  one  phrase  is  capable  of 
being  withdrawn,  so  also  is  the  other.      That   un- 
doubtedly is  so ;  but  "  zu  aller  Zeit "  in  the  one  case, 
and  "  in  einer  Zeit "  in  the  other,  were  really  added  in 
order  to  convey  the  universality  of  the  relation.     This 
is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  when  "in  einer 
Zeit"  was  eliminated  it  was  replaced  by  ^' nothwendig,'' 
But,   on  that  understanding,  what  Kant  meant  by 


4G2 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


"zu  aller  Zeit"  must  have  been  simply  ^^ always''  In 
point  of  fact,  the  "  zu  aller  Zeit "  is  not  in  aller  Zeit, 
and  can  mean  nothing  but,  as  it  is  translated,  "  at 
any  time."  The  relation  of  causality,  for  example,  is 
such,  that  it  holds  good  "at  any  time."  Or,  as  it 
may  be  otherwise  said,  "  at  any  time  "  that  the  cause 
is  given,  the  effect  follows.  That  is  just  the  meaning 
of  aller^  every  and  any.  From  all  this,  it  is  evident 
that  it  was  no  wonder  "  in  einer  Zeit "  was  with- 
drawn ;  for  it  is  adequate,  after  all,  only  to  a  very 
dubious  and  unsatisfactory  sense.  "All  presentations 
to  sense,  so  far  as  their  existence  is  concerned,  stand 
a  priori  under  rules  of  the  determination  of  their 
relation  the  one  to  the  other  in  one  time."  As  said, 
one  might  get  a  meaning  out  of  this — by  reference  to 
reciprocity  especially.  The  elimination  of  the  phrase, 
however,  leaves  the  question  of  no  importance.  But, 
be  all  that  as  it  may,  I  am  positively  very  much  in- 
clined to  suspect  that  what  Kant  meant  to  write,  or 
perhaps  wrote  and  forgot,  was  not  "  in  einer  Zeit,"  but 
"  in  irgend  einer  Zeit ; "  which,  naturally,  is  but  another 
reading  for  "zu  aller  Zeit."  And  for  "zu  aller  Zeit," 
with  what  holds  of  it,  as  much  as  this  may,  by  way 
of  discussion,  suffice.  I  will  only  add  that  we  might 
illustratively  refer  here  to  the  phrase  "zu  jeder  Zeit  " 
which,  to  the  same  effect,  is  used  elsewhere.  On  II., 
153,  there  occur  in  the  first  paragraph  the  words: 
"drei  Regeln  aller  Zeitverhältnisse  der  Erschein- 
ungen, wonach  jeder  ihr  Daseyn  in  Ansehung  der 
Einheit  aller  Zeit  bestimmt  werden  kann ; "  and  we 
English  them  thus :  "  three  rules  of  all  the  time- 
relations  of  objects,  according  to  which  rules  there 
can  be  determined  for  each  object  its  relative  ex- 
istence  in  regard  of  the  unity  of  all  time."  For  reasons 
given  "  Daseyn  "  is  correctly  enough  translated  "  re- 


COMMENTARY. 


4G3 


lative  existence,"  which  tends  to  lessen  the  difficulty. 
Still  "  existence  in  regard  of  the  unity  of  all  time  "  is 
a  phrase  that  seems  to  imply  that  every  object  has  its 
existence  expressly  determined  for  it  in  the  unity  of 
all  time,  and  this,  too,  by  the  three  analogies.  We 
know  perfectly  well  from  the  state  of  the  case  that 
this  is  impossible ;  and  we  know  from  scores  of  sen- 
tences, and  the  whole  drift  of  his  theory,  that  Kant 
actually  proclaims  this  to  be  impossible.  Accordingly 
I  feel  myself  free  to  give  this  translation :  "  These 
laws  will  determine  for  every  object  its  relative  ex- 
istential place  in  regard  of  unity  (connexion)  always 
or  at  any  time."  And  this  is  confirmed  by  the  "jeder  " 
alluded  to,  which  occurs  in  the  very  next  sentence : 
"  The  general  principle  of  all  three  analogies  depends 
on  the  necessary  unity  of  apperception  as  regards 
every  possible  empirical  consciousness  (perception)  at 
any  and  every  time  {zu  jeder  Zeit),  and,  consequently, 
said  unity  being  a  priori  implied,  on  the  synthetic 
unity  (connexion)  of  all  objects  in  respect  of  their 
relation  in  time."  The  expression  is  certainly  awk- 
ward at  times,  but  all  these  allers,  einers,  and  jeders 
being  diligently  compared,  as  well  as  the  respective 
contexts,  no  one  can  have  a  moment's  doubt  that  Kant 
has  "  relative  existence  in  time  "  only  quite  generally 
in  his  eye ;  that  he  means  no  "  definite  "  time  for  any 
effect  whatever,  but  only  the  time  generally  of  an  effect 
relatively  to  its  cause — namely,  that  it  is  posterior. 

What  follows  in  this  chapter  is  so  clear  as  not  to 
demand  any  commentary.  Only,  the  reader  must 
familiarize  himself  with  the  idea  that  the  categories 
are  hardly  of  any  use  proper  but  as  unities  of  con- 
solidation to  manies  of  sense  (sense  of  some  kind — 
any  kind).  It  is  a  large  moiety  of  the  lesson  of  Kant 
to  say,  Oh,  use  the  categories,  not  as  to  the  Erschein- 


464 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


iingen  of  sense,  but  as  to  things  in  themselves,  if 
you  will,  but  accept  then  the  result— something  in 
regard  to  the  existence  of  which  you  can  say  notliino-, 
and  which  may  be  a  fiction.  In  point  of  fact,  Kan^,' 
by-and-by,  goes  on  to  show  that  the  Ideas,  God,  the 
Soul,  etc.,  are  just  of  such  origin.  These  he  does  not 
deny ;  he  will  put  them  in  place  here  as  regulatives, 
say,  affirmative  of  religion,  but  negative  of  fanaticism. 
Any  proof,  however,  of  their  eanstence  as  objects,  he 
leaves  for  another  region.  In  connexion  with  what 
we  know  from  elsewhere,  it  may  suggest  itself  here, 
that  Kant,  quite  as  much  as  any  sensationalist  proper, 
and  even  more  than  Locke,  limits  knowledge  of  any 
object  whatever,  cognition  proper,  to  what  contains 
actual  elements  of  sense.  This  will  contrast  some- 
what with  all  the  ordinary  exalted  notions  of  what  a 
transcendental  philosophy  may  be. 

Chapter  II. — System  of  the  Ground- Judgments  of  Pure 

Understanding. 

The  first  section  here  contains  nothing  that  is  of 
any  consequence  for  us.  Our  quest  is  of  necessity  in 
synthetic,  not  analytic,  propositions.  What  is  said 
of  the  condition  of  time  as  conciliating  apparent  con- 
tradiction in  ordinary  analytic  averments  is  intel- 
ligible of  itself 

In  section  2,  which  concerns  synthetic  judgments, 
we  learn  that,  as,  in  such,  two  notions  are  to  be 
brought  together  and  conjoined,  which  notions  are 
wholly  alien  the  one  to  the  other,  and  cannot  be  ana- 
lytically got  the  one  from  the  other,  the  need  is  a 
tertium  quid  which  shall  mediate  the  conjunction. 
That  tertium  quid  is  said  to  be  constituted  by  what  1 
shall  venture  to  call  the  transcendental  provision.     And 


COMMENTARY. 


465 


the  transcendental  provision  consists  of  those  a  priori 
forms  which  are  already  possessed  by  the  mind  in 
order  to  produce  synthesis,  objectivity,  on  the  sub- 
jective  manifolds  presented  to  us   (in  sensation)  by 
special  sense.     The  elements   of  the   transcendental 
provision,  now,  are  pure  perception  (time  and  space), 
the  action  of  imagination,  and  the  radical  notions  of 
the  understanding  (categories)    as  functions  of  the 
unity   of  apperception.     Out   of  such  elements  (at 
once  of  sense  and  understanding)  it  is,  evidently,  con- 
ceivably  possible  a  priori  to  realize  what  may  consti- 
tute, not  the   actuality,    but   the   possibility,   of  an 
object.     It  is  the  transcendental  provision,  therefore, 
that    constitutes    the    necessary   condition   to,  that 
actually  is,  "  the  possibility  of  experience."     For  the 
empincal  reference   involved   in   these   conditions   is 
always  to  be  borne  in  mind.     That  is,  it  is  always 
to  be  borne  in  mind  that  time  and  space,  and  the 
principles  of  synthesis  on  the  recognised  contents  of 
time  and  space,  have  no  meaning  or  purpose  whatever 
but  as  producing  objectivity  on  the  subjective  mani- 
folds  presented  to  us  (in  sensation)  by  special  sense 
—as  realizing  or,  in  fact,  simply  being,  the  possibility 
of  experience.     All  that,  in  effect,  is  involved  in  the 
very  word  transcendental      The  transcendental  pro- 
vision,  as  I  name  it,  simply  as  being  transcendental, 
points  to  experience,  points,  so  to  speak,  from  the 
a  priori  to  the  a  posteriori,  or  demonstrates  the  ne- 
cessity of  the  one  to  the  other,  the  necessary  nexus 
between  them.     To  call  a  thing  transcendental,  then, 
IS  the  same  thing  as  to  say  it  has  an  empirical  refer- 
ence.     Of  course  we  have  just  heard  again  of  the 
"  restriction  "  of  all  our  principles ;  that  they  bear, 
namely,  not  on  "  things  in  themselves,"  but  only  on 
Erscheinungen,  shows  or  appearances  due  to  the  mere 

2g 


466 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


affection  of  sense;  and  must  understand,  conse- 
quently, that  "  the  possibility  of  experience  "  refers  not 
to  an  absolute  experience,  but  only  to  such  expe- 
rience as  is  possible  to  us,  to  us  as,  sensuously  and  in- 
tellectually, we  are  actually  endowed  (not  but  that  we 
might  have  been  endowed  infinitely  otherwise).  All 
that  is,  accurately  and  literally,  the  holding  of  Kant. 
Here,  however,  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
that,  in  this  holding,  we  should  perfectly  understand 
w^hat  I  mean  by  empirical  reference.  But,  turning 
back  to  the  beginning  of  the  section,  we  may  first 
remark  on  a  point  or  two. 

Why   synthetic   propositions   are   no   business    of 
general  logic  is,  obviously,  for  the  reason  that,  while 
they   involve  material   considerations,    the   latter   is 
restricted  to  the  bare  form  of  the  implied  action,  all 
questions   of  the    matter    concerned  being  for  the 
moment  suspended.     But  a  prion  synthetics,  again, 
are  the  precise  business  of  a  transcendental  logic, 
which,  as  transcendental,  has  simply  to  explain  all 
that  concerns  the  presence   of  the  necessity  of  the 
intellect  in   the   contingency   of  sense,    or,  what  is 
the  same  thing,  the  presence  of  the  a  jtriori  in  the 
a  posteriori.     All  this,  as  what  is  to  be  explained, 
Kant  conveys  by  the  single  word  "  possibility."     To 
demonstrate  the  "  possibility  "  of  God  is   to   argue 
towards  His  existence  and  nature  ;    and  to  explain 
the  "  possibility  "  of  a  priori  synthetics  is  to'  ration- 
alize certain  facts  as  above  referred  to.     In  truth, 
if  the  one  amounts  to  a  Theology,  the  other  (all  its 
parts  being  complete)  cannot  be  considered  less  than 
a  Transcendental  Philosophy.     And  of  such  philo- 
sophy we  cannot  miss  now  the  definition ;  though, 
surely,  what  we  offer  in  that  respect  above  contrasts 
perceptibly   with   current  notions.      The   man  who 


COMMENTARY. 


467 


only  wants  to  explain  why  we  believe  that  every 
change  must  have  a  cause,  has  been  converted  into  a 
vulgar  Professor  of  the  Black  Art,  with  a  rod  in  his 
hand  and  a  cloak  on,   skulls  on  the   table,  stuffed 
crocodiles  hanging,  and  what  not !     It  is  quite  true, 
nevertheless,  that,  in  Kant's  sense,  the  very  object  of 
a  transcendental  philosophy  is  "  determination  of  the 
extent  and  limits  of  pure  understanding ;  "  for  it  is 
precisely  by  determining  the  constituent  functions  of, 
or  moments  in,  pure  understanding,  that  Kant  thinks 
he  reaches  the  source  of  that  peculiar  necessity  in 
interests     apparently    absolutely    empirical,    which 
Hume  instanced  in  the  proposition  of  causality — a 
proposition   which   Kant   himself  conceived  himself 
thoroughly  to  complete  and  cap  when  he  added  to  it 
his  own  propositions  of  quantity,  quality,  reciprocity, 
etc.     It  is  true,  a  transcendental  philosophy,  even  on 
Kant's  scheme,  may  be  described  as  a  *'  determination 
of  the  extent  and  limits  of  pure  sense,''  not  less  than 
of  ''  pure  understanding,"  with  the  result  of  time  and 
space  being  exhibited  as  a  priori  mirages,  calentures. 
Nay,  Kant  actually  extends  the  transcendental  philo- 
sophy beyond  both  the  perceptions  of  sense  and  the 
notions  of  the  understanding  to  the  ideas  of  reason ;  but 
still  that  is  a  very  simple  matter,  and  very  unlike 
the  Black  Art  dreamed.     It  is  even  possible  to  view 
it,  and  not  quite  incorrectly  to  view  it,  as  something 
childish.     That  is,  it  is  possibly  childish  in  Kant  to 
take,  out  of  our  ordinary  logical  school-primers,  cer- 
tain mere  terms  applied  to  two   or  three  different 
propositions,   and  so  practise  on  them,  with  a  turn 
this  way,  and  a  twist  that,  as  to  convert  them  into 
his  own  categorical  tables.     That,  it  may  be,  is  not 
altogether  unlike  the  seriousness  of  a  child   at  its 
house  of  cards.     But  it  is  not  that  which  concerns  us 


468 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  i 


at  present.      What  we  have  to  understand  at  this 
moment  is,  that  completely  to  tabulate  a  priori  syn- 
thetics would  be,  in  Kant's  sense,  completely  to  map 
out  the  functions  of  pure  understanding ;  or,  what  is 
the  same  thing,  completely  to  map  out  the  functions 
of  pure  understanding  would  be  completely  to  tabu- 
late a  priori  synthetics.     What   follows  next   about 
analytic  propositions  and   as  opposed   to   synthetic 
propositions,  we  shall  assume  to  be  sufficiently  on  the 
surface.     The  peculiarity  of  synthetic  judgments,  and 
the  need  in  these  of  a  tertium  quid,  have  been  already 
touched  on.     That,  for  this  tertium  quid,  Kant  should 
at  once  turn  to  inner  sense,  is  natural  enough ;  for  it 
is  in  inner  sense  that  all  meets.    And,  once  there,  it  is 
equally  natural  that  imagination  should  be  referred  to 
for  synthesis,   as   apperception  for  unity.      Of  this 
latter,  of  course,  the  categories  are  simply  the  various 
functions.    Kant  calls  all  of  these  "  Quellen  zu  Vorstel- 
lungen a  priori''  (a  plural  translated  "sources  oi  a  priori 
cognition  "  in  the  singular,  as  justified  by  the  "  zu  "  and 
generally)  ;  and  he  means  that  they  are  conjointly  so. 
"  If  there  is  at  all  to  be  a  cognition  of  objects  which 
shall  solely  depend  upon  a  synthesis  of  mental  ele- 
ments," it  is  evident  that  it  is  from  these  it  must  issue. 
The  next  paragraph   concerns   one  of  the   most 
important  and  peculiar  of  Kant's  principles.     This  is 
to  the  eflfect  that,  let  a  cognition  be  intellectually  what 
it  may,  it  is  no  cognition  proper,  it  is  not  properly 
knowledge,  unless  and  until  it  have  an  actual  per- 
ceptive  application,   an   actual  filling   of  sense,   an 
actual  filling  through  matter  of  sense.     Kant's  ruling 
here  is  so  strong,  indeed,  that  we  are  to  understand 
even  a  j^ori  sense-matter  (that  of  time  and  space) 
insufficient  till   special   sense-matter  (colours,  feels, 
sounds,   etc.)   has   come  forward  to  add   itself  on. 


COMMENTARY. 


469 


i 


I 


Strange  as  it  may  appear,  this  is  Kant's  sole  reason 
why  we  do  not  know  God,  why  we  do  not  know  the 
soul.     We  cannot  see  God,  or  hear  God,  etc.     We  can- 
not smell  the  soul,  or  taste  it,  etc.     This  makes  Kant's 
duality — the  duality  by  which  he  would  resolve  all 
metaphysical  difficulties,  as  of  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
etc.     Our  principles  of  intellect  applied  to  things  of 
sense  is  one  thing,  but  applied  to  things  in  themselves 
quite  another  thing.     Things  in  themselves  are  not 
given  us  here.     Still  there  is  a  presumption  towards 
them  practically,  as  in  Will,  Immortality,  and  God. 
But  of  all  this  there  is  no  question  here.     We  have 
only  to  see  as  yet  that,  for  us,  there  can  be  no  know- 
ledge proper  unless  with  a  filling  of  sense.     Ideas  are 
void  unless  with  a  complement  of  sense.     This  com- 
plement, now,  may  be  either  actual  or  possible.     The 
former  refers  to  special,  and  the  latter  to  general, 
sense.     As  said,  however,  even  the  latter  is  meaning- 
less and,  so  far,  void,  unless  there  be  further  given 
to  it  a  reference  to  the  former.     General  sense  may, 
so  far,  give  filling  to  the  forms  of  intellect ;  but  even 
that  is  insufficient  unless  special  sense  follow.     This 
is  what  I  mean  by  the  empirical  reference;  and  the 
empirical  reference  must  be  precisely  distinguished 
from  what  I  call  again  the  empirical  instruction.     Even 
space  and  time,  though  actually  a  priori  in  us,  and  so 
far,  it  may  be  said,  ours,  are  not  ours,  are  not  realized, 
until  we  give  them  the  empirical  reference,  and  for  this 
reference  we  can  always  appeal  to  reproductive  ima- 
gination— in  idea,  that  is,  or  in  general  act.    And,  this 
being,  it  is  easy  to  understand  that  time  and  space  are  a 
mere  schema  for  realization  through  reproductive  ima- 
gination and  its  objects  (imagination,  a  priori  as  pro- 
ductive, and  a  posteriori  as  reproductive,  being  always 
the  receptacle  and  vehicle  of  presentation  to  intellect). 


470 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


471 


We  can  see,  then,  that  the  empirical  reference  is 
always  free  to  postulate  the  general  idea  of  an  object 
for  the  synthesis  of  the  categories  in  the  element  of 
time  and  space.  It  is  this  a  priori  objective  synthesis 
in  time  and  space  that  converts  the  mere  rhapsody  of 
our  contingent  subjective  affections  (colours,  sounds, 
smells,  etc.)  into — the  context  of  experience.  Colours, 
etc.,  are  but  feelings  of  our  own,  and  quite  contin- 
gent, lawless;  how,  possibly,  could  they,  merely 
contingent  and  fortuitous  feelings  within  us,  as  they 
are,  become  this  ivorld^  were  there  not,  also  within 
us,  as  preparation  for  them,  the  necessity  and  law  of 
the — transcendental  provision  ?  This  will  render  the 
whole  paragraph  intelligible,  and  suggest  how  it  is 
that  an  empirical  reference  is,  even  with  whatever 
transcendental  provision^  still  necessary  to  realize  this 
latter.  Given  space  a  priori^  one  might  think  that 
geometrical  configuration  would  possess  then  all  that 
is  necessary  to  realize  it ;  but  no — even  then  it  would 
be  **  chimerical "  merely  unless  complemented  by  the 
empirical  reference. 

There  can  be  no  difficulty,  then,  in  understanding 
what  Kant  assigns  as  the  ''  ultimate  principle  of  all 
synthetic  judgments." 

W  hen  it  is  said,  therefore,  the  conditions  of  the 
possibility  of  "experience  in  general"  are  the  con- 
ditions as  well  of  the  possibility  of  the  "objects  of 
experience,"  the  apparent  tautology,  which  is  apt  to 
stumble  us,  must  be  understood  as  only  seeking  to  add 
to  the  transcendental  provision — the  empirical  reference, 
Tliis,  in  fact,  the  reader  will  find  Kant  actually  to  say, 

I  wish  here  particularly  to  note  that  I  do  not  think 
there  is  more  than  the  empirical  reference  alluded  to 
in  this  section :  there  is  no  advance  in  it  to  the  em- 
pirical instruction. 


I 


Section  3.  Systematic  Idea  of  the  Primary  Synthetics. 


Looking  back  a  moment,  before  proceeding  to  this 
our  final  division,  we  may  note  a  point  or  two.     It 
is  important  to  observe,  for  instance,  that  Kant  makes 
transcendental  to  differ  from  general  logical  judgment 
in  this,  that  the  former,  unlike  the  latter,  has  a  priori 
conditions  to  cases^  quite  as  well  as  a  priori  conditions 
to  rules,  for  its  business  proper  of  subsumption.     By 
Kant's  word  "doctrine"  in  this  reference,   too,   we 
are  to  understand  that  judgment  is  actually  to  be 
instructed  in  that  its  business ;  and  the  reason  is  pre- 
cisely said  peculiarity  of  transcendental  logic  in  re- 
ference to  cases.     Transcendental  judgment,  that  is, 
will  now  be  taught  by  Kant  how,  by  subsumption  of 
the  conditions  to  cases  (supplied  by  the  ^Esthetic) 
under  the  conditions  to  rules  (supplied  hj  t\iQ  Analytic 
of  Notions),    to   produce   those  primary  propjositions 
which  appear  in  order  as  Axioms,  Anticipations,  Ana- 
logies, and  Postidates,     And  what  underlies  this  are 
the  usual  transitions  in  ordinary  logic.     After  terms 
come  jiropositions,  as  after  these  syllogisms.     Sense,  as 
general  source  of  terms,  having  been  introductorily 
discussed,  terms  themselves,   or  notions,   were   pro- 
ceeded to,   and  now  we  have  reached  propositions. 
In  other  words,  having  left  Simple  Apprehension,  we 
are  now  in  Judgment,  while  it  is  further  intimated 
that  Reason  awaits  us.     And  these  three  faculties,  we 
are  expected  to  see,  constitute  together  what,  as  a 
whole,  is  commonly  called  the  Understanding. 

The  competency  of  general  logic  to  supply  an 
a  priori  canon  of  guiding  rules  derived  from  the  mere 
formal  process  of  abstract  intellect,  will  not  be  denied ; 
at  the  same  time  that  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  under- 
stand that  the  Dialectic  of  general  logic  is  produced 


472 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


by  the  attempt  to  use  said  canon,  not  formally  merely 
as  standard  and  test,  but  even  materially  as  organoii 
of  new  truth.  This,  again,  is  the  capital  point  with 
Kant  that  intellectual  principles  are,  as  such,  only 
formal,  and  that,  for  any  productive  application,  they 
are  rigorously  limited  to  the  field  of  experience, 
firstly,  as  possible,  but  secondly,  also,  as  actual. 
Hence  we  can  understand  how,  by  an  intelligible 
parallel,  the  transcendental  dialectic  is  due  to  the 
attempts  productively  to  use  the  transcendental  j^ro- 
vision  in  its  own  a  priori  seclusion,  and  without  the 
realization  of  the  a  posteriori  of  sense. 

I  do  not  suppose  that  the  schematism  has  presented 
much  difficulty.  So  far  as  there  is  a  priori  in  the 
mind  even  a  sense-matter  (the  details  of  time  and  space), 
there  are  conceivably  already  present  to  it,  also,  ob- 
jects. The  categories,  then,  as  functioning  synthetic 
unity,  have  already  breadths  on  which  to  act.  That 
is,  a  certain  reduction  of  sensible  details  into  the 
articulation  (synthesis,  unity)  of  intellect  may,  even 
before  experience,  be  allowably  pictured.  Presentation 
of  the  one  element  to  the  other  element,  of  a  priori 
sense  to  a  priori  intellect,  or  of  the  forms  of  the  one 
to  the  forms  of  the  other,  seems,  in  the  circumstances, 
an  operation  necessary.  This  necessary  operation  is 
committed  to  imagination.  Imagination,  indeed,  is, 
as  in  reference  to  intellect  and  sense,  the  natural  go- 
between  ;  for,  as  capable  of  exhibiting  an  object,  it 
holds  of  sense  (receptivity,  affection),  while,  as  capable 
of  producing  an  object,  it  holds  of  intellect  (spon- 
taneity, function).  The  categories,  then,  are,  through 
imagination,  brought  to  bear  on  the  a  priori  of  sense 
(the  details  of  time  and  space)  ;  or  these  latter, 
through  imagination,  take  on  the  influence  of  the 
former;  and  the  schemata  result    The  schematism. 


COMMENTARY. 


473 


in  short,  is  precisely  the  same  thing  as  what  is  called 
elsewhere  the  synthesis  speciosa.     But  a  schema  cannot 
be  a  single  individual  image;  it  is  only  a  o-eneral 
receipt  towards  the  imaginative  production  of  a  whole 
class  of  images.     With  all  this,  however,  the  great 
point  to  remark  here  is  the  positive  way  in  which  the 
schemata  are  just  set  doivn,     "  The  schema  of  caus- 
ality is  the  reale,  which  being,  something  else  always 
ensues."     "  The  schema  of  reciprocal  causality  is  the 
simultaneous  action  of  this  on  that,  and  of  that  on 
this."     We  just  read  as  much  as  that;  introduction, 
explanation,  rationale,  there  is  none  vouchsafed  us: 
Kant  simply  takes  it  for  granted  that  his  readers  will 
take  it  for  granted  that  these  are  self  evident  results 
of  the  coincidence  of  a  priori  form  (the  categories) 
with  a  priori  matter  (time  and  space).      The  ques- 
tion is  never  for  a  moment  whispered, — After  all  are 
they  coincident?     Let  us  see.     Evidently,  however, 
if  time  is  to  co-operate  with  the  categories  of  causality 
and  reciprocity  towards  such  results  as  the  schemata 
named  (and  just  as  so  named  they  are  directly  affirmed 
of  time) — if  time,  I  say,  is  to  co-operate  towards  such 
results  with  the  categories  of  causality  and  recipro- 
city, its  succession  must  be  capable  of  exhibitino-  in 
the  one  case,  the  type  of  influence  prospective,  and 
again,  in  the  other,  that  of  influence  \iO\h  prospective 
and  retrospective  at  once.     Now  time  as  time  is  only  a 
transit  of  uniform  but  indifferent  units.     There  is  no 
type  in  it  of  influence  at  all,  whether  all  forwards,  or 
all  backwards,  or  both  at  once.     Such  schemata  can 
result,  then,  only  from  a  glance  at  actual  fact,  or  they 
can  result  only  from  empirical  instruction. 

Then  the  reason  for  all  this !  Things  are  only  con- 
tingent ;  and  yet  in  certain  cases  they  exhibit  neces- 
sity.    That  necessity  cannot  belong  to  them  in  them- 


474 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


selves,  then,  but  must  come  upon  them  from  elsewhere 
(the  epigenesis).  But  things,  now,  are  only  our  own 
sensations;  and  any  necessity  that  falls  upon  them 
must  only  come  from  us.  In  short,  through  analogy^ 
we  let  fall,  on  our  own  affections,  shadows  from  our 
own  functions.  In  these  shadows  things  seeni  neces- 
sary ;  but  if  things  which,  as  contingent,  are  abso- 
lutely insusceptible  of  necessity,  seem  necessary,  the 
necessity  implied  can  only  be  the  unconscious  impu- 
tation of  a  necessity  of  our  own— a  necessity  flung, 
shadow-like,  from  our  own  constituent  tree  of  con- 
sciousness. This  may  help  a  general  understanding. 
To  return  to  the  section  immediately  before  us. 
The  first  sentence  here  seems  tautologically  incon- 
sequent, and  tautologically  unsatisfactory  generally. 
I  have  done  my  best  with  it ;  and  perhaps,  as  put  in 
English,  it  represents  now  Kant's  meaning.  In  itself 
it  is  of  little  consequence,  and  we  may  content  our- 
selves  by  catching  up  its  general  drift  of  sense.  There 
is  in  it  a  "  nach  welchem  "  which  might  have  been 
quite  as  well  a  nach  welchen.  The  "  source  "  and  the 
"propositions"  refer  both  to  the  same  thing.  The 
translation  will  be  taken  to  prefer  nach  welchen ;  but 
it  will  be  seen  that  connexion  with  "  nach  welchem  " 
is  really  not  denied  by  it.  It  is  just  possible 
that  as  in  the  concluding  sentence  of  the  preceding 
section,  here,  too,  "experience  in  general"  is  con- 
trasted with  "  objects  "  of  experience,  and  in  a  similar 
manner,  or  with  regard  to  the  empirical  reference. 
In  the  next  sentence  we  have  what  we  may  call  Kant's 
touch-stone  palpable  and  bare :  That  wherever  we  have 
necessity,  there  also  we  have  the  a  priori.  Of  course, 
that  being  so,  any  necessity  in  the  laws  of  nature  can 
be  no  exception :  if  laws  of  nature  are  necessary,  then 
these  laws  are  also  a  priori.     Most  people  who  read 


COMMENTARY. 


475 


this  look  at  once  away  out  to  the  immense  nature 
that  is  before  them,  and,  so  looking,  think  with  some 
wonder  of  that  vast  spectacle  being  after  all  pliable 
and  obedient  to  principles  from  within  each  one's  own 
mind.     Much  of  the  wonder  would  cease,  however, 
if  they  would  only  realize  where  Kant  is  when  he  says 
what  he  says.     He  is  only  within  himself,  that  is,  and 
has  only  his  own    contingent   feelings   before   him. 
But  contingent  feelings  (as  of  colours  and  sounds) 
constituting  the  whole  of  that  immeasurable  material 
bulk  that  seems  to  us  without,  it  is  evident  that  any 
law  apparently  existing  in  the  bulk  itself  must  simply 
be,  so  to  speak,  a  corporealization  and  externalization 
of  mere  connexions  among  the  contingent   inward 
feelings.     Kant's  very  hypothesis  compels  and  confines 
him  to  as  much  as  that.     Nature,  then,  to  Kant,  is, 
materially,  but  a  skein  of  our  own  inward  feelings 
falsely  reflected  into  an  infinite  outside  of  colours, 
sounds,  etc. ;  while  formally,  again,  this  same  nature 
is  but  the  strands  in  the  skein,  and  the  lines  in  the 
skein,  and  the  rolls  in  the  skein,  similarly  reflected, 
as    laws,    and  rules,    and   principles,   into  the  bulk. 
Evidently,  then,  to  Kant  even  any  empirical  law,  as 
that  of  gravitation,  must  stand  under  the  categories 
of  the  understanding,   which   are  the  primary  and 
fundamental  principles  of  connexion  in  our  own  sub- 
jective  contingent   feelings   of  colour,    sound,    etc.; 
and,  so  standing,  any  necessity  they  may  possess  must 
manifestly  be  a  necessity  from  the  internal  principles 
under  which  they  stand.     Such  considerations  as  are 
implied  here  are  calculated  to  extend  the  necessary 
correction  of  the  false  position  from  which  ive  are  apt 
to  hearken  to  Kant  when  he  has  such  words  as  nature 
and  laws  of  nature  in  his  mouth,     /may  wonder  that 
the  necessity  by  which  the  tides  rise  should  be  imputed 


476 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  T 


to  me ;  but  Kant,  seated  once  for  all  within  his  own 
mind,  and  his  own  feelings,  and  his  own  intromissions 
with  these,  cannot  so  w^onder :  he  must  hold  the  tides, 
and  the  sun,  and  the  moon,  and  the  starry  host  (in  a 
certain  way)  to  obey  him.  To  Kant,  indeed,  not  only 
his  own  self,  but  every  separate  individual,  let  him 
be  Thersites,  or  a  Pandarus  of  Troy,  or  the  pitifulest 
"  petty-larceny  rascal,"  must  be  a  sort  of  Joshua  the 
son  of  Nun,  who  made  the  sun  and  moon  stand  still, 
only  an  infinitely  mightier.  From  all  this,  it  is  quite 
evident  that  to  Kant  any  law  in  the  empirical  things, 
or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  in  the  empirical  feelings, 
must  be  only  a  case  under  a  higher  rule  within  us. 

What  follows,  whether  in  the  same   or  the  mathe- 
matical reference,  is  easy.     The  distinction  between 
mathematical  and  dynamical  categories  is  also  on  the 
surface  and  clear.     One  hesitates,  however,  about  the 
alleged  diflference  in  their  evidence.    If  categories  are 
necessary,  for  example,  and  if  it  is  precisely  necessity 
that  is  their  express  mission  and  use,  Avhat  are  we  to 
understand  by  the  contingency  which  is  still  ascribed 
to  the  dynamical  categories  ?    While  the  mathematical 
categories  are  "  out  and  out  necessary,"  the  dynamical 
are  "in  themselves  only  contingent."     I  know  not 
that  any  expounder  of  Kant  has  ever  stopped  at  this : 
all  of  them,  so  far  as  I  know,  have  merely  passed  on, 
contented  with  the  general  position,  that  the  function 
of  the  categories,  and  of  all  the  categories,  is  only  to 
give  necessity.     Some   expounders,   very  strangely, 
indeed,  have  simply  inverted  Kant  here,  and  have, 
even  infinitely,  subordinated  the  action  of  the  mathe- 
matical to  that  of  the  dynamical  categories.    And  the 
reason  for  this  was  that  the  latter  concerned  existence^ 
while  the  former  concerned  not  existence,  but  only 
iraa^^ination  I      There  never  was  a  greater  mistake. 


COMMENTARY. 


477 


There  is   certainly   a  verbal  reference   to  existence 
assigned  to  the  dynamical  categories,  and  no  such 
verbal  reference  assigned  to  the  others.     But  these 
latter  have  factually,  for  all  that,  a  much  more  direct 
and  intimate  reference  to  existence  than  those  former. 
Why,  the  mathematical  categories  are    "intuitive," 
"constitutive,"  "apodictic,"  while  the  dynamical  ones 
are  only  "discursive,"    "regulative,"  and,  in  some 
way  or  other,  "  contingent."     Kant  directly  tells  us, 
(II.,  154)  that  the  mathematical  categories  are  "con- 
stitutive," because  they  expressly  enter  into  the  actual 
"  construction  "  of  objects  themselves.     Surely  that  is 
existential  enough.    This,  again,  in  the  other  reference 
is  followed  up  thus : — "  Quite  otherwise  must  it  be 
situated  with  those  ground-propositions  which  have 
to  bring  under  a  priori  rules  the  existence  of  objects. 
For  that  (existence)  being  incapable  of  a  priori  con- 
struction, these  propositions  will  only  refer  to  relation 
of  existence,  and  avail  to  contribute,  consequently,  only 
regulative  principles.     In  this   case,  therefore,  there 
will  be  no  question  of  either  axioms  or  anticipations. 
But,  one  perception  of  sense,  in  a  certain  relation  of 
time  to  an  other  (for  its  part  not  necessarily  deter- 
mined), being  given  us,  they  (these  propositions)  will 
authorize  us  a  priori  to  say  how,  in  said  modus  of  time, 
the  latter  object  or  perception  is  necessarily  connected 
with  the  former  object  or  perception  from  the  point 
of  view  of  their  existence  mutually,  but  not  what^ 
from  the  point  of  view  of  extension  and  intension 
(quantity  and  quality),  said  latter  perception  actually 
is."     Evidently,  we  are  expected  to  understand  from 
this    that,    while    mathematical   categories  actually 
"  construct "  objects  (out  of  the  given  sense-manifold, 
of  course),  dynamical  categories  have  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  the  objects  themselves,  but  only  with 


478 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


479 


the  rule  of  their  connexion,  the  one  with  the  other, 
relatively  in  time.  We  are  expressly  told  that  existence 
is  incapable  of  a  priori  construction,  and  construction 
in  that  position  is  equivalent  to  production.     Even 
in  the  case  of  the  mathematical  categories,  then,  it  is 
not  existence  itself  that  is  to  be  attributed  to  them, 
but  only  the  construction  of  objects  out  of  the  ele- 
ments of  existence,   once  these  elements  have  been 
given  us  by  sense.     For  that  is  always  to  be  taken 
with  us,  That  all  material  elements  are  furnished  by 
sense  alone ;  so  that  even  when  I  talk  of  Kant  believ- 
ing the  tides,  and  the  sun  and  moon,  and  the  stars  of 
heaven,  to  obey  him,  I  mean  no  more  than  that.    They 
obey  him — once  they  are  received ;  but  they  themselves 
as  objects  (whatever  modification  even  as  objects  they 
take  on  from  him)  have  to  be  waited  for,  and  can 
only  be  received  through  sense.     What  they  are  con- 
ceived to  obey  are  assumed  a  priori  laws  of  necessity 
within.     Surely  a  transcendent   dotation  of  native 
nisrht  has  been   vouchsafed  to   those  views  which, 
missing  the  very  manifest  general  drift  of  Kant,  are 
not  kept  right  even  by  a  literal  reference  to  "the 
relation  of  existence ! "     Kant's  time  and  space  are  to 
be  marvellously  peculiar  entities;  and  no  less  mar- 
vellously peculiar  powers  his  categories.     They  shall 
constitute  together  a  transcendental  philosophy,  and 
we  shall  understand  by  it  at  last  how  the  actual  facts 
of  experience  get  located  into  their  own  definite  points 
of  space,  and  dated  into  their  own  definite  moments  of 
time !     And  transcendental^  alas,  means  only  why  we 
take  it  for  granted  that  everybody's  head  will  neces- 
sarily indent  everybody's  pillow  I     Kant  has  nothing 
to   expound    to   us  but,   in   explanation   of  David 
Hume's  query  about  necessary  connexion  all  undoubt- 
ingly  attributed  by  ourselves  to  matters  quite  em- 


pirical, his  own  hypothesis  of  an  intellectual  epi- 
genesis  that  consists  of  time,  space,  and  the  categories. 
I  am  told,  in  this  reference,  of  certain  devotees  of 
Kant,  who  "  feel  attracted  to  the  grossartigen  Formen 
of  this  latter's  system"  rather  through  professional 
exigency  "  than  any  clear  consciousness,"  that  they 
refuse  to  believe  any  so  prosaic  statement  in  his 
regard ;  and  I  am  reminded  hereby  of  the  medical 
student  who,  having  opined,  when  under  examina- 
tion for  his  degree,  that  the  number  of  the  teeth  was 
eight-and. twenty,  and  being  reproachfully  asked, 
then,  did  he  not  know  that  it  was  thirty-two,  ex- 
altedly  responded,  with  a  shake  of  his  head,  "that  he 
begged  to  doubt  it." 

The  dynamical  categories  concern,  then,  only  ''re- 
lation of  existence."  They  have  no  power  whatever 
as  regards  production  of  existence,  and  they  have  no 
power  whatever  as  regards  defi7iite  location  in  either 
time  or  space.  Both  the  one  and  the  other,  pro- 
duction of  existence  and — consequently  eYQn— definite 
location  in  time  and  space,  are  exclusively  due  to  the 
products  of  special  sense.  The  mathematical  cate- 
gories do,  indeed,  act  formingly  on  these  products,  once 
they  are  given,  and  once  they  are  located,  but  they 
have  no  influence  whatever  either  in  giving  or  locating 
them.  The  dynamical  categories,  again,  do  not  even 
act  formingly^  they  only  raise  the  actual  connexions 
of  the  products  of  special  sense  into  a  new  force- 
through  analogy.  The  things,  on  the  connexions  of 
which  they  act,  are,  of  course,  in  time ;  but  these 
things  do  not  take  their  place  in  time  from  the  cate- 
gories. It  is  special  sense  alone  that  even  prescribes 
the  relative  places  of  things  in  time.  The  categories 
only  insinuate  the  reason  and  necessity  of  a  rule  into 
the  mere  relation  of  position,  once  it  is  given  and  as 


4 


480 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


it  is  given.  The  sun  rising,  an  exposed  stone  warms. 
Sun  and  stone  are  both  due  to  special  sense,  so  far  as 
their  elements  of  sensation  are  concerned ;  the  cate- 
gories of  quantity  and  quality  (the  mathematical  cate- 
gories) then  act  formatively  on  both  sun  and  stone, 
but  only  in  the  direction  of  their  extension  and  inten- 
sion ;  and  lastly,  the  category  of  causality  raises  the 
mere  subjectively  logical  proposition,  when  the  sun 
rises,  a  stone  warms,  into  the  objectively  logical  pro- 
position, the  sun  warms  the  stone.  But,  after  all,  the 
only  ground  that  said  category  has  for  this  elevating 
action  is  the  mere  analogy  of  the  intellectual  function 
called  antecedent  and  consequent. 

I  think  now,  then,  we  are  prepared  to  understand 
how  it  is  that  the  dynamical  categories  are  inferior  to 
the  mathematical  ones,  and  in  what  sense  it  is  that 
the  former  are  said  to  be  in  some  way  contingent. 

Suppose  it  is  through  the  mathematical  categories 
that  we  are  able  to  perceive  both  sun  and  stone, 
whether  in  quantity  or  quality,  then,  evidently,  the 
action  of  these  categories  brings  with  it  the  character 
and  evidence  of  immediate  and  direct  perception.  It 
is  intuitive,  not  discursive;  constitutive,  not  regu- 
lative; apodictic,  not  contingent;  out  and  out,  and 
not  only  conditionally,  necessary.  But  conceive  now 
we  connect,  hypothetically,  but  logically,  within  our 
own  selves  the  heating  of  the  one  object  (the  stone) 
with  the  rising  of  the  other  object  (the  sun)  ;  conceive, 
further,  that  then  only  the  category  of  causality  epi- 
genetically  bestows  its  own  power  of  apodictic  neces- 
sity on  the  empirical  connexion  actually  in  force; 
and  I  fancy  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  understand  how 
it  is  that  the  dynamical  principles  "  bring  with  them 
the  character,  indeed,  of  an  a  priori  necessity,  but  only 
under  the  condition  of  the  empirical  thinking  that 


COMMENTARY. 


481 


shall  be  found   in   an   experience."    That  the  sun 
warms  the  stone  is  a  proposition  which  we  all  assume 
to  be  apodictically  necessary;    and  the  proposition 
itself,  further,  being  synthetic,  the  necessity  contained 
in  it  must  be  allowed  to  be  a  priori.     Nevertheless, 
analysis  proves  that  it  is  only  under  a  "  condition  " 
that  we  attach  this  necessity.     We  have  first  of  all 
empirically    thought    a    connexion   between   the  two 
objects — between  the  two  objects  as  in  experience. 
Not   only,    then,    the    objects  themselves   (as   mere 
objects  of  experience)  are  contingent,  but  even  the 
connexion  between  them,  as  in  the  first  instance  only 
empirically  thought^  must  be  allowed  also  to  be,  so  far, 
contingent.     It  is  only  the  analogy  of  the  connexion 
in  the  empirical  facts  with  that  between  antecedent 
and  consequent  that  raises  the  former  into  the  force 
of  the  latter.    Plainly,  then,  the  dynamical  categories 
do  not  "  possess  the  same  immediate  evidence  which 
is  proper  and  peculiar  to  the  others ; "  they  exhibit 
the  character  of  necessity  "only  mediately  and  in- 
directly," "  only  conditionally  on  an  empirical  thxnk- 
ing  in  an  experience;"  they  are  not  "apodictic  or 
unconditionally  necessary,"  but,  "in  themselves  only 
contingent."     Or,  to  take  the  extract  from  154,  these 
categories  "only  refer  to  relation  of  existence  and 
only  contribute  regulative  principles,  for  existence 
itself  is  quite  beyond  the  power  of  the  a  priori;'^ 
"  there  is  no  question  of  either  axiom  or  anticip>ation 
in  their  case,  but  sense-perceptions  being  given  us  in 
certain  time-relations,  said  categories  authorize  us  to 
assert  necessity  of  said  relations."     All  these  matters 
seem  so  very  plain  that  it  is  scarcely  credible  that  any 
one  should  miss  them.    Nevertheless,  when  I  tell  cer- 
tain students  there  are  thirty-two  teeth,  I  quite  expect 
to  hear  from  them  in  return,  "  We  beg  to  doubt  it !" 

2h 


482 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


The  note  here  is  very  Kantian  in  its  quality :  all 
conjunction  is  either  composition  or  connexion ;  the 
latter  necessary,  the  former  non-necessary ;  the  former 
mathematical  as  of  like  to  like  (and  so  either  exten- 
sive aggregation,  or  intensive  coalition),  the  latter 
dynamical  as  of  unlike  to  unlike,  either  as  referred  the 
one  to  the  other,  or  all  to  the  mind  (physical  and 
metaphysical).  It  is  easily  made  intelligible  by 
taking  the  four  categorical  classes  respectively  in 
their  order. 


1.  Axioms  of  Pure  Perception. 

I  may  remark  finally  here  on  the  word  Anschauung. 
It  really  is  nothing  but  perception — consciousness 
with  an  object  before  it,  said  object  having  elements 
of  sense  in  it,  general,  or  special,  or  both.  It  is  so 
easy  to  make  this  good  by  thousands  of  examples, 
whether  from  Kant  or  the  rest  (Fichte,  Schelling, 
Hegel),  that  I  must  be  allowed  to  express  my  surprise 
at  the  myriad  stumblings  over  a  very  intelligible 
term,  not  only  on  the  part  of  foreigners,  but  even  on 
the  part  of  original  Germans.  An  Anschauung  is  a 
perception,  consciousness  of  an  object  of  sense ;  and 
the  faculty  of  Anschauung  is  the  faculty  to  perceive — 
almost  the  faculty  to  object^  if  the  accent  be  put  upon 
the  cb  to  distinguish  the  word  from  the  ordinary 
verb  to  object.  Wahrnehmung  only  differs  from  An- 
schauung in  this  respect,  that  it  accentuates  the  fact 
of  the  presence  in  any  consciousness  so  named  of 
elements  of  special  sense.  Kant,  of  course,  believing 
in  an  a  priori  sense-material  (time  and  space),  can 
conceive  himself  to  perceive  without  elements  of  special 
sense.  In  that  case,  he  schaut  an^  while  in  the  other 
he  nimmt  wahr.     This  is  the  state  of  the  case  always — 


COMMENTARY. 


483 


when  the  words  are  used  strictly;  but  we  are  not 
to  suppose  that  that  is  at  all  times  de  rigeur,  to  use 
an  involuntary  tautology :  Kant  himself  can  talk  of 
an  "  empirical  Anschauung,''^  and  an  empirical  Anschau- 
ung is  exactly  a  Wahrnehmung;  he,  as  pointed  out 
elsewhere,  even  says,  at  least  once,  "empirische 
Wahrnehmung." 

That  all  objects  are  extensive  magnitudes  Kant 
conceives  to  depend  on  the  fact  (of  course  wiih  the 
category)  that  all  objects  of  sense  must  present  them- 
selves in  space,  which  being  extensive,  they,  too,  are 
necessarily  extensive.  By  the  phrases  '^a  deter- 
minate time  "  and  "  a  determinate  space,"  he  means 
(generally)  only  a  time  and  a  space  determined  into 
a  definite  time  and  a  definite  space  by  being  filled 
("  determined")  by  actual  possession  of  some  object. 
The  connexion  of  geometry  with  space  needs  no 
comment.  Here  Kant  is  found  again  to  insist  on 
the  subjective  nature  of  the  things  of  sense,  which 
things,  were  they  objects  in  themselves,  would,  for 
knowledge  of  them,  require  to  be  waited  for,  so  that 
any  a  j^riori  in  their  regard  would  be  manifestly 
impossible.  The  reader  will  please  to  remark  how 
much  or  how  little  information  even  Kant  himself 
asserts  for  his  express  category  of  quantity — informa- 
tion for  the  whole  of  which,  surely,  he  (having  an 
intellect)  need  only  apply  to  his  own  space  and  time. 
Of  course,  Kant  will  have  it  that  he  can  get  synthesis 
into  space  and  time  only  through  a  category :  things 
are  aggregations  of  units  in  consequence  of  the  nature 
of  space,  but  they  are  also  unities  of  aggregation 
because  of  the  category  quantity.  Note,  too,  that 
were  objects  things  in  themselves  (and  consequently 
perceptively  to  be  waited  for)  the  geometrical  a  priori 
in  them  (for  synthetic  necessity  must,  with  Kant,  be 


484 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


a  prion)  would  be  plainly  unintelligible.  Is  this  quite 
certain?  Might  not  space  and  time  be  things  in 
themselves,  and  yet  have  necessary  relations,  though 
it  were  only  a  posteriori  that  we  could  come  to  know 
either  the  one  or  the  other  ? 


2.  Anticipations  of  Senge. 

We  have  emphatic  declaration,  on  the  part  of  Kant 
here,  of  the  impossibility  of  anticipating  any  empirical 
fact,  or  anything  empirical  in  regard  to  it,  either  as 
concerns  time  or  space,  or  anything  whatever.    Never- 
theless he  still  claims  for  his  transcendental  machinery 
a  power  of  actual  anticipation  in  regard  of  something 
that  holds  of  sense.     This  is  degree.     But,  surely*^ 
there  is  very  little  show  here  to  boast  of.     That  I 
can  feel^  is  at  once  degree,  is  at  once  intensive  quantum  ; 
and  it  is  really  a  very  small  matter  that  I  rate  certain 
objects  according  to  the  degree  of  feeling  they  pro- 
duce.    That  feeling  being  so  situated  with  me,  I  am 
not  warranted  in  asserting  at  any  time,  from  the 
want  of  it,  that  no  matter  is  present — that  too  does 
not  seem  much.     Objects  can  easily  be  supposed  too 
weak  to  act  on  my  senses;  and  there  really  is  no 
surprising  enlightenment  in  the  fact  that  what  seems 
to  me  a  void  of  space  or  a  void  of  time  may  still  be 
filled  by  a  matter  that  is  of  a  weak  intensity.    Neither 
does  there  appear  much  promise  in  the  proposal  to 
substitute  degree  of  intension  for  the  current  hypo- 
thesis of  pores.     If  the  same  amount  of  actual  matter 
can  be  expanded  into  much  space  or  compressed  into 
little,  surely  the  supposition  of  pores  is  a  very  natural 
one— a  supposition,  moreover,  that  is  supported,  and 
very   satisfactorily   and    consistently  supported,   by 
scientific  calculation.    The  remaining  noticeable  point 


COMMENTARY, 


485 


of  fluent  or  continuous  quantities  does  not  seem  to 
involve  anything  of  a  discovery  either,  for  which  we 
have  to  admire  a  transcendental  philosophy.  On 
the  whole,  as  I  say  elsewhere,  there  does  not  seem 
much  need  for  a  special  a  jtrriori  category  to  tell  us 
no  more  than  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  degree. 
In  regard  to  the  phenomena  of  change,  Kant  himself 
says  a  good  deal  here  to  suggest  that,  for  his  schema 
of  causality,  he  must,  in  point  of  fact,  have  had 
recourse  both  to  the  empirical  reference  and  the  em- 
j){rical  instrudion. 

The  section  itself  is  easy,  but  I  may  indicate  its 
general  course  by  a  word  or  two.  Reality  involves 
the  conception  that  we  can  be  sensationally  affected 
in  our  subject,  and  that  this  subjective  state  is  re- 
ferred to  an  object.  Sensation  adds  this  element  to 
pure  perception  (of  time  and  space).  Now  we  can 
assume  as  much  as  this  to  be  a  priori^  and  of  tran- 
scendental function.  That  is,  we  can  assume  the 
function  of  sensation  and  as  much  as  the  bare  function 
implies.  But  what  it  implies  is  a  reality  (something, 
an  object  so  far)  in  time  and  space.  Now,  in  the 
very  action  of  this  function,  there  is  a  gradation — a 
gradation  from  a  certain  somethingness  downwards 
to  nothing,  or  from  nothing  to  a  certain  something- 
ness upwards.  This  is  degree.  It  is  not  duration 
of  time,  but  amount  in  the  filling  of  time.  But  this 
degree  attributed  to  the  objects,  we  have  what  is 
characteristic  of  intensive  quanta.  And  as  much  as 
this  being  capable  of  a  priori  assumption,  we  have 
the  right  to  call  it  an  actual  anticipation  of  sense- 
perception — an  anticipation,  plainly,  not  of  the  matter 
of  sense-perception  (which  is  impossible),  but  of  a 
certain  law  in  the  matter,  let  that  matter  be  specially 
what  it  may.     There  is  always  to  be  assumed  the 


486 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


possibility  in  the  reality  of  this  matter,  of  an  infinite 
series  of  degrees  between  negation  and  aflarmation. 
Whatever  the  amount  of  the  reality,  however,  so  con- 
ceived, its  sensation  is  momentary  or  instantaneous. 
The  unity  implied  here  is  that  of  an  intensive  quan- 
tum. But,  in  explanation,  as  much  as  this  shall 
suffice,  and  we  shall  leave  Kant's  relative  corollaries 
— after  what  has  been  already  said — to  the  reader. 
Surely,  there  is  hardly  the  tip  of  a  feather  to  be 
mounted  in  regard  of  any  one  of  them. 

3.  The  Analogies  of  Experience. 

Tkm  reasoning  here,  taken  very  generally,  seems 
to  run  somewhat  in  this  way.    We  see  that  experience 
consists  of  objects  in  necessary  connexion ;  and  can 
understand  that  experience,  to  be  experience,  must 
be  a  context  of  necessary  connexion.     But  objects  as 
first  received  by  us  are  so  many  indifferent  blurs  of 
units  of  sensation;   for  sensation   only  receives,   it 
cannot  connect.     The  question,  then,  is,  What  is  it 
that  connects  ?     The  units  of  sensation  are  in  time. 
That  is,  they  are  series  in  the  succession  of  time. 
But  that  succession  imparts,  so,  only  a  certain  exten- 
sion ;  it  does  not  unite  or  connect.     All  this,  so  far, 
must  be  so;  for  what  we  know  are  not  things  in 
themselves,  which,  as  such,  of  course,  would  dictate 
to  our  cognition  their  own  qualities,  and  in  that  case, 
evidently,  there  would  be  no  such  element  as  the 
a  priori,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  apodictic  neces- 
sity, in  experience  at  all.     All  our  knowledge  then 
would  have  to  wait  for  the  fact,  be  after  the  fact ;  or 
it  would  be  only  a  posteriori.    The  same  considera- 
tions concern  time :  it  is  no  thing  in  itself  a  posteriori 
to  prescribe  to  the  objects  in  it ;  it  is  but  an  a  j^riori 


COMMENTARY. 


487 


subjective  form  of  our  own,  and  is  only  there  as 
recipient  into  its  extension  of  our  own  subjective 
units  of  sensation.  The  question  recurs,  then,  Where 
can  the  synthesis  of  such  materials,  and  so  placed, 
come  from  ?  The  answer  can  only  be,  From  our  own 
selves,  from  our  own  understandings.  It  is  the 
understanding  only  in  us  that  has  power  of  synthesis ; 
and  its  synthesis  is  absolutely  necessary — absolutely 
necessary  if  I  am  to  call  anything  whatever  mute. 
Nothing  can  be  mine,  nothing  can  be  for  me,  unless 
it  be  synthetically  bound  together  into  the  unity  of 
my  apperception.  But  it  is  the  categories  do  that ; 
the  categories  are  the  various  functions  of  synthesis 
into  the  unity  of  apperception.  Again,  however,  it 
is  not  the  categories  that  act  directly  on  objects. 
What  act  directly  on  objects  are  the  sclmnata^  to 
which,  of  course,  the  categories  are  the  principles. 
Now  the  scJiemata  are  certain  determinations  of  time ; 
and  time,  on  the  question  of  relations,  can  exhibit 
only  three  such.  These  are  duration^  sequence^  and 
simuJtaneousness.  In  quantity  and  quality  we  were 
concerned  with  the  actual  what  of  objects,  with  their 
actual  body,  so  to  speak.  Here,  however,  we  have 
only  to  do  with  the  relations  of  such  bodies  mutually  : 
we  have  not  to  do  with  the  bodies  themselves,  but 
only  with  the  rules  on  which  they  may  depend — 
depend  even  for  existence,  it  may  be  (the  effect 
depends  for  its  very  existence  on  the  cause).  Still 
there  is  nothing  in  these  rules  that  produces  or  con- 
structs any  actual  existence.  Actual  existence,  actual 
place  in  space  or  position  in  time,  can  only  be  given 
— given  by  sense.  This  appears  to  me  pretty  well 
the  gist  of  the  section ;  but  I  shall  now  go  over  it  for 
notice  of  individual  points. 
The  reader  must  be  on  his  guard  with  the  word 


488 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


perception.     I  am  obliged  to  use  it  both  for  formed 
perception  and  for  crude.     Here  at  first  it  is  crude 
perception  that  is  spoken   of      Perceptions  in  that 
case  are  but  the  units  of  the  first  crude  perceptive 
blur  before  sense  the  instant  that  sense  is  affected. 
Formed  perception  results  from  the  introduction  into 
these  units  of  necessary  connexion  in  the  elements  of 
space  and  time.     Experience  is  an  empirical  cogni- 
tion :  it  determines  objects  in  consequence  of  sensa- 
tions.    It  is  a  synthesis,  then,  of  these,  and  not  in 
these:  it  implies  and  effects  the  synthetic  unity  of 
the  sensational  variety  of  particulars  in  a  single  con- 
sciousness ;  and  thxt  constitutes  what  is  essential  in  a 
cognition  of  objects  of  sense,  that  is,  of  experience. 
What  is  empirical  only  is  contingent ;  consequently, 
shmld  anything  empirical  exhibit  necessity,  that  neces- 
sity cannot  be  proper  to  it,  but  must   have  been 
borrowed  by  it,  and  from  some  element  that  could 
be  only  a  lyriori;  for  everything  a  posteriori  is  by 
very  nature  contingent. 

I  need  hardly  point  out  that  neither  duration  nor 
simultaneity  is  a  determination  of  time  as  such.     Time 
fleets  only,  and  no  two  instants  of  time  can  possibly 
be  simultaneous.     Sequence,  of  course,  is  a  modus  of 
time,  and,  so  far  as  that  goes,  its  only  modu^ ;  but 
neither  is  there  in  that  sequence  the  faintest  hint  of 
such  another  sequence  as  the  causal  one.     There  is  not 
only  a  necessity  for  appealing  to  ih^  empirical  reference 
for  the  realization  of  these  modi;  but  they  themselves, 
that  is,  substantiality,  causality,  and  reciprocity,  are 
wholly  due  to  the  empirical  instruction ;  which  instruc- 
tion contains  the  entire  problem,  and  Kant's  whole 
laborious  construction  is  but  a  house  of  straw  beside 
it. 

Kant  makes  it  very  evident,  however,  that  his  prin- 


COMMENTARY. 


489 


ciples  have  no  power  to  dictate  any  actual  constitutive 
empirical  element,  whether  any  empirical  objective  unit, 
or  any  empirical  space,  or  any  empirical  time.     What 
is  concerned  here,  he  tells  us  plainly,  has  nothing  to  do 
with  "  the  synthesis  of  the  empirical  object,'"  but  only 
with  "the  mutual  relation  of  objects  in  regard  of  their 
existence"  (what  in  its  existence  shall  precede,  for 
example,  and  what  in  its  existence  shall  follow),  but 
leaving  existences  themselves,  as  well  as  their  time 
when  and  space  where,  wholly  to  the  empirical  ele- 
ment.    "  Able   to  infer  in  regard   to  some  certain 
existence,  we  are  quite  unable,  nevertheless,  to  cog- 
nise, perceive,  or  anticipate  that  existence."     I  have 
already  quoted  the  paragraph  which  throws  the  un- 
mistakable light  here  into  why  the  categories  of  rela- 
tion are  discursive  and  not  intuitive,  regulative  and 
not  constitutive,  contingent  (so  far)  and  not  neces- 
sary ;  and  I  would  only  again  draw  the  reader's  atten- 
tion to  this.     The  whole  affair  is,  how  an  empirical 
connexion   (which  as  empirical  is  pronounced  con- 
tingent) gets  raised  into  the  force  of  an  apodictically 
necessary  connexion.     "  A  rule  whereby  to  look  for 
it  in  experience,  and  a  mark  whereby  to  recognise  it 
there  when  found."     This,  as  so  often  said,  must 
neither  be  chronologically  nor  geographically  under- 
stood.    No  a  priori  element  whatever  can  anticijMte 
either   actual  space,   or  actual  time,   or  any  actual 
object  in  the  one  or  the  other.     What  rule  is  alluded 
to  is  such  general  rule  of  causality,  that  the  effect 
always  follows  the  cause,  or  the  cause  always  precedes 
the  effect;  "but  in  the  production  of  these  objects 
themselves,  as  empirical  objects,  it  has  no  power  or 
part  whatever."     We   have   a  sentence   here  which 
makes  quite  clear  Kant's  consciousness  of  the  three 
grades  {form,  matter,  connexion)  in  his  categories. 


490 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


A,  First  Analogy. 


What  is  in  Kant's  head  here  is  this.     What  are 
called  tilings^  being  merely  contingent  affections  of  our 
own  subject,  are,  of  themselves,  and  as  such,  incapable 
of  exhibiting,  in  point  offad^  any  such  peculiarity  as 
the  idea  of  substance  involves.     The  inference,  only 
necessarily  consequent,  then,  is.  It  is  our  own  under- 
standing which,  on  summons  of  analogy,  reflects  its 
own  self,  in  its  category  of  substance  and  accident, 
into  our  own  subjective  affections  of  sense ;  and  hence 
only  it  is  that  we  have  the  correspondent  necessary 
objectivity  in  things.     All,  however,  is  so  clear  here 
that,  after  what  has  been  already  said,  I  know  not 
that  I  am  required  specially  to  dilate.     The  reader, 
too,  probably,  stands  now  in  little  need  of  being  helped 
to  a  suspicion — under  all  the  apparent  philosophizing 
— of  the  emjnrical  instruction.     In  fact,  Kant's  phrase 
"  the  possibility  of  experience  "  may  seem  in  the  end 
to  be  stretched  to  cover,  not  only  the  transcendental 
provision^  and,  in  addition,  the  empirical  reference^  but 
also  the  empirical  instruction. 

B,  Second  Analogy. 

The  sun  warms  a  stone,  the  air  recoils  to  pressure, 
frost  solidifies  water,  currents  drift  a  ship,  the  stove 
heats  the  chamber,  the  glass  attracts  the  water,  a 
bullet  indents  a  cushion:  these  are  Kant's  own  in- 
stances of  causality.  Now,  in  all  these  phenomena, 
there  are  an  antecedent  and  a  consequent,  the  con- 
nexion between  which  we  know,  feel,  or  believe  to  be 
necessary.  The  question  is,  therefore,  on  what  does 
this  belief,  feeling,  knowledge,  or  inference,  of  neces- 
sity rest?     Hume,  who  set  the  resultant  inquiry  a- 


COMMENTARY. 


491 


foot,  avowed  that  he  could  conclude  to  no  source  for 
the  connexion  implied  unless  the  workings  of  a  natural 
instinct,  for  which  he  could  offer  no  rationale^  either, 
but  the  known  effects  of  custom.  Custom,  however, 
is  evidently  quite  inadequate  to  the  apodictic  neces- 
sity which  is  concerned.  This  Kant  saw,  and  he  was 
led,  consequently,  to  seek  for  some  other  explanation. 
This  explanation  lies  in  what  he  calls  his  intellectual 
epigenesis.  His  theory,  namely,  is,  that  the  facts,  as 
empirical,  are  themselves  contingent,  but  that,  through 
analogy,  we  impute  to  them  a  certain  intellectual 
necessity  which  is  the  product  of  our  self-conscious- 
ness, the  product  of  our  very  selves.  Manifestly,  how- 
ever, we  have  only  to  look  at  Kant's  own  examples 
to  find  how  impossible  it  is  to  accept  this.  If  the 
sun  warms  the  stone,  we  feel  sure  that  the  necessity 
lies  in  the  things  themselves,  and  not  in  us.  So  it 
is  with  the  current  that  drifts  a  ship,  surely  it  is  of 
itself  that  the  current  necessarily  does  that ;  and  for 
the  indentation  of  the  cushion  under  the  bullet,  how 
on  earth  can  it  be  anything  in  us  which  effects  a 
necessity  of  such  a  palpably  external  origin  as  that  ? 
Or — just  fancy  this — is  it  we  make  the  air  elastic  ? 
What  I  wish  the  reader  to  see  in  this  section  is  that 
Kant  himself  is  constantly  staggered  by  an  involuntary 
reference  to  the  state  of  the  facts  themselves;  but 
that,  as  he  believes  absolutely  in  the  necessary  con- 
tingency of  all  that  is  empirical,  he  finds  nothing  for 
it  but  again,  and  again,  and  yet  again,  and  intermin- 
ablv,  to  assert  that  a  synthetic  necessity  cannot  be  a 
posteriori^  and  must  be  ajmori,  and  so — his  intellectual 
epigenesis  of  categories  of  apperception  and  schemata 
of  time !  Nevertheless,  we  have  always  to  bear  in 
mind  his  own  words  (IL,  156),  "  We  shall  be  author- 
ized, therefore,  by  these  principles,  to  set  the  Erschei- 


492 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


nungen  (the  units  of  sensation)  together  only  as  in 
analogy  with  the  logical  and  universal  unity  of 
the  categories."  That  is,  I  perceive,  the  sun  rising, 
a  stone  to  warm ;  but  so  far  the  relation  between  the 
objects  is  as  contingent  as  the  objects  themselves: 
only  when,  by  analogy^  I  have  apotheosized  the  em- 
pirical multiple  of  rising  sun  and  warming  stone  into 
the  necessity  of  the  categorical  multiple  of  antecedent 
and  consequent  does  the  former  quit  its  contingent 
frailty  and  assume,  instead,  the  apodictic  perpetuity 
of  the  other.  With  such  considerations  in  mind, 
indeed,  it  is  not  likely  that  we  shall  ever  stray  far 
from  the  intention  of  Kant's  words,  however  peculiarly 
they  may  at  times  sound  in  themselves. 

The  section  now  before  us,  5,  is  a  particularly  long 
one ;  and  this  very  length  may  be  taken  as  a  proof, 
perhaps,  of  Kant's  own  sense  of  a  mortal  quandary  all 
through  it.  Had  it  been  quite  plain,  namely,  that 
the  "  idea  of  necessary  connexion  "  in  causality — a 
"  voucher,"  or  the  "  voucher,"  for  which  Hume  (only 
able,  for  his  part,  to  suggest  a  natural  instinct  on 
custom)  simply  asked — was  but  a  reflection,  hy 
analogy,  from  intellect,  to  sense :  had  this  been  quite 
plain,  I  say,  Kant  would  have  found  no  difficulty  in 
saying  it  in  a  page  or  two ;  rather,  he  would  have 
found  it  impossible  to  fill  up,  with  no  more  than  that, 
a  score  of  pages. 

I  fancy  every  reader  will  find  himself  not  without  un- 
welcome doubts  at  the  very  outset  here.  The  proposi- 
tion laid  down  to  be  proved  is,  "  All  changes  follow 
from  the  law  of  the  connexion  of  cause  and  effect ; " 
and  our  first  thought  is.  No  one  ever  doubted  that. 
Kant  himself  has  abeady  said  the  same  thing  a  thou- 
sand times.  No  change  but  has  its  cause.  That,  in- 
deed, is  simply  the  one  hard  fact,  for  which  it  is  pre- 


COMMENTARY. 


493 


cisely  required  of  us  to  advance,  not  the  on^  but  the 
^LOTi.  We  have  no  difficulty  whatever  with  the  state 
of  the  fact — with  the  actual  existence,  that  is,  of  "  an 
idea  of  necessary  connexion,"  on  our  part,  between 
every  effect  and  its  cause.  All  that  we  want  to  know 
is  the  explanation  of  this.  Relations  of  ideas,  as  we 
know,  are  necessary.  Parallel  lines  never  can  meet ; 
the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  never  can  amount  to 
more  or  less  than  two  right  angles.  Matters  offactj 
on  the  other  hand,  are  contingent.  The  sun  shines 
and  wood  burns ;  but  they  might  not.  Now,  it  is  in 
these  latter  that  the  law  of  causality  has  place ;  and 
the  question,  consequently,  is.  How  can  any  idea  of 
necessity  enter  into  matters  of  fact — into  things  which, 
in  every  point  of  view,  are  themselves  contingent  ? 
Billiard  balls,  for  example,  are  but  things  of  the 
senses,  and  any  intromission,  the  one  with  the  other, 
among  them,  cannot  possibly  be  aught  else  than  a 
matter  of  fact.  How  is  it  then,  that,  for  all  that,  when 
the  ball  at  rest  is  struck  by  the  ball  in  motion,  I  have 
the  undoubting  conviction,  the  apodictic  conviction 
(which,  it  is  admitted,  experience  of  itself  could  never 
give),  that  it  is  of  necessity  the  former  moves  ?  Here  is 
an  "idea  of  necessary  connexion"  in  matters  of  fact; 
which,  plainly,  as  contingent,  are,  in  regard  of  any 
such,  absolutely  heterogeneous  and  alien.  The  ques- 
tion, then,  is  of  the  origin  of  this  idea. 

This  is  the  difficulty  we  experience  with  the  very 
first  word  of  Kant  in  regard  of  causality.  We  do  not 
want  the  mere  proposition,  namely,  to  be  simply  set 
down,  and  then  to  be  followed  by  a  formal  "proof" 
of  it — a  formal  proof  of  it,  the  proposition.  Of  that 
we  have  no  need.  We  accept  the  proposition ;  and 
we  ask  only  the  source  of  the  fact  it  affirms.  We 
know  that  Kant,  agreeing  with  Hume  in  regard  to 


494 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KtVNT : 


this  source  being  necessarily  extrinsic  to  such  facts, 
could  not,  at  the  same  time,  content  himself,  like  the 
latter,  with  placing  it  in  a  mere  instinct  or  a  mere 
habit  of  our  own,  but,  in  view  of  the  apodictic  nature 
of  the  validity  involved,  felt  under  an  obligation  to 
seek  for  it  where  only,  as  he  believed,  such  validity 
was  to  be  found — in  a  synthetic  a  jmori  at  once  of 
intellect  and  sense,  namely.  We  know  this,  and  we 
know  what  it  all  comes  to  in  the  end ;  but  still  we 
experience  the  dissatisfaction  named,  with  the  very 
first  appearances  that  are  to  lead  to  this  end. 

Kant  here  (paragraph  1)  precedes  his  "proof," 
parenthetically,  by  what  he  calls  a  "  Vorerinnerung.'' 
As  amounting,  however  (admittedly),  to  no  more  than 
the  proposition  under  substance,  one  hardly  sees  the 
use  of  it  at  first.  But  this  use  lay  possibly  in  the 
notion  of  change,  which  was  now  made  prominent. 
All  sensible  succession  is  only  change ;  and  change, 
strictly,  is  never  either  a  coming  to  be  or  a  ceasing 
to  be.  Change  is  but  the  consecutive  determinations 
of  substance ;  or  substance,  one  self-identical  subject, 
as  existing  in  two  opposed  determinations  the  one 
after  the  other,  yields  the  notion  of  change.  This  is 
the  tenor  of  the  "  premonition ; "  and  the  same  tenor 
reappears  once  or  so  again.  But  still  it  is,  after  all, 
pretty  well  foreign  to  the  matter  in  hand,  and  as 
actually  taken  in  hand  by  Kant  himself.  There  is  no 
truth  whatever  in  the  allegation  that  all  succession  is 
change.  All  succession  does  indeed  imply  change; 
but  succession  as  succession  is  by  no  means  change 
as  change.  Gun  succeeds  gun  in  distress;  soldier, 
soldier  on  the  march ;  but  gun  does  not  cause  gun ; 
nor  soldier,  soldier.  Nay,  the  successive  states  of  sub- 
stance (or  of  any  single  subject)  do  not,  when  regarded 
only  as  successive  states,   really  represent   change. 


COMI^IENTARY. 


495 


'< 


In  order  fairly  to  have  the  conception  of  change  in  a 
succession,  we  must  introduce  a  reference  to  the 
cause  or  causes  on  which  the  succession  itself  depends. 
That  is,  though  a  succession  may  be  called,  and,  in  a 
certain  way,  is,  a  change,  the  notion  of  change  proper 
demands  reference  to  a  cause ;  and  there  is,  formaliter 
and  exjiliciter,  no  such  reference  in  any  succession 
merely  as  such.  Consideration,  then,  of  the  states  of 
substance  themselves  even  as  a  series,  is  not  by  any 
means  necessarily  introductive  of  the  problem  of 
causality ;  and  it  is  the  problem  of  causality  that  is 
now  in  question.  Of  two  consecutive  states,  cer- 
tainly, say  cold  and  heat  in  me,  the  one,  as  first,  may 
be  called  A,  and  the  other,  as  second,  may  be  called 
B ;  but  the  state  A  is  not  the  cause  of  the  state  B. 
The  cold  that  was  first  or  A  was  not  the  cause  of 
the  heat  that  was  second  or  B.  B,  as  only  after  A, 
succeeds  A,  or  forms  a  succession  with  A.  But  it  is 
only  when  the  idea  of  mere  succession  has  been  aban- 
doned, and  reference  to  a  cause  introduced,  that  we 
get  the  idea  of  change.  Or  it  is  only  when  we  regard 
A  B,  not  as  a  succession  of  A  and  B,  but  as  a  change 
of  A  into  B,  that  we  arrive  at  the  idea  of  causality 
and  the  actual  problem  in  hand.  We  have  only, 
indeed,  to  consider  Kant's  own  examples  of  causality 
to  perceive  how  independent  they  are  of  any  reference 
to  substance.  Warmth  in  a  stone  follows  the  light 
of  the  sun.  Here  it  is  not  the  succession  of  states  in 
the  stone  itself,  not  the  A  B  of  cold  and  heat  in  it, 
that  is  considered ;  but  something  altogether  different, 
an  absolutely  other  A  B.  In  fact,  the  A  now  is  not 
in  the  stone  at  all ;  it  is  the  light  of  the  sun  ;  and  the 
B  now  amounts  to  the  whole  of  the  previous  A  B ; 
for  the  previous  A  B  is  now  regarded,  not  as  two  but 
as  one,  a  one  act ;  and  the  whole  question  is  of  a 


496 


TEXT-BOOK  TO  KANT  : 


cause,  a  new  A,  for  it.  Now  this  question  of  a  new 
A  is  precisely  what  is  distinctive,  what  is  constitutive 
of  the  problem  we  have  come  to.  In  fact,  the  ques- 
tion of  that  new  A  is  this  problem.  But  this  new 
A  is  not  at  all  present  in  the  A  B  that  singly  occupies 
the  whole  of  Kant's  own  Vorerinnerung,  Therefore 
it  is  we  say  that  said  Vorerinnerung  is,  in  this  place, 
no  introduction.  The  reader  will  do  well  here  to 
refer  to  the  other  illustrations  (already  given)  of 
causality  in  Kant. 

It  will  be  superfluous  to  call  attention  to  the  con- 
fused and  vexatiously  cross  nature  of  Kant's  expres- 
sion in  this  Vorennneimng ;  that  will  have  been  but 
too  obvious.  I  shall  point  out  only  that  all  that  is 
meant  to  be  said  in  the  first  place  is.  What  is,  per- 
manently is,  let  its  determinations  succeed  each  other 
as  they  may ;  and  in  the  second  place,  that  therefore 
all  changes  are  but  these  successive  determinations 
of  substance.  Of  how  it  is  really  situated  with  this 
therefore  we  are  now  perfectly  aware :  to  say  that  all 
changes  are  mere  successive  states  of  substance  is  not 
to  say  one  word  that  throws  light  on  causality  as 
causality,  or  even,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  on  Kant's 
theory  of  causality.  Kant,  under  influence  of  the 
present  idea,  simply  forgets  himself  If  "all  suc- 
cession in  sense-units  before  apprehension  is  only 
change,"  how  is  it  that  he  can  tell  us  elsewhere  of 
other  units  that  so  succeed  each  other  that  they 
are  quantities,  or  again  so  that  they  are  qualities, 
or  reciprocities^  etc.?  This,  in  fact,  is  matter  of  sug- 
gestion in  the  "proof"  itself,  to  which  we  now 
proceed. 

What  is  said  in  the  second  paragraph  here  is  accu- 
rately this :  Impressions  of  sense  are  feelings  in  my 
subject,  fkam  which  subject  they,  as  soon  as  felt, 


COMMENTARY. 


497 


receive  the  perceptive  forms  of  space  and  time.  Now, 
all  the  elements  here  have  (or  are)  certain  breadths 
or  pluralities  of  parts:  certain  constitutive  details, 
distinctive  of  each,  enter  into  or  compose  them.  But 
while  simply  thus  in  subjective  afi^ection,  the  units  of 
impression  can  only  be  apprehended  indifferently 
after  one  another:  they  are  but  successively  taken 
up  in  the  element  of  imagination,  which  is  at  all  times 
the  receptacle  and  vehicle  of  whatever  is  presented 
to  consciousness.  This,  in  perception,  is  the  first 
stage,  or  that  of  mere  apprehensioii — apprehension, 
namely,  of  what  elements  (both  specially  and  gener- 
ally of  sense)  are,  for  further  manipulation,  taken 
up  or  on  by  imagination.  So  far,  then,  there  is  as 
yet  but  apprehension.  Units  of  special  sense  (colour, 
say),  units  of  general  sense  (as  of  time)  are  but  pas- 
sively received  into  the  imagination.  But,  as  thus 
only  passively  received,  all  these  units  are  a  mere 
indiflferent,  disjunct  after  one  another.  So  far,  there 
is  affection  only:  element  of  function  (synthesis) 
there  is  as  yet  none.  But  in  actual  fact  we  do  find 
that  this  element  has  come  to  be  added.  These  mere 
units  of  passive  subjective  impression  do,  in  the  end, 
constitute,  so  to  speak,  the  condensed  and  concreted 
objects  in  the  interconnected  context  of  actual  ew- 
perience.  Plainly,  then,  function  has  intervened,  and 
synthesis  been  operated.  But  we  have  already  before 
us  all  that  could  take  place  from  without.  All,  then, 
that  we  see  further  take  place,  can  only  do  so  from 
within.  Synthesis  (function)  is  no  affair  of  sense, 
which  is  passive  affection  only.  Synthesis,  that  is, 
can  only  be  a  product  of  the  understanding.  In 
other  words,  it  is  only  the  categories  which,  as  con- 
stitutive of  the  understanding,  function  synthesis. 

In  the  case  immediately  before  us,  for  example, 

2  I 


498 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


499 


what  but  a  category  can  convert  the  mere  indifferent 
after  one  another  of  the  passive  sense-units  (whether 
general  or  special),  only  orderlessly  floating,  so  to 
speak,  into  a  necessarily-fixed  connexion,  where  an  A 
must  precede,  and  a  B  must  follow,  without  the  barest 
possibility  of  interchange  or  reversion — what,  I  say, 
but  a  category  can  effect  this  ?  The  ingredients  of 
apprehension  come  into  imagination  after  one  another ; 
but  all  so  far  is  passive  and  orderless ;  and  all  so  far 
is  only  subjective  and  within :  what  can  act  upon  it 
from  within— (there  is  nothing  further  to  act  upon 
it  from  without)— but  a  law  within,  a  law  of  the 
understanding,  the  law  of  one  of  its  categories,  the 
law  of  the  category  of  cause  and  effect,  which  itself 
depends  upon  the  logical  function  of  antecedent  and 
consequent  ? 

This  is  really  Kant's  "  proof,"  and  this  is  really  the 
whole  of  Kant's  "  proof."  He  is  bound  down  to  the 
contingent  subjectivity  of  impression,  and  can  find 
synthesis  for  it,  necessity  for  it,  a  law  for  it,  only 
from  what  is  still  further  within — the  intellect  itself. 
Of  course  the  whole  thing  is  a  figment  in  the  air. 
Objects  are  not  mere  bundles  of  our  own  merely 
subjective  impressions :  they  are  independently  with- 
out There  is  no  mx)dus  of  time,  either,  for  the  func- 
tion of  antecedent  and  consequent  to  clasp  and  coalesce 
with.  And  the  impressions  themselves  have  their 
own  order — for  Kant  himself  (to  get  his  category 
to  act)  must  have  their  own  order.  But  still,  for  all 
that,  Kant's  "proof"  is  nothing  whatever  else,  and 
he  can  only  repeat  it,  and  yet  again  and  again  repeat 
it  usque  ad  obscurity  and  cloud.  What  else,  indeed, 
in  the  midst  of  all  the  quakings  and  shakings  and 
slidings  of  the  soil  beneath  his  feet,  can  there  be  left 
for  him  but  to  repeat  ? 


Before  leaving  this  paragraph,  I  have  yet  one  other 
point  to  signalize;  and  it  is  what  concerns  time. 
"  For,"  says  Kant,  in  allusion  to  what  sense-multiple 
shall  eventuate  as  causal,  "  time  cannot  in  itself  be 
perceived,  so  that  what  in  the  object  precedes  and  what 
follows  may  be  determined  empirically^  as  it  were,  in 
reference  to  it"  (time).  Now,  we  know  that  Kant's 
time,  though  a  form  from  within,  is  empirically  de- 
terminative, and  quite  in  the  same  way  empirically 
determinative,  as  our  space,  though  an  object  from 
without ;  and  we  know,  moreover,  that  this  is  Kant's 
own  express  teaching.  Both  in  the  one  and  the 
other  regard,  then,  we  have  difficulties  here.  But  it 
will  suffice  for  us  at  present  to  make  out  what  it  is 
that  Kant,  at  this  moment,  has  specially  and  particu- 
larly in  his  eye.  Now  that  is  this.  Experience  to  Kant, 
let  his  forms  do  what  they  may,  is  still  from  without. 
Berlin  city  or  the  battle  of  Rossbach,  he  has  no 
pretensions  to  find  within  his  own  self.  Still  the 
impressions  constitutive  of  Berlin  city  or  the  battle 
of  Rossbach  are  received  into  a  time  and  space  of  his 
own.  So  it  is  that  these  impressions  are  to  him 
passively,  indifferently  floating  units  of  impression, 
and,  for  synthesis,  require  a  category  and  categories. 
But  it  is  only  because  time  and  space  are  mere  sub- 
jective mirages  of  our  own  senses  that  this  can  be  so. 
Were  time  and  space  actual  objects  in  themselves, 
and  such  that  we  cognised  them  as  actual  objects  in 
themselves,  then  the  impressions  of  sense,  other  objects, 
would  be  simply  their  contents,  and  astrict,  conse- 
quently, to  the  positions  and  connexions  they  them- 
selves (time  and  space)  prescribed.  Time  and  space, 
Kant  says  himself,  would  then  "  empirically,  as  it 
were "  (and  that  means  only  actually)  "  determine," 
" in  the  object"  what  should  be  first  and  what  second. 


/ 


/ 


/ 


500 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


One  sees  here,  then,  that  that  marvellous  *' all-em- 
bracing unity,"  of  such  marvellous,  dogmatic,  absolute 
potence  in  disposition  of  this  empirical  universe, 
which,  as  a  profound  discovery,  is  attributed  to  the 
space  and  time  of  Kant,  this  same  Kant  out  and  out 
denies  for  himself  and  actually  attributes — crushingly 
— to  the  other  side !  Kant's  time  is  thus,  as  we  have 
it  here  from  his  own  mouth,  powerless  to  "  date  I " 
Surely,  too,  the  argument  in  regard  does  not  want 
for  a  thousandfold  repetition.  If  time  and  space  are 
only  subjective  forms,  it  is  quite  plain,  in  fact,  that 
they  can  not  be  objectively  determinant ;  and,  as  said, 
this  is  Kant's  own  perpetual  refrain  everywhere: 
time  and  space  have  no  influence  whatever  in  pro- 
duction of  actual  objective  experience,  but  only  in 
location.  In  this  latter  respect,  indeed,  they  are  to 
Kant  quite  as  they  are  to  us:  they  actually,  or  em- 
pirically, impose  on  things  the  peculiarities,  struc- 
turally, of  their  own  constitutive  details.  "We 
maintain  the  empirical  reality  of  space  (in  regard  of 
all  possible  external  experience),  but  at  the  same  time 
also  its  transcendental  ideality,  or  the  fact  that  it  is 
nothing  so  soon  as  we  withdraw  the  condition  of  the 
possibility  of  all  experience,  and  accept  it  as  something 
that  essentially  belongs  to  things  in  themselves." 
This  (IL,  38)  is,  in  that  respect,  Kant's  incessant 
declaration;  and  time,  in  the  same  reference,  is 
always  viewed  in  the  same  way  (see  IL,  44).  Whether 
as  forms  or  as  things,  time  and  space  are,  in  point 
of  fact,  quite  the  same  determinating  receptacles. 
There  is  only  this  diflerence,  that,  were  they  things 
(things  in  themselves),  and  did  they  receive  things 
(things  in  themselves),  then — and  then  only  I — 
they  would  geographically  place  in  space  and 
chronologically    "date"    in    time;    for    then,    and 


COMMENTARY. 


501 


then  only,  says  Kant,  they  would  '^empirically  de- 
termine." 

The  third  paragraph  makes  very  plain  the  differ- 
ence between  a  unit  of  sense-perception  as  called 
object,  and  the  completed  object  of  categorized  per- 
ception, and  equally  between  the  mere  succession  of 
apprehension,  and  that  which  is  named  "  in  the  object,'' 
the  latter,  of  course,  referring  to  what  we  name  com- 
pleted, or  categorized  perception.  Then  it  is  again 
insisted  on  that  our  objects,  as  objects  of  sense,  can 
never  be  things  in  themselves.  The  examples  of 
the  house  and  the  ship  (to  take  in  paragraph  4)  are 
excellently  illustrative,  and  leave  no  excuse  for  a 
mistake  of  meaning.  The  details  of  impression  that 
constitute  the  objective  phenomena  in  each  case  are 
declared  to  be  equally  successions.  Nevertheless  the 
succession  is  such  in  the  one  case  that  the  category 
of  quantity  acts,  and  such  again  in  the  other  that 
the  category  of  causality  must  acknowledge  the  call. 
Involuntarily  here  Kant  is  made  to  imply  that,  on 
the  part  of  the  latter  succession,  it  is  the  fact  of  its 
being  irreversible  that  gives  causality  the  call,  and 
alone  the  call,  and  irresistibly  the  call.  Nevertheless, 
he  will  assert,  for  all  that,  that  any  necessity  of 
order  can  not  be  in  sense,  and  must  be  in  the  under- 
standing ! 

"  With  which  object  my  notion,  as  derived  from 
the  units  in  apprehension,  must  agree."  Kant's  case 
is  so  peculiar,  that  it  is  sometimes  hardly  possible  for 
him  to  avoid  a  certain  confusion  of  language.  The 
object  and  the  notion,  which  are  here  said  to  be  under 
an  obligation  to  agree,  for  example,  are  precisely  and 
numerically  one  and  the  same  thing.  Certain  feelings 
of  my  own,  in  a  time  and  space  of  my  own,  pinned 
together  by  a  category  of  my  own.     That  to  Kant  is 


502 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


an  object.  Of  course,  when  we  differentiate  this  as 
though  it  were,  not  a  mere  state  of  myself,  but  an 
independent  object,  we  may  conceive  ourselves  to 
have  two  things  comparable  the  one  with  the  other ; 
but  still,  for  all  that,  they  are  numerically  the  same, 
and  there  is  but  one  object.  The  reference  here  is 
back  to  paragraph  3. 

The  first  sentence  of  paragraph  5  deserves  a  word. 
"  In  this  case,  therefore,  it  is  from  the  objective  suite 
of  the  facts  that  I  must  infer  the  subjective  suite  in 
apprehension ;  for  this  latter  suite  (of  mere  units  in 
sense)  is,  as  such,  quite  undetermined,  and  not  dis- 
criminative as  yet  of  object  from  object."    This  is  to 
the  effect  that  it  is  after  objective  experience  (cate- 
gorized perception),  and  not  before  it,  that  we  can  tell 
how  it  was  with  the  order  of  the  sense-units  them- 
selves while  still  subjective.     But  can  this  be  granted  ? 
Is  it  only  after  I  have  recognised  the  house,  and  after 
I  have  recognised  the  drifting,  that  I  can  tell  the 
units  of  impression  were  in  the  one  case  coexistent, 
and  in  the  other  consequent  ?     Kant  tells  us  himself 
that  one  category  is  determined  at  one  time,  and 
another  at  another.     He  also  tells  us  that  the  agents 
of  determination  are  "  empirical  circumstances."    Are 
we   to  suppose  that   these   empirical   circumstances 
which  determine  whether  the  category  of  reciprocity 
shall  apply  to  an  A  and  a  B  which  are  coexistent,  or 
that  of  causality  to  an  A  and  a  B  where  the  latter  is 
consequent  on  the  former — are  we  to  suppose  that 
these  empirical  circumstances  are  known  to  us  only 
after  formed  and  finished  perception,  only  after  cate- 
gorized experience?     In  that  case,  what  could  con- 
ceivably determine  one  category  more  than  another  ? 
In  short,  it  is  quite  evident  that  the  units  which  call 
in  reciprocity  must  already  have  an  order — an  order 


COMMENTARY. 


503 


fairly  given  in  consciousness — to  legitimate  the  call, 
just  as  the  units  which  claim  causality  must,  on  their 
side  also,  have  an  order  of  their  own  to  show  for  any 
claim  of  their  own.  Kant  himself  will  be  found  to 
admit  as  much — not  but  that  it  is  evidently  a  neces- 
sity of  the  bare  facts.  It  is  here,  however,  that  Kant 
finds  his  very  centre  escaping  from  his  feet,  and  that 
qualms  and  vacillation  result.  In  the  passage  imme- 
diately before  us,  as  we  see,  Kant,  whether  he  feels 
the  difficulty  or  not,  is  at  least  found  eagerly  to  grasp 
to  the  stereotyped  phrase,  Synthesis  is  not  possibly 
an  affair  of  mere  sense,  and  7nu>st  come  from  the 
understanding. 

By-and-by  we  have  a  paragraph  which  begins  by 
considering  the  difficulty  of  the  cause  and  the  effect 
sometimes  appearing  to  be  simultaneous.      Now  the 
sixteen  earlier  paragraphs  really  contain  Kant's  dis- 
cussion of  the  particular  interest  of  causality.     Of 
these  paragraphs  we  have  already  considered  five,  and 
we  shall  now  take  the  remaining  eleven  together. 
As  said,  they  are  but  repetitions,  and  very  wearisome 
and    unsatisfactory   repetitions,    of    what   we   have 
just   stated   as   the    "proof."      I   have,    besides,  en- 
deavoured to  assist  the  reader,  even  in  situ,  by  certain 
footnotes.      One  sees  that  Kant,  all  through  these 
paragraphs,  is  in  utter  subjection  to  the  single  pre- 
supposition that  all  objects  are  at  bottom  but  modi- 
fications of  our  own  subject.      But  that  being  so, 
then  his  further  thought  is,  were  that  all,  there  would 
be  but  a  random  play  of  the  units  of  impression. 
There  must,  then,  be  laws  to  order  these,  and  such 
laws  are ;  but  they  (these  laws)   can  only  emanate 
from  our  own  intellect.     Did  we  suppose  that  we 
attained  to  a  knowledge  of   these   laws  only  from 
the    experience   of   them,   then    such  origin   would 


504 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


be   manifestly  inadequate    to    their    own    intrinsic 
validity:     they    are    apodictic,    while     any    such 
origin  could  only  extend  contingency.     I  allude  in 
the  footnotes  to  a  difficulty  in  regard    to   whether 
time,  as  time,  is  an  element  or  not  in  the  virtue  of 
causality.     Kant  really  means  no  such  thing.     He 
speaks  for  the  most  part  of  only  Erscheinungen  m 
time ;  and  time,  if  ever  for  its  part  alone  mentioned, 
means  a  filled  time.     We  have  always  to  consider 
that  Kant  has  never  anything  before  him  in  this 
section  but  the  phenomena  of  event.     Kant  knows  of 
no  peculiarity  in  time,  nor  yet  of  any  peculiarity  in  a 
category,  whereby  an  event  shall  be  actually  *«  dated." 
That  is  but  too  manifestly  absurd.     He  can  neither 
dictate  a  when  nor  a  where  for  any  event ;  but  any 
event  being  actually  given  in  its  when  and  its  where, 
then  he  knows  that  the  cause  being,  the  effect  will 
follow.     That  relative  place  in  time  is  the  only  place 
in  time  that  Kant  presumes  to  refer  to  a  rule.     I 
may  note  here  that,  in  all  the  preceding  paragraphs, 
the  term  apprehension  having  been  confined  to  the 
subjective  stage  in  perception,  would,  in  the  last  para- 
graph of  the  sixteen,  appear  to  be  extended  also  to  the 
objective  stage.     There  is  no  real  difficulty.     I  must 
call  special  attention,  however,  to  the  third  sentence  of 
the  twelfth  paragraph.     Kant  there,  having  remarked 
on^  the  indifference  of  succession  on  the  part  of  all 
units  of  impression  in  the  first  instance,  expressly 
avows  that  he  converts  that   indifference  into  the 
necessity  of  cause  and  effect  only  "  when  he  perceives 
or  previously  assumes  that  in  a  succession  there   is 
a  reference  of  what  is  subsequent  to  what  is  pre- 
cedent according  to  a  rule."     Of  course,  it  may  be 
said   that    a  rule  can  only  come   from    the   under- 
standing ;  bftt^  in  the  Prolegomena,  Kant  really  finds 


COMMENTARY. 


505 


himself  obliged  to  allow  a  rule  subjective  in  priority 
to  the  rule  objective.  In  fact,  it  is  only  such  rule 
that,  from  the  nature  of  the  case  itself,  can  be 
meant  here ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  overestimate  the 
importance  of  the  admission  that  there  is  a  necessity 
for  the  "  Wahrnehmen  oder  vor  am  Annehmen''  of  this 
rule,  in  order  that  there  should  be  determination 
of  the  correspondent  category  to  act  and  substitute 
its  own  objective  rule. 

There  follow  now  twelve  paragraphs  rather  of  a 
miscellaneous  nature.  What  is  first  taken  up  in  them 
is  the  fact  that,  though  in  the  causal  process  the 
effect  is  empirically  recognised  by  being  after  the 
cause,  yet  there  are  many  cases  wehere  the  effect  and 
its  cause  seem  at  once  and  together.  The  room  is 
heated  by  the  fire,  but  both  are  together :  the  one 
instance  will  suffice  to  suggest  a  thousand  others. 
The  solution,  of  course,  lies  in  this,  that  the  cause  is 
always  dynamically  first,  as  the  effect  second.  After 
this  Kant  proceeds  to  speculate  on  the  infinitude  of 
parts  in  the  process  of  change,  in  the  same  way  as  he 
was  seen  to  be  much  caught  by  the  degrees  in  inten- 
sion. The  whole  matter,  however,  is  in  effect  barren, 
and  a  mere  affair  of  quantity.  Intension,  extension, 
process  of  change,  are  all  quantities,  and,  as  such, 
open  to  an  infinite  reciprocation  of  the  two  moments, 
discretion  and  continuity.  What  concerns  derivative 
categories  as  action,  power,  etc.,  seems  sufficiently 
plain  as  it  stands.  I  do  not  think  it  will  be  difficult 
to  understand  either  that,  though  change  can  be 
made  conceivable  only  by  actual  experience,  the 
abstract  process  may  be  capable  of  general  considera- 
tion. We  are  reminded  here,  too,  of  a  passage  under 
"Anticipations  of  Sense-Perception"  (148),  where, 
on  occasion  of  the  collation  of  extension,  intension. 


506 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


and  change,  it  was  said  "  that  the  causality  of  a 
change  at  all  lay  completely  outside  of  the  limits  of 
a  transcendental  philosophy,  and  presupposed  em- 
pirical principles,"  1  have  no  doubt  there  are 
students  of  Kant  quite  capable  of  lifting  this  crumb 
up  and  asserting,  on  the  authority  of  it,  that  there 
was  not  possibly  any  question  of  causality  in  the 
Kritik  of  Pure  Reason  at  all !  And  yet  the  motive  prin- 
ciple of  the  entire  business  is  just  to  find  a  solution 
for  the  problem  of  causality.  I  have  certainly  heard 
a  student  assert  of  Kant  that,  in  a  change  of  states,  it 
was  only  the  one  state  he  questioned  as  the  antecedent 
of  the  other.  Kant,  however,  regarded  any  two  succes- 
sive states  only  together  as  the  single  thing  he  called 
change,  and  it  was  the  cause  of  change  he  discussed 
("  two  things  so  related  that  the  state  of  the  one  con- 
ditions  a  consequent  state  in  the  other,"  IL,  185). 
Of  course,  that  discussion  was  not  of  what  caused 
change  either  generally  or  particularly;  for,  as  he 
expressly  declares  (as  well  in  our  present  text, 
174,  as  in  the  accidental  reference,  148),  "  how  there 
can  be  change,  we  have  a  priori  not  the  least  idea — 
that  requires  a  knowledge  of  actual  forces  only  em- 
pirically possible;"  while  the  question  of  "Schöp- 
fung "  does  not  enter  here.  That  discussion  was  not 
precisely  of  the  cause,  nor  yet  precisely  of  the  effect, 
but  still  it  was  of  the  relation  between  both.  It  con- 
sidered not  any  one  cause  and  not  any  one  effect — 
not  even  cause  as  cause  or  effect  as  effect ;  but  only, 
any  one  case  of  cause  and  effect  being,  how  was  it 
that  we  held  the  transition  from  the  one  to  the  other 
to  be  necessary.  Manifestly  there  is  no  such  transi- 
tion in  any  mere  succession  of  states  (of  course  in  the 
same  subject).  Then  it  is  plainly  the  general  question 
that  introduces  the  idea  of  change  as  change ;  and 


COMMENTARY. 


507 


surely  it  is  quite  legitimate  to  consider  the  mere 
general  form  of  change  and  in  its  quantitative 
character ;  but  in  this  reference  our  word  or  two  will 
suffice.  It  is  sufficiently  striking  that  the  good 
Kant  can  talk  of  his  a  priori  "  so  much  enlarging 
our  knowledge  of  nature  "  here. 


C,  Third  Analogy. 

This  is  a  short  section,  and  not  difficult.  The 
great  point,  as  regards  Kant,  is  simply  to  see  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  empirical  communion,  and 
that,  to  his  mind,  the  necessity  which  is  attributed  to 
the  relation  can  only  proceed  from  a  category.  This 
category  we  actually  have.  Necessarily,  too,  the 
communion  which  Kant  sees  is  not  of  a  geometrical 
nature,  as  of  point  to  point  in  space,  but  depends  on 
the  dynamical  "influence"  of  factors  mutually.  In 
fact,  he  actually  prefers  to  deduce  the  "  communio 
spatii^''  the  local  communion,  from  a  ''  communion  of 
influence." 

The  root-difficulty,  however,  which  we  have  already 
so  often  seen,  must  still  haunt  the  reader  here,  and 
not,  it  may  be,  in  any  less  aggravated  form.  We 
have  just  had  an  A  B  of  causality,  for  example,  he 
may  say,  in  which  B  could  not  be  set  before  A,  and 
here  we  have  another  A  B  which  may  quite  as  well 
be  B  A.  Does  Kant  wish  us  to  understand  that  this 
difference  is  due  only  to  the  difference  of  categories  ? 
Surely  there  must  be  a  difference  in  the  facts  (the  units 
of  impression)  themselves  to  call  for  this  difference 
of  categories ;  and  in  that  case  is  not  the  first  differ- 
ence the  vital  and  determining  one,  while  the  second 
difference  can,  as  surplusage,  be  really  only  one  of 
luxury?      Kant's   answer   is,    It   is   one  of  dignity. 


508 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT 


The  first  difference  is  contingent  and  subjective ;  but 
the  second  is  one  of  necessity  and  objectivity,  and 
this  is  due  to  the  category.  But  let  us  look  at  the 
text. 

"  All  substances,  so  far  as  they  may  simultaneously 
be  perceived  in  space,  are  in  thoroughgoing  recipro- 
city."    One  is  tempted  to  add  here,  And  so  far  as 
they  are  perceived  after  one  another  in  time,  they  are 
under  a  thoroughgoing  law  of  causality.     Therefore 
it  is  owing  to  the  differences  in  the  substances  them- 
selves that  they  are  now  under  the  one  category, 
and  again  under  the  other.      So  far  as   words  go, 
Kant's  very  first  sentence  here  bears  this  fully  out. 
The  reciprocal   sequence  which  is  now  to  be  seen 
under  C,  is  directly  declared  to  have  been  impossible 
under  B  ("  welches — beim  zweiten  Grundsatze — nicht 
geschehen  kann  ").     It  is  quite  plain  that  Kant  postu- 
lates a  determining  difference  in  the  empirical  facts, 
and  that  he  has  recourse  to  his  Epigmesis  only  for  the 
imputation  or  the  imposition  of  necessity.     How  else, 
he  seems  to  say,  can  you  get  necessity  ?     For  all  that, 
every  successive  sentence  seems  simply  there  to  assert 
that  the  order  concerned  is  empirical  and  not  intel- 
lectual, that  it  is  ab  extra  and  not  ah  intra — that,  in 
truth,  very  palpably  and  transparently,  it  is  in  the  facts 
themselves,  in  priority  to,  and  independence  of,  any 
category  whatever.     No  doubt,  in  the  simple  signs 
of  things,  as  in  the  first  instance  they  merely  affect 
sense  (say  colours  on  the  retina),  there  is  as  yet  no 
notion  of  an  object  present ;  but,  in  the  end,  it  is  not 
we  that  throw  into  them  that  notion  of  an  object. 
On  the  contrary,  we  recognise  it  in  them.     Two  boats 
collide,  and  there  is  action  and  reaction, — necessarily, 
too, — but  neither  the  action  nor  the  reaction  is  due  to 
us.     In  the  presence  of  such  things  Kant  can  only 


COMMENTARY. 


509 


repeat.  Nevertheless  it  is  we  who,  by  imputation  of  a 
category,  introduce  necessity.  Inexorably  shut  in 
to  his  presuppositions,  too — of  all  objects  being  at 
bottom  subjective,  etc. — it  is  quite  evident  that,  while 
he  can  say  nothing  else,  he  is,  in  saying  it,  out  and 
out  sincere.  I  may  remark  that,  as  may  have  been 
observed,  here  too  any  objective  action  on  the  part 
of  time  is  carefully  eliminated ;  and  again  later. 

In  reference  to  the  general  remarks,  which  follow 
the  asterisks,  in  regard  to  Nature,  etc.,  we  probably 
find  ourselves  saying.  No  doubt  substantiality,  caus- 
ality, and  reciprocity  are  vital  laws  in  it ;  but  they  are 
really  in  it,  and  it  is  not  we  who  have  thrown  them 
in  from  our  categories.  Of  course,  too,  when  it  is 
said  a  rule  of  understanding  determines  place  in  time, 
that  place  is  only  a  co-relative  place  in  the  respective 
association,  substantial,  causal,  or  reciprocal,  actually 
empirically  given.  The  categories  do  not  emjnrically 
give,  even  should  we  grant  on  their  part  an  epigenesis 
of  necessary  rule.  It  confirms  what  has  been  often 
said  already  to  see  the  possibility  of  experience  styled 
a  tertiwn  quid,  and  that  tertiwn  quid  identified  with 
*'  the  synthetic  unity  of  all  apperception." 


4.  The  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought. 

All  here  is  quite  exoteric  and  easy  to  be  understood. 
No  one  who  bears  in  mind  the  machinery  he  has 
seen  will  find  it  difficult  to  acknowledge  that  whatever 
coheres  with  the  possibility  of  experience  is  possible ; 
whatever  with  its  actuality,  actual;  and  whatever 
with  its  necessity,  necessary.  But  then  he  may  say. 
Possibility,  actuality,  and  necessity  are  simply  facts, 
and  I  recognise  them  :  if,  then,  to  see  them  I  have  just 
to  look  at  them,  why  this  gratuitous  and  very  idle 


I 


510 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT  : 


assumption  of  three  original,  special,  and  peculiar 
cells  in  the  mind,  expressly  there  for  no  other  purpose 
than  to  enable  me  to  do  so  ?  It  is  very  extraordinary 
how  the  very  aspect  of  Kant's  machinery  has  proved 
so  imposing  to  mankind  that,  after  a  hundred  years, 
they  still  remain  blind  to  its  reality. 

From  expressions  here,  it  becomes  again  quite  plain 
that  by  the  phrase  "the  possibility  of  experience'' 
Kant  only  means  his  own  formal  a  priori  conditions 
of  this  experience  of  ours ;  and  these,   as  we  abun- 
dantly  know,  are,  with  time  and  space,  the  categories. 
It  is  also  no  less  plain,  however,  that  what  I  call  the 
empirical  reference  is  at  the  same  time  fully  and  fairly 
in    his   mind.      It   is   in    this    connexion    that    we 
find  him  to  refer  to  construction  in  space.      Such 
construction  enables  us  to  give  a  certain  reality  to 
objects,  even — space,    that   is,    being  taken   on   the 
terms  of  Kant — in  independence  of  experience,  but 
vnth  the  proviso  that  they  shall  be  such  as  to   be 
found  in  experience.     It  does  not  follow  from  this, 
however,  that  the  empirical  reference  can  be  allowed 
Kant  beyond  such  possible  construction  in  time  and 
space  alone.     It  is  quite  untrue,  for  example,  that  we 
can  conceivably  construct  beforehand  out  of  the  single 
monotonous  sequence  of  time  three  such  compound 
schemata  for  actuality  as  shall  enable  us  to  realize,  as 
it  were  only  by  empirical  reference,  the  three  categories 
of  relation.     The  categories  of  cause  and  reciprocity, 
for  instance,  are  quite  opposed  the  one  to  the  other, 
the  specifically   distinctive   character   of  the   latter 
being  reversibleness,  and  equally  of  the  former  irre- 
versibleness.     Nor  has  the  remaining  category,  sub- 
stance, any  less  its  own  proper  and  distinctive  diflfer- 
ence.      It  is  utterly  impossible   to  throw   into  the 
monotony  of  time  the  very  shadows  of  three  such 


COMMENTARY. 


511 


difi^erences.  If,  then,  we  are  to  understand  that  Kant 
would  pretend  to  profier  a  legitimate  claim  for  these, 
too,  surely  it  will  occur  to  every  one  to  object  that, 
to  convert  the  empirical  reference  into  the  empirical 
instruction,  is  not  legitimate.  It  is  quite  possible,  how- 
ever, that  Kant  would  assert  his  right  even  to  the 
empirical  instruction.  I  do  not  deny,  he  might  say, 
that  we  have  one  set  of  empirical  impressions  to  form  a 
case  of  substance  and  accident,  or  that  we  have  another 
set  to  form  a  case  of  cause  and  effect,  or  that  we  have 
a  third  set  to  form  a  case  of  action  and  reaction. 
Nay,  on  the  contrary,  my  proposition  is,  that  I  must 
be  allowed  such  empirical  reference,  even  under  the 
name  of  the  possibility  of  experience,  if  for  nothing 
but  to  realize  my  principles.  What  I  pretend  to  do, 
he  might  be  supposed  to  continue,  is  to  explain  the 
presence  of  necessity  in  contingency  by  reason  of  a 
certain  transcendental  epigenesis  from  the  functions 
of  our  intellect — an  epigenesis,  that  is,  which  is  a  priori 
valid.  I  do  think  that  this  was  Kant's  own  position 
in  the  end ;  but  it  is  still  open  to  every  objection,  so  far 
as  I  see,  that  has  been  suggested  on  my  part,  while 
probably,  also,  it  is  a  position  which  itself  has,  gener- 
ally, never  yet  been  explicitly  seen.  In  any  discus- 
sion of  Kant,  it  ought,  I  think,  to  be  finally  allowed 
him,  however  little  it  may,  finally,  too,  stead  him. 
Empirical  instruction  is  not  legitimate;  and  without 
it  his  categories  are,  for  production  of  the  schemata, 
incompetent  to  impregnate  or  infect  time — this,  with 
all  the  rest.  The  category,  of  course,  is  assumed  to 
represent  a  universal  relation  which  the  empirical 
intromissions  only  exemplify ;  at  the  same  time  that 
it  is  these  latter  alone  enable  the  category  to  get 
realization  for  itself:  but  then  it  is  the  having  this 
category,  this  universal  relation,  beforehand,  which 


512 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


enables  us  to  predicate  necessity  of  the  empirical 
examples.  This  is  fair  statement;  but  the  state  of 
the  case  remains  essentially  the  same. 

As  regards  what  Kant  properly  means  by  possibility 
of  experience,  we  have  the  unmistakable  avowal  here 
that  he  "omits  from   consideration  everything  the 
possibility  of  which  can  only  be  made  out  from  its 
actuality  in  experience,"  and  that  he  "  regards  only 
the  possibility  of  things  so  far  as  dependent  on  a  priori 
notions^    That  is,  and  the  clause  which  follows  makes 
this  plain,  the  a  priori  notions  are  the  conditions  of 
possible  experience,  but  they  accredit  themselves  when 
referred  to  experience.     These  words  again  are  also, 
in  the  same  reference,  eminently  declarative,  "At  the 
same  time  it  is  true  also  that,  even  without  premising 
experience  itself^  we  are  quite  able  to  discover  and 
characterize  the  possibility  of  things."     Now  the  pos- 
sibility of  things  is  "the  possibility  of  experience;" 
how  then  does  he  go  on  to  say  we  can,  even  without 
experience,  know  "the  possibility  of  experience"? 
We  do  this,  he  says,  "  merely  by  referring  to  the  formal 
conditions  quite  generally  determinative  of  objects  in 
experience."    Then,  finally,  he  adds,  "  but  still,  again, 
only  as  referred  to  experience,  and  within  the  limits 
of  experience."    As  regards  the  important  phrase  in 
question,  we  shall  now  allow  this  to  be  decisive. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  avow  that,  after  all  that 
has  been  said  for  substance  and  reciprocity,  it  is  a 
little  surprising  to  find  all  necessity  of  existence  re- 
ferred to  causality.  If  accidents  are  necessarily  due  to 
substance,  action  to  re-action,  and  re-action  to  action, 
it  is  evident  that  causality  is  not,  on  Kant's  own 
terms,  the  only  source  of  necessity  in  existence,  unless 
its  relation  be  interpolated  into  all  these  relations. 
And  surely  the  prospective  force  of  causality  proper 


COMMENTARY. 


513 


being  once  laid  down  as  the  single  element  at  work, 
the  idea  of  the  double  force  of  reciprocity,  now  pro- 
spective and  again  retrospective,  ought  at  least  to  pre- 
sent to  reflection  a  considerable  difficulty.  Kant, 
however,  does  not  even  seem  to  have  felt  this.  It  is 
certainly  inconsistent  on  his  part ;  for  why  the  three 
if  they  come  all  to  one  ? 

I  dare  say  there  is  but  little  need  to  refer  either  to 
Kant*s  pretensions  to   the   construction   of  Nature. 
Even  on  his  own  showing,  any  such  pretensions  are 
at  last  void.    He  only  claims  at  last  merely  fictitiously 
to  varnish  the  laws  of  nature  that  already  empirically 
exist.     "  Nothing  is  to  be  admitted  in  the  empirical 
synthesis  which    could  interrupt  or  infringe  under- 
standing and  the  continuous  unity  of  all  perceptions, 
«.e.,  the  unity  of  its  notions."     Kant's  own  claims, 
when,  in  their  regard,  he  is  driven  into  the  definitive 
extremit}^,  fall  far  short  of  that.     The  empirical  syn- 
thesis is  a  business  of  its  own,  and  it  proceeds  always 
without  even  deigning  a  look  to  the  understanding. 
Substantiality,    causality,  reciprocity,  said  synthesis 
possesses  of  itself,  and  so  far  it  is  a  ruled  and  regu- 
lated synthesis.    Still,  for  all  that,  the  reverse  is  quite 
as  true  as  the  obverse  of  each  of  Kant's  four  proposi- 
tions here.     I,  for  my  part,  have  no  hesitation  in  say- 
ing, (/a^wr  hiatus,  datur  saltus,  datur  casus,  datur  fatum. 
But  even  were  this  not  so,  and  the  contrary  aver- 
ments, as  on  the  part  of  Kant,  the  only  true  ones ; 
still  such  things  are  in  nature  not  from  us  or  him, 
but  only  from  itself.     To  this,  of  course,  Kant  replies 
promptly,  Synthetic  necessity  cannot  possibly  be  a 
posteriori^  but  only  ajjriori     What  is  concerned  here, 
however,  is  a  matter  for  separate  consideration ;  in 
regard  to  which,  indeed,  we  have  already  at  least 

indicated   the   truth,    as   well   as   how   it   was   that 

2k 


514 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


Kant  (with  his  presuppositions)  was  led  aside  from 
it. 

The  speculations  which  follow  in  regard  to  a  "field 
of  possibility,"  "  other  forms  of  perception,"  "  other 
forms  of  understanding,"  "other  series  of  objects,'* 
"more  than  one  experience,"  etc.,  relating  all  of  them 
to  an  "  absolute  possibility "  (which  is  declared  no 
question  for  us),  are  at  least  idle.  The  term  postulate 
is  used  here  by  example  of  mathematics.  A  mathe- 
matical postulate  refers  to  the  mind  being  credited 
with  a  power  of  actual  synthesis,  which  synthesis  is 
at  the  same  time  genesis  of  the  notion  concerned.  So 
what  is  possible,  what  is  actual,  what  is  necessary, 
invites  the  mind  simply  to  regard  a  certain  corre- 
spondent synthesis,  when  the  due  notion  springs. 
They  (the  postulates)  can  hardly,  in  any  important 
sense,  be  called  synthetics,  however.  We  turn  back 
for  a  miscellaneous  remark  or  two. 

The  postulates  can  be  seen  to  restrict  the  other 

categories  to  empirical  use,  if  we  consider  that,  one 

after  the  other,  they  respectively  refer  to  the  other 

categories,  at  the  same  time  that  they  are  themselves 

principles  of  empirical  thought,  and,  as  such,  relative 

to  questions  of  existence.     The  consequent  denial  to 

the  categories  of  a  "  transcendental  use "  may  seem 

somewhat  contradictory  when  we  consider  that  their 

very  reason  to  be  is  their  transcendmtal  reality.     We 

have  only  to  turn  to  the  paragraph  next  but  one, 

indeed,  to  hear  of  the  "  transcendental  truth  "  of  the 

categories,  which  transcendental  truth,  too,  is  declared 

to  be  nothing  less  than  their   "objective   reality." 

Transcendental  use,  nevertheless,  is  not  exceptively 

denied  only  here:    it  is  equally  denied  elsewhere. 

On  pages  155,  201,  204,  there  will  be  found  similar 

express  and  unmistakable  denials  of  any  transcen- 


COMMENTAIIY. 


515 


dental  "  Gebrauch  "  on  the  part  of  the  categories.  It 
is  not  difficult  to  see  what,  in  regard  of  the  various 
expressions,  Kant  must  have  had  variously  in  mind. 
Still  such  variety  suggests  on  our  part  indulgence  to 
Kant  in  the  use  of  his  terms.  I,  for  my  part,  would 
have  preferred  to  have  denied  for  the  categories  a 
transcendent  Gebrauch.  Of  course,  it  is  not  at  all 
necessary  for  us  to  have  Kant's  categories  in  order  to 
understand  how  absent  things  may  be  still  actual. 
There  is  a  very  objectionable  hide  and  seek  on  the 
part  of  Kant  in  special  reference  to  necessity,  now  as 
causal,  and  now  as  modal.  We  have,  in  this  section, 
a  strong  declaration,  too  (190),  in  regard  to  that 
determining  in  the  unity  of  an  all-embracing  time, 
etc.,  which  is  viewed  as  an  actual  "  dating."  Causal 
determination  is  here  restricted  to  "the  relation  of 
things,"  the  one  as  cause  and  the  other  as  effect,  etc. 


General  Remarks,  etc. 

The  chief  reason  for  this  section  seems  to  be  the 
making  good  of  the  empirical  referemx  even  in  its 
extremest  form.  The  section  itself  is  an  addition, 
and  not  found  in  the  Kritik  in  its  first  form.  I  have 
no  hesitation  in  regarding  it  as  an  afterthought.  I 
have  examined  the  text  of  the  first  edition,  and  col- 
lected several  scores  of  passages  that  bear  on  this 
question  of  an  empirical  reference ;  but  I  can  find  in 
none  of  them  any  examples  of  such  extreme  state- 
ment as  we  have  here.  I  suspect  Kant  now  to  have 
his  eyes  open  to  the  possible  failure  of  his  rationale  in 
its  attempt  to  account  for  the  principles  of  relation, 
and  to  be  grasping,  consequently,  at  suggestions  to 

justify. 

That  Kant's  machinery  is  only  of  possible  empirical 


516 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


use,  we  accept  at  once  and  without  difficulty.  To 
that  extent,  then,  we  grant  the  empirical  reference. 
We  grant  the  empirical  reference,  I  say,  and  we  are 
even  willing  to  grant  an  appeal  to  actuality  in  order 
to  effect  realization  for  the  principles  potentially  at 
work.  But  then  these  principles  must  be  perfectly 
seen  to  be  potentially  at  work,  the  moment  the  reali- 
zation has  been  effected.  If  on  withdrawing  the 
reabzation  the  principles  themselves  disappear,  then 
these  are  not  independent  of  that.  Kant's  scheme  of 
pure  perception  was  just  to  enable  us  to  pass  beyond 
mere  notions  and  to  have  for  the  realization  of  these 
pure  matter.  Are  we  to  suppose  now  that  pure  per- 
ception is  not  enough,  but  that  we  must  be  allowed 
to  orient  ourselves  by  an  actual  appeal  to  empirical 
fact?  Well,  that  surely  is,  by  no  means  obscurely, 
a  very  important  change  of  front ;  but  we  shall  even 
grant  it  on  condition  that,  after  realization  has  been 
so  procured,  the  a  priori  system  is  seen  then  quite 
plainly  in  its  own  independent  reality  of  place  and 
function.*  Should,  however,  said  a  priori  system  show 
to  have  been,  not  only  illustrated,  but  actually  pro- 
duced, by  the  realization,  then  it  will  be  our  right  to 
cancel  the  term  (a  priori).  It  is  so  clear  from  a 
thousand  intimations  that  the  original  intention  was, 
for  realization  of  the  categories,  only  to  refer  to  pure 
sense,  that  now  we  can  only  suspect  an  actual  em- 
pirical reference  as  involuntary — as  something,  by 
mere  necessity  of  the  case,  compelled.  The  empirical 
reference,  in  fact,  is  seen  to  have  become  the  empiri- 
cal instruction.  The  categories  of  relation  are  not 
only  seen,  with  Kant,  to  be  impossible  of  realization 
out  of  mere  notions ;  but  these  very  notions,  and  not 
less  their  dependent  schemata,  are  seen  to  be  impos- 
sible of  realization  without  this  that  we  call  empirical 


COMMENTARY. 


517 


instruction.  Kant's  own  allures^  and  all  the  more 
because  of  their  very  simplicity,  betray  the  truth 
here.  How  very  naive  these,  "  Es  ist  etwas  sehr 
Bemerkungswürdiges  dass,"  "  noch  merkwürdiger 
aber  ist,  dass,"  etc.  !  That  reference  to  "  All  con- 
tingent existence  must  have  a  cause,"  etc.,  is,  on  the 
part  of  the  good  Kant,  but  a  simply  artful  diversion. 
We  do  see  into  such  things  through  mere  notions, 
and  it  is  no  objection  that  we  do  not  know  them  to 
dictate  to  experience,  and  they  would  dictate  to  ex- 
perience were  experience  so  and  so  constituted.  His 
reference  to  space  in  order  to  realize  action  and  re- 
action is  surely  a  saying  for  the  sake  of  a  saying,  and 
very  artful  is  his  mixing  up  of  the  category  of  quan- 
tity that,  for  realization,  stands  in  no  need  of  empiri- 
cal exemplification,  with  those  others  that  expressly 
do  so  stand.  Give  us  but  space,  give  us  but  time,  and 
we  can  perfectly  realize  all  that  is  given  to  quantity ; 
but  give  us  both — give  us  a  time  actual,  give  us  a 
space  actual,  and,  even  with  their  infinitudes  before 
us,  we  shall  never  be  able  to  realize  substance  and 
accident,  cause  and  effect,  action  and  reaction. 


Appendix. 

It  may  be  reasonably  thought  that,  latterly,  on  the 
part  of  the  Commentary,  there  has  been  criticism, 
rather  than  exposition.  To  amend  this,  I  propose  to  ap- 
pend here  the  conclusion,  so  far,  of  an  earlier  analysis  ; 
beginning,  that  is,  from  B  or  the  second  analogy.  In 
writing  this  out,  I  shall  compare  it,  paragraph  by 
paragraph,  with  the  original,  and  should  anything 
su""<^est  itself  worthy  of  further  remark,  I  shall  add  as 


518 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT 


much  in  footnotes.  I  shall  not  be  sorry  that  a 
specimen  of  this  analysis  should  be  seen,  as  well  as 
the  fact  known,  that  my  views  then,  whether  in 
exposition  or  critique,  were  pretty  well  already  fixed. 
I  propose  also  to  include  in  this  appendix  whatever  I 
may  judge  to  be  of  an  illustrative  nature  in  the  first 
93  pages  of  the  Prolegomena,  I  shall  probably  sub- 
join, too,  under  a  third  head,  sundry  extracts  from 
other  works  of  Kant,  which  may  seem  to  me  eluci- 
dative of  what  positions,  special  or  general,  we  have, 
in  the  foregoing,  seen. 


I.  Pen-in-Hand  Analysis  of  the  Year  1860, 
(From  B  to  middle  of  C.) 

B. 

Second  Analogy.  Principle  of  sequence  in  time  as 
modified  by  the  law  of  causality,^ — All  alterations  occur 
according  to  the  law  of  the  connexion  of  cause  and 
effect.  Proof  (already  proved  that  all  phenomena  of 
time  are  but  changes  or  alternating  modi  of  sub- 
stance, which  itself  is  constant.  The  idea  of  change 
just  one  subject  with  two  opposed  modi), 

I  perceive  phenomena  only  in  succession,  ie,,  I 
connect  two  or  more  in  time.  But  nexus  holds,  not 
of  sense,  but  of  understanding,  through  imagination. 
The  two  states  in  a  sequence  may  be  put  indifferently 
(unless  on  a  law)  so  far  as  time  is  concerned.  For 
time  is  itself  unperceived,  so  that  no  empirical  deter- 
mination can  flow  thence.     Still  one  is  first  and  the 

»  Of  course,  mij  position  is  that  no  mere  logical  function  of  intellect 
mn  modify  the  sequence  of  time,  even  if  given  pure,  into  the  law  of 
cause  and  effect  as  experience  in  things.  **  Empirical,"  that  soon  follows, 
is  not  Kant's  ordinary  empirical :  it  refers  to  the  »upposititiously  deter- 
mining act  of  a  thing-in-itself.  Of  course,  what  is  in  this  "  analysis,"  is 
of  little  use  unless  compared  with  the  original. 


COMMENTARY. 


519 


other  second  without  apparent  reason — so  far  as  sense 
is  concerned,  they  are  not  objectively  related.  To 
effect  this  objective  relation,  the  one  must  be  thought 
as  necessarily  first,  and  the  other  as  ditto  second.  But 
the  category — and  only  a  category  can  do  this— the 
category  of  causality  has  just  this  precise  effect.  It 
prescribes  the  order  of  nexus — brings  it  about  that 
we  subject  all  sequence  of  phenomena,  all  change,  to 
this  law,  which  is  the  foundation  of  experience.  As 
objects  of  experience,  phenomena  only  possible  on 
this  law.  [We  see  here  there  is  not  so  much  induc- 
tion as  dogmatism :  we  have  the  category  of  cause 
and  effect,  we  have  the  universal  sense-form  time ; 
impressions  from  without  must  submit  to  be  modified 
by  this  a  priori  machinery :  one  event  is  seen  as 
cause,  the  other  as  effect ;  the  one  necessarily  first  in 
time,  etc.  The  only  reason  for  the  inversion  is  the 
necessity,  not  only  of  explaining,  but  of  possessing 

necessity."^ 

Our  subjective  modifications  successive ;  but  the 
important  point  in  them  is  their  objective  reference. 
They  are  not  only  subjective  states,  but  they  take 
up  an  objective  position.  Now,  it  is  the  necessary 
nexus  extended  to  them  by  the  understanding  that 
effects  this  objectivity.  We  can  pronounce  nothing 
of  them  as  things  in  themselves.  They  are  successive 
in  apprehension,  but  receive  a  mutual  nexus  in  time. 
Even  in  the  apprehension  of  a  house  there  is  succession, 
but  this  is  not  predicated  of  the  object.  The  house, 
though  a  sum  of  successive  subjective  modifications  of 


»  The  passages  in  square  hooks  are  comments  of  the  pen-in-hand 
analyst  as  he  goes  on  ;  that  is,  they  are  in  the  original  MS.,  and  not 
added  by  me  now.  I  add  nothing  now  but  by  footnote.  The  inversion 
referred  to  is  the  transference  of  the  law  of  causality  from  the  things 
themselves  to  us. 


520 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


ourselves,  comes  to  be  viewed  as  their  object ;  and 
with  this  object  the  notion  I  derive  from  my  subjec- 
tive modifications  must  agree.  Truth  being  agreement 
of  the  idea  with  the  object,  the  formal  or  a  priori 
conditions  of  empirical  truth  can  alone  be  our  question 
here ;  and  the  phenomenon,  conceived  as  in  contra- 
distinction to  the  subjective  modifications  which  con- 
stitute  it,  can  become  distinguished  from  these  as 
their  object,  only  if  it  stand  under  a  rule  or  law, 
which  distinctively  characterizes  it  in  opposition  to 
all  others,  and  renders  necessary  a  certain  mode  of 
uniting  into  the  unity  of  an  object  the  complex  of 
its  details.  The  condition  of  this  necessary  nexus  is 
that  in  the  phenomena  that  constitutes  the  object ;  or 
that  in  the  phenomena  which  constitutes  this  condi- 
tion is  the  object.  [The  subjective  modification  of 
sense,  then,  not  the  object :  the  ingredients  derived 
from  the  a  j?nm  of  sense  and  understanding  consti- 
tute the  object.]* 

To  perceive  a  new  state,  a  former  other  state  is 
presupposed ;  for  a  state  following  an  empty  time  is 
as  unperceivable  as  this  latter  itself  The  event,  then, 
follows  some  other.  But  this  following  is  common 
to  all  apprehension  (as  in  the  house),  and  there  is  no 
principle  of  distinction  so  far.  But  now  the  first 
is  seen  to  be  necessarily  first,  and  the  second  neces- 
sarily second.  The  boat  drifting  down  a  river  can- 
not  reverse  its  successive  loci.      The  ordo   of  these 

^  >  The  above  paragraph  is,  in  the  first  edition,  the  first.  In  that  edi- 
tion, too,  the  second  analogy  was  called  "  Grundsatz  d^r  Erzeugung  • " 
and  the  initial  proposition  ran  thus  :  «  All  that  happens  (begins  to  be) 
presupposes  something  whereon  it  follows  in  obedience  to  a  rule."  Be- 
ginning to  be,  actual  genesis,  Kant  found,  evidently,  not  to  answer. 
The  category,  with  time  alone,  would,  certainly,  have  been  more  glar- 
ingly unable  to  account  for  causality,  were  cases  of  causality  to  be 
regarded  as  actual  originations. 


COMMENTARY. 


521 


is  fixed.     First  and  last  is  indifferent  in  the  house, 
but  here  absolutely  fixed. 

The  subjective  sequence  (otherwise  quite  indeter- 
minate) is  to  be  inferred  from  the  objective.  The  nexus 
of  first  discretionary.  The  second  depends  on  a  rule. 
Only  on  such  rule  can  I  have  authority  to  prescribe  the 
succession  as  objective  to  the  succession  as  subjective 
while  still  simply  in  apprehension.  [All  this  particu- 
larly puzzling  to  common  reader,  as  to  him  all  that 
Kant  states  plainly  proves  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  to  depend  on  what  comes  ab  extra^  and 
not  ah  intra.  Kant's  argument  is  this:  We  only 
know  appearance  to  sense,  and  appearance  to  sense 
can  be  subjected  to  law  only  from  within  ;  that  it  is 
so  subjected  is  evident  from  the  element  of  necessity 
which  obtains  in  it — an  element  impossible  to  be 
derived  ah  extra^  for  elements  ah  extra  always  are,  and 
can  only  be,  contingent.]^ 

*  The  reader  may  now,  quite  legitimately,  take  it  for  granted  that  he 
has  the  whole  case  before  him.  All  lies  in  the  first  three  paragraphs  of 
the  first  edition.  "  Apprehension  "  is  explained  as  "  Aufnahme  in  die 
Synthesis  der  Einbildungskraft."  Then  "das  Mannigfaltige  der 
Erscheinung  ist  jederzeit  successiv."  From  this  it  is  plain  that  the 
Mannigfaltige  of  the  Erscheinung  is  the  complex  in  sense,  the  units  in 
the  breadth  of  a  sensuous  impression.  Now  that  Mannigfaltige,  these 
units  are  taken  up  in  apprehension  successively.  All  is  as  yet  subjective, 
but  the  question  is,  how  will  it  be  when  the  subjective  impressions 
differentiate  themselves  and  stand  apart  from  the  mind  as  a  single  actual 
object  ?  Then  he  goes  on  to  say  that  the  object  may  be  such  that  its 
units  are  all  together  in  time,  and  not  after  one  another,  as  in  the  house, 
or  again  that  the  object  may  be  such  that  it  exhibits  even  objectively  a 
succession  in  time,  that  is,  a  necessarily  irreversible  succession  in  time, 
as  in  the  boat.  And  here  Kant  will  impute  all  such  difference  to  the 
influence  of  a  categorical  rule,  while  the  puzzled  reader  feels  that  all 
difference  concerned  was  only  due  to  the  difference  of  the  transcendental 
objects  themselves.  "  The  question  is  now  :  whether  the  units  of  the 
house  itself  are  also  in  themselves  successive,  the  one  to  the  other,  which, 
of  course,  no  one  will  admit.  But,  again,  directly  I  raise  my  notions  of 
an  object  into  the  transcendental  sense,  the  house  is  not  a  thing  in  itself 
but  only  an  Erscheinung j  that  is,  impressions  of  sense  whose  transcendental 


522 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


The  antecedent  determines  the  consequent,  and  not 
vice  versa.  No  event  goes  back  from  subsequent  to 
previous  time ;  still  it  refers  to  what  was  previously. 
But  the  antecedent  being  given,  the  progressus  is 
forwards. 

The  subjective  succession  of  apprehension  insuffi- 
cient to  the  objective.  This,  were  it  only  that,  would 
be  mere  sport  and  confusion,  etc.  For  a  connected 
sane  experience,  then,  a  rule  of  nexus  is  absolutely 
necessary. 

If  consequent  not  (on  a  law)  referred  to  an  ante- 
cedent, I  could  not  assert  a  sequence  in  the  object. 
This  law,  then  (of  derivative  consequent),  enables  me 
to  make  my  subjective  synthesis  objective ;  and  only 
on  such  presupposition  is  the  experience  of  occurrence 
or  event  possible. 

This  opposed  to  the  ordinary  derivation  of  the 
notion  cause  from  a  comparison  and  induction  of 
actual  experience.  But  were  its  origin  so  {Le.^  em- 
pirical) it  would  be  of  a  contingent  nature,  as 
contingent  as  the  experience  itself;  there  could  be 
no  element  of  universality  and  necessity  present» 
Such  necessity,  etc.,  would  be  merely  assumed  (as  in 
an  induction).  Like  others  the  like  (as  space  and 
time),  we  get  these  from  experience  because  we  our- 
selves had  previously  placed  them  in  experience,  and 
in  this  way  even  rendered  it  possible.  The  logical 
clearness    of   the   rule   and   principle  is,  of  course, 

object  is  unknown."  It  is  important  to  know  thoroughly  what  these 
words  mean,  Apprehension,  Erscheinung,  Mannigfaltiges,  Transcendental, 
etc.  For  the  second,  phenomenon  can  be  used,  and  is  used  by  Kant. 
The  unknown  object  of  any  perceived  object  is  rather  transcendmt  than 
transcendental,  but  it  is  transcendental  so  far  as  it  is  supposed  actually  to 
operate  in  experience.  To  give  my  notions  of  an  object  their  transcen- 
dental sense,  is  to  see  that,  materially,  we  have  only  to  do  with  our  own 
sensuous  affections.  Evidently,  we  have  to  be  indulgent  with  Kant  in 
the  use  of  his  terms. 


COMMENTARY. 


523 


only  possible  after  experience,  but  dependence  on  it 
(rule,  principle)  as  condition  of  synthesis  in  time 
was  the  foundation  of  experience  itself,  and  preceded 
it  a  priori,     [This  a  lucid  paragraph.] 

Could  not  predicate  such  nexus  in  experience 
without  such  a  priori  principle :  apprehension  were 
merely  subjective,  and  without  distinction,  else.  Wc 
are  compelled,  etc. 

Impressions  are  only  modifications  of  our  subject. 
How  do  we  give  them  an  object  ?  How,  by  addition 
to  the  subjective  reality  as  modifications,  do  we 
attach  to  them  an  objective  reality  also  ?  Reference 
to  another  impression  or  idea  (outward  object)  in- 
sufficient, for  how  does  that  again  transcend  its 
merely  subjective  nature  (as  affection  of  our  own)  ? 
The  new  condition  and  dignity  derived  by  our  im- 
pressions from  this  objective  reference  indicate  the 
production  of  a  certain  necessary  collocation  into 
unity  on  the  part  of  our  impressions,  and  their 
reduction  to  rule.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  our 
impressions  obtain  an  objective  character  because 
there  is  in  them  a  necessary  order  in  relations  of 
time.  [How  important  it  is  always  to  bear  in 
mind  that  we  know  only  the  inward  affection,  which, 
being  inward,  must  receive  all  further  elaboration  ab 
intra.  An  outward  cause  of  impressions  is  assumed, 
but  not  the  slightest  idea  can  be  formed  of  its 
nature.]' 

*  The  hooks  have  simply  got  hold  of  the  truth.  If  what  Reid  calls 
the  "  ideal  theory  "  is  true,  then  Kant,  who  professes  nothing  else,  must 
be  admitted  to  be,  on  the  whole,  right.  If  the  material  elements  of 
things  are  only  successive  units  of  subjective  impression  taken  up  in 
sense,  and  if  sense  must  distribute  these  units  only  indifferently  into 
two  mirages  within  us  called  space  and  time,  then  any  rule  in  these  suc- 
cessive units  can  only  come  from  within.  It  shall  be  the  influence  of 
such  ruling,  consequently,  that  raises  these  subjective  units  into  the 
objective  things  of  the  cosmical  whole.     Of  course,  that  is  the  bother  aU 


524 


TEXT-BOOK   TO    KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


525 


In  apprehension  the  particulars  are  successive,  but 
— ^in  so  much  general  and  common  apprehension — 
there  is  no  object,  for  no  one  is  distinguished  from 
the  rest.  But  relation  in  sequence  to  an  antecedent 
on  which,  in  virtue  of  a  law,  a  consequent  follows — 
this  attained,  then  there  is  something  that  presents 
itself  as  an  event,  an  occurrence.  Then  there  is  a 
necessary  time-order.  In  the  idea  event,  then :  1st, 
an  antecedent  (determination  of  something  to  exist 
in  virtue  of  something  in  a  time  in  which  it  was  not). 
The  antecedent  contains  the  condition,  in  virtue  of 
which  the  consequent  always  (ie,,  by  a  law)  follows. 
Hence,  Istly,  cannot  reverse  the  series;  and,  2dly, 
the  antecedent  being  given,  the  consequent  miist 
follow.  So,  order  in  our  ideas:  the  present  state 
refers  to  the  past  as  indefinite  correlate,  determinative, 
however,  of  the  former,  and  uniting  it  necessarily 
with  itself  in  the  sequence  of  time. 

Former  time  (as  filled)  determines  later  time  neces- 
sarily, the  latter  being  reached  only  through  the 
former:  this  a  formal  condition  of  all  perception. 
Therefore  the  empirical  perception  has  a  like  law. 
Former  phenomena  determine  later.  For  only  on 
occasion  of  phenomena  is  this  continuity  of  time  and 
times  empirically  perceived.» 

To  experience  understanding  necessary,  not  for 
clearness,  but  for  possibility.  Here  understanding 
imposes  time-order  on  the  phenomena,  assigning  a 
sequence  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  without  which 

along,  that  the  reader's  feeling  is  constantly  giving  the  lie  to  the 
necessity  in  the  causal  sequence  not  being  in  the  impressions  them- 
selves. 

*  This  paragraph  seems  so  to  refer  to  time  as  time,  that  a  mistake  were 
venial.  The  first  words,  however,  contain  the  necessary  correction. 
What  is  concerned  is  "  a  formal  condition,"  not  of  time  as  time  (though 
that  is  true  too),  but  **  of  all  perceptions" 


i 


there  were  no  agreement  with  time,  the  order  of 
whose  parts  is  a  priori  established.  This  is  not  in 
consequence  of  a  reference  to  absolute  time  itself — 
that  is  not  perceivable;  but  inversely  phenomena 
must  determine  their  own  time-sequence,  the  ante- 
cedent in  virtue  of  a  law  determines  the  consequent, 
and  a  series  results,  which  (by  understanding)  pro- 
duces the  same  order  and  continuity  in  all  possible 
perceptions  as  is  found  a  priori  in  the  form  of  inner 
perception  (into  which  all  must  come).  [Under- 
standing reduces  phenomena  (the  units  of  impression) 
to  the  order  of  time  by  the  law  of  causality.]^ 

The  phenomenon  becomes  real  (when  assigned  its 
place  in  time),  Le.^  an  object  which  by  virtue  of  a  law 
can  always  be  found  in  its  place  relatively.  The  law 
is :  that,  in  the  antecedent,  is  the  condition  determina- 
tive of  the  consequent.  Thus,  the  principle  of  a 
sufficient  reason  is  the  foundation  of  experience,  or 
of  the  objective  knowledge  of  phenomena  with  regard 
to  their  mutual  relation  in  the  sequent  series  of  time.^ 

Moments  in  said  principle :  Apprehension  of  ima- 

1  The  hooks,  again,  contain  the  whole  truth  here.  Time  is  not  an 
absolute  object.  Were  it  such,  it,  of  itself,  would  determine  everything 
that  might  be  in  it.  Time  is  only  a  mirage  of  general  sense.  Units  of 
impression,  then,  are,  in  the  first  instance,  uninfluenced  by  time.  They 
present  themselves  in  us  indifferently  timeless.  It  is  the  law  (of  the  cate- 
gories) determines  them  into  the  order  of  time  itself,  for,  though  a  mirage, 
it  has  an  order.  There  is  no  determination  into  time  till  a  category  acts. 
Time  itself  determines  not.  Think,  then,  of  the  mess  made  by  that 
"  unity  of  an  all-embracing  time  !"  Of  course,  the  units  being  then  time- 
less, it  is  inconsistent  on  the  part  of  Kant  himself  to  call  them,  even  in 
the  first  instance,  a  "  succession." 

^  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  "  phenomena "  under  this  sec- 
tion are  always  such  as  go  to  make  up  a  case  of  causality.  No  other 
phenomena  are  ever  meant  here  as  being  reduced  to  the  order  of  time 
itself  (a  first  that  is  first  and  a  second  that  is  second,  irreversibly).  It 
is  certainly  only  causality  that  does  this  ;  but  that  only  in  its  own  case. 
To  mistake  this  is,  with  Schopenhauer  and  others,  to  make  only  one  cate- 
gory of  the  twelve,  objective. 


526 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


gination  successive.  So  far  no  determinate  order. 
But  the  order  becomes  determinate  (objective).  There 
is  an  empirical  judgment  assigning  the  consequent  to 
the  antecedent;  otherwise  mere  subjective  Spiel 
The  law  of  causality,  then,  conditions  the  objective 
validity  of  our  empirical  judgments  in  regard  of  events 
in  experience.  The  principle  of  causality  in  the  suc- 
cession of  phenomena,  therefore,  operates  for  all 
objects  of  experience  (under  condition  of  succession), 
because  it  is  itself  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  such 
an  experience.  [If  the  mere  indifferent  succession  of 
our  units  of  sense-impression  exhibits  law,  that  law, 
as  neither  in  these  units  from  themselves,  nor  yet  from 
time,  can  only  come  from  the  understanding,  from  a 
category.  Were  the  law  not  necessary,  there  were  in 
said  units  mere  subjective  sport.] 

(What  follows  of  B  seeming  unimportant,  I  with- 
hold the  relative  notes  and  pass  on  to  C.) 

Third  Analogy,     Principle  of  simultaneity  on  the  law 
of  reciprodty  or  community. — All  substances,  so  far  as 
they  can  be  perceived  together  in  time,  are  in  con- 
stant relation  of  reciprocal  action.     Proof — Things 
simultaneous  if,  empirically,  the  perception  of  the  one 
can  follow  the  perception  of  the  other  interchangeably 
(not  as  last).     Moon  and  earth.     Time  cannot  itself 
give  us  this.     The  synthesis  of  imagination  says  only 
the  one,  in  apprehension,  is  in  the  subject  now,  the 
other  again,  and  vice  versa ;  not  that  they  are  simul- 
taneous, or  that  their  simultaneity  is  necessitated  by 
their  interchangeable  position  in  the  sequence.     Con- 
sequently, a  notion  of  understanding  is  necessary  in 
order  to  say  that  the  mutual  sequence  is  in  the  object, 
and  that  the  simultaneity  is  objective.     But  the  rela- 
tion of  reciprocal  influence  is  that  in  which  substances 
exhibit  möc/ünterchangeably  attributable  to  each  other 


COMMENTARY. 


527 


I 


m 


as  ground  or  cause,  and  is  a  notion  of  understanding. 
Therefore  the  simultaneity  of  substances  in  space 
cannot  be  otherwise  known  in  experience  than  on  the 
assumption  of  mutual  reciprocity.  This  a  condition 
of  the  possibility  of  things  as  objects  of  experience. 
[Next  paragraph  seems  to  imply  that,  to  come  under 
the  law,  the  things  themselves  have  transcendental 
peculiarities  to  qualify  or  render  them  eligible — is  not 
this  the  assumption  of  transcendental  principles  ab 
extra?  This  must  be  so,  indeed,  or  the  application 
of  the  categories  would  be  itself  confused  and  indeter- 
minate. Kant,  perhaps,  would  call  this  no  objection : 
he  would  say,  it  is  so,  but  still  the  empirical  sense- 
units  are  contingent,  and  we  can  ascribe  necessity  to 
them  only  so  far  as  they  cohere  with  necessary  a 
jjriori  principles  of  the  understanding.  But,  in  this 
case,  it  would,  after  all,  be  no  more  than  a  transcen- 
dental necessity  ab  extra  coinciding  with  a  transcen- 
dental necessity  ab  intra,  and  the  theory  would  no 
longer  consist  of  a  contingent  a  posteriori  fashioned 
cosmically  by  a  necessary  a  priori.  There  is  a  diver- 
sity in  the  application  of  the  categories ;  the  one  is 
now  in  use,  and  another  again:  there  must,  there- 
fore, be  something  ab  extra  that  gives  the  hint  when 
this  one  shall  come  into  play,  and  when  that  one.  In 
short,  there  must  be  transcendental  peculiarities  in 
the  a  ijosteriori  matter  of  a  necessary  kind,  wholly 
independent  of  us.  This  necessity  in  the  a  posteriori 
construction  simply  corresponds  to,  and  coincides 
with,  the  necessity  of  the  a  priori  construction;  and 
we  are  back  again  in  the  very  middle  of  the  pre- 
established  harmony.]  This  paragraph  states  the 
criterion  of  simultaneity;  and  that  criterion  proves 
to  be  the  peculiarity  of  the  ordo.  [This,  then,  implies 
a  peculiarity  in  the  manifold  itself  that  calls  for  the 


528 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


COMMENTARY. 


529 


law  of  reciprocity  (say),  and  not  for  that  of  causality.] 
If  the  items  of  the  manifold  were  isolated  and  rela- 
tionless,  simultaneity  would  be  no  object  of  a  possible 
perception ;  and  the  existence  of  the  one  could  con- 
duct, by  no  path  whatever  of  empirical  synthesis,  to 
the  existence  of  another.  For,  though  there  might 
be  successive  perception  of  isolated  objects,  there 
could  be  no  criterion  of  whether  they  were  objectively 
consequent,  or,  in  point  of  fact,  objectively  at  once. 
[Still  it  is  manifest  that  there  is  an  objective  pecu- 
liarity determinative  of  the  assertion— which  it  shall 
be.]  [No  doubt,  Kant  sees  this ;  but  he  simply  says, 
what  that  is,  we  don't  know ;  what  we  know  is  that 
we  translate  it  into  a  law  of  the  understanding. — 
In  this  way  we  have  a  sort  of  rationalized  pre-estab- 
lished harmony.] 

Besides  mere  existence  there  must  be  something 
determinative  of  their  mutual  position !» time,  where- 
by we  declare  their  simultaneity.  But  causality 
determines  place  in  time,  and  simultaneity  is  possible 
only  through  each  being  at  once  cause  and  effect. 
Dynamical  community  the  condition  of  simultaneity. 
If  they  are  to  be  known  as  simultaneous,  they  must 
be  seen  to  be  mutually  operative ;  for  unless  so,  they 
would  be  isolated,  and  no  connexion,  one  way  or  the 
other,  could  be  predicated.  But  such  mutual  deter- 
mination being  seen,  then  they  are  together.  This, 
then,  that  renders  such  experience  possible,  is  neces- 
sary ;  and  all  objects  that  are  simultaneous  must  be 
subject  to  this  necessity.  The  experience  impossible 
without  such  and  such,  therefore,  conversely,  all 
objects  of  experience  fall  under  such  and  such, 

Communia  and  commercium.  The  cmimunio  localis 
or  spatii  unknowable  without  the  communio  dynamica. 
This    continuous    iniiience    necessary  to  lead    our 


thought  from  object  to  object.     It  would  be  a  frag- 
mentary and  interrupted  experience  else. 

Subjectively,  all  must  be  a  whole  under  appercep- 
tion. Objective  reference  of  this  renders  it  necessary 
that  the  one  perception  should  condition  the  other  in 
order  that  the  subjective  succession  of  apprehension 
should  not  be  predicated  of  the  objects,  but  that  these 
should  be  known  as  simultaneously  existent.  This, 
then,  a  real  commerce.  The  three  dynamical  rela- 
tions (on  which  all  others  found)  are  those,  therefore, 
of  inherence^  consequence^  and  comjjosition. 

(What  follows  is  from  a  pencilled  summary  of 
similar  date.) 

Transcendental  reason,  why  dialectic  ?  As  transcen- 
dent^ etc.  Kritik  here  to  prevent  lapsus  judicii.  In 
transcendental  judgment  both  regula  and  casus  :  hence 
the  fundamental  or  primary  synthetic  propositions  or 
judgments.  A  canon  for,  a  doctrine  of,  judgment. 
Categories  and  sense  -  conditions  make  schemata. 
[Judgment  subsuming  objects  under  these  gives  rise 
to  fundamental  judgments.]  The  empirical  intention 
of  all,  but  can  only  act  through  these  sense-forms. 
[The  inferrible  subjective  conditions,  without  which 
such  an  experience  as  we  possess  were  impossible.] 
[In  apprehension  (sensation)  as  such,  there  are  differ- 
ences, but  that  they  are  differences  in  time  can  only 
be  our  doing — the  transcendental  object  that  so  acts 
on  us,  unknown,  etc.]  How  know  things-in-them- 
selves  through  forms,  which  must  modify  ?  [Succes- 
sion of  time  to  be  viewed  always  as  time  filled ;  then 
the  filling  called  change  is  so  and  so  that  such  rule 
acts — cannot  invert  the  succession.]  [Simultaneity  of 
clianges — not  merely  of  objects.  Subjectively,  this 
change  is  now,  that  again,  and  also  that  now,  this 

again ;  but  this  subjectivity  is  converted  into  objec- 

2  L 


530 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


tivity  by  the  peculiar  inferential  function  of  the  dis- 
junctive judgment]  [Kant  in  these  compound  rela- 
tions, must  admit  a  subjective  construction  which 
brings  in  an  element  from  without  ?  He  only  insists 
on  the  necessity  of  the  conversion  of  the  subjective 
into  an  objective  construction.]  [There  are  the  em- 
pirical peculiarities,  but  without  the  notions  they 
would  be  successive  and  isolated :  it  is  the  notions 
convert  succession  into  objective  this  and  that.  The 
notion  must  be  seen  to  prescribe  the  time-relation. 
The  notion,  on  such  and  such  subjective  successions 
(which  as  such  only  isolated  and  individual),  is  seen 
to  connect  them  objectively  in  time.  The  phenomenon 
change  we  translate  into  cause  and  effect.]^ 

*  These  notes  will  show  on  the  part  of  the  student  an  anxiety  to  find 
Kant  right,  but,  on  the  whole,  whether  negatively  or  affirmatively,  a 
mood  of  mind  which  the  reflection  of  the  twenty  years  subsequent  to  the 
writing  of  them  has  only  widened,  deepened,  completed,  and  confirmed. 
Suppose  we  look,  for  a  moment,  at  the  first  sentence  under  the  "  Proof  " 
for  reciprocity.    Translated,  it  runs  thus  :— 

"Things  are  together,  if,  in  the  empirical  presentment,  the  per- 
ception of  the  one  can  mutually  follow  the  perception  of  the  other 
(which  cannot  take  place  in  the  time-relation  of  objects  as  exhibited 
imder  causality)." 

Evidently,  the  subjective  state  that  precedes  entrance  of  the  category 
of  reciprocity  must  be  very  different  from  that  which  precedes  entrance 
of  the  category  of  causality.  The  latter  must  have  shown  units  of  im- 
pression which  could  only  be  A  B  ;  while  the  latter  must  have  shown 
others  which,  in  their  turn,  could  be  A  B  and  B  A  at  once.  Surely  a 
relation  that  was  at  once  prospective  and  retrospective  could  not  be 
determined  by  the  same  antecedents  that  determined  a  relation  prospec- 
tive only.    The  facts  here  are  more  glaringly  put  in  the  first  edition  : — 

"  Things  are  together,  so  far  as  they  exist  in  one  and  the  same  time. 
By  what  do  we  know,  however,  that  they  are  in  one  and  the  same  time  ? 
If  the  order  in  the  synthesis  of  the  apprehension  of  this  particular  mani- 
fold is  indifferent,  that  is,  can  go  from  A,  through  B,  C,  D,  to  E,  or, 
contrariwise,  as  well  from  E  to  A.  For  were  the  synthesis  in  time  an 
after-one-another  (were  it  in  the  order  beginning  from  A  and  ending  in 
E),  it  would  be  impossible  to  begin  the  apprehension  in  the  perception 
from  E  and  proceed  back  to  A  j  for,  as  belonging  to  past  time,  A 
could  not  be  any  longer  an  object  of  apprehension."  This  needs  no 
comment. 


COMMENTARY. 


531 


II.  From  the  Prolegomena. 

There  are  scholars  to  whom  the  history  of  philo- 
sophy is  itself  their  philosophy.     III.,  3. 

There  are  no  sure  weights  and  measures  for  them 
in  order  to  distinguish  solid  insight  from  shallow 
prattle.     4. 

I  was  far  from  giving  ear  to  Hume  in  his  con- 
clusions, which  arose  simply  from  the  fact  that  he 
put  his  problem  to  himself  not  in  its  totality,  but 
only  hit  on  a  part  of  it,  which,  without  drawing  the 
whole  into  consideration,  could  lead  to  no  solution. 
9. 

This  deduction— was  the  hardest  thing  that  could 
ever  possibly  be  undertaken  in  aid  of  metaphysic. 
With  it,  I  have  succeeded  in  determining  at  last  the 
entire  system  of  pure  reason,  and  that,  too,  according 
to  universal  principles.     10. 

How  is  it  possible,  said  Hume,  that,  if  a  certain 
notion  is  given  me,  I  can  pass  beyond  it,  and  connect 
with  it  another,  which  is  not  at  all  contained  in  the 
former,  and  that  too  as  though  the  latter  necessarily 
belonged  to  it  ?     30. 

The  entire  transcendental  philosophy,  which  must 
necessarily  precede  metaphysic,  is  itself  nothing  else 
than  simply  the  complete  resolution  of  this  question. 
32. 

Here  now  there  is  a  great  and  authenticated  science, 
which,  already  of  an  admirable  extent,  and  with  the 
promise  in  it  of  infinite  expansion  in  the  future,  brings 
with  it  a  certainty  out  and  out  apodictic,  that  is,  an 
absolute  necessity, — a  science,  therefore,  that  rests 
not  on  any  empirical  grounds,  but  is  a  pure  product 
of  reason,  and  that,  too,  at  the  same  time  that  it  is 


532 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


thoroughly  synthetic:  how  now  is  it  possible  for 
human  reason  to  bring  into  existence  such  a  science, 
and  entirely  a  priori  ?     35. 

These  notions  require,  in  order  to  procure  them 
meaning  and  sense,  a  certain  employment  in  concreto^ 
Le,y  an  application  to  some  perception  (Anschauung) 
or  other,  whereby  an  object  of  them  were  given  them ; 
but  how  can  perception  (Anschauung)  of  the  object 
precede  the  object  ? 

Were  it  necessary  that  our  perception  should  be 
such  that  it  exhibited  to  us  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  then  perception  were  never  a  priori^  but 
always  empirical.  For  what  forms  part  of  the  object 
in  itself,  I  can  only  know  when  it  is  present  to  me, 
when  it  is  given  to  me.  And  then,  too,  it  were  all- 
incomprehensible,  to  be  sure,  how  the  perception  of 
a  present  object  should  enable  me  to  know  it  as  it  is 
in  itself,  inasmuch  as  the  qualities  of  it  could  not 
possibly  migrate,  as  it  were,  and  pass  over  into  my 
consciousness.  But  even  admitting  such  possibility, 
any  such  perception,  even  then,  could  not  be  a  priori^ 
— could  not  possibly  take  place,  that  is,  before  the 
object  were  actually  given  to  me;  for  without  this  it 
were  impossible  to  conceive  any  ground  for  the  refer- 
ring of  my  consciousness  to  this  object — unless  in- 
spiration, revelation.  There  is  only  one  way,  there- 
fore, in  which  it  is  possible  for  my  perception  to 
precede  the  actuality  of  the  object  and  so  realize  an 
a  priori  perceptive  cognition :  said  perception,  namely, 
shall  be  nothing  else  than  that  form  of  sensibility 
which,  in  my  subject,  precedes  all  actual  impressions 
whereby  objects  might  aflFect  me.     37. 

It  is  only  by  the  form  of  sensuous  perception,  there- 
fore, that  we  can  a  priori  perceive  things ;  but  so  we 
shall  be  able  to  know  objects  only  as  they  are  capable 


COMMENTARY. 


533 


of  appearing  {erscheinen)  to  us  (to  our  senses),  and  not 
as  they  are  in  themselves. 

Time  and  space,  now,  are  these  perceptions,  or  per- 
ceptive sense-forms.     38. 

What  I  say  is  this :  there  are  given  to  us  things  as 
objects  of  our  senses,  that  are  external  to  us ;  but  of 
what  they  may  be  in  themselves,  we  know  nothing. 
We  know,  indeed,  only  their  Erscheinungen^  i.e.,  the 
Vorstellungen  (ideas,  affections)  which  they  operate  in 
us  by  affecting  our  senses.  I  admit,  with  all  assur- 
ance, that  there  are  bodies  outside  of  us,  that  is, 
things,  which,  though  completely  unknown  to  us  as 
concerns  what  they  may  be  in  themselves,  we  know 
through  the  affections,  the  consciousnesses,  operated 
in  us  by  their  action  on  our  sensibility  (our  senses). 

45. 

Experience  tells  me  what  is,  and  how  it  is,  but 
never  one  whisper  that  it  necessarily  is  and  cannot  be 
otherwise.  [The  inference  is  that  every  apodictic  syn- 
thetic must,  let  it  appear  wherever  it  may,  as  theo- 
rems in  mathematics,  or  axioms  of  causality,  reci- 
procity, etc.,  in  daily  life,  be  a  priori,  and  have  ^  its 
seat  in  the  functions  of  the  understanding,  the  logical 
forms  of  judgment]     54. 

The  subjective  laws  under  which  alone  an  empirical 
perception  of  things  is  possible,  hold  good  of  these 
things  as  objects  of  a  possible  experience  (not  of 
course  as  things  in  themselves,  which  is  no  considera- 
tion here). 

The  conditions  under  which  alone  an  experience, 

in  regard  of  them,  is  possible.     56. 

We  shall  have  to  do  here,  consequently,  only  with 
experience,  and  the  universal,  a  priori  given,  condi- 
tions of  its  possibility. 

We  must,  in  the  first  place,  remark,  therefore,  that, 


534 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT: 


though  all  judgments  of  experience  are  empirical,  or 
have  their  ground  in  direct  perception  of  sense,  it 
does  not  follow  from  this  that,  conversely,  all  empiri- 
cal judgments  are  judgments  of  experience,  but  that, 
in  addition  to  what  is  empirical,  and  generally,  indeed, 
in  addition  to  what  is  given  in  perception  of  sense, 
there  must  supervene  special  notions  which  have  their 
origin  wholly  a  priori  in  pure  understanding,  under 
which  notions  every  perception  of  sense  must  be  sub- 
sumed, and  then  thereby  converted  into  experience. 
57. 

^  Empirical  judgments^  so  far  as  they  have  objective  vali- 
dity^ ARE  JUDGMENTS  OF  EXPERIENCE ;  those^  again,  ivhich 
are  only  subjectively  valid,  I  name  mere  judgments  of 
sense-perception/  The  latter  require  no  pure  notion 
of  the  understanding,  but  only  the  logical  connexion 
of  the  sense-perception  in  a  thinking  subject.  The 
former,  however,  always  require,  in  addition  to  the 
units  presented  in  sensuous  perception,  special  notions 
a  priori  generated  in  the  understanding  which  just  make 
it  that  the  judgment  of  experience  is  objectively 
valid. 

All  our  judgments  are,  in  the  first  instance,  mere 
judgments  of  sense-perception ;  they  are  valid  merely 
for  us,  that  is,  for  our  subject,  and  only  afterwards  do 
we  give  them  a  new  reference,  namely,  to  an  object, 
which  reference,  we  take  for  granted,  at  the  same 
time,  is  to  be  valid  for  us,  and  equally  so  for  all 

»  The  italics  and  smaU  capitals  are  Kant's  own.  When  Kant  permits 
himself  to  use  the  word  judgment  in  reference  to  the  succession  of  sense- 
units  in  perception,  whüe  still  subjective,  he  is  attempting  to  meet  the 
objection  of  a  transcendental  necessary  order  already  present  in  the  con- 
tributions of  sense,  precedent  to,  and  determinative  of,  the  action  of  a 
category,  but,  in  reaUty,  only  contradicts  and  stultifies  aU  his  own  prin- 
ciples, and  even  his  single  object :  for  what  has  Kant  himself  declared 
a  judgmenl  |i  J>e  %    Verbindung,  (yrdo  I 


COMMENTARY. 


535 


others.  For  when  a  judgment  is  congruous  with  an 
object,  the  judgments  of  all  men  in  regard  to  the 
same  object  must  mutually  agree.  The  objective 
validity  of  the  judgment  of  experience,  consequently, 
means  nothing  else  than  its  apodictic  validity,  its 
necessary  and  universal  validity.  But,  conversely 
also,  should  we  find  cause  to  regard  a  judgment  as 
apodictic  (which  never  depends  on  the  sense-percep- 
tion, but  solely  on  the  category,  under  which  the 
sense-perception  is  subsumed),  we  must  regard  it  also 
as  objective — as  expressing,  namely,  not  merely  an 
affair  of  sense-perception  in  a  subject,  but  a  character 
of  the  object.  For  there  were  no  reason  for  the  judg- 
ments of  others  necessarily  to  agree  with  mine,  did 
not  such  reason  lie  in  the  unity  of  the  object  to  which 
all  these  judgments  referred,  and  with  which — neces- 
sarily all  agreeing,  consequently,  among  themselves — 
they  must  agree. 

Objective  and  apodictic  validity  are  therefore  con- 
vertible expressions;  and  though  we  knownot  theobject 
in  itself,  still,  when  we  regard  a  judgment  as  universal, 
and  consequently  necessary,  we  understand  that  to  con- 
stitute objective  validity.  The  object  (let  it  remain,  as 
what  it  is  in  itself,  always  unknown  to  us)  is  percep- 
tively cognised  and  recognised  by  us  through  such  judg- 
ment, operating,  as  it  does,  the  universally  valid  and 
necessary  connexion  of  the  perceptive  units  given  in 
sense.  And,  inasmuch,  consequently,  as  the  case  is 
the  same  with  all  objects  of  the  senses,  judgments  of 
experience  will  derive  their  objective  validity,  not 
from  the  direct  cognising  of  the  object  (for  this  is 
impossible),  but  merely  from  the  condition  of  the 
universal  validity  of  the  empirical  judgments,  which 
validity,  as  said,  depends,  never  on  the  empirical,  or, 
indeed,  sensuous  conditions,  but  on  a  pure  notion  of 


536 


TEXT-BOOK   TO   KANT  : 


understanding  (a  category).  The  object,  as  object  in 
itself,  remains  always  unknown.  So  soon,  however, 
as  the  connexion  of  the  impressions  (which  are  given 
by  the  object  to  our  senses)  is  recognised  as  univer- 
sally valid,  then  the  object  is  by  means  of  this  relation 
recognised,  and  the  judgment  is  objective.     58,  59.' 

We  shall  illustrate  this. 

I  willingly  admit  that  these  examples  (which  follow) 
do  not  represent  such  judgments  of  sense-perception 
as  could  ever  become  judgments  of  experience,  were 
even  a  category  added  to  them,  because  they  refer 
only  to  feeling,  which  everybody  knows  to  be  merely 
subjective   and  never  capable  of  being  referred  to 
the   object:   these  judgments,  therefore,   never   can 
become  objective.     I  only  wish  for  the  moment  to 
give  an  example  of  the  judgment  that  is  merely  sub- 
jective, and  brings  with  it  no  ground  of  necessary 
and  universal  validity,  and  of  reference  thereby  to 
an  object.     An  example  of  the  judgments  of  sense- 
perception,  which,  by  addition  of  a  category,  become 
judgments  of  experience,  will  follow  presently. 

That  the  room  is  warm,  sugar  sweet,  wormwood 
bitter,  are  judgments  merely  subjectively  valid.  I 
do  not  require  that  I  always,  or  equally  every  other, 
should  find  the  case  to  be  just  as  I  find  it  now! 
These  judgments  express  only  a  reference  of  two  sen- 
sations to  the  same  subject,  namely  myself,  and  that 
too  only  in  my  state  of  sense-perception  for  the 
moment.  They  are  not,  therefore,  supposed  to  hold 
valid  of  the  object.  Now  these  I  name  judgments  of 
sense-perception.     Quite  otherwise  is  it  situated  with 

*  On  page  58,  line  17  from  bottom,  there  is  an  «  alle  Urtheile,"  which 
I  have  translated  as  if  it  were  Aller  Urtheile.    I  think  the  sense  will 
justify  the  change;  but  the  "Anderer  Urtheüe,"  line  5  from  bottom 
will  probably  prove  definitively  convincing.  ' 


COMMENTAKY. 


537 


the  judgment  of  experience.  What,  under  certain 
circumstances,  experience  tells  me,  experience  must 
always  tell  me,  and  equally  everybody  :  its  validity  is 
not  limited  to  the  subject  or  the  momentary  state  of 
the  subject.  Hence  I  pronounce  all  such  judgments 
to  be  objectively  valid.  For  example,  if  I  say  the 
air  is  elastic,  the  judgment  involved  is,  in  the  first 
instance,  only  a  judgment  of  perception :  I  refer  two 
sensations  in  my  senses  only  to  each  other.  But 
shall  this  judgment  be  a  judgment  of  experience, 
then  I  require  that  the  connexion  in  question  shall 
stand  under  a  condition  such  that  it  will  become 
universally  valid.^  My  meaning  is,  therefore,  that  I, 
and  everybody  else  as  well,  must,  in  the  same  cir- 
cumstances, always  effect  necessary  synthesis  in  the 
sense-perception  in  question.     59,  60. 

We  must,  therefore,  analyze  experience,  in  order 
to  see  what  this  product  at  once  of  sense  and  under- 
standing implies,  and  how  the  judgment  of  experience 
is  itself  possible.  We  have  first  the  perception  in  my 
consciousness,  that  is,  the  sense-perception  (percejjtio), 
what  is  merely  given  in  the  senses.  But,  secondly, 
there  is  also  the  judging  (which  is  to  be  ascribed 
to  the  understanding  only).  This  judging  now  is 
capable  of  being  double:  firstly,  in  that  I  merely 
compare  the  sense-perceptions,  being  simply  conscious 
of  my  state  at  the  time ;  or,  secondly,  in  that  I  syn- 

*  Let  the  reader  pay  particular  attention  to  the  phrase  "  a  reference 
of  two  sensations  to  the  same  subject,"  as  applicable  to  sugar-sweetness, 
wormwood-bitterness,  etc.,  and  equally  to  the  other  phrase  "I  refer 
two  sensations  in  my  senses  only  to  each  other,"  as  applicable  to  air- 
elasticity.  Kant  accidently  hits  there  in  passing  the  essential  and 
decisive  distinction;  but  he  only  accidentally  hits  it  there  in  passing. 
He  makes  nothing  more  of  it ;  I  have  not  seen  that  he  ever  again  men- 
tions it.  The  two  differences  only  suggest  themselves  in  passing,  and 
are  no  more  thought  of.  The  latter  of  them,  indeed — the  important  one 
—is  thrown  off  with  an  "  only." 


538 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


thetically  unite  them  in  an  act  of  consciousness  gener- 
ally. The  former  judgment  is  one  merely  of  sense- 
perception,  and  so  far  has  only  subjective  validity : 
it  is  a  mere  connecting  of  the  sense-perceptions  in 
my  own  sentient  state  without  reference  to  an  object. 
Hence,  for  experience,  it  is  not  enough,  as  is  com- 
monly supposed,  to  compare  sense-perceptions  and 
connect  them  in  a  consciousness  by  means  of  an  act 
of  judgment :  there  is  not  given  thereby  the  universal 
and  necessary  validity  of  the  judgment  on  account 
of  which  alone  there  were  objective  validity  and 
exjoerience} 

There  must  still  be  a  quite  other  judgment  ad- 
vanced  before  sense-perception  can  become  experience. 
The  given  perception  must  be  subsumed  under  a 
notion  which  determines  the  form  of  judging  gener- 
ally in  regard  of  perception,  connects  the  empirical 
consciousness  of  this  latter  in  an  act  of  consciousness 
universally,  and  thereby  procures  the  empirical  judg- 
ments universal  validity.  Such  notion  is  a  pure 
a  priori  notion  of  the  understanding  (a  category), 
etc.     61. 

Now,  before  a  judgment  of  perception  can  become 
a  judgment  of  experience,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
sense-perception  should  be  subsumed  under  a  cate- 
gory. For  example,  the  air  falls  under  the  notion  of 
cause,  which  notion  determines  the  judgment  on  the 
air  in  regard  of  expansion  as  hypothetical.  Or,  to 
give  a  more  conspicuous  example:  When  the  sun 
shines  on  a  stone,  this  latter  becomes  warm.  This 
judgment  is  a  mere  judgment  of  sense-perception, 

>  Kant  may  be  often  heard  saying,  that,  "  to  compare  sense-percep- 
tions and  connect  them  in  a  consciousness  by  means  of  an  act  of  judg- 
ment," is,  "  for  experience,"  quite  "  enough."  What  makes  him  say  the 
opposite  now,  is  that  he  is  thinking  only  of  what  he  calls  his  "  subjective  " 
judgment. 


COMMENTARY. 


539 


and  contains  no  necessity.  I  may  have  ever  so 
often,  and  others  may  have  ever  so  often,  perceived 
the  circumstance:  the  sense-perceptions  find  them- 
selves only  usually  so  connected.  But  if  I  say  the 
sun  warms  the  stone,  then  there  has  added  itself  to 
the  sense-perception  the  category  of  cause  as  well, 
which  uniting  the  notion  of  the  heat  necessarily  with 
that  of  the  sunshine,  the  synthetic  judgment  be- 
comes apodictic,  consequently  objective,  and  from  a 
perception  of  sense  converted  into  experience.  61, 
62. 

The  judgment  of  experience  must,  to  the  sense- 
perception,  and  its  logical  connexion  in  a  subjective 
judgment  (when,  through  comparison,  it  has  been 
made  universal)^  add  something  which  determines  the 
synthetic  judgment  as  necessarily  and  universally 
valid.  What  this  is  can  be  nothing  else  than  that 
notion  which  presents  the  perception  as,  in  regard  of 
one  form  of  judgment  rather  than  another,  determined 
in  itself  Said  form  of  judgment,  again,  is  a  notion 
of  that  synthetic  unity  of  perceptions  which  can  be 
expressed  only  by  a  given  logical  function  of  judg- 
ment.    65,  66. 

When  I  say,  experience  tells  me  something,  I 
always  mean  only  the  sense-perception  which  lies  in 
the  experience ;  e,g.^  that,  on  the  shining  of  the  sun 
on  a  stone,  heat  always  follows.* 

These  concern  the  possibility  of  experience  (of 
which  the  units  of  sense-perception  constitute  the 
matter  only,  not  the  form)-concern,  that  is,  certain 

*  The  reader  will  please  to  observe  the  above  "  always,"  and  also  the 
"  universal "  in  the  paragraph  immediately  preceding.  Kant  imdoubt- 
edly  intimates,  in  such  expressions,  that  the  effect  of  the  mere  "  subjective 
judgment,"  of  the  mere  "  logical  comparison,"  is,  after  all,  to  determine 
an  "  always  "  and  a  "  universality  "  in  the  sensations  themselves  before  a 
category  can  act. 


540 


TEXT-BOOK  TO   KANT: 


synthetic  propositions  of  apodictic  validity  which,  as 
in  judgments  of  experience,  constitute  the  ground  of 
the  distinction  of  these  from  mere  judgments  of  sense- 
perception.     71. 

Logic  gives  me  a  priori  the  form  of  antecedent  and 
consequent.  There  may,  possibly,  now,  in  a  percep- 
tion of  sense  be  found  a  rule  of  relation  which  declares 
that  on  a  certain  impression  of  sense  another  (but 
not  conversely)  constantly  follows ;  in  which  case  I 
have  reason  to  apply  the  judgment  of  antecedent 
and  consequent,  and,  for  example,  say,  when  a 
body  has  been  long  enough  in  the  sun  it  becomes 
warm.     75. 

The  notion  of  cause  contains  a  rule,  according  to 
which  from  one  state  another  necessarily  follows ;  but 
experience  can  only  show  us  that  often,  and,  when  it 
rises  high,  commonly,  on  one  state  of  things  another 
follows,  and  can  extend,  therefore,  neither  rigorous 
universality  nor  necessity.     80.^ 


in.  From  the  Logic. 

These  rules  may  be  understood,  therefore,  even 
a  priori,  that  is,  independently  of  any  experience,  because, 
without  distinction  of  objects,  they  contain  merely  the 
conditions  of  the  exercise  of  understanding,  let  it  be 
pure,  or  let  it  be  empirical  And  from  this  it  follows 
at  the  same  time  that  the  universal  and  necessary 
rules  of  thought  generally  can  concern  solely  its  form 
and  nowise  its  matter, — This  science — of  the  mere 
form  of  thought — we  name  Logic.     IlL,  171. 

>  Tbeae  last  two  extracts,  though  contrasting  in  strength,  and  Kant 
is  seen  to  vacillate  in  them,  shed  unmistakable  light  on  the  fact  that, 
already  in  the  received  elements  of  sense  there  must  be  a  certain 
conviction  of  universality,  which  the  category  can  only  apodictically 


COMMENTARY. 


541 


The  question  in  Logic  is  not,  how  we  think,  but 
how  we  must  think.     172. 

All  our  cognitions  are  either  perceptions  {Anschau- 
ungen) or  notions  {Begriffe).  The  former  have  their 
source  in  sense — the  faculty  of  the  perceptions ;  the 
latter  in  the  understanding — the  faculty  of  the  notions. 
200. 

All  Begriffe  given  empirically  or  a  posteriori  are  called 
Erfahrungshegriffe;  those  given  a  priori,  Notionen, 
272. 

A  judgment  of  sense-perception  is  merely  subjec- 
tive; an  objective  judgment  from  perceptions  is  a 
judgment  of  experience.     296. 


INDEX. 


Abraham,  443. 

Absolute,  369,  373. 

Abstract,  17. 

Accident,  290,  292. 

Action,  13,  19,  22,  311,  ix. 

Actuality,  323-336,  469,  472. 

^schylus,  427. 

Esthetic,  138-140,  157,  339,  434-437, 

471. 
Affection,  67,  72,  87,  404,  419,  472, 

497. 
Affinity,  451. 

Aggregation,  268,  270,  277,  482. 
Air,  536  sqq. 
Alexander  (Aph.),  24. 
Alexander  (the  Great),  443. 
Aller  Zeit,  373-377,  456-463. 
America,  xix.,  xxii. 
Amphiboly,  448. 
Analogy,  95,  109,  267,  282-323,   471, 

474,  475,  480,  486-509. 
Analytic,  15-20,  27,  33,  m,  122,  128, 

177-181,  243,  258-261,383, 434-437, 

471, ix. 
Anglesea,  Marquis  of,  427. 
Ansdmuung,  38,  41,  52,  56,  284,  351- 

359,  372,  409,  422,  452,  532,  541, 

xvi. 
Anticipations,  85,  95,  109,  267,  273- 

282,  471,  477,  484-486,  505. 
Apodictic,  11-20,  27,  28,  49,  72,  79, 

80. 
A  posterioH,  12,  18,  21,  23,  30,  31,  47, 

48,  49,  116,  xxiii.,  xxiv. 
Aposteriorität,  452. 
Apperception,  4,  39, 164,  213-220,  230- 

235,  322,  378,  389,  403,  409,  417, 

451,  452,  487,  529,  xvi. 
Application,  453. 
Apprehension,  34-36,  44,  46,  282,  283,  | 

289,  297-301,   308,  317,   422,   452, 

497,  504,  xvi. 
Apprehension  (Simple),  445,  402. 
A  pnori,  12,  17-23,  28-34,  47,  48,  79, 

80,  116,  xxiii.,  xxiv. 
Architectonic,  61,  135. 


Aristotle,  24,  31,  32,  73,  193, 194,  360, 

373,  393,  xxviii. 
Assertoric,  188. 

Association,  6,  7,  10,  12,  42,  452. 
Attention,  233. 
Authenticity,  61. 
Axiom,  85,  94,  100, 148,  267-272,  473, 

477,  482-4. 

Bacon,  9. 

Bashfulness,  xxii. 

Baumgarten,  139. 

Beattie,  8,  23,  26,  167. 

Begriffe,  358,  452,  541,  xvi. 

Belief,  7. 

Berkeley,  89,  90,  368,  369,  447,  450. 

Beriin,  499. 

Bestandtheile,  149,  372. 

Birds,  xxii. 

Blödej  xxii. 

Body,  18,  20,  21. 

Boune  (de),  443. 

Brown,  23,  90. 

Bruce,  443. 

Buckle,  417. 

Bullet,  310. 

Bui  wer,  xxi.,  xxvii. 

Canary  Islands,  xviii. 

Canon,  32,  33,  134,  361,  385,  471. 

Cape  (the),  xviii. 

Cariyle,  379. 

Cases,  471. 

Categorical,  187,  x. 

Categories,  69,  70,  97,  190,  193-243, 
357,  358,  387-462,  492. 

Caterpillar,  xxii. 

Catharticon,  32,  385. 

Catlin,  xxvii. 

Cato,  xxi. 

Causality,  6-20,  26,  29,  68,  79,  80,  98, 
101-103,  107,  130,  238,  275,  277, 
294-317,  330,  337,  339,  356,  359, 
360,  401,  438-444,  449,  480,  490- 
498,  501,  503,  506,  518-31,  ix., 
xxvi. 


"T 


544 


INDEX. 


INDEX. 


545 


Change,  11,  12,  20,  116,  117, 124,  277, 

293-317,    345,   355,    492-496,   605, 

629. 
Cheselden,  459. 
Cicero,  xxi 

Circumstances,  502,  527. 
Clermont,  xix. 
Clew,  385. 
CHtus,  443. 
Coalition,  268,  482. 
Co-existence,  289,  297,  410. 
Cognition,  115,  117, 119, 134,  135,  137, 

144,  468,  xvi. 
Cold,  xxii. 
Commentary,  x. 
Commerdumy  319,  321,  528. 
CommuniOy  507,  528. 
Completeness,  61. 

Composition,  267,  268,  321,  451,  482. 
Conditions  (of  Perception),  208,  447. 
Congo,  xviii. 

Conjunction,  7,  10,  23,  267,  268,  482. 
Connexion,  7,  267,  268,  295,  381,  400, 

402,  452,  478,  479,  482,  486,  489, 

492,  498,  ix. 
Consequence,  321. 
Constitutive,   28,   95,  161,   286,  286, 

363,  392,  403,  ix. 
Construction,  477. 

Contingency,  25,  29,  47-49,  338,  ix. 
Continuity,  276. 
Contradiction,  15,  27,  259,  449. 
Copernicus,  29. 
Cousin,  379. 
Criterion,  117,  176,  177. 
Criticism,  25,  30,  132,  182,  447. 
Critique,  133,  135,  136,  361,  363. 
Crusoe,  64. 
Cushion,  310. 
Custom,  6,  7,  12,  23,  26,  81,  104,  401, 

491. 

Darwin,  xxi. 

Daseyn,  266. 

Dating,  426-438,  478,  479,  500. 

Deduction,  77,  201,  223,  240,  241,  335, 

390-445,  455,  531,  xxüi.-xxvüL 
Degree,  273-282. 
De  Quincey,  156,  193. 
Descartes,  3. 
Dialectic,  33, 176,  178,  180,  332,  383, 

471. 
Diathesis,  451. 
Dinge  an  sich,  353,  354. 
Discursive,  47, 148,  267,  399,  xvi. 
Disjunctive,  187. 
Disposition,  451. 
Divisibility,  18,  272. 
Doctrine,  471. 
Dogmatism,  30,  132. 
Dogs,  xix.,  xxii. 


Dove,  121,  604,  515. 

Dreams,  xxi. 

Duality,  470. 

Duration,  290,  321,  487,  488. 

Dynamical,  267,  268,  321,  392,  528. 

Dynamical  categories,  392,  476-489. 

Earth  (the),  xx.,  xxii. 

Editions  of  Ki-Uik  of  Pure  Reason,  368, 

446-452,  515,  520,  x. 
Ego,  4,  39,  150-154, 164,  xvi.,  xvii. 
Eindrücke,  347. 
Einer  Zeit,  373-377,  455. 
Einheit,  388,  426-432. 
Elements,  137. 
Empirical,  13,  14, 17,  21, 116,  138,175, 

298,  371,  396,  410,  452,  518,  xvi. 
Empirisch,  347. 
English  (the),  xviii.,  xxii. 
Epicurus,  274. 
Epigenesis,  241,  444,  474,479,  480,  491, 

508-511. 
Erdmann,  79. 
Erfahrung,  347,  358. 
ErJcenntniss,  347,  354,  409. 
Erscheinung,  138,  166,  170,  266,  284, 

351-354, 446,  448,  449,  452,  465,  492, 

533. 
Evolution,  XX. 
Examples,  246,  247. 
Existence,  477-479,  487. 
Ex  nihilo,  291,  292. 
Experience,  3-34  passim,  44,  45,  86, 

106,   108,  115,  207,  224,  282,  283, 

321,  333,  385,  395,  409,  419,  422, 

434-437, 444,  497,  533,  xxiii.-xxviii. 
Extension,  18,  20,  21,  268,  269,  355. 
External,  36-39,  42,  140,  445,  446. 
Extrinsic,  393. 

Fact,  6,  7,  11,  14,  27,  28,  45,  349. 
Faculties,  22,  23,  25,  29,  30,  34,  35,  62, 

243,  244,  362. 
Fate,  331. 

Feeling,  4,  5,  49, 115. 
Flux,  276. 
Force,  311. 
Form,  24,  29,  30,  32,  33,  34,  45,  139, 

402,  466,  473,  475,  489. 
French  (the),  xviii. 
Friday,  54. 
Frost,  238,  438-442. 
Function,  67,  72,  87,  185,  385,  404, 

419,  472. 

Galileo,  9. 
Gambia,  xix. 
Gedanke,  xvi. 
Oegendand,  347. 
Gen^ratio  JEquiv.,  241,  444. 
Geography,  xviii. 


Geometry,  143,  161, 162,  204,  271,  272, 

396,  397,  470. 
Glass,  310. 

God,  5,  28,  38,  167,  168,  369,  470. 
Grfetz,  X. 

Gravitation,  475,  489. 
Green  Hand,  xxi.,  xxvii. 
Ground-propositions,  257. 

Habit,  6,  10. 

Harmony,  Pre-,  527,  528. 

Hartenstein,  x. 

Health,  xxi. 

Hegel,  79,  80,  348,  373,  412,  436,  452. 

Henosis,  451. 

Herschel,  xx. 

Heterogeneous,  268. 

Highlanders,  xviii. 

Hindoos,  80,  xxii. 

Homogeneous,  268. 

Horace  xxi. 

House,' 237i  297,  299,  438-442,  501, 
519  520. 

Hume,  3, '4,  5,  6,  8,  9,  12,  15-20, 
22-27,  30,  31,  35,  36,  42,  77-81,  89, 
90,  104,  118,  130,  200,  301,  302,  305, 
348,  357,  359,  372,  381,  389,  392, 
394,  401,  405,  406,  455,  456,  467, 
478,  490,  492,  493,  531,  ix.,  xxi., 
xxii.,  xxvi. 

Hypothetical,  187. 

Ibis  xviii 

Idea,  3,  4,  5,  7,  15,  16,  17,  35,  161, 

332,  349,  357,  363,  383. 
Ideal  (the),  446,  503. 
Idealism,  154,  447,  449,  450,  451. 
Ideality,  146,  164,  500. 
Ideas  (the),  445,  449,  464,  467. 
Imagination,  66,  97,  98,  229,  239,  264, 
295,  308,  317, 388,  389,  409,  413-416, 
419,  447,  451,  469,  472,  497. 
Immediate,  138,  144,  403. 
Immortality,  5,  28,  470. 
Imperative,  x. 
Imi>ression,  4,  5,  7,  35,  36. 
Imputation,  303,  304. 
Index,  X. 

Induction,  303,  304. 
Infinite,  186. 

Influence,  317. 

Inherence,  292,  321. 

Innate,  3. 

Inner  sense,  230-235,  417,  418. 

Insect,  xxii. 

Instinct,  6,  7,  8,  23,  81,  104. 

Instruction,  empirical,  442,   469-488, 
490,  511-517. 

Intellect,  21,  71,  xvii. 

Intellectual,  xvi. 

Intension,  268,  273-282. 


Internal,  36-39,  42,  140,  164,  378. 

Intrinsic,  392. 

Intuitive,  42,  267,  287,  399,  xvi. 

Intuitus,  38,  374,  379,  418,  419,  420. 

Isaac,  443. 

Italy,  xviii. 

Jakob,  16. 

Jeder  Zeit,  455. 

Jews,  xxi. 

Joshua,  476. 

Judgment.  23,  29,  30,  34,  63-67,  78, 
83-85,  106,  108,  109,  111,  183-185, 
221-224,  243-265,  324,  355,  386, 
387,  403,  412,445,452-529,  534-541, 
xvii. 

Jus,  27,  28,  45. 

Kant,  6,  16,23,  24,  46,  89,  138,  139, 
149,  156,  193,  204,  205,  212,  233, 
266,  282,  293,  298,  301-308,  317, 
330,  345  passim  to  end,  ix.,  x.,  xi., 
xv.-xxviii. 

Kepler,  xxii. 

Key-concejition,  71. 

Knowledge,  5,  34,  36,  72,  74,  87,  155, 
469. 

Kcßiiigsbcrg,  xv.,  xvi.,  xxvii. 

Kritik,  506. 

Lampe,  xv.,  xxvii. 

Languedoc,  xviii. 

Laplace,  xx. ,  xxvii. 

Law  lectures,  408. 

Lebanon,  xxii. 

Leibnitz,  3,  30,  31,  43,  111,  159,  340, 

367. 
Levers  of  argument,  77. 
Lewes,  79,  80,  xi. 
Lions,  xviii. 
Locke,  3,  4,  14,  16,  17,  25,  27,  30,  31, 

45,  77,  203,  210,  346,  347,  368,  398, 

399   464. 
Logic'  31-33,  36,  63-66,  140,  169-176, 

185,  221,  243,  383-386,  389,  402,  466, 

540. 
Logical,  xvi. 

Machinery,  transcendental,  445,  447, 
510,  516,  521,  537,  538. 

Magic  lantern,  367. 

Mannigfaltiges,  317,  388,  429,  452,  497. 

Marriage,  xxi. 

Mathematical  categories,  392,  476-480. 

Mathematics,  15,  16,  17,  29,  42,  128, 
130, 155,  156,  210,  225,  258,  265-272, 
285,   336,   359,  380,  381,  384,  392, 

428. 
Matter,  13,  19,  22,  24,  26,  29,  30,  33, 
34,  138,  139,  402,  414,  452,  4G6,  473, 
475,  478,  489. 

2  M 


546 


INDEX. 


Matters  of  fact,  493,  ix. 

Memory,  389. 

Metaphysical,  140,  141,  482. 

Metaphysicians,  155,  156,  158. 

Metaphysics,  5,  6,  9,  12,  29,  43,  120, 
128,  129,  130, 131, 132,  236, 268,  357, 
371,  404,  531,xxiii.-xxviii. 

Äletathesis,  151. 

Method,  33,  137. 

Mill  (Mr),  349. 

Mind,  31,  32,  34,  47, 

Mittelbar,  363. 

Mixed  aprioriy  345,  355. 

Modality,  107,  108,  188. 

Modi,  321. 

Moluccas,  xviii. 

Moment,  275,  314. 

Moon,  476. 

Morals,  136,  137. 

Motherwit,  90,  246. 

Motion,  149,  150,  157,  232. 

Multiple,  72. 

Narr,  xvii. 

Natural  philosophy,  128,  130. 

Nature,  7,  239,  240,  321,  421,  452,  509, 

513,  xxii. 
Necessity,  6,  7,  11,  47,  48,  117,  323- 

336,  396,  444,  473,  513,  519,  521,  ix. 
Necessity,  empirical,  100, 101, 102, 103, 

105,106.  .       .       .       . 

Negroes,  xyüi.,  xix.,  xxii. 

Newspapers,  xxii. 

Newton,  9,  393. 

Nexus,  18-21. 

Mail  est,  etc.,  31. 

Nominalism,  89. 

Notion,  35,  41,  47,  53-59,  111,  171, 175, 

384,  386,  387,  395,  404,  444,  xvii. 
Nationen,  541. 

Noit7netmi,  39,  42,  47,  49,  110,  415. 
Nous,  360. 
Number,  17,  271. 

Object,  24,  29,  35,  42,  43,  45,  48,  289, 
295,  317,  353,  354, 370, 877, 412, 446, 
501,520.  »       '        1        > 

Objections,  69,  73. 

Objective,  10,  11,  59,  60,  06,  295-317, 

375,  411,  497. 
Obscurity,  xxi. 
One  time,  374. 
Ontology,  6. 

Order,  498,  502,  503,  507,  527. 
Organism,  xxii. 

Organon,  32,  33,  134,  361,  385,  472. 
Origin,  XX.,  xxii. 
Oswald,  23,  26. 
Ovid,  12. 


Pandarus,  476. 


Parts  of  Composition,  149. 
Perception,  4,  5,  23,  25,  29,  34,  35,  36, 
38,  39,  41,  50,  66,  67,   106,  121-128, 
138, 139, 145, 157, 162, 167-170,  204, 
205,  218,  225,  284,345,349-354,357, 
358,  363,  368,  374, 385, 395,  397,  398, 
434-437,  488,  497,  xxiii.-xxyiii. 
Petri,  secunda,  90,  246,  453. 
Phenomenon,  39,  42,  47,  49,  74,  97,  98, 

255,  420. 
Philosophy,  7, 51,  52, 419, 422, 432, 435, 

437,  458,  459,  466,  467,  478. 
Physics,  13,  29,  210,  268,  278,  482. 
Place  in  time,  509. 
Plato,  121,  373,  404,  405,  xxviii. 
Poles,  xxii. 
Poltroon,  xviii. 
Pores,  279. 

Possibility,  323-336,  421. 
Possibility  of  experience,  8Q,  108,  118, 
145,   146,   209,   226-229,   240,    241, 
250,  255,   261,  264,  291,  298,  357, 
360,  361,371,374,380,  408,  409-413, 
415,  454,  466,  472,  490,  500,  509- 
512,  533-541,  xxiii. 
Post-predicaments,  195. 
Postulates,  85,  95,  109,  267,  323-336. 

471,  509-515. 
Practical  critique.  111. 
Predicables,  73,  195. 
Predicaments,  73,  195. 
Pre-fomiation,  242,  444. 
Presuppositions  of  Kant,  368,  503, 509, 

523. 
Priestley,  26. 
Priests,  xxi. 
Probation,  49,  110. 
Problem  (Kant's),  488. 
Problematic,  188. 
Prolegomena,  303,  304,  531,  540. 
Up6\vi^is,  274. 
Proof,  498. 

Propmieutic,  134,  361. 
Proposition  of  contradiction,  259. 
Propositions,  445,  471. 
Protagoras,  405. 
Protoplasm,  79,  80. 
Provision,  transcendental,  464-490. 
Pure,  39,  40,  115,  119,  366,  xvi.,  xxv. 


Qualitative  unity,  393. 

Quality,  273-282,  480. 

Quantity,  17,  20,   29,  237,  238,  269- 

272,  281,  438,  480,  501,  605. 
Qidd  facti,  27,  45,  77,  201,  394,  397, 

398. 
Qiiüi  juris,   27,    45,  71,  72,   77,  201, 

394,  397,  398. 


Raij^bow,  160. 
I  Ramus,  453. 


INDEX. 


547 


I 


l: 


Reaction,  18,  19,  22,  131,  139,  141,  ix. 

Reality,  500. 

Reason,  34,    108,   111,   129,    131-134, 

243,  244,  324,  363,  445,  471,  xvii. 
Recejitivity,   71,    169,  170,  385,  472, 

xvi. 
Reciprocity,   29,  70,  71,  87,  101-103, 

107,   316-323,   337,  339,  502,  507- 

509,  526-529. 
Recognition,  451. 
Reference,     empirical,    464-488,    499, 

510,515,516,  517. 
Reflection,  3,  4,  17,  35,  38,  111,  448, 

xvi. 
Regulative,  28,  95,  161,  285,  286,  363, 

392   403  x, 
Reid, 'l7,  23*  24,  26,  77,  78,  80,  81, 

446,  523. 
Mein,  347. 
Relation,  7,  11,  15,  16,  17,  29,  67,  68, 

163,  187,  477-480,  487,  493,  515. 
Rel.ations  of  ideas,  349. 
Relative,  437,  459,  479. 
Relative  a  priori,  345,  346,  355. 
Reproduction,  451. 
Reproduction  (the),  xi. 
Reversibleness,  510. 
Rhapsodic,  73. 
Rhinoceros,  xviii. 
Right,  159. 
Rose  (a),  147. 
Rosenkranz,  16,  79, 117,  120,  122,  125, 

159,   193,  227,  234,  238,  239,  243, 

257,  258,  259,  296,  306,  x. 
Rossbach,  499. 
Rules,  246,  247,  504,  505,  540. 

Saturn,  166. 

Scepticism,  26,  30. 

Schein,  165,  166. 

Schemata,  487,  xxvi. 

Schematism,   83,  88,   89,  91-96,   107, 

248-256,  383,  389,  394,  454-464. 
Scholastics,  199. 
Schopenhauer,  447,  525. 
Schrcedcr,  16. 
Schubert,  x. 
Schwegler,  405,  417. 
Science,  9. 

Scotch,  23,  26,  xviii. 
Sea  (milk-white),  xviii. ,  xxi. 
S<:cret  of  Ecgel,  xi. 
Self-consciousness,  4,  39,  164,  409-413, 

416,  417,  418,  xvi. 
Sensation,  3,  4,  5,  17,  22,  25,  35,  36, 

39,  50,  51,  52,  138,  139. 
Sense,  3,  4,  5,  14,  24,  34,  36,  37,  43, 

45,  48,  67,  68,  84,  87, 137,  145,  371, 

378-383,   406,   421,   442,   467,   497, 

503,  xvi. 
Ship,  299,  501,  520. 


Siberia,  xxii. 

Simple  apprehension,  453,  471. 

Simultaneity,  289,   309-311,  316-321, 

487,  505. 
Singulars,  185, 186. 
Sketch  (biogi-apliical),  xi. ,  xv. 
Smoke,  291. 
Socrates,  404. 
Soul,  371,  470. 
Space,  40-45,  97,   140-169,  341,  357- 

359,   366-377,   387-389,    399,   422- 

443,  478. 
Spontaneity,  71,  87, 169,  170,  385,  472, 

xvi. 
Stahl,'  9. 

States  (succession  of),  506. 
Sterne,  10. 
Stewart,  23. 
Stockings,  xxi. 
Stone,  375,  480,  538  sqq. 
Stupidity,  xvii. 
Style,  193. 
Subject,  39,  42,  43,  45,  48,  213-220, 

228  229   236. 
Subjective,' 5,  10,  11,  25,  39,  49,  242, 

376  444  497. 
Subreptions,  152,  160,  378. 
Subsistence,  292. 
Substance,  13,  19,  22,  29,  67,  119,  211, 

288-294,  337,  339,  490. 
Succession,   289-317,    398,    410,   487, 

494-497,  501,  504,  518-541. 
Sugar,  536  sqq. 
Suggestion,  empirical,  304. 
Sulzer,  16. 

Sun,  375,  476,  480,  538  sqq. 
Swedenborg,  xix.,  xx. 
Syllogism,  404,445,471. 
Symbolical,  xvi. 
Synopsis,  451. 
Synthesis,  60,  61,  66,  67,  81,  82,99, 

118,   191,  212,  241,  267,  268,   295, 

387-392,  403-409, 414,  426,  451,  452, 

487,  497,  503,  ix. 
Synthesis  spedosa,  473. 
Synthetic,  19,  20,  21,  22,  25,  27,  28, 

79,  80,  81,   122-129,  130,  261-264, 

355-357,  379-381,  385,  466. 
System,  391,  531. 

TAIT,  XX. 

Taste,  451. 

Temperance,  xxi. 

Tennemann,  16. 

Terms,  445,  471. 

Tertium  quid,  454,  464,  468. 

Text,  X. 

Text-book  (this),  ix. 

Thesetetus,  404. 

Theology,  466. 

Thersitcs,  476. 


548 


INDEX. 


Things  in  themselves,  28,  38,  46,  47, 
48, 146,  147,  368,  369,  370. 

Thomson,  xx.,  xxvii. 

Thor,  xvii. 

Tides,  476,  xx. 

Time,  40-45,  97,  98, 140, 147-166,  217, 
288,  289,  290,  294,  307,  317,  321, 
357, 366-383,  387, 399, 422-432,  439- 
442,  499. 

Time-determination,  375. 

Tobacco,  XV. 

Torricelli,  9. 

Transcendent,  13,  28,  46, 161,  361,  399, 
449. 

Transcendental,  13,  28,  29,  33,  46,  86, 
107,  134,  136, 143, 174,  175,  207, 209, 
229,  236,  360,  361,  366,  372, 383, 384, 
396,  397,  399, 403,  406,  400.  411, 414, 
415,  421,  449,  452,  465,  478. 

Transcendentixl  lo-'ic,  382,  333,  384, 
393,  466. 

Translations,  x. 

Transposition,  451. 

Triangle,  455. 

Type,  89. 

Ueberweg,  447,  448,  451. 

Understanding,  36,  44,  47,  50-55,  62, 
63,  84,  87,  137,  170,  183,  185,  217, 
224,  246,  307, 321,  324, 333,  361,  363, 


385, 418,  420,  421,  452, 467,  471,  497, 
xvi. 

Understate  (it  is  to),  ix. 

Unity  of  causality,  316. 

Unity  of  time  and  space,  374,  375,  376, 

388,  426-438,  500. 
Universality,  117. 
Unmittelbar,  363,  373. 
Unthings,  378. 
l/iium,  verum,  etc.,  393. 
Urtheil,  412. 

Vacfüm,  320,  332. 

Verstand,  347. 

Vivacity,  7. 

Vorstellung,  4,  347,  353,  373,  533. 

Wait RNEiT MEN,  298,  354,  372, 452,  xvi. 

Water  (of  Cape),  xviii. 

Weight,  21. 

Will,  5,  28,  470. 

Wine,  xxi. 

Wit,  xvii. 

Wolff,  43,  159. 

Women,  xviii.,  xxi. 

Wood,  xxii. 

Worcester  (Bishop  of),  IC 

Works  (Kant's),  xxviii. 

Zusammensetzung,  149. 


I 


EDINBUIIGU  :    TRINTED   BY  OLIVER   AND   BOYD. 


TV^  O  RK  S 


BT 


JAMES  HUTCHISON  STIRLING, 

F.R.C.S.  &  LL.D.,  Edin.; 
Fo&EiGN  Member  ov  the  Philosophical  Society  of  Berlin. 


I. 

In  2  vols.  Svo,  Price  28«. 

THE    SECRET    OF    HEGEL; 

Being  the  Hegelian  System  in  Origin, 
Principle,  Form,  and  Matter. 


OPINIONS   OF  THE  PRESS. 


<(i 


From  BelVs  Messenger. 

There  can  be  no  question  whatever  respecting  the  weight 
and  solidity  of  Mr.  Stirling's  exposition.  ...  It  will  mark 
a  period  in  philosophical  transactions,  and  tend  more  thoroughly 
to  reveal  the  tendencies  of  modern  thought  in  that  direction 
than  any  other  work  yet  published  in  this  country  has  done." 

From  the  Edinburgh  Courant. 

"Mr.  Stirling's  learned  and  laborious  endeavours  to  unveil 
the  mystery  of  Hegel  are  entitled  to  attentive  and  thoughtful 
consideration.  .  .  .  Mr  Stirling  has  applied  himself  to  his 
subject  systematically  and  thoroughly.  .  .  .  There  can  no 
such  complete  guide  be  found  in  the  English  language." 

From  the  Glasgow  Herald. 

"  This  is  a  most  remarkable  book  in  several  respects.  The 
author  is,  perhaps,  the  very  first  in  this  country  who  has  labori- 
ously and  patiently  sounded  Hegel.     .     .    .    unlike  any  of  the 


■iiiiiiiiiii ■i|iiiii|||iM 


"#■) 


2 

commentators  of  Hegel  that  we  have  yet  seen,  Mr.  Stirling  can 
always  be  understood  by  an  intelligent  and  attentive  reader. 
He  writes  as  if  he  wished  to  make  himself  plain  to  the  mean- 
est capacity,  and  he  has  a  facility  of  language  and  illustration 
which  lights  up  the  driest  and  most  abstract  reasonings  of  his 
master.** 

From  the  Temperance  Spectator. 

"  A  great  book  has  just  been  published,  entitled  *  The  Secret 
of  Hegel,*  which,  sooner  or  later,  must  attract  the  attention,  and 
influence  the  conclusions,  of  true  thinkers." 

From  the  Weekly  Despatch. 

"  A  very  elaborate,  conscientious,  and  earnest  work.  .  .  . 
We  express  our  high  estimation  of  the  ability  and  research  dis- 
played in  it." 

From  the  John  Bull. 

"  If  anything  can  make  Hegel's  *  complete  Logic  *  acceptable 
to  the  English  mind,  such  faith  and  industry  as  Mr.  Stirling's 
must  succeed.  .  .  .  Those  who  wish  to  form  a  complete 
survey  of  the  great  field  of  German  philosophy  will  do  well  tt» 
study  these  volumes," 

Frotn  the  London  Review. 

"  We  welcome  most  cordially  these  volumes.  ...  A  work 
which  is  the  monument  of  so  much  labour,  erudition,  persever- 
ance, and  thought." 

From  the  Atheno'tim. 

"  To  say  that  this  is  by  far  the  most  important  work  written  in  the 
English  language  on  any  phase  of  the  post-Kantian  philosophy 
of  Germany  would  be  saying  very  little.  .  .  .  One  of  the  most 
remarkable  works  on  philosophy  that  has  been  seen  for  years." 

From  the  Churchman, 

"  The  book  itself  is  of  much  value,  especially  at  the  present 
time.  ...  It  will  repay  those  well  who  will  give  the  necessary 
attention  to  its  reading.  We  have  to  thank  Mr.  Stirling  for 
setting  these  obscure  dicta  in  as  clear  a  light  as  they  can  be  set 
in,  and  making  them  as  intelligible  as  they  can  be  made." 


From  the  Eclectic  Review. 

"  All  readers  who  have  the  taste  and  patience  necessary  for  the 
encountering  such  tasks  will  be  glad  to  receive  Mr.  Stirling's 
exposition.  We  have  read  it  with  deep  interest.  It  was  a 
very  tough  task,  and  he  has  wrought  it  in  a  determined  and 
intelligent  manner." 

From  the  Westmitister  Review. 
"...  Has  approached  nearer  to  an  intelligible  exposition  of 
the  Hegelian  philosophy  than  has  yet  been  accomplished  in  Eng- 
land.    .    .    .   The  Preface  a  remarkably  vigorous  and  masterful 
piece  of  writing— the  book  able  in  the  highest  degree." 

From  the  Globe. 
"  Mr.  Stirling  has  certainly  done  much  to  help  the  English 
student.  ...  He  is  a  writer  of  power  and  fire— original,  bold, 
self-reliant,  and  with  a  wealth  of  knowledge  and  thought  that 
must  soon  make  him  distinguished  among  the  teachers  of  the 
teachers  of  this  country. 

From  Professor  Masson. 
"The  book  deserves  a  cordial  welcome.'* 

From  Mr.  Cupples. 
"  The  whole  work  is  in  my  view  a  masterpiece — a  great  book. 
The  style,  manner,  method,  and  art  of  it  enchant  me— to  use  a 
loose  expression  among  general  terms.  I  consider  it  to  be  com- 
pletely successful  in  what  it  proposes  to  do.  Its  appearance 
should  constitute  an  era  at  once  in  the  literary  and  the  philoso- 
phical a.spect.  The  ease  and  fulness  of  philosophical  expression 
in  it— the  power  and  wealth  of  illustration,  comparison,  assimila- 
tion, analogy,  metaphor,  literary  filling  out  and  accommodation, 
and  finish— are  to  my  mind  unique.  The  labour,  the  patience— 
the  instinct  for  truth  and  for  metaphysical  tracks  and  trails— the 
constant  connection  with  life— the  explanatory  method  of  re- 
suming and  taking  up,  so  that  the  reader  is  taught  without  almost 
»ny  stress  on  his  own  thought— these  things  continually  rouse 
my  admiration  and  deh'ght.  The  whole  book  is  colossal— a  won- 
der of  work.      The  style  of  it  is  unique  in  raciness,  original 


% 


force,  and  utterly  unafll^cted  prodigality  of  wealth—ctposlloiy, 
ratiociuative,  illustrative,  literary,  familiar,  discursive.  The 
characterisations  of  the  man  Hegel  are  delicice  of  literary 
touch. " 

From  the  Caledonian  Mercury. 

"  Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  speculative  German  himself, 
the  ability  of  his  expositor  is  superior  to  question.  Mr.  Stirling 
has  brought  to  his  work  an  able  and  instructed  mind,  and  an 
unwavering  confidence  in  the  power  and  majesty  of  his  master. 
He  is  in  himself  a  host  of  critics  and  disciples." 

From  the  Scotsman. 

*'  The  critic,  the  historian,  the  sociologist,  the  physiologist,  the 
student  of  natural  science,  will  find  ideas  in  exploring  after  the 
secret  of  Hegel  that  will  be  useful  in  arresting  other  secrets." 

From  the  North  Amei-ican  Review. 

"  The  author  is  a  man  of  classical  accomplishments,  of  the 
sturdiest  and,  at  the  same  time,  keenest  intellectual  faculty, 
of  imagination  enough  to  stock  an  aviary  of  popular  poets." 

From  the  British  Controversialist 

"  It  is  granted  to  few  in  any  age-  -and  especially  in  this  age 
of  critical  rather  than  of  effective  thought— to  gain  by  a  single 
effort  the  highest  place  in  any  department  of  literature.  This 
rare  feat  has  been  accomplished  by  James  Hutchison  Stirling. 
To  him  'familiarity  has  been  converted  into  insight;  the  toils 
of  speculation  have  made  him  strong  ;  and  the  results  of  specu- 
lation have  made  him  wise.'  At  a  time  when  philosophic 
thinking  seemed  exhausted,  and  panting  souls  toiled  after  truth 
apparently  in  vain ;  when  realism  and  psychology  appeared  to 
be  triumphant  over  idealism  and  metaphysic  ;  when  the  diviner 
element  in  man  was  losing  the  consciousness  of  itself,  and  had 
begim  to  be  ignored  in  speculations  upon  human  nature  ;  and 
when  the  outward  forms  of  Bemg  looked  as  if  they  were  certain 
not  only  to  win,  but  to  monopolise  the  entire  attention  of  man- 
kind— one  arose,  suddenly  as  an  apparition,  capable  of  changing 
all  that.  A  philosopher  in  good  truth—  one  who,  stirred  by  the 
love  of  wisdom,  had  toiled  long  and  longingly  to  acquire  a 


5. 

knowledge  of  the  hidden  roots  of  thoughtful  life,  and  who,  un- 
restingly  though  unhastingly,  devoted  the  vigour  of  manhood's 
prime  to  that  researchful  study  which  alone  repays  the  thinker 
with  revelations— came  forth  from  the  seclusion  of  a  self- 
imposed  discipleship  to  lay  upon  the  library  table  of  reflective 
men  the  results  of  a  *  ten  years'  conflict '  with  the  mighty 
mysteries  of  human  thought  and  feeling.  Solid,  judicious,  and 
capable  men  saw  in  the  book  matter  for  profound  consideration, 
and  determined  to  bestow  on  it  a  loving  perusal  and  a  careful 
judgment.  .  .  .  The  value  of  the  book  is  so  great  that 
merely  to  read  it  is  an  education  in  philosophy." 

From  Der  deutsche  Pionier  of  Cincinnati. 

"  So  blieben  die  Sachen  stehen  bis  vor  ungefähr  einem  Jahr- 
zent  als  zu  gleicher  Zeit  in  England  und  in  America  dem  Studium 
deutscher  Philosophie  ein  neuer  bisher  unerreichter  Aufschwung 
gegeben  ward  :  in  England  geschah  diess  namentlich  durch 
J,  Hutchison  Stirling." 

From  the  Troy  [U.S.A.)  Daily  Press. 
"Dr.  James  Hutchison  Stirling,  the  newest  and  deepest 
thinker  of  Great  Britain,  has  for  the  first  time  reproduced 
German  philosophy,  with  sufficient  insight  and  culture  to  render 
it  thoroughly  intelligible.  Dr.  Stirling  has  not  only  proved 
that  such  men  as  Kant  and  Hegel  understood  themselves,  but  he 
has  duly  scalped  the  quacks  who  have  met  transcendentalism 
with  sneers  instead  of  brains." 

From  Letter  of  Prof.  Rosenkranz  to  Joum.  Sp.  Phil. 
"In  an  article,  'Theism  and  Pantheism,'  you  have,  in  speak- 
ing of  Hegel,  adopted  an  interpretation  of  his  system  to  which 
I  adhere,  and  which  is  also  represented  on  the  part  of  the 
English  by  Dr.  Stirling  (*  Secret  of  Hegel ').  Hegel  not  only 
does  not  deny  God,  freedom,  and  immortality,  but  he  teaches 
them  as  the  highest  consequences  of  his  speculation.  He  rejects 
atheism  and  pantheism  in  the  clearest  words.  Freedom  is  the 
soul  of  his  ethical  view  of  the  world.  In  regard  to  immortality 
he  has  nowhere  propounded  a  credo  in  catechism  form  j  but  the 
manner  in  which  he  expresses  himself  in  his  'Philosophy  of 
Religion,'  in  treating  of  the  Egyptian  religion,  can  surely  leave 
no  doubt  on  the  subject." 


6 


IL 

In  Svo,  Price  5a, 

SIE    WILLIAM    HAMILTON; 

BEING  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PEKCEPTION. 

AN  ANALYSIS. 

From  the  Scotsman. 

"Mr.  Stirling  has  published  a  separate  thin  volume,  justifying 
his  hostile  criticisms  by  details,  and  dealing  altogether  a  blow 
to  the  reputation  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  perception 
more  ponderous  than  that  dealt  by  Mr.  Mill  j  for  it  is  a  blow 
struck  from  a  higher  altitude,  and  directed  by  au  eye  that  com- 
mands a  wider  range  than  Mr.  Mill's. 

From  the  Aberdeen  Journal. 

"  Mr.  Stirling's  works  in  exposition  of  the  Hegelian  philoso- 
phy stamped  him  as  a  writer  of  the  first  rank  on  philosopical 
subjects.  .  .  .  We  unreservedly  give  Mr.  Stirling  high 
praise  as  a  controversialist ;  he  had  already  earned  his  laurels 
as  an  expositor  in  the  field  of  philosophy.  His  vision  is  large, 
clear,  and  minute ;  and  as  a  mental  anatomiät,  he  cuts  neatly, 
cleanly,  and  to  the  core." 

From  the  Glasgow  Herald. 

"  We  place  a  very  high  value  upon  this  analysis.  It  shows 
that  the  author  writes  from  fulness  of  knowledge,  and  after  a 
careful  thought ;  and  it  also  exhibits  ingenuity,  dexterity,  clear 
decided  convictions,  and  vigorous  expression." 

From  the  Guardian, 

"  It  is  the  genuine  product  of  a  peculiar  mind  which  is  really 
original  and  thoughtful." 

From  the  Edinburgh  Courant. 
"  His  knowledge  of  metaphysical  subjects  is  plainly  thorough 
and  extensive  ;  and  his  book,  as  it  stands,  will  very  well  reward 
the  attention  of  the  student." 


I 


From  the  Westminster  Review. 
"  There  could  not  be  a  more  vigorous  and  damaging  onslaught 
on  Hamiltonianism  than  that  of  Mr.  Stirling— the  more  damag- 
ing, because  we  have  here  the  result  of  an  unprejudiced  ex- 
amination  of  the  writings  of  that  celebrated  logician." 

From  the  London  Review. 
"The  author  of  this  second  volume  under  notice,  bears  a 
name  that  stands  high  in  the  list  of  modern  philosophical 
writers.  Mr.  Stirling's  'Secret  of  Hegel,'  which  was  noticed  in 
our  columns  some  time  back,  stamped  the  writer  at  once  as  a 
man  of  profound  thought,  wide  erudition,  and  great  independ- 
ence of  view.  ...  As  we  might  expect  from  a  critic  of  Mr. 
Stirling's  subtlety,  earnestness,  and  self-reliance,  the  scrutiny  is 
very  close  and  unsparing,  and  we  must  say  that  Hamilton's 
reputation  comes  out  of  the  trial  considerably  damaged." 

From  the  British  Controvei'sialist. 

"This  is  the  work  of  a  man  who  is  emphatically  a  thinker. 
James  Hutchison  Stirling  has  written  a  treatise  on  '  The  Secret 
of  Hegel  '—which,  we  regret  to  say,  we  have  not  read.    There  is, 
however,  in  this  harsh-spoken,  trenchant,  and  incisive  critique, 
proof  enough  of  ability  to  give  new,  fresh,  vigorous  thought  to 
the  problems  of  philosophy.     The  vision  and  the  insight  of  the 
man  is  acute  and  accurate.     The  argument  against  Sir  William 
Hamilton's  tenets  is  put  in  a  more   telling  form  than  it  has 
been  presented  by  its  author's  '  more  distinguished  contemporary, 
Mr.  Mill ; '  and  as  it  is  less  discursive,  it  is  more  cogent.     The 
eye  with  which  Mr.  Stirling  has  perused  the  scattered  writings 
of  Hamilton  has  been  lynx-like  in  its  fault-seeing.    The  selective 
faculty  which  culled  the  pertinent  extracts  to  which  he  refers 
as  embodying  the  distinct  utterances  of  the  doctrine  of  Hamilton, 
has  been  choicely  gifted  with  a  sleuth-hound's  infallibility  of 
pursuit  and  seizure,  despite  of  all  dodges  and  evasions.     The 
logical  power  by  which  comparisons  have  been  made  between 
passage  and  passage,   thought  and   thought,   is   cultured   and 
sharpened  to  the  finest;    while  the  language  employed  in  the 
discussion  is  terse,  animated,  varied,  well  arranged,  and  most 
effectively  put  together.     It  would  be  difficult  indeed  to  mistake 
the  signification  of  any  sentence  in  the  book.     Without  being 


8 

8o  pedantically  scholastic,  it  is  as  translucent  as  Hamilton's. 
The  grasp  of  his  mind  is  tense,  the  heat  of  his  passion  intense, 
and  the  language  in  which  he  expresses  both  is  sententious, 
graphic,  and  precise." 


III. 

In  8i70,  Price  2*. 


AS  REGARDS    PROTOPLASM; 

SECOND   COMPLETED   EDITION. 

F^'om  the  Journal  of  Speculative  Pldlosophy. 

"  The  preface  is  an  annihilating  reply  to  the  last  rejoinder  of 
Mr.  Huxley.  Indeed  the  pamphlet  as  a  whole  is  one  of  the 
most  powerful  polemics  ever  written." 

From  the  Athenaeum. 


u 


Clearly  and  forcibly  written,  it  is  distinguished  by  a  fairness 
of  statement  and  a  moderation  of  tone  which  are  rare  in  contro- 
versies of  this  sort.  If  Professor  Huxley  intended  in  his  essay 
to  propound  a  complete  theory  of  the  physical  basis  of  life,  the 
honours  of  the  controversy  must  be  adjudged  to  Dr.  Stirling." 

Frmn  "Nature"  {Br.  Bastian). 

"When  one  of  the  most  powerful  representatives  of  the 
transcendental  school  of  philosophy,  himself  possessing  a  know- 
ledge of  biological  science,  consents  to  do  battle  against  the 
modem  doctrines  concerning  life  and  its  assumed  material  sub- 
stratum, protoplasm,  we  may  expect,  at  least,  that  the  strongest 
arguments  which  can  be  adduced  will  be  brought  to  bear  against 
the  obnoxious  theories  and  their  supposed  materialistic  tenden- 
cies. Still  more  especially  must  we  prepare  ourselves  for  battle 
ä  outtnnce  when  the  champion  that  steps  forward  is  one  who 


MillliillM^ 


9 

has  already  grappled  so  manfully  with  the  *  Secret  of  Hegel,' 
and  is  otherwise  so  distinguished  a  leader  amongst  the  adverse 
school  of  thinkers." 

From  the  Watchword, 

"  We  have  space  for  nothing  more  than  a  sentence  to  accord 
to  this  splendid  tractate  the  tribute  of  our  highest  admiration. 
It  meets  the  materialism  of  Huxley  at  every  point,  and  at  every 
point  confutes  it  by  the  clearest  demonstrations,  and  by  a 
wonderful  surplus  of  overwhelming  argument,  at  once  in  phy- 
siology, chemistry,  logic,  and  metaphysics." 

From  the  Courant. 

"  We  may  just  say  that  Dr.  Gamgee,  as  well  as  Dr.  Beale, 
bears  most  emphatic  testimony  to  the  completeness  and  success 
of  Dr.  Hutchison  Stirling's  argument  with  Mr.  Huxley." 

From  "  Force  and  Matter,"  by  Prof.  Arthur  Gamgee. 

"  To  enter  into  a  complete  discussion  of  the  whole  argument 
would  extend  far  beyond  the  limits  of  this  lecture,  and  would 
serve  no  useful  purpose,  more  particularly  after  the  very  able 
and  exhaustive  essay  in  which  one  of  the  leading  thinkers  in 
Europe — Dr.  Hutchison  Stirling — has  treated  the  subject." 

From  "Protoplasm,"  by  Dr.  Scale. 

"Since  the  first  edition  of  this  work  was  published,  Mr. 
Huxley's  essay  on  the  *  Physical  Basis  of  Life '  has  been  sub- 
mitted to  a  very  just  but  clear  and  searching  philosophical 
criticism  by  Mr.  James  Hutchison  Stirling,  of  Edinburgh,  whose 
excellent  treatise  I  very  strongly  recommend  my  readers  care- 
fully to  study.  I  should  have  taken  from  it  many  extracts,  but 
the  work  is  easUy  obtained,  and  readers  should  see  it  in  a  com- 
plete form." 


From  "  Systematic  Theology,"  by  Dr.  Bodge,  of  Princeton. 

"  This  is  considered  to  be  the  best  refutation  of  the  theory  of 
the  correlation  of  physical  and  vital  force." 


liiiliill i|iiiiiiiii]|iii||iiiiii 


>i*iiiiiii!i II iiiiiiiiiiiii. ■liiiiiiii 


From  Dr.  John  Drown, 

"  Thanks  very  much  for  the  knowledge  and  comfort  your  '  As 
Ilegards'  haa  given  me— it  is  lion's  marrow,  and  disposes  of 
Huxley  and  his  protoplasm  once  for  all" 

From  '*  As  regards  Protoplasm/*  6y  Dr.  Hugh  Martin, 

"  The  Edinburgh  press  has  reason  to  be  proud  of  producing 
the  overwhelming  exposure  which  Hutchison  Stirling's  splendid 
and  masterly  reply  contains.  .  .  .  While  students  of  physio- 
logy will  find  in  Stirling's  '  As  regards  Protoplasm '  a  much 
more  complete  discussion  of  the  physiological  question  than 
Huxley  has  supplied,  those  interested  in  the  higher  philosophy 
and  natural  theology  will  find  in  it  a  power  of  analysis,  a 
cogency  and  conclusiveness  of  reasoning,  a  completeness  of  treat- 
ment, and  an  occasional  beauty  in  the  line  of  the  severe  and 
higher  eloquence,  which  will  lead  them  to  deal  with  it  as  a  charm- 
ing study  rather  than  as  something  to  be  merely  perused." 

From  "Fallacies  of  Darwinism/*  by  Dr.  Bree. 

"  It  is  impossible  to  read  auch  clear  logical  reasoning  as  this 
without  pleasure.  .  .  .  Mr.  Huxley's  lecture  upon  Protoplasm 
has  been  dealt  with,  unanswerably  and  unanswered,  by  Dr. 
StirHng." 

From  the  Dublin  Review, 

" '  As  regards  Protoplasm '  brims  over  with  fact  and  reason- 
ing, and  is  at  the  same  time  lightly  and  agreeably  written. " 

From  Sir  John  Ilerschcl, 

"  Anything  more  complete  and  final  in  the  way  of  refutation 
than  this  essay,  I  cannot  well  imagine." 


iiii|iiil|iiiiin|iiyi 


lllil||||iii|l|l||||l|<ii 


IT 


iriliilf^^ 


11 


IV. 

In  Svo,  Price  6s. 
LECTURES  ON  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LAW. 

TOGETHER  WITH 

WHEWELL  AND  HEGEL,  AND  HEGEL  AND 
REV.  W.  R.  SMITH  : 

A  Vindication  in  a  Physico-Mathematical  Regard. 

From  the  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy. 

"  TTie  first  of  these  lectures  is  a  very  entertaining  *  Introduc- 
tion to  Philosophy  in  general,'  and  the  others  unfold,  step  by 
step,  in  a  style  such  as  only  Dr.  Stirling  can  write,  the  ideas  of 
rights  in  general,  of  property,  of  criminal  jurisprudence.  They 
furnish  an  exceedingly  valuable  contribution  to  philosophical 
literature,  and  should  be  largely  read  in  America,  now  that 
80  much  thought  is  directed  towards  the  foundation-ideas  cf 
government." 

From  the  Journal  of  Mental  Science. 

"  These  admirable  lectures  upon  the  Philosophy  of  Law  are 
not  given  to  the  public  for  the  first  time  in  the  present  volume. 
Originally  delivered  before  the  Juridical  Society  of  Edinburgh, 
they  were  published  in  the  *  Journal  of  Jurisprudence '  in  the 
fomr  first  months  of  the  current  year.  From  thence  they  passed 
into  the  pages  of  the  *  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,'  and 
are  at  the  present  time,  we  have  reason  to  believe,  being  re- 
printed in  book  form  in  St.  Louis,  Missouri.  ...  It  is  satisfac- 
tory to  find  one  work  which  is  really  valuable,  highly  thought 
of — to  find  that  a  book,  which  is  in  every  way  admirable,  has  a 
real  marketable  value,  and  has  found  favour  in  the  eyes  of  pub- 
lishers both  in  this  country  and  in  America.  .  .  .  Further,  in 
the  work  before  us  Dr.  Stirling  '  falls  foul '  of  Whewell,  and 
shows  not  only  his  ignorance  of  German,  but  his  incapacity  for 


12 

the  criticism  of  Hegel,  which  he  so  gratuitously  undertook  ;  and, 
at  the  same  time,  he  deals  summarily  with  Mr.  W.  R.  Smith, 
who  thought  to  prove  that  Hegel  had  attempted  to  *  establish 
the  calculus  on  a  new  and  very  inadequate  basis.'  ...  As  against 
Whewell,  he  is  vindicating  Hegel  against  a  mistaken  belief  that 
the  great  German  had  really  tried  to  throw  discredit  upon  New- 
ton's law  of  gravitation,  and  on  the  mathematical  proof  of 
Kepler's  laws  in  the  'Principia;'  and  that,  as  correcting  the 
errors  of  Mr.  W.  R.  Smith,  he  is  vindicating  the  metaphysical 
position  of  Hegel  in  reference  to  the  calculus,  and  that  every- 
where and  always  he  is  simply  'philosophical.  .  .  .  The  mistake 
which  has  been  made  by  Whewell,  Smith,  and  the  rest  is  just 
this  :  Hegel  never  did  profess  to  find  fault  with  any  one  received 
physical  principle  ;  he  neither  thought  of  substituting  a  mathe- 
matical proof  of  Kepler's  laws  for  that  which  had  been  offered 
by  Newton,  nor  did  he  think  of  attempting  to  establish  a  calculus 
upon  a  new  basis.  .  .  ,  His  work  was  not  with  physics  as 
physics,  but  with  metaphysics  as  such.  ,  ,  ,  His  objections  are 
never  mathematical,  always  metaphysical.  .  .  .  The  incom- 
petence of  such  men  as  Whewell  and  Suiith  to  deal  with  the 
questions  which  Hegel  had  in  hand  to  answer  is  remarkable,  and 
is  pointed  out  with  much  skill  and  intense  force  of  reason  and 
expression  in  these  most  able  vindications.  No  vindications 
could  be  more  satisfactory. 

"...  We  may  say  that  one  of  Dr.  Stirling's  greatest  merits 
is  his  admirable  power  of  statement  of  creeds.  Nothing  could 
be  better  than  his  statement  of  the  contents  of  Kant,  contained 
in  his  article  in  the  October  number  of  the  '  Fortnightly  Review ' 
('Kant  refuted  by  dint  of  muscle ').  Here,  in  the  first  of  these 
lectures  upon  the  philosophy  of  law,  we  have  equally  good  ac- 
counts of  Kant  and  Hegel  in  their  relation  to  each  other.  These 
statements,  which  only  extend  over  a  couple  of  pages,  are  the 
rich  results  of  years  of  labour.  ...  In  no  relation  does  the  con- 
sciousness of  Dr.  Stirling's  power  force  itself  more  resolutely 
upon  us  than  in  connection  with  these  pithy  expressions.  .  .  . 
Hence  we  have  that  marvellous  system,  which  is  so  admirably 
rendered  by  Dr.  Stirling  in  these  lectures  into  the  most  compact 
and  crowded  English.  .  .  .  One  thing  we  wonder  at,  and  that 
is  how  Dr.  Stirling  has  been  able  to  convey  so  much  in  so  little. 
.  .  .  We  fear  that  we  have  done  but  scant  justice  to  Dr.  Stir- 


13 

ling's  very  admirable  work  which  lies  before  us.  .  ^  .  We  hope 
that  we  have  said  enough  to  convince  our  readers  that  this  work 
is  worthy  of  the  most  careful  attention  and  untiring  study.  .  .  . 
We  must  here  quit  the  subject  with  an  expression  of  our  deep 
sense  of  indebtedness  to  Dr.  Stirling  for  work  which  he  alone  in 
this  country,  nay,  even  in  Germany  itself,  was  capable  of  doing. 
That  it  has  been  done  with  care,  with  thorough  metaphysical 
ability,  and  with  genius,  we  are  happy  to  be  able  to  report,  as 
we  were  previously  prepared  to  expect.  Dr.  Stirling  is  our 
greatest — almost  our  only  great  metaphysician." 

Tekf/raphed  to  Scotsman  by  its  London  Correspondent. 

"  Dr.  Hutchison  Stirling's  new  work  was  published  to-day.  .  . . 
This  chapter,  though  a  short  one,  is  very  incisive.  .  .  .  Each 
point  of  attack  is  taken  up  successively,  and  vigorously  assailed. 
.  .  .  Here  the  renowned  Hegelian  philosopher  appears  in  his 
might,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  lays  about  him  is  indicative 
of  the  intellectual  giant  in  the  world  of  metaphysics." 


LONDON:  LONGMANS  &  CO.,   Paternoster  Row. 


V. 


ADDRESS  ON   MATERIALISM. 


From  the  Newcastle  Chronicle. 

"The  students  of  philosophy  who  are  familiar  with  that 
profound  work.  The  Secret  of  Hegel,  will  be  pleased  with  a 
brochure  just  issued  by  Blackwood  &  Sons,  being  an  Address 
to  Medical  Students  on  *  Materialism,'  etc.  It  contains,  be- 
sides much  beautiful  writing,  one  of  the  most  acute  and  power- 
ful assaults  upon  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  of  *  Natural  Seleo 
tion'  which  has  yet  been  published." 

2  N 


»'■■■Ill .l|l!HHIWIIIIIH^IIII.ll 


VI. 

Eirjhih  Edition,  Crown  8ro,  Price  6«. 

SCHWEGLER'S  HANDBOOK  OF  THE 
HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

From  the  London  Review. 

"  Those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  other  works  of  Dr.  Stirling 
\i  ill  be  disposed  to  congratulate  Schwegler  on  falling  into  such 
good  hands.  It  will  be  difficult  to  mention  any  one  in  England 
so  well  versed  in  the  philosophy  of  Germany,  from  Leibnitz  to 
Hegel,  as  the  translator  of  tliis  Handbook.  Dr.  Stirling  is  also 
a  man  of  independent  thought,  fearless  judgment,  and  a  meta- 
physical appetite,  that  enjoys  with  the  keenest  relish  the  heavy 
and  somewhat  unpalatable  systems  of  German  speculation.  The 
subtleties  of  thought  and  expression  in  which  Berlin  professors 
delight  are  quite  to  our  translator's  taste.  ...  It  would  be  hard 
to  praise  the  Handbook  too  highly,  and  we  hope  to  hear  that 
within  a  short  period  it  has  taken  the  place  of  Lewes  and 
Renouvier  in  the  hands  of  our  young  philosophical  student." 

From  the  Glasgow  Daily  Herald, 

"  We  should  hardly  call  a  book  of  this  character  here  by  such 
a  modest  name  as  a  *  Handbook,'  because  handbooks,  especially 
handbooks  of  philosophy,  are  generally  of  the  most  meagre  and 
trashy  description.  The  student,  however,  will  find  this  little 
history  of  three  hundred  and  forty  pages  crammed  full  of  infor- 
mation, systematised,  and  clearly  expounded  by  a  mind  that 
took  in  the  whole  range  of  philosophy  at  a  glance.  .  .  .  Dr. 
Stirling,  whom  we  do  not  now  hesitate  to  call  the  ablest 
metaphysical  writer  we  have  in  Scotland,  says  that  to  the 
studeut  of  philosophy  Dr.  Schwegler's  History  is  indispensable  ; 
and  we  believe  he  is  correct.  We  do  not  know  any  other  work 
where  such  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  long  life  of  philosophy, 
from  Thales  to  Hegel,  is  to  be  found." 


iüH»tiiiw|«iiii 


liiillfiiiillpii I||i|iil|i||||pii!«i«ii> 


u 


From  the  Courant 

"  Mr.  Stirling  has  done  good  service  to  the  student  of  philo- 
sophy by  translating  Dr.  Schwegler's  admirable  and  excellent 
little  Handbouk." 

From  the  "Revival  of  Philosophy,^''  by  Dr.  Inghhrj. 
"  Schwegler's  *  Handbook '  is  not  only  indispensable,  but  suffi- 
cient. .  .  .  The  annotations  by  Dr.  Stirling  are  fully  as  im- 
portant as  the  text  of  the  work,  and  are  almost  of  equal  bulk. 
.  .  .  Apart  from  Hegel,  that  splendid  work  {the  '  Secret  of 
Hegel')  affords  the  only  trustworthy  English  commentary  of 
Kant." 

From  "Pedagogics  as  a  System"  by  Professor  Rosenkranz. 
"  The  Germans  are  fortunate,  in  consequence  of  their  philoso- 
phical criticism,  in  the  production  of  better  and  better  text- 
books, among  which  may  be  mentioned  Schwegler's  *  History  of 
Philosophy.' 


I  }t 


From  the  Chronicle. 

"It  is  a  history  of  philosophy  in  the  ordinary  sense,  written 
with  extreme  accuracy  and  clearness,  and  with  wonderful  power 
of  condensation.  Zeller's  *  History  of  Greek  Philosophy '  is  too 
masterly  a  book  to  contain  much  that  is  superfluous :  still  the 
earlier  part  of  Schwegler's  volume  contains  in  substance  nearly 
all  that  is  important  in  Zeller,  except  the  references  and  illus- 
trations. .  .  .  His  translation  abounds  in  vigour  and  liveliness, 
which  is  quite  wanting  in  the  very  imperfect  version  of  Mr. 
Seelye.  Schwegler's  text  does  not  stand  in  much  need  of  anno- 
tation. Still  the  remarks  which  Dr.  Stirling  has  appended  are 
useful  in  bringing  Schwegler's  results  side  by  side  with  the  con- 
clusions of  writers  popular  in  England ;  and  they  may  certainly 
claim  the  merit  of  thorough  insight  into  the  points  at  issue." 

From  the  Oxford  University  Herald. 

"The  circumstances  narrated,  the  facts  reproduced,  the  inci- 
dents compiled,  and  the  conclusions  deduced,  are  suggestive  of 
historical  research  and  descriptive  powers  on  the  part  of  the 
writer  of  a  high  order.  Dr.  Stirling's  translation  and  annotations 
are  a  valuable  addition  to  the  standard  works  of  the  classical 


II» Illll'iililHliillliWIiiipiiifPniifl 


16 

library,  and  our  only  desire  in  speiJcing  cautiously  of  the  work 
is  that  the  talented  translator  may  be  induced  to  reproduce  the 
rendering  of  *  The  History  of  Philosophy  '  in  a  more  elaborate 
form." 

From  the  Aberdeen  Free  Press  and  Buchan  Nctcs. 

"  ITiis  is  a  good  translation  of  an  admirable  book.  .  .  .  Avoid- 
ing the  lengthened  criticisms  in  which  Lewes  frequently  indulges, 
Schwegler  is  able  to  devote  more  space  to  the  historical  and  ex- 
pository part  of  the  subject,  and  consequently,  except  in  the  case 
of  the  English  schools,  liis  delineation  of  the  system  of  any  philo- 
sopher is  generally  fuller  and  more  minute,  and  his  exposition 
more  detailed  than  the  corresponding  one  in  Lewes.  We  might 
point  to  the  account  of  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza  as  a  good  ex- 
ample of  the  author's  singularly  lucid  manner  in  portraying  an 
important  system." 

From  the  Morning  Journal. 

"  Its  careful  and  intelligent  perusal  must  prove  of  very  great 
service  to  any  one  just  entering  upon  the  noblest  of  all  studies. 
.  .  .  This  German  Handbook  deserves  all  the  merit  assimaed  for 
it  by  the  translator,  in  respect  of  its  clearness,  fulness,  and  con- 
nectedness. .  .  .  The  annotations  at  the  close  of  the  volume  by 
the  translator  are  both  elucidatory  and  controversial,  and  throw 
considerable  light  on  the  early  schools  of  philosophy." 

From  the  Saturday  Meview, 

"  Dr.  Hutchison  Stirling  himself  is  neither  a  confused  thinker 
nor  an  obscure  writer.  An  essay  which  he  has  lately  published 
on  De  Quincey  and  Coleridge  shows  an  intelligence  clear  of  all 
fog,  and  a  power  of  direct  and  forcible  exposition. .  .  .  His  account 
of  the  mode,  half -conscious,  half- unconscious,  in  which  Coleridge 
lapsed  into  his  appropriation  of  another's  thoughts  and  words, 
is  a  really  fine  piece  of  pyschological  tracery.  So  in  the  little 
volume  which  is  now  before  us,  Dr.  Stirling  has  appended 
some  fifty  or  sixty  pages  of  annotations,  which,  taken  by  them- 
selves, will  be  found  very  interesting  and  original  reading." 

From  the  British  Quarterly  Review. 
"  Enough  is  done  to  enable  us  to  endorse  Dr.  Stirling's  verdict, 
that  Schwegler's  is  at  once  the  fullest  and  the  shortest,  the 


17 

deepest  and  the  easiest,  the  most  trustworthy  and  the  most 
elegant  compendium  that  exists  in  either  German  or  English." 

From  the  Westminster  Review. 


fCi 


'  Schwegler's  is  the  best  possible  *  Handbook  of  the  History 
of  Philosophy,'  and  there  could  not  possibly  be  a  better  translator 
of  it  than  Mr.  Stirling  :  it  is  rarely,  indeed,  that  a  person  of  such 
qualifications  will  be  good  enough  to  translate." 

From  the  British  Controversialist. 

"This  translation  is  fluent,  readable,  and  thoroughly  English, 
although  it  retains  the  clasp  and  grasp  of  the  original  German. 
.  .  .  The  annotations  as  a  whole  form  a  body  of  powerful  con- 
troversial adversaria  to  the  positive  school  of  speculative  writers." 


VII. 

In  Crown  8vo,  Price  5». 

JERROLD,  TENNYSON,  AND  MACAULAY, 

WITH  OTHER  CRITICAL  ESSAYS. 

From  the  Edinburgh  Courant. 

"  Dr.  Hutchison  Stirling  has  for  some  time  past  been  known 
and  recognised  as  a  thoroughly  matured  and  competent  philo- 
sophical thinker  and  critic,  but  he  has  not  hitherto  come  before 
the  public  as  a  contributor  to  general  literature.  In  the  volume 
before  us,  he  therefore  presents  himself  in  a  new  light ;  and 
although  it  is  true  that  once  a  metaphysician,  always  a  meta- 
pliysician,  and  that  whether  in  criticism  of  politics,  or  history, 
or  poetry,  the  metaphysician,  if  true  to  himself,  must  criticise 
upon  philosophical  principles,  and  after  a  philosophical  method, 
yet,  in  appearing  as  a  popular  essayist,  he  must  exhibit  other, 
and,  if  commoner,  not  less  indispensable,  qualities  ere  he  can 
be  said  to  have  won  his  spurs  in  literature.  The  collection  of 
Essays  here  gathered  together  and  republished,  shows  that  Dr. 
Stirling  is  possessed  of  many  of  these  qualities.  The  writer  who 
can  read  the  Secret  of  Hegel,  also  evidently  possesses  the  recep- 
tivity and  sensitiveness  to  poetic  gifts  and  graces  which  a  critic 


18 

of  poeta  and  poetry  requires.  He  is  full  of  fervour,  and  appre- 
ciative of  the  most  delicate  traceries  which  we  owe  to  the  poet's 
imagination.  .  .  .  The  admirers  of  Tennyson  owe  a  debt  of 
gratitude  to  Dr.  Stirling  for  the  finely  discriminative  and 
thoughtful  criticism  with  which  the  Essay  on  the  Poet-Laureate 
is  replete.  .  .  .  The  essayist  shows  himself  capable  of  judging 
Macaulay's  real  capacities,  which  were  certainly  great,  fairly 
and  without  prejudice  ;  and  we  know  not,  amid  the  multitude  of 
writings  about  the  historian,  where  to  find  anything  that  can 
surpass  this  essay  for  genuine  insight  into  the  heart  of  Macaulay, 
and  for  appreciation  of  his  eminent  gifts.  It  is  a  fine  specimen 
of  philosophical  criticism,  that  seizes  the  inner  principles  of  the 
subject  discussed,  criticising  from  the  heart  outwards,  as  from 
»  centre  to  the  circumference,  and  not  from  the  waistcoat  in- 
wards. .  .  .  We  recommend  this  volume  heartily  as  a  collec- 
tion of  most  able  essays,  full  of  fine  criticism,  distinguished 
by  genuine  philosophical  power,  to  all  our  readers." 

From  the  Edinburgh  Daily  Review, 

"The  graceful  and  perspicuous  writing,  the  refined  poetical 
taste,  the  keen  practical  eye,  the  profoundly  solemn  reverence 
and  simple  faith  which  characterise  these  papers.  ...  It  would 
not  lie  easy  to  choose  between  these  two  in  point  of  mere  interest. 
That  on  Macaulay  is  perhaps  the  more  valuable,  inasmuch  as 
a  fair  estimation  of  Macaulay  is  rarer  at  present  than  a  due 
meed  of  praise  to  Tennyson.  .  .  .  But  tliis  paper  on  Älacaulay 
aspires  to  be  much  more  than  a  mere  stringing  together  neat 
sentences  of  just  criticism.  It  tries — and  the  field,  we  fancy,  is 
virgin  soil — to  take  the  man  as  he  was,  and  to  ask  how  he  came 
to  be  such  :  to  trace  in  him  a  development  of  the  spirit  which 
jjervafles  history.  .  .  .  The  Essay  on  Tennyson  is  in  a  diflferent 
strain.  The  critic  is  not  sunk— far  from  it ;  his  comparisons  of 
our  Laureate  with  Wordsworth,  Shelley,  and  Keats  are  keen-eyed 
and  felicitous  in  the  extreme  j  but  the  devoted  admirer  finds  less 
room  for  his  critical  faculty  to  play.  The  style  changes  with 
the  thought :  it  becomes  more  resonant,  figurative,  and  solemn." 

From  the  Perthshire  Joui-noL 

"This  volume  is  a  book  for  all  with  any  literary  culture  or 
enthusiasm.    Not  one  of  mere  superficial  or  external  criticism, 


I 


"«piii|||j!iilliiii|liiiilti|iiiillli 


iMlM!^^ 


1§ 

but  penetrating,  subtle,  incisive,  it  is  pre-eminently  a  book  of 
ideas,  from  which  no  one  can  rise  without  recognising  that,  while 
he  has  been  wandering  in  the  pleasure-paths  of  easy  literature, 
he  has  at  the  same  time  had  a  compagnon  de  voyage,  who  has 
told  him  many  profound  truths,  and  who  has  left  him  with  his 
intellect  braced  and  sharpened.  .  .  .  The  mind  of  the  powerful, 
far-seeing,  deeply-piercing  critic  is  stamped  on  every  page  of  the 
Essay  on  Macaulay.  .  .  .  The  Essay  on  Tennyson  is  dictated  by 
a  spirit  of  intense  admiration  and  love — not  the  less  finely  critical, 
however,  for  that.  .  .  .  Dr.  Stirling's  portraiture  of  Macaulay  is 
wonderfully  true  ;  he  almost  startles  us  by  the  way  in  which  he 
seems  to  see  through  him." 

From  the  Scotsman. 
"  These  essays  are  all  written  in  a  style  so  transparent,  that 
we  do  not  remember  of  a  paragraph  that  seemed  to  demand 
a  second  reading  for  the  sake  of  being  understood,  though 
many  of  them,  for  other  reasons,  did  solicit  more  than  one 
reading.  The  style  is  really  a  clear,  forcible,  often  elegant, 
English  style,  and  is  generally  the  vehicle  of  a  weighty  meaning. 
Dr.  Stirling  has  evidently  tried  to  understand  thoroughly  what 
he  was  to  criticise.  Finding  fault  for  its  own  sake,  or  for  the 
sake  of  mere  smartness,  and  the  pleasure  of  saying  a  biting, 
scornful  thing,  lies  far  out  of  his  way.  Guided  by  a  right,  if 
rather  stem,  moral  purpose,  he  has  done  his  work,  mastering  it 
completely,  even  to  details,  and  never  pretending  to  knowledge 
which  he  has  not  done  his  utmost  to  attain,  and  has  not  attained 
in  so  far  as  severe  industry,  rare  logical  acuteness,  and  a  ready, 
capacious  memory  for  details,  have  rendered  attainment  possible. 
Without  a  very  remarkable  memory,  he  could  not  have  dropped 
into  their  proper  places  such  apt  quotations,  and  cited  regularly 
facts  and  principles  so  pertinent  to  the  purposes  of  illustration, 
collation,  and  contradiction.  He  keeps,  for  the  most  part,  a  firm 
hold  of  principles — as  it  was  to  be  expected  a  writer  of  his  great 
philosophic  powers  and  proclivities  would  do — but  he  certainly 
works  in  about  them  a  sort  of  mosaic  of  nicely  adjusted  illustra- 
tive or  ornamental  details,  which,  to  most  reflective  readers,  will 
eeem  both  curious  and  surprising.  .  .  .  The  Essay  on  Tennyson 
is  a  criticism  of  the  works  of  this  greatest  of  living  poets,  con- 
ceived in  a  spirit  of  intense  sympathy  and  warm  appreciation  J 


inililW^^^^ illiili 


20 

and,  to  the  beet  of  our  knowledge  and  belief,  no  estimate  ha« 
yet  appeared  bo  exhaustive,  so  just,  and  at  the  same  time  so  high, 
of  the  productions  of  Alfred  Tennyson's  geniua" 

From  the  Eocaminer. 

"The  first  essay  is  a  pleasing  tribute  to  the  memory  of  frank, 
generous,  kindly  Douglas  Jerrold,  than  whom  it  would  be 
difficult  to  find  a  man  whose  loss  was  more  regretted  by  his 
friends  of  the  literary  guild.  Dr.  Stirlmg's  estimate  of  Douglas 
Jerrold's  writings  is,  we  think,  a  correct  one.  .  .  .  There  is  a 
k)gical  accuracy  and  a  clearness  of  diction  in  the  style  of  Dr. 
Stirling  which  many  of  our  essayists  would  do  well  to  imitate. " 


VIII. 


In  Crown  8vo,  Pi-ice  Qs. 

BUENS   IN   DEAMA. 

TOOBTHEB  WITH 

SAVED    LEAVES. 

Prom  the  Liverpool  Mercury. 

"The  dramatic  sketch  of  Bums  is  a  powerful  piece  of  writ- 
ing, thoroughly  uniijue  of  its  kind  in  the  English  language,  and 
managed  throughout  with  the  highest  literary  skill.  The  Scotch 
especially,  as  introduced  in  the  different  scenes,  is  perfect." 

From  the  Aberdeen  Daily  Free  Press. 

"  A  vein  of  broad  humour  runs  through  much  of  the  dialogue^ 
and  the  resources  of  the  vernacular  dialect  are  used  to  gwKl 
purpose,  while  in  his  use  of  incident  as  well  as  of  language,  the 
author  exhibits  much  skill  in  the  production  of  picturesque 
effects.  .  .  .  This  *  drama '  certainly  displays  a  variety  of 
powers  of  a  very  high  order  on  the  part  of  its  w^riter." 


21 


From  the  Liverpool  Weekly  Albion. 
"  The  first  and  largest  piece,  which  gives  its  name  to  the  book, 
is  a  careful  study  of  the  character  of  Burns.  ...  A  note  at 
the  end  sketches  the  principal  traits  of  the  man,  with  an  insight 
which  makes  it  well  worth  the  attention  of  all  the  lovers  of  the 
poet." 

From  the  Athencüum. 

"  It  is  a  powerful  study  of  character.  .  .  .  Some  of  these 
(Saved  Leaves),  like  Ogrebabe,  the  Body-Snatcher,  are  very 
grim." 

From  the  Galloway  Gazette. 

"Some  of  the  productions  are  remarkable  for  their  origin- 
ality, thought,  and  gracefulness  of  expression.  '  The  Ballad 
of  Merla,'  *  Belshazzar's  Feast,'  'Venetian  Madeline,'  'The 
Sleeping  Beauty,'  all  stamp  the  author  as  a  talented  and 
original  writer." 

From  the  Dumfries  Courier. 

"Poetic  feeling  is  manifested  everywhere.  .  .  .  The 
Welsh  articles  are  interesting,  the  social  articles  reveal  a  keen 
eye  and  a  manly  tone,  and  the  story  of  the  dissecting-room  is 
sensational  enough  to  satisfy  even  a  palled  appetite." 

From  the  British  QuaHerly  Review. 

"  Mr.  Stirling  takes  up  the  great  Scotch  poet,  and  unfolds  to 
us  the  phases  of  his  character  through  the  medium  of  a  play. 
.  .  .  Powerfully  and  graphically  painted." 


From  the  Dundee  Advei'tiser. 

"  This  racy  and  refreshing  little  volume.     . 
some  exquisite  papers." 


containing 


From  the  Northei'u  Ensifjn. 

"  Here  the  man  lives  before  us ;  the  life  becomes  articulate. 
This  sketch  presents  by  much  the  best  idea  of  the  personality  of 
Burns  with  which  we  are  acquainted,  because  its  dramatic  form 
gives  at  once  what  is  most  deep  and  versatile  in  the  nature  of 
the  man,  and  the  true  aroma  and  atmosphere  of  his  outward 
life.     The  character  of  ]^>urns  himself,  his  joviality  and  fits  of 


22 

melanclioly,  his  heart-bumingp  and  haughty  indifference,  his 
tenderness  and  devil-may-care,  shine  out  before  us  along  with 
his  associates  of  twenty  years,  his  patrons  and  cronies,  his  butts 
and  bores,  Ainslie  and  Rankine,  Jean  and  Luath,  the  impres- 
sive Hornbook,  the  insufferable  Blair.      Nor  could  anything 
more  exactly  express  the  nature  of  the  man  on  its  serious  side 
tlian  the  words  put  into  his  mouth,—'  I  dare  sin,  but  I  dare  not 
lie  J '  or  on  the  other  side  the  words  (when  his  wife  has  sung 
'  My  Nannie,  O'),  *Ay,  ye  may  weel  clap  your  hands,  Ainslie. 
A  finer  singer — or  a  finer  song — weel,  we'll  no  praise  oursels.' 
Trust  one  canny  Scotchman  to  find  out  in  another  that  affecta- 
tion of  being  vain,  which  is  three  parts  affectation  and  one  part 
real  vanity.      The  author's   faculty  is  unique  for  insinuating 
himself  into  these   half -conscious   moods,    and   turning  them 
mside  out  j  all  of  which  is  much  helped,  and  often  suggested,  by 
his  strong  sense  of  humour.     ...     In  *  Sleeping  Beauty '  we 
have  another  phase  of  the  same  fact,  the  Spirit  of  Grace,  like 
the  moonlight  in  Turner's   *  Dudley,'  struggling  with  the  des- 
potism of  trade,  and  the  influence  of  modem  competition,  cant, 
and  rascality.     The  moral  purpose  of  the  volume  is  at  its  high- 
est  in  this  noble  prose  poem.     But  we  have  a  quaint  variety  of 
it  in  the  article  on  ladies'  full  dress,  which  is  a  delightful  union 
of  dexterous  argument  with  sound  sense.     In  point  of  general, 
literary  merit,  the  book  is  superior  to  anything  Dr.  Stirling  has 
published.     The  most  perfect  in  form  and  most  original  of  the 
poetical  pieces  are  the  *  Universal  Strike '  and   *  I  am  That  I 
am,'  which  we  take  to  be  the  most  luminous  piece  of  metaphy- 
sical poetry  in  existence.    *  Venetian  Madeline  '  and  Belshazzar's 
Feast'  are  rich  in  Venetian  colour  and  Oriental  sumptuous- 
ness.    But  all  have  a  poetical  individuality,  and  an  imagina- 
tive grasp  which  enables  us  to  indorse  the  opinion  expressed 
of  the  author's  first  prose  work,  that  his  powers  in  this  direc- 
tion were  sufficient  '  to  stock  an  aviary  of  popular  poets.'  " 

Post  Card  from  W.  T.  Harris,  LL.I).,  Editor  of  The  Western, 
of  the  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  Superintendent 
of  Public  Schools,  etc.,  St.  Louis. 

"Oct.  29,  1878.— I  read  through  Burns  m  Drama,  night 
before  last,  beginning  it  at  9  p.m.,  and  finishing  it  at  4  a.m., 
reading  slowly  and   making  references  to  the  Cyclopcedia  and 


to  my  copy  of  Bums  as  I  went  along.  I  was  intensely  inter- 
ested in  it.  It  beats  any  biography,  or  even  Carlyle's  famous 
Essay  on  Burns.     I  am  writing  a  notice  of  the  book  to-night" 

From  the  Rev.  Joseph  Taylor  Goodsir. 

"  I  quite  agree  with  W.  T.  H.  in  his  conclusions.  Having 
read  Carlyle's  essay  again  on  purpose,  I  have  no  hesitation  in 
saying  that  there  is  all  the  difference  between  his  representation 
and  yours  that  there  is  between  a  plain  daguerrotype  and  a  first- 
rate  stereoscopic  view.  The  details,  too,  are  admirable  ;  ex  gr., 
the  duel  between  the  'High  Kirk  Orator  and  the  Poet.'" 

^rom  Dr.  William  Veitch,  Author  of  the  Clarendon  Press 
Treatise  on  the  Greek  Verb. 

"  I  rejoice  that  there  is  *  a  Scot  abroad,'  Tcal  ^vverbg  xou 
ffu)(p2üjv.  It  would  be  humane  and  patriotic  to  subscribe  a  trifle 
to  send  a  few  of  our  little  big  men  to  the  New  Country  to  relume 
'  the  sacred  fire.' " 


From  the  Journcd  of  Speculative  Philosophy. 

"  This  small  volume,  from  the  distinguished  author  of  *  Tlie 
Secret  of  Hegel,'  will  prove  of  unusual  interest  to  those  who 
have  read  his  philosophical  writings.  His  intense,  fiery  style, 
his  profound  absorption  in  his  theme,  his  amazing  gifts  at  de- 
scription of  subtle  psychological  processes,  rendered  his  book 
on  Hegel  what  the  Germans  call  an  *  epoch-making '  one.  He 
seizes  the  reader's  attention  from  the  start,  and  holds  it  by  his 
power  to  throw  the  interest  of  personal  adventure  into  his  por- 
trayal of  the  struggles  and  disappointments  incident  to  discover- 
ing the  thought  of  a  great  philosopher.  ...  Dr.  Stirling  is 
certainly  the  most  successful  of  philosophers  in  his  literary  pre- 
sentation of  the  steps  of  philosophic  experience.  This  has  been 
realised  by  a  multitude  of  old  and  of  young  who  have  read  his 
books.  These  persons  will  welcome  the  *  Saved  Leaves '  as  a 
desired  completion  to  the  biography  of  a  true  man,  who  has 
laboured,  with  no  mean  success,  to  become  man — the  generic 
type,  to  realise  his  race.  .  .  .  Most  of  the  scenes  of  the  first 
three  acts  would  make  a  lively  impression  on  the  stage.  The 
fourth  and  fifth  acts  follow  the  life  of  Burns  into  richer,  nobler 


.l»i|l^plpil[ll|i|illl!lllll 


24 

developments,  but  which  cannot  be  presented  with  adequate 
stage  effects  because  of  their  intemality.  .  .  .  The  characters 
are  portrayed  in  a  few  masterly  strokes,  showing  the  very 
essence  of  their  humanity.  ...  No  essay  on  Burns,  or  biography 
of  him,  gives  such  vivid  pictures  of  the  man  as  does  this  '  drama.' " 

From  Patrick  Proctor  Alexander ^  Esq.^  M.A.,  author  of  "  Moral 
Causation,"  "MiU  and  Carlyle"  "Life  of  Alexander  Smithy''  d:c. 

"  As  to  the  bleaching-green  scene,  I  have  no  doubt  it  was 
pretty  well  just  that  that  did  take  place," 


From  J.  Scot  Bendason,  Esq.,  of  "  Globe  "  and  "  World,"  dfcc,  dbc. 

*'I  do  not  think,  in  all  the  innumerable  contributions  to 
Bums  literature,  I  ever  met  anything  that  is  at  once  so  truth- 
fully characteristic,  so  pre-Eaphaelitically  realistic,  so  to  speak, 
and  yet  so  discriminative  of  the  best  ideal  tendencies  of  the 
man  and  poet  both.  You  have  lived  yourself  into  his  central 
individuality— if  I  may  say  so.  .  .  .  This  notice  is  to  the 
point,  and  expresses  what  I  felt  most  strongly  about  the  Burns 
— you  have  restored  to  us  the  very  personality  of  the  man." 


From  Mr.  Cupples, 


u 


'  Bums  in  Drama  *  is,  beyond  question  and  opinion,  masterly 
--a  first-rate  piece  of  work.  It  is  thorough  poetical  representa- 
tion— sets  the  man  there — enters  into  him  and  all  his  surround- 
ings. Wilson,  to  my  mind,  is  better  than  Carlyle  on  the  subject. 
But  you  do,  I  think,  in  far  less  space  and  few  words,  what  he 
does  with  much  oratory — and,  besides  that,  you  give  what  no 
one  else  ho  ^  given,  to  me  at  all  events ;  you  reproduce  and  re- 
present, and  also  give  touches  that  are  absolutely  clairvoyant 
In  Bums's  case  these  have  a  peculiar  value,  for  to  understand 
and  appreciate  him,  personality  is  first,  indispensable,  essential 
'Sleeping  Beauty'  is  exquisitely  well  done  ;  it  reminds  me  of 
Shelley  when  he  ia  at  his  beat.     .     .    .     The  descriptive  touches 


I"  f igMiiipi'iiiiiiigi »iiiiiiiii|i!!ii' 


liiiiHiiiiiiniliiilflliliiililllllnMilllliiliiii» 


25 

throughout  the  volume  are  often  exquisite,  always  indicative  of 
unusually  accurate  observation  as  regards  Nature,  still  more  so 
where  any  human  concern  is  involved,  e.g.,  '  there  are  men  work- 
ing on  a  hull ;  you  see  the  hammer  fall — soundless — but  with  an 
echo,' as  'the  steamer'  passes  with  this  one  hearer  amidst  a 
babbling  crowd  of  Glasgoio  Down-the-vxitcr.  The  pictures  of 
Wales  are  uncommonly  full  of  such  graphic  touches.  .  .  . 
•  Ogrebabe '  is  a  very  powerful  sketch,  but  not  pleasant  to  read 
of  a  night.  The  allegorical,  or  rather  the  symbolical  and  hiero- 
glyphic force  of  meaning  in  *  Aihai, '  and  in  the  various  poems, 
is  of  a  quality  that  places  them  far  above  mere  off-hand  estimate 
by  journalists." 

From  the  late  Douglas  Jerrold. 

"  I  was  very  much  struck  vdth  the  peculiar  freshness  and 
vigour  of  your  first  paper  (the  Novelist,  etc.) ;  it  had  thought 
and  sinew  in  it." 


From  January  Searle,  author  of  "Life  of  Ebenczer  Elliot,"  Ac,  d:c. 

"It  is  a  graceless  oflSce,  however,  to  find  fault,  especially 
where  there  is  so  much  to  admire.  I  think  the  reader  will 
agree  with  me  that  *  Merla '  is  full  of  nature  and  beauty,  and 
that  it  is  woven  in  the  woof  of  genius  and  poetry.  It  contains 
sea-pictures  and  sea- voices,  such  as  one  does  not  often  find  in 
literature." 

From  the  late  George  Gilfdlan. 

"  I  am  reading  your  *  Leaves'  with  continued  interest :  'Ariel* 
is  a  piece  of  genuine  poetic  beauty." 


Edinburgh  :  OLIVER  axd  BOYD. 


26 


EXTEACTS  FROM  GENERAL  TESTIMONIALS,  &a 


From  Professor  Zeller,  of  Berlin, 

"  AU  tbat  I  have  read  of  the  philosophical  writings  of  Mr. 
James  Hutchison  StirHng  has  convinced  me  that  their  author 
is  distinguished  not  only  by  a  comprehensive  and  thorough 
knowledge  of  ancient  and  modem  philosophy,  but  also  by  L 
accurate  understanding  and  appreciation  of  its  import  and 
history,  as  weU  as  by  a  clear,  animated,  aud  universally  intelli- 
gible  style  in  the  statement  of  it." 

From  Professor  Erdmann,  of  Halle, 

"  That  his  knowledge  of  phüosophy  as  a  whole  is  not  restricted 
to  Kant  and  Hegel,  has  been  demonstrated  by  him  in  the  anno- 
tations  with  which  he  has  adorned  his  translation  of  Schwegler's 
*  Handbook'  .  .  .  Every  word  that  seems  not  to  breathe 
the  greatest  esteem  for  StirKng  ia  wrongly  read,  and  must  bo 
replaced  by  another  at  choice," 

From  the  late  Professor  Ueherweg,  of  Königsberg, 

"Through  my  colleague,  Rosenkranz,  who  bears  you  in  mind 
with  great  recognition,  I  became  acquainted  with  the  first  edition 
of  your  translation  of  the  introduction-generally  acknowledged 
to  be  exceUent  in  its  kind-~by  which  Schwegler,  too  early  lost 
to  us  by  a  premature  death,  rendered  an  inestimable  service  to 
the  study  of  the  history  of  philosophy.  The  speedy  demand  for 
a  second  edition  testifies  to  the  approbation  which  this  useful 
book  finds  in  your  country  also.  The  completion  of  the  notes 
m  your  second  edition  enhances  the  interest  of  the  work 
It  affords  me,  too.  great  satisfaction  to  see  a  system  so  complet^ 

"^J    .     u  V^^^l  '^'^"^  "^  ^^^^'  °^^«  by  you  more  acces- 
mble  to  the  English  mind." 


27 


From  Professor  Fosenkranz,  of  Königsberg. 

"James  Hutchison  Stirling,  LL.D.,  marks  an  important 
turning-point  in  the  history  of  English  philosophy.  Provided 
with  that  most  solid  knowledge  which  only  the  study  of  positive 
science  can  supply,  he  has  made  himself  master,  at  the  same 
time,  and  in  a  rare  degree,  of  all  the  speculative  problems  of  the 
deepest  thinkers.  It  would  be  exceedingly  one-sided  to  call  him 
an  Hegelian,  for  the  simple  reason  that  he  has,  with  less  pre- 
judice, more  clearly  and  more  deeply  comprehended,  and  more 
luminously  expounded,  the  worth  and  the  warrant  of  the  He- 
gelian philosophy  than  has  hitherto  been  accomplished  in  Eng- 
land. Stirling  nowhere  belies  the  true  English  spirit  that  is 
directed  to  reality  and  fact.  In  his  celebrated  work,  *The 
Secret  of  Hegel,'  he  makes  it  prominent  in  this  respect,  there- 
fore, that,  not  the  abstract,  but  the  *  concrete  universal'  con- 
stitutes the  principle  of  his  speculation.  And  in  this,  too,  is  he 
equally  national,  that  with  free  mastery  of  the  object,  he  can 
dispense  with  the  scholastic  form,  which,  at  the  same  time,  he 
perfectly  well  knows  how  to  handle,  and  can  illustrate  the 
boldest  thoughts  with  brilliancy  and  humour.  His  vi"-orou3 
polemic  against  Hamilton  is  a  remarkable  example  of  the 
higher  criticism,  which,  with  the  advantage  of  his  universal 
standpoint,  he  is  enabled  to  exercise.  Instead  of  translating 
Schwegler's  'History  of  Philosophy,'  its  excellence  of  execu- 
tion notwithstanding,  he  might  have  done  as  well,  and  perhaps 
still  better,  had  he  given  us  his  own  composition;  as  is  evi- 
denced by  the  ample  critical  annotations  which  he  has  added 
to  this  useful  work." 


Fivm  Ralph  Waldo  Emerstm,  Esq. 

"I  have  never  seen  any  modern  British  book  (refers  to 
*  Secret  of  Hegel ')  which  appears  to  mQ  to  show  such  com- 
petence  to  analyse  the  most  abstruse  problems  of  the  science 
and,  much  more,  such  singular  vigour  and  breadth  of  view  in 
treating  the  matter  in  relation  to  literature  and  humanity.  It 
exhibits  a  general  power  of  dealing  with  the  subject,  which,  I 


/ 


\y^^ 


1 


\ 


Hill II Ilil!lllll!l!llllll|.lll|p^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Illlimi 


think,  must  compel  the  attention  of  readers  in  proportion  to 
their  strength  and  subtlety.  One  of  the  high  merits  of  the 
book  is  its  healthy  moral  perceptions.  ...  If  there  can 
be  any  question  when  such  an  incumbent  can  be  found,  I  shall 
be  glad  to  believe  that  Intellectual  and  Moral  Science  is  richer 

in  masters  than  I  have  had  opportunity  to  know 

Schwegler  came  at  last.  I  found  on  trial  that  I  too  could 
read  it,  and  with  growing  appetite.  I  could  at  least  appreciate 
well  enough  the  insight  and  sovereignty  of  the  annotations,  and 
the  consummate  address  with  which  the  contemporary  critics 
and  contestants  are  disposed  of  with  perfect  comity,  yet  with 
eflFect  .  .  .  The  essays  I  have  carefully  read.  The  analysis 
of  Macaulay  is  excellent.  The  '  Coleridge '  painful,  though,  I 
fear,  irrefutable.  .  .  .  The  'Tennyson'  is  a  magnificent 
statue— the  first  adequate  work  of  its  kind — his  real  traits  and 
superiorities  rightly  shown.  ...  I  never  lose  the  hope  that 
you  will  come  to  us  at  no  distant  day,  and  be  our  king  in 
philosophy." 

Prom  Thomas  Carlyle,  Esq. 

"  To  whatever  I  have  said  of  you  already,  therefore,  I  now 
volunteer  to  add,  that  I  think  you  not  only  the  one  man  in 
Britain  capable  of  bringing  Metaphysical  Philosophy,  in  the 
ultimate,  German  or  European,  and  highest  actual  form  of  it, 
distinctly  home  to  the  understanding  of  British  men  who  wish 
to  understand  it,  but  that  I  notice  in  you  further,  on  the  moral 
side,  a  sound  strength  of  intellectual  discernment,  a  noble  valour 
and  reverence  of  mind,  which  seems  to  me  to  mark  you  out  as 
the  man  capable  of  doing  us  the  highest  service  in  etliical 
science  too ;  that  of  restoring,  or  of  decisively  beginning  to 
restore,  the  Doctrine  of  Morals  to  what  I  must  ever  reckon  its 
one  true  and  everlasting  basis  (namely,  the  divine  or  supra- 
sensual  one),  and  thus  of  victoriously  reconciling  and  rendering 
identical  the  latest  dictates  of  modern  science  with  the  earliest 
dawnings  of  wisdom  among  the  race  of  men.  This  is  truly  my 
opini(jö." 


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